 Good morning, good afternoon and good evening, depending on where you're joining us from today. My name is Oge on a ballroom, and I'm the director of the West Africa program at the US Institute of Peace. Thank you for joining us for this conversation on Guinea, which is part of a US IP series exploring the surge in coups around the world. In September 2021, the military in Guinea Conakry took over following President Alpha con base on popular constitutional change to secure a third term in office. Today, we will explore the role of the economic community of West African states echo us and other regional buddies such as the African Union, and the international community. We will also reflect on the several possible pathways that could be followed to return Guinea to constitutional order. To help us explore all these questions today and more we are joined today by an excellent group of experts. Ibrahim in the end is the regional advocacy manager with the open society Institute, West Africa, based in Dakar, Senegal. Dr Joseph Segal is the director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington DC. Dr Christopher Munoz is the senior associate and regional director for Central and West Africa at the National Democratic Institute also in Washington DC. And Alexis are a specialist in African affairs at the US Congressional Research Services. For our general audience, I encourage you all today to please join the conversation on Twitter using the hashtag, why all the coups. Let's get into the conversation and Ibrahim I will start with you first. It's been almost three months since the coup in Guinea, and the general outlook in the country still seems very uncertain. Can you bring us up to speed on where things are in the country today. What does the current situation look like, Ibrahim. Okay, it's been now three months since the transition started in Guinea with the military coup and the transitional government is in place with a civilian prime minister and women and men of integrity holding key ministerial positions in the government. We still do not have a very clear timetable with indicators and dates for the review of the voters list, the organization of the elections, and the constitution building process. And despite the echo us sanctions, we are really observing positive developments indicating that the new Guinea and authorities are making efforts to rebuild the relationship with the regional organization, and also the international community. And maybe echo us will consider this during the December 12 summit in reviewing its engagement strategy in Indian. So the recent developments I am referring to are the transfer of President Condé to his wife's residents. So technically, his situation has improved from being detained at an unknown place to being under house arrest. The establishment of a court to fight financial and economic crimes. In French, it's the court, a la cour de répression, des infractions, economic and financier. An audit of the civil servants registry which led to 6,300 people being sent on retirement and various high ranking military officers being sent on retirement as well. The new Guinea authorities have also authorized former heads of states in exile. Musadadis Kamara and the sekuva corner to travel back to Guinea. And this is seen by many as assigned to promote national reconciliation and the consultation and application process for the establishment of the national transitional council, which is supposed to be the legislative body of the transition is almost complete. And the transitional body will be in place before the end of this month. So we really hope that the National Transition Council will be established by the end of the month, and that the timetable for the completion of the transition will be made public by the end of January 2022. The transitional government and institutions will really need technical support to conduct an inclusive and participatory constitution building process, investigate and litigate on economic crimes while respecting the rights of all parties, build a new clean voter register based on a new population census and establish a coherent and inclusive national reconciliation process. So I will just share these initial remarks for now. And I look forward to the conversation. Thank you very much. Thank you very much Ibrahim. It seems a lot has happened in the last three months almost three months. So I'm going to turn over now to Joseph Segal and Joseph military coups in Africa, basically have a terrible track record for the well being of citizens, you know, in the case of Guinea, we saw a lot of citizens, mostly young people take to the streets in support of the military after the recent coup. Guinea and have experienced military rule before, and they know the consequences can be dangerous. So clearly there is a need to support support an urgent civilian transition, but the question is how best to do this. Maybe when the military in the current military junta in Guinea seems to enjoy a lot of popular support. Thank you. Okay. I think this idea of popular support is an important one to talk about. Because in the case of Guinea and often other accusers in Africa. There is often a, you know, some very deep seeded grievances towards the previous administration. And in the case of Guinea. There was a lot of opposition to Alpha Conte's bit to retain power for a third term, there had been massive protest against that, and many felt that he had taken unconstitutional actions to stay in power and was growing and increasingly authoritarian. So when there was the coup in September, but there