 It's one of the cliches of talking about China to invoke the events of 1793 and the ambassadorial visit of Lord McCartney to Peking for an entirely unsatisfactory encounter with the Emperor Qinglong, one of the three great emperors of the Manchu dynasty, and in the 58th year of Qinglong's record-breaking rule, Qinglong pronounced in response to the blandishments of the British ambassador famously that, quote, the products of our empire are abundant and there's nothing we do not have. So we never have needed trade with foreign countries to give us anything we lacked. That said, he said the tea, porcelain and silk that the world wanted from China was there for you who so pathetically and desperately needed and that's really that. McCartney then went for three months over land along canals and rivers and over mountains, wouldn't any of us envy him that journey of seeing imperial China for three months? He was angry and incredulous that the Chinese couldn't understand that, quote, a couple of English frigates would be an overmatch for the whole naval forces of this tottering empire. He thought the empire so praised by Voltaire as a model government was facing a revolution from its Han subjects against what he called their Tata, what we would call their Manchu rulers. Well, the story has been told many times. Every comprehensive history about China in the West features the story of Lord McCartney and his encounter with Qinglong. I want to recommend a book though by Stephen R. Platt, Imperial Twilight, The Opium War and the end of China's last golden age published this year and I opened with this for many reasons. I like recommending books. I wrote a book of book recommendations called My Reading Life but this is a truly elegant history and it reminds me of how indebted so many of us are to American scholarship about China and I say this knowing that the air is heavy with a certain McCarthyist odor at this time and that at any moment I could be denounced for praising scholarship on China and not in its direction could bring a stern indictment. But second, recommending Platt's book is a reminder of a time when China was antiseptically closed, when foreigners could not get in there, its borders were sealed and for Australians this is a pre-echo of 1971 when Gough Whitlam went to China, again I trespass on cliche because there's not a labour spokesperson or leader who speaks about Australia and China who won't talk about Whitlam's visit as opposition leader in 1971 but it wasn't antiseptically closed China, every bit as closed as that of the Manchu China of 1793 and Whitlam shot off a telegram from our Parliament House addressed to Joe Enlai, Beijing and improbably received a reply and was off in a flash, there's no there's no embassy here of course and it was a far fetched and high-risk political investment to say I will go and and encounter communist China. Later when Whitlam recognised China he used language which I'm indebted to Stephen Fitzgerald's beautiful book, another book recommendation from me, Comrade Ambassador, the memoirs of Stephen Fitzgerald, our first ambassador in the People's Republic of China and Fitzgerald records what's known as a post directive, a formal letter of direction and advice from the foreign minister to the head of mission going off to represent Australia and and Whitlam was Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and he gave a directive to Fitzgerald and it used this language and I think it's appropriate, I wish it were chiseled up there for us. Whitlam said to his ambassador we seek a relationship with China quote quote, based on friendship, cooperation and mutual trust comparable with that which we have or seek with other major powers. At that time in 1972 it was a huge strategic, it was a huge leap in strategic thinking, Fitzgerald says, from where we were before December 1972 a leap of the imagination. You couldn't just walk into China and invent a relationship comparable to that we had with Washington, Tokyo, Jakarta but that's what Whitlam wanted and it's noteworthy to me that Whitlam didn't say or didn't think a relationship with China based on friendship, cooperation and mutual trust with a qualification that read only as long as China remains impoverished and in field. Whitlam didn't say we want a relationship a friendship, cooperation and mutual trust with China quote only as long as China promises never to become an economic challenger to the western world. Whitlam didn't say we want a relationship a friendship, cooperation and mutual trust with China only as long as it's entirely satisfactory to our great and powerful ally the United States. It was a leap of the imagination as Fitzgerald says and it envisaged a day implicitly I think when China would enter the community of nations when it might belong to the UN and other institutions when it might even devise some institutions of its own by one estimate there are 22 such institutions in which China is participating and usually the lead member like the AIIB or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Whitlam's words those visionary words contemplate the possibility that China would become a great economic power by 1976 remarkably Fitzgerald as our ambassador living in cramped and difficult circumstances in Beijing was sending a cable back to Canberra contemplating that this impoverished enfeebled China enfeebled by the self inflicted damage of Maoist policies over the previous decade would grow in the vicinity of 10 per cent per annum over a period of 25 years leading