 And this session will be chaired by Roberto Schaefer, and it will be a session about aligning oil developments and climate change mitigation goals. Roberto, I'll hand it over to you. Okay, good afternoon. My name is Roberto Schaefer. I'm a professor of energy planning at the Federal Universal Rail in Brazil. And I have been working with energy issues for almost 25 years now, and with climate issues for almost 20 years by now with the IPCC. And somehow I have been able to, let's say, to work with these two communities, the energy community and the climate change community. And sometimes I notice that these two communities do not talk with each other. And somehow I notice this during these two days here because sometimes we have different speeches that somehow we're speaking. And I think the good thing about this session is exactly about that, because the name of the session, as Arro said, is aligning oil development and climate change mitigation goals. So somehow, since we're very close to the end of this meeting, it's good to have a session where we try to align, let's say, fossil fuel development and climate change mitigation options. The first speaker is going to be Mark Jakart. He's from the Simon Fraser University in Canada. So I'm going to ask each presenter to stick with the 10 minutes for two reasons. One is because I noticed that some people in the attendent of the meeting are not very happy or not having enough time to raise issues and for discussions and also because I had to catch a plane right after this session. So I have two very good reasons to keep the 10 minutes very strict. So Mark, you'll have the floor, please. No warning. Thank you. So I'll be talking about fossil fuel project approvals and climate commitments, and my talk is called Modeling Tools for Connecting the Dots. So I'm addressing the rationale that a given fossil fuel project is consistent with 2C. President Obama said, we're not approving the Keystone XL pipeline if it significantly increases greenhouse gases. So there you had a case where we were looking at a fossil fuel infrastructure investment and we actually had political leaders saying, I need to know what is going to be the impact of that particular investment. And of course the fossil fuel industry and its allies said, well, listen, this project is consistent with 2C. Or they have a lot of different rationales and then in my paper I talk about the other rationales, but here I'm just focused on the idea that an individual project can be a clever economist to claim it's consistent with 2C. And as I say, regulators and governments assessing, in the case study I'm going to use, I'm going to say that this can apply to other fossil fuel projects and in fact we're using something like this for looking at a coal port expansion project. But I'm going to focus on the Alberta oil sands and the pipelines to the Alberta oil sands because that is such a huge issue in North America. So climate is obviously interested in this claim about is this project consistent with 2C especially for these long-lived infrastructure projects. So I'm going to start with the unconnected dots. The climate Earth models estimate the carbon budget for 2C. And then this carbon budget is what is used by, I'll call them global energy economy emissions models to estimate the 2C path for the carbon price for fossil fuel demand. So we saw that in various talks here but even the opening talk of Paul Eakins put up a slide I believe of the carbon price trajectory. But most of these models don't give you a real world oil price, don't try to give you a real world oil price. There's an optimization aspect to these models and so they have, we might call them, shadow prices but when I talk to them and say okay but what will be the oil price because we really need to know that for 10 years, 20 years from now and well as I'll show you as a doctoral student of mine interviewed a lot of modelers and we couldn't quite get the answers we wanted. So we're interested in doing that in order to check these claims of consistency with the climate goals. So from that we built the oil price determination model and I'm an energy economist and for years I'd have to say decades I've been a reviewer of papers and journals and reading about of course the oil price but I haven't really written on this area so I got together some colleagues that are well known in this field and I said to them how would we build the oil price determination model taking information from these energy economy emissions models. So what we're going to do is get from them the two degree Celsius carbon price and we're going to get from them their oil demand and so what we did is as I said we surveyed the global EEE modelers but in the results I'm going to show you right here we're mostly using and I saw somebody else use this in the slide earlier in this conference EMF that's the energy modeling forum at Stanford based at Stanford University which brings together modeling teams and does different reports number 27 is the one that I'm referring to here and there were 13 models involved in that so that can give you a nice spread for under 2C what might be that carbon price trajectory and what might be the oil demand trajectory so we're using that as external to our model and our median I can't remember value was that the carbon price would hit $370 U.S. in 2012 dollars and the demand would be down to about 65 million barrels per day and I think from Paul's slide earlier you had a lower price than 370 in the year 250 and there's quite a range in those 