was some relief and, you know, and some sense of hope that this would end, you know, a prolonged tenure for Quendey and office. At the same time, I think that to be careful about calling the coup a popular, you know, a popular act. Many of the opposition leaders, you know, while while criticizing Quendey denounced the means of using the military to try to change the order of country. As you noted, many citizens in Guinea are well familiar with the abuses of military government. Indeed, you know, Guinea is one of the poorest countries in Africa, one of the most corrupt countries in Africa, because of its many decades of military and authoritarian rule. I think there's a lot of trepidation about an ongoing military government in Guinea. You know, more fundamentally is the question of, you know, how should change come about. You know, there are in any country there are problems. And in Guinea, you know, there are serious problems. The question is how do you change. And the problem of legitimating and tolerating a military intervention is that it effectively creates an extra legal process. For political change. And once you start down that road, it's a very slippery slope. You know, what's to say what's legal and what's not legal. What is the process of transition who sets the norms for what a new trans traditional order will be in place. Now what basis are they doing it what legitimacy do they claim. And I think that's really the problem because if we tolerate this if we recognize the authority of a crew leader, then what's to stop another lieutenant colonel from stepping and say well they're not happy with the way things are going. And therefore they have the right to change the government. Surely there will be a few people come on the streets and support that too. And that's the way that we want to normalize the process of change in Guinea or in any African country. Thank you so much, Joe, definitely really wonderful insights there so I'm going to turn over to Dr Chris for money you're still following on that thread, and the overview that Ibrahim are provided as well. So we see that echo us has suspended Guinea imposed individual sanctions on the military gender, and they've also called for elections within six months. However, there's growing concern about the credibility of African regional buddies such as echo us and the African Union, because it seems that they are tough on cruise, but a little relaxed on the issues that cause the cruise in the first month. So, Chris, this this question here is for you. How feasible is it for Guinea to conduct elections in six months. And what should echo us and the African Union be doing now during this period of fragile transition to support Guinea and citizens to build the type of inclusive democracy that the country deserves. Well, thank you very much. Okay, for those questions. And let me let me start with the last point, because I think when we talk about Guinea. There is the track record about the people of Guinea and their aspirations for freedom for liberties for democracy that sometimes get overlooked. But let's remember let's keep in mind that Guinea was the first colony in 1958 to vote against to go against the goal of France to say they wanted their independence. And at the time in 1958 the guinean said, we would rather be a poor country, but be independent and have our freedom than be a colony under France. And that was a very brave decision. And as I look at the politics and the history of Guinea, even in the last five or six decades, I see a constant determination on the part of the guinean people to have their freedom and their rights respected. And to aspire to be governed democratically. That's why the successive military regimes that have occurred or come to power in Guinea have not been able to sustain themselves. Whether it was General Lassana Conte, we had people demonstrating and asking for democracy, or that this camera, or even general Theruba who facilitated the transition and the return to civilian rule in 2010. Now with regards to the timelines that has been debated now between the junta and echo us. Of course, echo is aspects or stated publicly in the declaration made by the heads of states that they wanted elections in six months. But the junta has said on its own part that it wants the transitional legislative body that Abraham referred to the same day to be the one to determine the duration of the transition. I mean this is a very sticky point, because nobody wants the military to become so comfortable that they find ways to prolong their stay. We've seen countries as big as Nigeria that had a one year transition when general Ibrahim, when general Abu Bakr, Abdul Salami, managed the transition from 1998 to 1999 in Nigeria. He stated he wanted a one year transition and it worked. So, we've seen other countries that are going to 18 months, but I faulted along the way. So I think the important thing is going to be to have a timeline that's workable. And that would allow the various pillars, especially with regards to the new constitution and new elections to be conducted in an inclusive manner to kind of lay the foundation for the next phase of guineas democratization process. Obviously, this presents a lot of challenges for a course for the African Union, because you're right, they have come under a lot of criticism from the guineas, and I think a course is being tested in terms of its commitment to its own protocols. Fortunately, we are in the 20th year and echo us this month of December will be celebrating the 20th anniversary of the additional protocols that were adopted in 2001 