to a tenfold increase in GDP in real terms by the close of the century. Our projections assume stability in politics and a commitment to economic reform but most of all assume that China will rediscover for itself the dynamism we've seen in other Asian economies things like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand. Now that was a leap of the imagination by our ambassador appointed by Whitlam. He says that it was greeted with total silence from DFAT what we now call DFAT in Canberra. In fact he assumed that the the loud guffaws of incredulity in Canberra could almost be heard from where he sat in Beijing but it came to pass and one economist from the OECD now from the Brookings Institution argues that no previous industrial revolution not that of Europe beginning with that of the UK and not that of the United States from 1865 the end of the civil war to the start of the start of World War II not that of Japan in the post-war period rivals for scale and speed the industrialization and urbanization that China's achieved since the start of what they refer to reform and opening up in 1979. Let's think about what China's done as a shock. That's the shock of the new. It's a shock to us given the way it's gathered pace in recent years especially and being reflected in China's strategic behavior. It's certainly a shock to what I refer to as the prevailing power and I'll develop that later. James Lawrenson my deputy director Professor James Lawrenson has produced the very useful report Australia Talks China. It discusses a phenomenon that other academics have identified David Goodman for example was the first to use the term China threat appearing in Australian discourse as part this is me talking as part of our shock at the speed and the scale of China's rise. Little like this nothing like this has happened in human history little has come close to it from 1979 until today. Professor Greg McCarthy refers using different language to China angst the notion that our sovereignty is threatened by the rise of China and a third academic Joe Chiang Tong uses this language quote scarcely veiled sinophobia with old fears of the yellow peril unquote. Certainly it's possible to see that in for example Clive Hamilton's assessment that up to 40 percent of Chinese born Australian citizens are quote words from his book ready to take to the streets to express their loyalty to Beijing dash in other words comma to Australia's enemy unquote. 40 percent of Chinese born Australians ready to take to the streets in support of China which he describes as Australia's enemy language no Australian government has used since Billy McMahon. It is reasonable in the face of the shocked response that some Australians have inched to the rapidity and the speed of China's growth when they talk about Chinese students as spies or Chinese tourists as potential spies as a Chinese investment like that in the Port of Darwin as threats to Australian sovereignty Chinese donations to Australian political parties it's a reasonable response for scholars and others to say what is the evidentiary base not an unreasonable question what is the evidentiary base do the headlines and the commentary and the assertions accord with a recognizable identifiable evidentiary base that's what James Lawrence and us in the Acre publication in respect of Hamilton's claims for example it turns out it's a good question to ask the notion that 40 percent of Chinese born Australians are ready to take to the streets in support of Australia's enemy China because his source his evidentiary base he concedes is the view of two unnamed friends that's their assessment all I ask all James asked in the very useful publication in response to heated claims that are made about China its influence on Australia its influence in our region is it's its inclination to build a naval base at Banuatu which is another example of recent commentary is what is the evidentiary base apply that in some cases concern and criticism of Chinese behavior might be entirely justified in others partially justified in others not at all justified by an evidentiary base it's the White House winter 2013 couldn't be more picturesque it's in Vice President Biden's office the furniture Federation era American furniture would have made Paul Keating abandon his taste for the French Museum quality there was an almost theatrical log cracking away in the fireplace and the vice president was practicing his supercharged American charm and no nation in the world no people of world charm with more laser concentration than Americans and no Americans more than Irish Democrat polls now China does not innovate he said to me I remember those words the Chinese don't innovate China perhaps too provocatively I know there are some Chinese who hold this view perhaps too provocatively unveiled its plans made in China 2025 and I've often thought how shocked a Joe Biden would be by what might be seen as the daring aspiration of the China to lead America in these fields I think by the way that one factor in the shock America feels at the speed the concentration concentrated energy the rapidity of China's rise in the last 40 years is that their newspapers do not report China the New York Times for whatever reasons decided the boycott China if they've got a bureau in China and I'm told they have it's sedated it doesn't produce stories about the editor of the paper I want to know why China's not being explained illuminated by its staff I think that's one reason that elements of the American leadership I'm