 What you're about to see are the events that led to the Golden Gate Estates Fire burn over on January 30th 1985. There was one fatality and 11 injuries. The Golden Gate Estates Fire occurred near Naples, Florida and was the prelude to one of the worst fire seasons on record in the state. During mid-January a series of strong cold fronts had pushed through Florida. The successive freezes from these fronts killed and dried out normally green vegetation making conditions tender dry. Additionally there was no significant rainfall during January. The fire season had already been very active and firefighters were stretched to their limits from working abnormally intense fires that were driven by the strong winds from these frontal systems. This unusual weather pattern had put firefighters off balance from their routine fires which were influenced by normal diurnal winds. These normal winds consisted of light morning land breezes followed by strong afternoon sea breezes. The fire was arson caused and started on or about January 26th. Tractor plows and engine crews worked the fire for several days and contained it on January 29th at 10 thousand acres. The fire occurred as the trailing edge of the last cold front passed over the area. Normal winds had returned by January 29th. Fire crews were extremely fatigued getting only two to four hours of sleep at night. Fighting fire by reaction they were not recognizing the unusual weather pattern and the resulting changes in fuel moisture and fire intensity. In the process of containing the fire several near-miss situations had occurred. The fire had overrun several firefighters causing tractor plow units to be abandoned. On the morning of January 30th the fire rekindled. This rekindle was on the north flank of the original 10,000 acre fire that had been contained the day before. Fire crews dispatched to initial attack the rekindle considered it a routine fire. The routine view of the fire was based on the return of normal diurnal winds. The previous day's weather had been humid and the winds were light. Weather observations taken on January 30th at 10 hundred hours at the Naples airport were temperature 67 degrees, relative humidity 54 percent. Wind south at 14 miles per hour. Naples is on the coast 15 miles west of the fire location. It should also be noted that the daily weather observations for the fire behavior indices were taken and calculated from the Florida Division of Forestry District Office in Fort Myers 30 miles to the north. The differences between the predicted and actual weather caused fire crews to view the fire behavior indices as less than accurate. Suppression actions on the rekindle began south of the Golden Gate Canal shortly after 10 hundred. The objective was to keep the fire south of Golden Gate Boulevard due to the number of structures north of the Boulevard. The fire was burning in what local firefighters called the blocks. This was a subdivision with a road system that divided the area into rectangular blocks that were a quarter mile wide by one mile long as seen in this aerial photo. South of Golden Gate Boulevard the subdivision had a few scattered homes but was mostly wildland fuels. Fuels in the area were varied. About half the area was heavy rough of Palmetto Galberry under southern pine interspersed with grass and small cypress. The remaining fuels were cabbage palm with an understory of wax myrtle grape vines and grass. This understory was 12 to 20 feet tall and indicated that fire had been excluded from the area for many years. Four Florida Division of Forestry tractor plow units arrived at the scene between 10 hundred and 11 hundred. They began to plow lines across the head of the fire and around spots in front of the fire, a tactic known as potato patching. By 1130 two of the tractor plow units were overrun by the fire and the operators suffered from burns and smoke inhalation. These were the first injuries on the fire. A third unit became stuck in a ditch. The remaining tractor plow operated by forest ranger Shane Sullen continued to work the right flank of the fire unassisted. At about 1200 another near miss occurred. Five engines from the local fire department were parked nose to tail headed in on a narrow dead-end road. The wind shifted threatening to overrun 18 firefighters and their equipment. The wind shifted again allowing them to successfully defend their position. As the day wore on initial attack efforts became more fragmented and additional tractor plow and engine units were requested. At 1430 forest ranger Marco Miranda radioed the incident commander that his tractor plow was fire ready. Miranda had been at the Naples Work Center repairing his equipment. His tractor plow unit had been abandoned in a near miss situation the day before. This had caused damage to the plow tires. The IC directed the 26-year-old Miranda to proceed to the fire. Miranda had been with the Division of Forestry for 10 months. He had completed his basic fire training in October 1984 and had worked about 20 fires in his tenure with the Division of Forestry. Just after 1430 the fire spotted over the Golden Gate Canal. It crossed into four blocks bounded by 9th Street on the east and 17th Street on the west. A county road grader put a quick line around a spot fire in the block between 11th and 13th streets and then moved on. Other spot fires pushed by southeast winds quickly moved north through a two block area bounded by 13th and 17th streets and another block between 9th and 11th Streets. At this same time mechanic Frank Smith was leading an out-of-district tractor plow crew into the fire. Smith had worked 15 years as a firefighter with the Florida Division of Forestry and had previous firefighting experience with the states of Ohio and Missouri before becoming the district mechanic. Smith led the crew from Ocala in along the canal