to strengthen and reinforce democracy and good elections across the sub region. And I think that echo us is mindful of the fact that if it falters on Guinea, it's going to open the Pandora's box to what could be a contingent effect, because we've seen the military get back into politics in Mali. We've now seen it in Guinea. We see it in neighboring Chad. We see it in Sudan. And it's a concern, not just in West Africa but across the continent, that if our regional organizations are not firm in the way in which the stand up to the military, but also in the way in which we are going to autocratic regimes, the country could see a lot of its democratic gains reversed, and that would be a very negative trend that we all have to stand up against. Thank you. Thank you very much, Chris. And I will continue on those points that you made and I will call an Alexis. Now, and Alexis, you know, beyond the statements from the international community, condemning the coup in Guinea. And the US in specific responded to the coup. You know, what's the broader state of play of congressional efforts in response to the coup in Guinea and just the shocking rising coups that we see in general. Are there opportunities for the US to engage during this period of fragile transition in Guinea. Okay, so, starting with Guinea in response to the recent military coup there, the US government has called for a restoration of democracy and respect for the rule of law in the State Department's phrasing and encouraged a national dialogue to address political conditions that presaged the coup, and also expressed support for ECOWAS mediation efforts. On the assistance side, you know, Guinea is a recipient of US foreign assistance, not a top recipient in Africa, but, you know, a sizable recipient there is a USAID mission and other forms of aid, and pursuant to section 708 in annual foreign aid appropriations laws, the US government has suspended certain other certain types of aid to the government of Guinea after the coup this year. There are legislative exceptions for democracy promotion, humanitarian assistance and certain other types of aid, including there's a precedent for considering life saving health assistance to be a form of humanitarian aid, for example. And as you've probably seen in in the news, COVID vaccine deliveries have continued from the United States, for example, the administration has made it very clear that these are not contingent on policy conditions. The US has also provided health system strengthening assistance to Guinea, including in prior years related to Ebola surveillance and response efforts. And there is some precedent for exempting governance support to local versus central government entities, although this has not been publicly detailed. In general, the administration has not publicly released a detailed account of the impact of these aid restrictions, but generally these primarily concerned military aid, including the nascent counterterrorism assistance that we've seen in Guinea in recent years. During the coup, there was a focus on this counterterrorism cooperation because of a video that circulated on social media and eventually got picked up in the international press that showed US military personnel returning to Conakry during the coup from a base nearby where they were conducting training with partner forces. So that military assistance generally is primarily affected and usually suspended or terminated after an application of this provision in foreign aid law. In addition and separately, the president issued a notice recently of his intent to suspend Guinea's eligibility for unilateral trade benefits under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act for Guinea starting next year. And here the president cited a lack of continual progress toward establishing the protection of the rule of law and of political pluralism. Now this is a reference to a set of democracy and governance benchmarks written into the law that authorizes a go as a program. And so in that same communication, the president also notified his intent to suspend a go of benefits for Mali, for example. Similarly in a parent connection with the coup in Mali or the coups plural in Mali, and also citing concerns about international humanitarian law presumably a reference to alleged violations of human rights by Malian security forces. There are additional tools at the US disposal, including visa restrictions which were applied in 2009 against members of the junta in power at that time in Guinea. And of course other forms of targeted sanctions but there have been no public announcements at this time that these tools are being used, presumably they remain on the table, depending on how the situation evolves in Guinea. In addition, the next year's defense authorization bill as passed in the house would require the executive branch to report on US security assistance to Mali, Guinea and Chad. Reflecting congressional concern with US security cooperation with African countries where military forces have gone on to seize political power. And I would just note in, in addition that the United States government had had expressed significant and high level concern with political developments in Guinea prior to the coup, including at the level of then secretary of state Mike Pompeo in 2019 and 2020 and repeated statements of concern from State Department officials about the conduct of last year's elections both the constitutional referendum and the presidential election that that led to President Pompeo being sworn in for a controversial third term. So the US had publicly and at a very