just talking about the Trump administration they don't read the New York Times and has been taken by shock by the emergence of a Chinese middle class by the sophistication of the Chinese economy by the by the the the graph that China is on the China's writing rising and one response to shock at the rise of a country that at least liturgically is communist is to revive Cold War tropes if China is catching up it is because China has stolen our technology for example Pence refers Vice President Pence refers to a ninefold growth in the last 17 years in China and says that is because China has stolen American technology and even more perfectly piece perfectly drafted piece of Cold War nostalgia was in Vice President Pence's speech detecting Chinese communist subversion in American movie studios which to me would create a prima facie case for reinstating the House Un-American Activities Committee calling directors and actors to Washington to be questioned before it and even considering a Hollywood blacklist to remove from the screenwriting fraternity anyone who might be suspected of a sympathy for Chinese communism in fact in his address of October 4th which are Australians need to read our policy makers need to study given to the Hudson Institute the Hudson Institute the vice president accuses China of quote pursuing a comprehensive and coordinated campaign to undermine support for the president and our nation's most cherished ideals this is a mythological interpretation of the country's own history Russia it can be believed destroyed a potential presidency in Hillary Clinton's and China's now setting out to destroy the presidency that was created by Russia and blocked Clinton's the speech is worth a study reading it I'm drawn to Cicero's observation as Caesar approached Rome Cicero said quote this cause lacks nothing this cause lacks nothing but a cause unquote there are to be fair elements in the Pence critique that are valid two examples China's social credit scores and the repressive policies directed at the Uyghur population in Xinjiang any democratic government is going to be drawn because of commitment to its own values to saying to China we want to talk to you about these especially the harsh measures measures applied to Uyghurs in fact it's all together appropriate even using Reagan s language and as part of ideal ideological competition with a non-democratic state for a democratic state to say this is wrong we can't support it because we want to talk to you about it and then to do so from an Australian perspective for example in bilateral meetings and in the international fora that are appropriate to it the Human Rights Council and thirdly in a structure like the Australia-China human rights dialogue where democracies we're true to our values we are entitled to press such concerns there's a second category where I think Pence and his strategy can be engaged with seriously and they lend themselves to hard-nosed economic negotiations in that category I would place American concerns with forced technology transfer and unjustified subsidies to state-owned industries there should be the stuff of economic negotiations and the regular dialogue between China and the US if I were foreign minister today I'd find very little to disagree with in America's language on the South China Sea and in America's insistence on its right in accordance with international law and consistent American practice to run freedom of navigation patrols the trespass within the 12 nautical mile radius of artificial Chinese structures they make a point America's justified in making the point and the language the jewelry bishops used on on the on the South China Sea in general but on American patrols is no different from what I would use where I foreign minister today what however makes the pence speech so important less convincing as a causes ballet is the jumble of less convincing grievances that fill the pages it comprises even the politically convenient location from the speech and I quote what the Russians are doing pales in comparison to what China is doing across the country unquote that's too convenient for an administration that is being investigated by an all-powerful special prosecutor about its links with Russia and the Russian role identified by American security agencies in internal American politics also I'm convincing is the appeal that pence directs to us voters that criticizing china for what he says is their appeal directed to us voters with a single wraparound supplement in the date the moans register or pence's suggestion that china is seducing business with quote the allure of their large marketplace unquote as if the hard heads of wall street can be conned by party bosses into putting their money where it's not going to be profitable profitable but rather serve the purpose of the Chinese Communist Party and also verging on the ludicrous is the suggestion that China's exploiting divisions between federal and local levels of government in America as if as if a constitution drafted by Thomas Jefferson John Adams and James Mason could be undermined by a couple of Confucius institutes in American universities above all pence lamented china quote wants a different us president unquote in fact there's a lot of evidence that china is mass opinion even a lead opinion is rather fond of trump but I presume pence is saying china wants a different us president in contra distinction contra distinction to a united states that has never trespassed on the sacred groves of the internal politics of any