13 studies and I'm not going to report on that but we do a lot of sensitivity analysis of putting in the different ranges of values but what does our model look like so this is what takes the most part of my talk first of all we're not trying to predict short run price disruptions and what is a short run price disruption that's difficult to to determine but I have a slide that in my extra slides if that question is raised sort of looking at wow the price of oil has been actually pretty low for much of the last 100 years and we've got a couple of 12 year anomalies in there so and are they and to what extent related to short run kinds of disruptions in the market secondly and this is something that I could talk about for 5 minutes but I can't we assume no scarcity rent so what we mean by that is there are energy economists have debated this for 30 years is there a part of the price of oil that isn't to do with a short run disruption but it's actually to do with expectations of running out of oil and being more valuable in the future and therefore bidding up the price and economists call that a scarcity rent or a hoteling rent but if you looked at the literature even people who sort of become the leaders in the field and trying to find that scarcity rent have really had a lot of trouble finding it and certainly as we move forward into a world in which we can see how large oil resources could be relative to that declining oil demand we decided to put a scarcity rent element into our oil price determination model that's a very quick justification but if you want to go after me that in questions I'd be happy to but one element that we did put in there is a long run OPEC market share strategy of 40 to 45% of production now we're trying to run this model out sort of 3, 4 decades this isn't 100 years and if you have a slide that will help explain this so and then finally ours is a snapshot model and this is also a bit complicated but instead of us graphing all of the resources for oil out there and building a supply curve where you align them from cheapest to more expensive we do this in a snapshot way we just look at current production so implicit in that so million barrels a day of OPEC non-OPEC and implicit in that is a notion that there's enough reserves behind each one of that production that we can focus on barrels per day so here was my point about OPEC people will say well OPEC you know they've had a strong influence on the price of oil the energy experts economists that I talked to say well it hasn't really been controlling it on a sort of an annual or five year basis it's been that Saudi Arabia and others have not invested as much as they could have or that price would be a lot lower at the same time there's sort of a constraint there and we've seen that kind of playing out over the last while that OPEC has actually taken what it just did recently is that it again said we're not going to let the price get too low but we also know we can't let the price get too high because we'll lose market share so that's in the model basically and then so here's what that curve looks like this on top is just a blow up so here's the curve this is in million barrels per day so here's the market in I know it's 213 to 214 this is dollars per barrel and then this is just a blow up of what's at the high cost margin of the snapshot supply curve okay and and now here's the dynamic so the model starts as a static portrayal of oil market shares and it becomes dynamic as the carbon price rises and oil demand falls so the carbon price changes the production cost of each type of resource so we had a Norwegian speaker saying you know at least we're low emissions in production so we should be able to stay competitive so we're how do oil sands do in that and they'll in our model they'll either be investing in reducing emissions at the production level or paying carbon charges or some combination this will force the marginal producers out and lower the oil price because we calculate the oil price from who's at the margin but it's a cloud at the margin subject to that OPEC market share constraint so let's take the last slide this is complicated but I'm just going to flip through it quickly because my PC student said that I'd be able to explain this in one minute so there's 2015-2025 2035-2045 see where we're going and that's that curve I already showed you and this was the oil price that we figured out for 250 I can't remember why and so as you move from left to right the carbon price is going up 21-166-308 and that means the costs of oil sands and other producers are also moving up at the same time the oil demand so I just presented it as a vertical line it's at 90 now it's at 87 it's moving to the left so that's the information the carbon price and the oil demand that we're taking from those models and so the oil price is going down and so there so there it is connected dots last two bullets it's possible to use global energy economy emission model outputs and an energy market pricing model to estimate the economic viability of fossil fuel project X under 2C and this is our proposed method for doing that thank you very much thank you Mark let's move to our next presenter is Katia Perez-Guzman from Faculdade Latin American de Ciência Sociales in Mexico Katia have 10 minutes let's begin I'm going to present two case studies of Colombia and Mexico focusing basically on the economy of the relationship between the oil supply policies and the climate change policies thank you very much but first I'm going to steal valuable time