high level stated concerns with that progress with that process and with political trends more generally including political detainees in Guinea. To your broader question about US tools responding to this trend, sort of wave of military seizures of power in the region. Some of these tools are already at play in other countries so Mali is also under this same aid restriction as Guinea under section 7008 pertaining to countries where the military has seized power through a coup. And there are similar discussions I think about additional tools like sanctions and other types of restrictions. It's a broader conversation and I think it's a it's a moving target but I look forward to going more into detail perhaps later in the discussion. Thank you very much Alexis and thank you, you know, Ibrahim and Chris for laying this, this, this picture this overview of the current situation and also helping to explore some of the possible pathways to move the conversation forward. I think from all of your presentations we've established that the failure of both echo us and the international community to support or proactively support democratic processes when President Alpha Condé was seeking a third term in large part contributed to what led to the current coup in Guinea. So we're having this conversation on Guinea today against the backdrop of the rise in military coups. Not only in the region and amid the Biden administration summit for democracy as well. So, I'm going to go around to each of you depending on where you sit and from your vantage point, what type of advice would you give for engagement in Africa, especially in the context of Guinea and in the region. What advice would you give as the Biden administration commits to revitalizing global democracy. I'm going to start with Ibrahim. Yeah, thanks. Okay, so just some, you know, some quick, you know, advice. The first one is obviously to, you know, help with national dialogue processes, because I guess the situation in Guinea to the one in Mali and I think now we are being more, you know, will work from the people to, to have internal dialogues to, you know, be in a position where they can find solutions to their own problems in respect obviously, you know, of international legal instruments and conventions etc. So, promoting national dialogues and really listening to, to these stakeholders in country and trying to understand, you know, where they are coming from, and how they really want to, you know, get out of these situations. One thing is to really support, you know, long term processes and longer term reforms, because, for instance, the problem in Guinea has a very, you know, deep root cause which is the instability of the Constitution. It's really helping, you know, build solid the Constitution's following inclusive participatory processes, but also help build solid institutions, and especially institutions at the, at the, at the local level, and increase the support to civil society groups, and you know, acting as watchdogs of democracy. I think those groups need youth groups, women's group community based groups need really much more, you know, technical and financial support. And the last, you know, the last piece of advice I can give is to support all the efforts around, you know, electoral reforms. You know, the reform of the voter register and also reform of electoral laws, because many, you know, most of the time, that's where the issue is here in Guinea. So, yeah, those are some advice from where I'm, you know, from where I'm sitting. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ibrahim. I'm going to turn to Joe, if you're there. What advice would you give from where you're sitting from your, from your vantage point? Well, I think there's quite a number of things that can be done to try to reverse the trajectory we've seen a democratic decline, and especially with regards to the the flurry of clues that the Africans experienced the last several years. I would start by saying we need to better incentivize democracy. So, from a positive standpoint, make legitimacy matter. There should be more opportunities, more options for partnership with African democracies and countries that are doing the right thing to try to govern in a way that's participatory and open, transparent. And this is both good for Africa in terms of stability and prosperity, but it's good in terms of a basis for partnership with the United States. And so we need to recognize these are long term partnerships we should be building and try to incentivize and encourage great opportunities for development assistance, financial assistance, debt relief, security assistance. For countries that are doing the right thing. I think the flip side of that is, you know, there need to be cost for governments and leaders who are trying to undermine democratic processes. And this applies to those who are trying to unconstitutionally extend their terms. And indeed this is another problem we've seen 13 leaders in Africa since 2015 extend their terms for their term. And so we're seeing a reversion to these, you know, extended presidencies in Africa, which is, which plays into a whole host of other problems in terms of insecurity corruption and instability more generally. Then, you know, I think specifically when when it comes to coups, we need to be clear that when a coup happens. There shouldn't be a question that there shouldn't be any recognition for the, the junta that emerges from that, you know, and without international recognition. The coup leaders are really isolated. They need international political recognition they need financial