other country two influences have fed the pence speech one is a fond american notion that this extraordinary rise of china over the past 40 years the kind of thing imagined by Stephen Fitzgerald and laughed at by his bosses back here in this city when he sent them cables in 1976 the sort of thing that dung shall ping perhaps the great the greatest leader of the 20th century gave effect to certainly the greatest revolutionary leader of the 20th century gave effect to is due only to american help pence says in his speech much of the success that china's enjoyed that is has been driven by us investment the figures show that us investment in china has accounted for less than 120th of total foreign investment flows entering the country in other words us capital has been a marginal source of foreign capital for china and foreign investment has never been worth more than one tenth that's the highest point of total investment in china currently foreign investment accounts for less than three percent of total investment in other words the overwhelming majority of capital for investment in china has been mobilized from domestic sources the same point can be made of trade currently the chinese value added chinese value added in exports to the us account for less than three percent of china's gdp the us has never taken more than one fifth of china's total exports the second american fund american notion that feeds into the pence challenge has been developed by a number of american commentators most seriously by kurd m campbell and elie ratner in their article in foreign affairs reproduced in the economist and that is the notion that the american engagement with china going back to kissinger has always been based on the expectation that china would become quote more like us unquote henry kissinger deserves still to be to be counted the most insightful american observer of china took a different view and i think it's a witty one and a very clever one he talks about american foreign policy becoming increasingly driven by domestic politics well although i'm not sure when that has never been the case he says when pressure on foreign countries appears free of risk there's an increasing scope for legislating american domestic preferences as objectives of foreign policy a revealing example of the new congressional engagement was a comment by representative nancy polosi of california a strong supporter of restrictions on chinese trade when clinton early in his administration i'm quoting from kissinger's book on global order when clinton early in his administration made the granting of most favored nation status to china dependent on chinese demonstrations of progress on human rights within a year nancy polosi rhapsodized quote hopefully at the end of this 12 months if there is freedom of the press in china and the other human rights conditions are met then we can begin to solve some of the other problems that members of congress have unquote kissinger observes nothing illustrates better the collapse of the westphalian notion of non interference from the proposition that freedom of speech in the press which has never existed in china for five millennia of history could be brought about through legislation by the american congress as the initial 12 month installment in a continuing series of unilateral american demands unquote i think that realism is preferred as an interpretation of what might have been the american view of china i'm not sure how deeply americans really believe that china would become quote more like us unquote they're the two things i think the two intellectual underpinnings of the pen speech the the idea like the romantic american notion that no country could have done what china did in the last 40 years without help from america it's a bit of national egotism and america's achievements have been so extraordinary they can be forgiven for needing to believe that and the second the second one is the the the folly that america believed all along from 1971 and the nixon kissinger initiative that china as a result of engagement would be drawn to american standards of quasi democratic practice the implications of the pen speech to bring this to a head should be these for australia's as we work in our relationship with china and the us the october the fourth ruminations of the vice president are not just a gesture towards the midterm elections about to be dispelled by a g2 summit of the american and chinese presidents this is a recasting of us-china relations the most radical the most dramatic since 1971 the recasting this is important is supported across the spectrum of american politics a former american diplomat said to me recently there is now no one in washington who would want to be seen inhabiting the kissinger camp of realism on china no one is an advocate for american china relations the way had once been the case during the 2016 presidential campaign crews and ruby among the republican contenders did not talk about economic warfare against china but rather defended free trade practice trump as a political genius has recast his own party and changed the opposition party now there is a consensus in washington that china must be combated the rise of china must be curved as the president put it quote when i came in we were heading in a certain direction that was going to allow china to be bigger than us in a very short period of time that's not going to happen anymore unquote in that sometimes disarming honesty with which this exceptional president captures his nation's thinking