of my presentation to do a reflection a little bit of the conference specifically of thinking about what type of problem we are facing clearly the problem of oil supply and climate policy is not the same as the problem of demand of consumption and climate policy what are the differences what are we looking at is it a problem of control and compliance of oil industry is it a problem of social responsibility merely is it an economic is it soldable with the markets is it a common problem somebody said it is it a problem of lack of international cooperation or political, institutional, historical and international cooperation is going to focus more on this part we think that at least for a category of countries it is much more a problem of institutions and political systems than anything else and that's important because how you frame the problem is how you get to the best solution possible so the questions we tried to ask in our case studies is who decides or who contests these decisions in Mexico and Colombia what is the definition and climate what are the incentives and interests and how do they interact or diverge in distinct political arenas basically our definition of political economy we know that political economy in the literature has many many implications but we focus mainly on actors that form alliances that's our framing of the literature the methodology in what we wrote is institutionalism we definitely take the stance that institutions matter institutions not just as being buildings but as being people with interests and decisions definitely bounded by where they're from and what interests they're serving not homogeneous we're definitely not assuming that they are comparable in many ways in this way that's why we use the methodology of case studies but very focused on complexity studies of bragging 2000s which applied to case studies uses a lot of process tracing and what that does is what the name says you get Mexico, Colombia and perhaps other countries in the future hopefully for Mexico you define different process of interest to you and then for Colombia you do the same for the other countries you do the same there will be many differences and that's why sometimes you cannot even put them into models but then what you do is you define exactly what you're going to base your analysis on in these cases interactions between actors there's two types of interactions intersections and discrepancies that's all we were looking for do they intersect in the processes that we're looking or do they not intersect of course not all the processes there's many things happening right now in Mexico and Colombia in terms of oil and climate change but we focused on the main things that were happening from 2000 to 2015 which are oil rents is the process for Mexico and Colombia happening between oil actors and the rest of the society as for Colombia there were two oil reforms very important for both countries transition in Mexico which was the green part of the oil reform that we chose civil society in Mexico for renewables and civil society in Colombia in general because in Colombia the climate debate is still in the process of getting started so we had to expand our search and the definition of renewables which you will say why would the definition of renewables be even called a process in itself in Mexico it turns out it has been a years long process of actually coming to terms of what we call renewables because of the reasons I will mention right away so I would say just two results the general results that who are the actors and how they interact so in general there is a very uneven playing field as happens in another country which is not new the institutionalism of oil is historic it's very inside of Mexico's society and politics in very deep ways versus the institutionalization of climate change which is recent in fact here we have one person who promoted a lot of the institutionalization of climate change but it is very recent it has to policy networks describe a lot of what is going on in climate change in Mexico still and basically for oil we saw that the main actors for Colombia and Mexico were the state and the oil company and you will tell me of course I mean it's Mexico the company is nationally owned so of course the state and the oil company will have to do we emphasize this relationship because we found several literature that suggests that this is not only what happens in the places who have nationally owned companies but for example in the United States there's a lot of deep relationships maybe not so explicit between the oil company and the state so the state has to be considered so the problem is not just about the oil company the problem is about how the oil company relates to powerful political actors in the state in Mexico and Colombia what is a little bit more specific to them is that they are not petrol states which I say here there's a continuum between petrol states on one extreme which is Venezuela maybe it's the state who relies a lot on production of oil the exports of oil are a big part of the exports Mexico and Colombia are not there they're also of course not net importers but they're somewhere in between but what does characterize them is that the economization of their fiscal accounts which means that they rely 30% about each country on the the fiscal spending relies on the money that they get from exports but what's very particular about this this Terry Lynn Carl says very clearly in her work on Venezuela the paradox of plenty is that the economy craft is almost