support they need to be able to engage with international financial networks. If those aren't accessible to them they really are at a loss in terms of how they can, they can cover. So, I think we need to recognize that there's more leverage on the part of the international community than is often appreciated, and, and, and make sure there are costs. I think part of the decline in democratic standards we've seen is that there has been a recognition within some African leaders that the international community is not upholding the same level of standards. And to do the minimum amount required to be recognized and in the process, retain power and with it, you know, all the disparities in revenue allocation and opportunity and impunity that come with it. Thank you very much, Joe. So we'll turn to Chris and Chris, you know, you've been in the business of democracy strengthening for quite some time so you know that it is long term. So what advice would you give here? Well, you know, in all modesty I probably put on the table a few ideas for consideration, maybe three and ask or encourage them to take a keen look at those. The first point would be that the administration needs to be proactive. In fact, I was I was delighted when, when my co-panelist talked about Secretary Pompeo's, when Alexis talked about Secretary Pompeo's being very blunt and very upfront about the fact that Guinea was on the wrong trajectory. And I was really delighted when he made that announcement, I believe, either early 2020 or so. And I thought to myself, maybe if he had made the announcement in 2019, when we all had a sense that President Conde was going the wrong direction, it probably would have had a greater impact. And I know that in a number of these countries, the US government is knowledgeable or has a way of knowing in advance where the country is headed. And I think it would be useful to share some of that information with the public so that it puts the autocrats or the military in those countries on notice that they're being watched, that the world is watching. So that productivity is something that I would recommend very strongly, especially in the domain of public diplomacy. Secondly, I would recommend that they put some muscle to their declarations, because people have become to some extent, especially in the global south in general, not just in Africa, but in even in Asia and Latin America and other continents. People have become pretty blasé with declarations that are not followed by actions. And we see that the bad actors, whether it's the military, whether it's autocratic regimes, whether it's illiberal forces operating on the African continent, they're very action oriented. And so they do things that undermine democracy, but the pro-democracy elements on the continent, the pro-democracy forces, civil society, political parties, progressive minded legislators very often don't feel that they have the material resources to be able to stand their ground or continue in the actions that they're taking to strengthen and deepen democracy. And so it's important to speak out, my first point, but it's also more important to back up our declarations with other actions. I recognize that, for example, for the democracies summit, this criteria that has been laid out, and not all 49 countries of South South Africa or not all 54 will be attending. There's a select group that's been invited, and that's some recognition and that's good. But I think we need to do more to reward the good guys, but also penalize and punish the bad guys. The third thing I would like to put on the table is the matter of consistency and solidarity in terms of how they engage with various countries. Because now, thanks to technology, the world has become really flat, that people in Mali know how their counterparts in Guinea are being treated. That people in the military in Guinea and in Mali look at what happened in Chad. And so if you give Chad a pass, because you want to please one ally or you're afraid of ruffling the feathers of another country, that when you get to Guinea and you're taking a tough stance, people are going to look at, you know, the people of Guinea are going to say but why, why pick on us, you give everyone else a pass. And so that's going to be need for a lot of consistency in terms of how the administration deals with bad actors on the African continent, and how it rewards the good actors to provide incentives, so that the people who are laying their hands on the line on a daily basis, the civic activists, the lawyers, the women leaders can have room and space to have their voices heard and for democracy to be strengthened and deepened across the continent. Thank you very much Chris, and I'm going to turn it now to Alexis. To say upfront that CRS doesn't give policy recommendations you know we're just analysts so I would make instead just a few observations. One is that it, it has been a challenge I think for us and other international policy actors to distinguish and emphasize the quality of democracy and not just kind of the procedural trappings of regular elections. I think that the US government seeks to do this and you know through USA ID and State Department democracy promotion assistance there's a range of assistance that aims at some of those quality, you know quality metrics, including efforts to strengthen civil society efforts to strengthen as I mentioned local government actors not just central government, not just electoral processes but service delivery, but still I think diplomatically it's it's a challenge and that's really what we see playing out in West Africa, right