certainly that of his own party that does say at all this is designed to curb china's growth to curb the to disrupt the trajectory that china's on towards rich world third is rich world status by 2030 or soon after and its roots exist in a combative paranoia that occurs from time to time at odds with some of the finer features of american liberal internationalism i i recorded my book which is on sale out there all proceeds going to the kids who are victims of the syrian civil war i urge you to buy it and i'll happily sign it in a chapter on america i opened by by recording bill clinton at a function i hosted in sydney when i was premier it's easy to remember the date it was a couple of days before september 11 sunday night before september 11 that was clinton's first visit to australia since he stepped down as u.s president and um an australian chinese woman came up to him with a book of photos of his administration i remember clinton was very touched by a photo of him and rabbi the former prime minister of israel he looked at it he was quite he became quite distracted by it he said he was a great man he was a friend of mine if he had lived i believe we'd have peace in the middle east and then there was a photo of of clinton with bang xiao ping and clinton said i was just on the side listening to him as he engaged this chinese australian woman he said he said we can be friends with the chinese or words to that effect but i remember clearly his next sentence he said you know there are some people in my country who think america must always have enemies and that stuck with me and i opened my chapter on america by quoting clinton saying that and i remember norman mailer who has privileged to meet on a few occasions the american novelist saying he said the end of the cold war in this country the end of the cold war in america left the air full of iron filings that had been drawn in a sort of unifying hatred at the soviet union but when the soviet union collapsed almost without warning they had nowhere else to go they're looking for a new target i thought that was a vivid novelistic insight but more seriously an academic that some of the older people here jane might recall called oan harry's welsh australian and then quite an influential figure in washington where he is the editor of a journal had a lot of influence on neoponservative opinion although he is more in the kissinger realist school oan harry's read an article in 1997 in prospect magazine talking about america having enemy deprivation syndrome because of its success in the cold war all of a sudden the soviet union had gone they're looking for a new enemy that provided a sense of national cohesion he said and he proves this with some extensive quotations america became very focused on japan as a rival stroke enemy then on china and i remember through through the midst of time i remember an australian-american leadership dialogue with rich armenage um who went on to serve in the bush administration served under colon power um i remember him at this dialogue in sydney 1999 or 2000 saying you are these are going to make a decision there's going to be a war over the taiwan strait and you've got to determine whose side you're on coalition mps as much as labor people were looking at one another with raised eyebrows and and the message from australians as we absorb this from rich rich armenage was uh this is not the way we would frame the tensions in the taiwan strait very interesting to me that alexander downer said that on a visit to china in 2004 would answers being invoked in respect of the taiwan strait and downer said and answered that question i think from an australian journalist uh words of the effect it wouldn't the answers treaty would not oblige us to enter a a conflict between america and china over the status of taiwan it was an untidy backtracking from that form of words by downer but i think america got the message more more interestingly in a way in 2013 the then defense minister david johnson was in japan when he was asked whether answers would apply in respect of a showdown in the east china sea his response was probably not there was no there were no alarms and excursions back in canberra there's no suggestion that he should recast this i think therefore that it's very very likely even in a shuffling embarrassed manner australia will be saying to washington if your vice president's speech of october four is a declaration of economic warfare the unveiling of a new cold war directed at china this is not in australia's interest if you white sitting there i can say uh this is the china choice even more real for us than when tony abbott decided despite barrigabhams request we would make a choice we'd join the asia infrastructure investment bank or when over five years of coalition government under prime minister abbott and prime minister turnbull despite heavy-handed hints from three u.s admirals australia made the decision no doubt taken at a national security committee of cabinet in the city that we would not run patrols that mimicked the american patrols as i said earlier justified defensible in the south china sea 82 of australians according to louis i quoted that report in my article in the financial review yesterday believe china is more of an economic partner than a military threat that figure strikes me as striking even more striking is that that 82 percent reflects a five percent increase in australians who hold that view over the last three years which includes the year or so concentrated china panic we