synonymous to fiscal spending so doing state things in Mexico and Colombia means spending revenues and these revenues come a lot from oil sales so this just shows another time the actors of oil in these countries show the very very close relationship that there is with oil and other actors in the society all this is very well planted in the natural resource course literature we just showed it a little bit but I think this debate here in this conference would benefit a lot from this type of literature aside from what has been shown already in the excellent presentations in the last days for climate, the actors are highly heterogeneous and more for Colombia than for Mexico for Colombia there are many things happening that are not even called climate they are climate things but they are not called that way so we could not find specific patterns as with oil and of course the inequality that both countries have had for decades also translates into the inequality of civil society causes in fact there is a famous author that has called the environmentalist of the north of the south which is of course not surprising climate change but that is not just in the literature that is lived every day by a lot of us who are working as environmentalists in these countries because you cannot just go and say climate change is bad for you there are so many things competing for the people's attention like hunger and what you already know that when you talk about climate change in some of these spaces it's really not even relevant about talking about it but for the results I am not going to go in depth about them of each processes and what we saw about the main actors the main things happening in the countries but as you see no surprise a lot of actors like our moderator said in the beginning they are diverging most are actors they are talking of course it's not that they are completely separate but the activities and the actors diverge a lot of questions the law of energy transition there was a lot of talk about it there was even a two year delay between the reform and the law being actually passed and the main topic of contention as I said before is the definition of renewables and the reason why a lot of people came together in the gray color which meant not necessarily our green agenda was first because of the lack of coalitions in the green side definitely we didn't have we had responses but it was not as strong as to pass it the way we wanted to but also because some important actors in civil society a little bit took the side of contention which was that the definition of renewables included carbon capture and sequestration cogeneration a lot of oil, low carbon oil technologies so this was definitely a loss an example of actors coming together in the wrong direction just to close Colombia's trans-millennial and this is the civil society movement that formed around it and that continues to be formed around it got people together talking and aligning but based on the not on the topics of climate but on the topics of co-benefits so one of the main findings is co-benefits was one narrative that definitely ring the bells of people in Colombia and Mexico in fact Mexico's INDC the main message about this document was co-benefits let's take co-benefits first and then the rest just to close there were many things about banning oil industries of taking more oil I like this cartoon because it's an oil based economy it's this big truck going downhill with all the signs people telling them no no don't go let's stop banning these types of companies in these countries is kind of an emergency break in this trailer like the colleagues yesterday were saying Mexico is not going to stop doing this alone it needs pressure it needs a lot of things so that all this machinery that's going to happen thank you very much thank you Katja, let's move on the next presenter is going to be Henry Wattsmeister from Uppsala University and you have the floor 10 minutes please thank you good afternoon everyone so I'm Henry Kwakmeister I'm a PhD student at Uppsala University Sweden and I have a difference on investment and production dynamics of conventional oil and unconventional conventional oil and unconventional and when I say unconventional oil I mean tight oil only today so shale of the U.S. Bakken and Igor Ford kind of type of oil and then I will explore whether this difference in investment production dynamics has any implications for climate so let's start with a little look on recent developments in this graph we have global oil production and price and we can see the recent quite dramatic price drop which sometimes is quite often blamed on the tight oil now if we look at the second graph we can understand a little bit more why here we have total production broken up in conventional the black line and unconventional the blue one in the bottom we also have investments in these kind of categories in this graph and here we can see around 2005 conventional oil reached some kind of stagnation and where the price increase and also at around the same time the technological breakthrough making the U.S. tight oil available so following this we have the search in investment and quite rapidly search in production in these categories ultimately leading them to an oversupply and price collapse on the global oil market so apparently there seems to be more oil available than we thought just a few years back and this maybe is not in line with the unburnable carbon and carbon locking concerns that we have been hearing about these two days and also some