it's just that right now we have a wave of erosions of formal democracy in the form of military coups, or you know rebel challenges to central governments, but we've had a long standing deterioration in the quality of democracy so that even, you know, we even had democracies like Molly obviously we had to learn this this very hard lesson, multiple times now in the last 10 years, you know, first with the military coup in 2012 that followed a real deterioration in Molly and perceptions of what they were getting out of their democracy under under President ATT. And then, again, last year with the with some popular expressions of support for the coup that overthrew President Keita, you know this this reflected it seems to me a sense among many that democracy was not delivering. And, and not just on economic and social, you know socio economic issues, but also even just on the quality of democracy that nepotism and corruption were undermining the principle of accountability to citizens that lies at the heart of a functioning and undermining true checks and balances. And so we obviously see that in in Guinea, with President Condé's inheritance of an already very institutionally weak state. And then he, you know he often decried that institutional weakness as president, while also also taking full advantage of it, right, but taking full advantage of the lack of a fully empowered parliament. The lack of true political decentralization of the lack of a fully functioning and independent judiciary. So, so again those quality issues are at the fore. Another observation I would have is that us influence at the end of the day is limited and peer to peer influence among African heads of state is very important. And so it's not. It's not an accident, I think that President Condé is bid for a third term coincided with President Watara's bid for a third term under very similar conditions and with a very similar roadmap in Côte d'Ivoire. Because of what's standing in the international community. I think President Condé benefited a bit from being able to sort of move forward in tandem with his peer in that case. And what we've seen in Mali and Guinea is that ECOWAS heads of state are much more forward leaning and inclined toward punitive actions in the wake of military coups that overthrow elected presidents. They are in opposing unconstitutional third terms for other kind of abuses of power or abuses of office by sitting president by sitting civilian presidents. And so that's obviously a challenge that the United States has to acknowledge and be a bit modest maybe about us influence in the absence of that peer to peer influence. To Dr. Fomunia's point about US messaging, I would note that the secretary Pompeo made his first statement about support for democratic transitions of power in Guinea in September 2019 after meeting President Condé. So it did, you know, start US messaging at the very high level did start in 2019 and then there was another statement by Pompeo in early 2020. And as was mentioned, during that same visit to Washington by President Condé, he met with a number of US policymakers and civil society and NGO members. I remember attending a small meeting with him, I believe hosted the Atlantic Council, and he made it, you know, President Condé was fond of saying, I'm the president of Guinea, I'm not the president of human rights watch. Whenever anybody would challenge him. And he said in the meeting that I was in at least in my recollection. You know, I don't care about what US NGOs, or even, you know, presumably US policymakers say about my presidential ambitions. What I care about is the people of Guinea, and the view of other peer African heads of state, you know, he was coming off of his time as chair of the African Union. And so I think it's, it's crucial that that that that the United States seek to work with and build support for some of these norms around term limits, for example, and other democratic norms. In full recognition that African views matter, most foremost, that that's the example that people like President Condé look to and understandably so. And then work also, you know, again that that strengthening of civil society can help get at the point that you know, Guinea and public views matter obviously we all are aware of public opinion polls that show that and we're very much opposed to President Condé's third term bid. So it was a bit spurious of the president to make the point that he did. Thank you very much Alexis, all very wonderful and insightful thoughts that you've provided here. I want to turn it back to the panel again to see if anyone has any closing thoughts or anything that you'd like to put on the table that we may not have already addressed. We've addressed a lot through this conversation. There are a lot of questions that have come up through the discussion. So wondering if there are any final thoughts that anyone would like to share again. Ibrahim. Yes. Thank you again. So I just want to come back to something that was, you know, talked about earlier. And I think this is a very important instrument, which really needs to be updated, or I would even say revised. If you really want to promote democracy, and if you really want a co has to continue playing an important role in the region. I think, you know, in the in the revision process. I know some experts have already been, you know, hired to work on the, you know, on the, on the revision to propose a draft. But I think it's very important to do advocacy. So towards the, the improvement of the protocol, and especially as you know with regards to the sanction regimes