from the west. He was working with the air attack pilot Connie Ryan trying to place the crew on the head of the fire before it bumped Golden Gate Boulevard. Looking for the left or west flank Smith passed by 19th Street and proceeded north on 17th Street believing this to be the western extent of the fire. Halfway up the street he found the fire had already crossed 17th Street and was moving west toward 19th Street. By the time he arrived on Golden Gate Boulevard the fire had already spread north across the boulevard in the block between 17th and 19th Streets. At approximately 1455 Miranda drove east on Golden Gate Boulevard past Smith's location to the intersection of 11th Street. At this time it was decided by the IC that the air attack pilot would direct Miranda into position on the left flank or where he was needed the most. Initially Miranda was directed to turn south on 15th Street. Then the pilot noticed that the block between 11th and 13th Streets was beginning to burn. This was a rekindle of the spot fire initially suppressed by the road grader. The pilot then directed Miranda down 13th Street. At this time mechanic Smith got on the radio and said he would escort Miranda to the site. The pilot's last instructions to Miranda were grab the first piece of fire you come to and do the best you can. Smith led Miranda down 13th Street where he helped Miranda unload his tractor. The point Smith picked to start Miranda was about 1100 feet south of a home under construction. According to Smith the fire was just moving around another house about a quarter mile south of the offload point. Smith observed two sheriff's deputies putting water on the house and said that the fire was not all that intense. It was later measured to be four tenths of a mile from that house to where Miranda started his plow line. The smoke from the fire was observed by Smith to rise about 100 feet level off and move north. Some of the smoke seemed to be pulled back into the fire. At this time Smith said that flames were not visible in the block that Miranda was about to plow in between 11th and 13th Streets. He told Miranda to plow only in third or fourth gear to give him time to put a couple of lines in across the block and maybe stop it at that point. His experience was that most new firefighters tended to plow in lower gears. Smith stated that as he walked back to his truck a gust of wind snatched a rag out of his hand followed by another big gust picking up dirt and sand. Looking south Smith saw a wall of flame moving toward their location. This was less than five minutes after Miranda had started his plow line. He had progressed less than 250 feet from the road. Smith immediately called Miranda on the radio and told him get out come out of there. As Smith back down the road to get away from the fire he saw the headlights from the tractor turn back toward the road. Less than a minute later the fire overran Miranda's location. After the flame front passed Smith returned to Miranda's plow line starting point and tried to walk the line looking for Miranda. He was forced out due to the intense heat and smoke. Later two firefighters with air packs went down the plow line and located Miranda's body as you see here next to his tractor plow unit. Using data from two nearby weather stations the investigation team reconstructed the weather for the time of the burn over. Temperature 78 degrees, relative humidity 33 percent, wind southeast at 20 miles per hour. The winds had shifted several times earlier in the day and the fire had also jumped roads and a 60 foot wide canal. Significant fire behavior observations were made independently by personnel on the fire. Forest ranger Shane Sullen said the fire seemed to breathe and pulse. Race 20 to 30 yards then lay down then pick up and run again. Mechanic Frank Smith saw the wind suddenly increase enough to raise debris from the ground and tear a rag from his hand. Others described the fire as just standing up and moving forward. The peak rate of spread at 1505 was estimated to be 20 chains per minute with flame fronts moving in three directions. These observations would indicate a plume dominated fire event. When the two fingers of the fire pulled together and made the run that entrapped Miranda, nine other firefighters on three different sides of the fire received burn and smoke inhalation injuries. In a witness statement by the pilot Connie Ryan he said he directed Miranda to 13th Street because he felt the block to the east between 11th and 13th Streets had just begun to burn at the south end and was not an immediate threat. He thought there was a possibility that with the wind at his back Miranda could put in a plow line from 13th Street to 15th Street that would hold as the flanking movement of the fire spread to meet his line. This tactic would enable him to keep the fire south of Golden Gate Boulevard. He then would have time to do the same in the next block or that the next crew in could do it. This is what he meant by his instructions to Miranda to grab the first piece of fire you come to and do the best you can. Instead Smith led Miranda in, told him to unload and plow an indirect line from 13th Street to 11th Street and back. Smith made sure Miranda had plenty of distance over a quarter mile between the plow line starting point and the south end of the block. However, 13th Street was as far east as Smith had been on the fire. As a result Smith was unaware of the large finger of fire that had extended past them to the east in the block bounded by 9th and 11th Streets. You have just seen the events that occurred on the Golden Gate Estates Fire. The instructor will now facilitate a discussion about the use of fire safety guidelines by the involved personnel, the strategic and tactical decisions that were made and the human factors that contributed to this burn over incident.