recent research point out that oil is particularly prone to these carbon locking since it's highly capital and rent intensive but as professor Rieken pointed out yesterday all oil is not the same so now tight oil having this very fast dynamics could it be that it's actually better in some of these carbon locking concerns so that's simply the aim of this study to document the difference and explore if it has any implications for carbon locking concerns we do this in four steps we start with an individual study of fields and wells empirical study and then we derive some standard production profiles for conventional and tight oil and then we use these profiles in a bottom-up approach to explore the aggregate dynamics of production and investments and then finally we just discuss potential implication of this difference in production dynamics so first let's have a look at conventional oil fields they look something like this we have a discovery then we have investments starting decreasing and then following we have production building up reaching a plateau and then decline and as you can see these kind of giant oil fields have very long lifetimes it could be several decades and also we have the capital structures you have the initial investment before most of the production and then we know we have quite low operating costs so with this kind of structure the incentive is to keep on producing even though oil prices go down quite low it has to go below the operating costs if you look at unconventional on the other hand these kind of individual wells declines very very fast so here we look at monthly production data this is only 3 years of production and as you can see in practice it starts declining immediately after around 3 years only about 10% of the initial production rate is still there and we know that drilling and fracking a new well could take only a month so it's very fast if you want to hit a new well then from looking at several thousand of tight oil wells and hundreds of fields we come up with these kind of standard production profiles that we can compare and first of all you can see the different scale so a conventional giant oil field equals several thousands of tight oil wells but also there is a similar capital cost structure and low operating costs so both these kind of sources have incentive to keep on producing while investments are spent and but here we have the same kind of production annual basis now the difference becomes very clear how fast first of all the investment production dynamic is and also the very very high decline rate compared to conventional fields so even though these kind of production types can have similar propeller capital cost which is sometimes used as a metric of carbon locking strength since the title has such high decline in short lifetime that should entail that title has actually lower carbon locking effects for strength so so this kind of individual fields and wells translates to some different aggregate dynamics so this bottom-up approach is just simply adding fields and wells on top of each other and then we can see the aggregate behavior so the first one is conventional oil for 25 years of constant capital deployment will be something that looks like a bell shape so when investment stops we have a kind of moderate decline and also you can see there is a lot of legacy production still going to be production even though new investment stops unconventional on the other hand it looks more like a shark fin or something like that and you can see there is very fast increase and then when new investment stops production declines very fast and not as much legacy production locked in and in the paper we use this kind of approach to investigate some real world examples for example constant investment, constant production and also investments constrained by a two degree scenario and this kind of exercise two points, two main results and it's simply that title can deliver required production flow the Nian term at the lower amount of annual investment rate and this is just a direct result of the more front-loaded production profile and for two degree scenario investments needs to start increasing quite soon so what kind of conclusions can we draw from this kind of exercise first of all I think it's very important to consider these kind of lifetimes when assessing carbon locking strength and since title has less capital and production locked in it should entail a weaker carbon locking effect which in turn should mean less resistance to transitions and less risk for stranded assets so this kind of flexibility should be good for both for oil developers and also climate policy makers for example maybe there can be some common ground here and also this fast investment production dynamics could lead to shorter periods of oversupply and under supply which would entail less volatility and I think Kristoff told us this earlier that volatile prices is probably the worst kind of scenario for this transition so that in itself is good and if marginal costs of production is coming down this kind of production source could give a period of moderate prices which in turn would reduce rents for low cost producers which could weaken their carbon like more institutional carbon locking so here's just some points that came up while doing this research which I send out to the audience and the panel for further discussion and investigation and first of all the location of TITO being in the US what does that mean compared to production in other countries UPEC countries or developing