witnessed and which i referred to earlier it seems that australians think that 82 percent australians thinking that china is more economic opportunity than military risk it seems that australians over the decades the decades of china's reform and opening up have accepted the view especially from the time of bob hawk that our economic futures are linked it might be that when hawk went the chinese prime minister in 1984 to mount chanor great iron ore mine and sent a subliminal message that our economic futures are linked this is a guarantor this relationship with china of australian prosperity into the years ahead australians absorbed that message the gap between the american perception of china's continued economic growth and the australian perception i think has been confirmed by the fact that even after this lurid phase of china panic the federal treasurer josh fridenberg can say australia is a trade exposed country we want to see cooler heads prevail or scott morrison can say it's important that us china relations do not become defined by confrontation or to say at some length in the financial review that john howard on china not malcolm turnbull on china is the model that he as prime minister aspires to have quote he used to talk that is how he used to talk about that relationship and not having to choose but just understanding the differences in the nature of both relationships says says our prime minister in the press today as a sovereign nation we're going to have our own views on a range of things but we respect the views absolutely of those who may not share all beliefs with us unquote interestingly i read a report today that john howard has been chosen by scott morrison to attend the australia china dialogue in beijing opposition leader bill shortan addressing lowey was more explicit than he's ever been before about this opening divergence in us and australian views he said quote preemptively framing china as a strategic threat the language pence has used confirmed by all those quotes from his october 4 addressed that i've just shared with you continue shortan isn't a sufficient response to its role and increasing influence in our region these kinds of false binaries take us nowhere we will deal with china respectfully and directly at all times and frankly when necessary we'll speak out when its actions are contrary to our own to our own interests and we would expect china to do the same it's been easy up to now to reject the notion i always have that australia has a role as some kind of mediator or interlocutor between china and the us in that conversation with biden he kept saying as part of the flattery that's instinctive to a irish american politician charming an australian the log fire and the snow coming down outside and that priceless federation era furniture and he kept saying but you australians know so much about china and you australians are the experts in this finally i thought i had to interrupt him and say i actually reflect i actually respect american expertise on china because their relationship with china started when a ship the emperors of india emperors of china set out from new york harbour in 1793 to start trade with china because the monopoly of the east india company which america as a british colony had previously had to respect it was now broken with american independence in 1783 american relationship with china goes back a long way i said at the outset how deeply one must respect american x american scholarly expertise on china and so too on the other side of the equation there's a deep reservoir of good will towards the united states extant in china but right now i don't think it's so naive to think that australia if our diplomacy is mature and confident could play a role if we take up some openings i think we can ask america to for example uh defense secretary mattis on october the 27th said something i think that that is profound he said quote strategic competition does not imply hostility america says the strategic competition between itself and china pince used that language but mattis says that doesn't imply hostility and indeed to be fair to pince in his speech he said quoting america's major strategic document he said quoting the u.s strategic strategy he says quote competition does not always mean hostility unquote i see that as an opportunity for australia given the respect we have in washington and the opportunity we have to engage with the trump administration to invite america to think through the opportunity for nuance in a policy that based on the october 4 speech can easily be portrayed as invitation to cold war we have a right to be to such to talk with such candor to washington and i think in the current setting we have the right to say that the words of the defense secretary are reassuring and like other us allies here we'd be speaking in tandem with japan and american partners india singapore we've got a right to seek more gradation in the expression of policy from the prevailing power toward the rising power i think by the same token this gives us this climate this new climate gives us the opportunity to exert more influence with china for example to press the case for reform and opening up that goes beyond the commitments that president jijin ping gave in davos in april and more recently this month in speech in shanghai this is the time for some confidence and urgency in australia's conversations with both beijing and washington and in partnership with other american friends and partners well ladies and gentlemen i began