in order to, you know, ensure that they will be sanctions for those who will manipulate constitutions in order to run for third terms, as well as those who will come to power, you know, through military coups. It's very important to review that instrument and I'm glad that the processes is underway. But, you know, as it always is the case, I think that there needs to be a push that needs to be, you know, strong advocacy for the protocol to be, you know, very progressive now and for the sanction regime to be, you know, a concrete one that can be implemented. Thank you. Thank you, Abraham. Joe, Chris. Yeah. I like to throw a couple other things. One, just again, stepping back. I would want to reiterate, we need to be careful about how we talk about change. I see in a lot of discussion about coups that there's a quick, you know, assessment of how difficult the conditions are, and that there's corruption or there's unhappiness with the government. And therefore somehow that rationalizes the coup. And I think it's important to keep those concepts separate. Yes, there can be criticisms. There can be valid grievances and genuine concerns about corruption. But that doesn't justify taking extra legal means to replace that government. It doesn't justify a coup. If we're trying to build democratic processes, we need to be talking about what are the ways that you address those grievances through legal constitutional means. You know, how do you empower the domestic reformers? How does the international community get behind those who are advocating for constructive change? You know, any government, any democratic government in the world has its critics that doesn't justify overthrowing them. That's why we have elections. And I love having protests, but there's a free press. So you can channel those, those different points of view through constitutional means. So I think that's a really important point to make that we have to be careful about conflating grievances with justifications for the coup, because coups, again, take you on extra, extra constitutional path, which then really leaves it up to the coup makers to decide how transitions happen and how you get back to a constitutional and legal foundation. And so it's a big step backward. And if I could, I would throw in another consideration. We haven't really talked about, I apologize, less in Guinea than in Sudan and Mali and Tunisia, but that's the role of international or external actors in trying to, excuse me, intervene and manipulate these, these outcomes, these democratic transitions, and in fact, encouraging these countries and, you know, primarily referring to some of the golf actors and Russia. And I think, again, as we're, as we're doing this review of coups in Africa, we need to recognize when, when, when a coup happens and a country's taken off a constitutional path. It would be very vulnerable to outside influences who can then co-opt who leaders who are seeking international recognition and support. And in the process, really compromise sovereignty and the interest of trying to gain that, you know, that external political recognition and financial support. And so, as part of that recognition, I think it's important and incumbent on the international democratic community to call this out, but also to, to work in a more uniform and collaborative way to uphold democratic norms. And really insist on a high threshold for democratic processes. And in that process, when, when, when these things are undermined, when there is a clear violation through a coup, to, to not recognize the junta, to try to work with civilian authorities to re-institute a constitutional path. That's, you know, give more voice, give more leverage to citizens in those countries who are electing the leaders rather than to the external actors who can gain more leverage by working through coup leaders. Thank you very much, Chris. Yes, I will echo one of the points met by Joe and maybe expand on it by saying, you know, this conversation about military course and military interventions in political processes has also to be put in a broader context of some of the security challenges, some of the vulnerabilities that West Africa is facing right now. For example, the, you know, the need to counter violent extremism, that's really eating at the heart of the Sahel, and that's destabilizing the countries in the Sahel, but now also threatening countries along the Atlantic coastline. And the other day about, you know, extremists or Islamist elements killing people in Benin, in northern Benin, we've heard about incursions into northern Côte d'Ivoire. So that's a, that's a major security threat that's looking at countries in West Africa. And you'll be most unfortunate if the security services in countries in that sub region are spending their time focusing on scheming on how to get involved in politics, rather than really carrying out the missions for which they have been institutionalized they have been created. And that would really put a lot of the economic gains, it would really put civilian lives, the security of the population at jeopardy. And so in some ways this is an appeal to the militaries in those countries to say, the purpose of your well-being is to guarantee the safety and security of your compatriots. Stick to your mission and do it well, and that would be an act of patriotism, rather than spend your nights scheming about how to get involved in the political process, because that's not what you trained for. The second thing I would say is, you know, thanks Alexi for reminding us of the date of Secretary Pompeo's announcement, I