with a book recommendation steven our plants a counter the forcible opening of china and the decades leading up to the first opening of war can i conclude with one on australian history that's really grabbed my attention it's by an historian called peter cochran and it's called best we forget published by text publishing out this year he settles on a subject that again might be expected to be heavy with cliche it's an account of yes white australia um the racism in our national dna that did more than ensure the immigration restriction act was one of the first pieces of legislation enacted by the new australian parliament in 1901 cochran goes beyond that he says the notion of white australia was so passionately held by our forebears at the turn of the century it fed into a deep insecurity that the notion of this continent for the white man would be lost because of merit because the united kingdom would not defend the notion what alarmed australians more more than the defeat of russia at the hands of japan in their war was britain's naval treaty with japan and the suggestion that in west minster this would count more for britain than the idea of protecting a white australia cochran details the panic yes somehow again the noun seems appropriate in australia 1901 to 1914 that ministers in the british government would let us down and they would force on us force on us a change in our immigration policy that would mean we would be open to asian major phobia was about japanese immigration it's a fascinating account it suggests that one of the reasons we so eagerly entered world war one was that we wanted to demonstrate our indispensability to britain so that britain could never overlook our desire to be protected as a anglo-saxon race bastion william morris hues of course our seventh prime minister ford hard at versi to entrench this notion further a support for our white australia and our desire to be part of an empire that would protect our status as a white australia was a great determining motif in our history argues cochran in what i think is a compelling addition to our historical literature the title of his book best we forget because this is so uncomfortable for us to contemplate given our multicultural character our triumph at multiculturalism yet you know even as we dwell on our our racist origins there comes from our history the most optimistic contradiction and it's about our china relationship and there'll be a little memorial unveiled at port kemba on thursday this week to what happened there in 1938 and i was called by goff wittlum son nick wittlum a few days ago to see if i could track down a chinese diplomat to get him or her to be present because what the community is doing in port kemba is unveiling a memorial to a remarkable thing that happened there if you consider our history as a white australia the waterside workers of port kemba were persuaded there were 180 of them working on the wars at port kemba they were persuaded that what the japanese were doing following the rape of nanjing 1937 to 1938 over that christmas new year period was so horrific that on the other side of the world in this white australia a distant part of the british empire ordinary blue collar workers laboring on the wars should go without their incomes and risk sacking go without their incomes for an indefinite period and risk losing their jobs for all time and even risk going to jail because that's what the federal government threatened them with because they refused to load pig iron on a vessel headed for the steel works in co-bay japan where munitions would be produced for the unofficial japanese invasion the undeclared japanese invasion of china these white australians proud white australian supporters like yes of the white australia policy had absorbed the suffering of the chinese people the brutal rape of nanjing that effectively was the commencement of world war two and they said no we'll risk everything to ensure australian iron ore does not feed the brutal japanese invasion and the suffering of the chinese people as a result it led to a refusal by workers in other wars to load pig iron on other ships that they believed were bound for japan on december the 17th bhp laid off 4 000 men claiming that this ban was responsible for bringing everything to a standstill there was increasing hardship experienced by the workers at bhp as a result of the shutdown of the wars and eventually talks between the communist leader of the waterside workers federation and the federal government resulted in an unofficial assurance that no more pig iron would be shipped to japan the export was ceased as a result of this brave action and i find that a remarkable story i think it's it's so positive that it's going to be memorialised in two days time not least i find it remarkable not least because it says a lot about the capacity of the people to grow and to look beyond the horizon ordering people to have a vision the workers in port kimberlain australia to be touched by what had happened in nanjing even though we were part of the british empire we were a white race imbued with racism a different people a different civilisation and even our capacity beyond that to produce a political leader in goff widlam who confronting a self-imposed isolation and the apparent rigidity of maos china could imagine could envisage a day when a relationship between two very different peoples might aspire to one based on friendship cooperation and mutual trust comparable with that which we have or seek with other major powers