was looking for it. I knew that it was early, and many of us were very delighted by that. And I should say that, you know, as we discussed Guinea, the US government's messaging on Guinea has been consistent, because having come out in 2019 to make its position clear, very directly to the president at the time, the US earned the credibility to also condemn the coup, and to also work alongside the Guineans to help the country come out of this transition. And what happens, and this is the case for the original bodies, is that if you lose the opportunity to speak out, you also lose the credibility in the eyes of the citizens when things really go wrong. And actually, I know that USAID and other agencies of the US government have done an incredible job in putting resources into what needs to happen in between elections, because we have to keep our eyes on the fact that the decay of democratic institutions and democratic practices tends to happen in between elections, because autocrats know and even military regimes know that around elections, everybody's around, everybody's putting the spotlight on them. They try as much as possible to play the act or to be their best behavior, but once the lights go off with the elections, then they can go into the very bad practices and everybody's gone, everybody's gone, and waiting for the next election. And so what we do in between elections to strengthen political parties to strengthen legislatures so they can be an equal branch of government and exercise oversight over the performance of the executive branch of government. To better advocate for citizens and help the government deliver services to citizens. What we can do to help civil society and create the space for them to be able to do their work and advocate on behalf of citizens without having their heads chopped off, that those things that need to happen in between elections should be prioritized, that's really where the decay begins to happen. And then the last thing that I would say for for echo was, is that I'm really hoping that going into this 20th anniversary celebration, the heads of states of the sub region are thinking through the path that has been traveled so far, where they've stumbled and what needs to be done going forward, because we have to remember that in 2015, echo was came very close to adopting a resolution that would have limited every president in the sub region to not more than two presidential terms. In fact, 13 of the 15 presidents of the echo sub region were favorable to that kind of resolution. Unfortunately, that effort in 2015 was torpedoed by just two presidents. Given what is transpired between 2015 and now I'm hoping that the presidents have learned their lesson. They've realized that they have a stake in this and don't want to put up set of themselves to become targets of assassinations or course, and that they will do the right thing, not just for themselves, and their countries, but also for future generations. I think we have to, as friends as as partners, work side by side with them with civil society political parties in the region to make sure that some of these actions that undermine democratic processes can be proactively dealt with and preempted. And that efforts to strengthen and deepen democracy that come with all of the gains of accountability and transparency and space for citizens to participate in how they're governed that those positive attributes could be able to bring that very, you know, commendable and very resource worthy very rich sub sub region of the continent. Thank you very much Chris for that very compelling message. So Alexis before I bring us to a close, do you have some final closing thoughts that you would like to add here as well. I don't have much to add to the excellent points made by my fellow panelists and by you. I would just as we're having this conversation. My thoughts are turning to friends and loved ones who live in Conakry. The Indians have had to live through just unimaginable hardships and challenges over the recent decades, you know, starting but not even ending with regional wars at the country's doorstep, the Ebola outbreak, less than, you know, 10 years ago, continuing deep economic hardships attributable to the COVID pandemic and other factors. And some of the people I know in, in Guinea are cautiously optimistic about what can be achieved now, even though they're fully cognizant and lived through, you know, the dangers and abuses of prior periods of military rule in Guinea so even though as a, as an analyst I feel very concerned and skeptical about the hunters intentions and what they can achieve and what they even hope to achieve. And yet I have to, you know, I have to hope that my, that my, that those who I know in Guinea who are cautiously optimistic that they're correct and that I'm wrong. So that's where I would, I would close today. Thank you so much Alexis and thank you everyone for a very rich conversation. I think from this discussion we've established that there are some possible pathways to move forward in Guinea, some more obvious than others. But there are possible pathways to explore to help Guinea during this period of fragile transition to move back to constitutional order. So I really want to thank all our panelists today, Ibrahim, Joe, Chris, Alexis, thank you for all your wonderful input in this discussion. And for those who are joining us online I encourage you to continue the discussion using the hashtag on Twitter, why all the coos, and look forward to continuing this discussion with everyone. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you.