countries and also the organization of the oil sector, the TITO oil sector it's mostly small and medium sized companies doing this it's not majors or not national oil companies not as concentrated and this in part because of this kind of technology which involves not that much capital for a new oil for example so it's low barriers to entering kind of lesser returns to scale which according to some literature is like the main driver of institutional locking so this question I pose to the audience myself my fellow panelists the TITO will actually provide a helpful first step in an oil transition or is it only bad news I'm not sure but let's discuss it thanks thank you very much we still have 15 seconds to go but thank you very much let's move to the next presenter it's Zepora Berman from York University and Alberta Government thank you very much and just this thank you so much and first of all I would like to be clear that the opinions that I'm expressing are my own here today and not those of the Alberta Government the Alberta Climate Plan which was introduced late in 2015 includes in it a complete phase out of coal including of renewable energy production an economy-wide carbon tax a limit on emissions from the oil sands it also contains very strong energy efficiency plans and a commitment to reduce methane from the oil and gas sector by 45% a commitment that very likely gave Canada the capacity to commit nationally to methane reduction by 45% and to work with the US to harmonize this across North America it has been lauded by some as a historic climate policy as a breakthrough and certainly in Canada it has also been attacked by a come under heavy attack both as being too strong by some and too weak by others many were very surprised to see five of the largest oil company CEOs on the stage with Premier Rachel Notley when she announced the plan as well as five environmental leaders from environmental organizations the remarkable support from unlikely allies came in large part because of the strength of civil society campaigns against fossil fuel development and infrastructure across North America in the last six to eight years it also of course came as a result of a multi year effort to create a collaboration within the oil industry and the environmental community for two years now a number of us from the environmental sector have been meeting with oil CEOs and trying to reach common ground on climate policy however underpinning the diffuse sectoral support is a very different vision of the future the oil industry hopes to maintain and in fact increase production by reducing emissions and decarbonizing oil while the environmental organizations believe that the climate leadership plan is the first step towards planning for a managed decline of oil over the past couple of years both parties have been able to agree on the value of a carbon price to stimulate innovation both were willing to support an emissions limit to provide some planning certainty both parties have agreed on the need for Alberta and Canada to do our fair share in reducing emissions and to meet Canada's climate targets to create a pathway to 2050 and so in a lot of ways the Alberta climate plan is historic in that it what we've seen in Canada has been this incredible polarization of the debate that has paralyzed policy progress for many many years and I won't go into the politics at length here but suffice it to say that Canada's economy and culture has been since colonization a resource based economy this is simply an added historical layer to the dominant view perpetuated by conservatives in the fossil fuel industry in Canada and I think in many supply side regions that continued growth of fossil fuel development is essential to the economic health of our country over the last decade Canadians have been subject to a barrage of advertising that I can only believe is and I call peacetime propaganda that claimed that continued oil sands development was essential to keeping our hospitals open and our roads paved criticizing Tarsans development especially in Alberta was widely criticized as anti-Canadian in fact this open letter to Canadians appeared in the Globe and Mail national newspaper from the last administration during the debate over the gateway pipeline anyone that criticized or expressed concerns about the pipeline was considered a radical extremist that was trying to kill good projects that was trying to hijack the regulatory system our own Prime Minister at the time Prime Minister Harper pulled Canada out of Kyoto declaring at the time Canada's and I quote a socialist scheme to suck money out of good people however I want to use my brief time remaining to talk about this policy conundrum because since the election of a new majority liberal federal government and a new majority progressive government in Alberta the first change in government from a far right government by the way in 44 years new political space and narratives have opened up in Canada governments that believe in climate change as a priority that have committed to the Paris Agreement that support the importance of the 1.5 degree goal but here's the rub they also believe that Canada should green its oil industry and that while we will use far less fossil fuels in the future whatever piece of the pie oil makes up in 2030 in 2040 in 2050 we have a right to compete the argument is being made that as carbon price increases it will increase innovation make expensive technologies accessible and we will reduce the carbon content per barrel below conventional from the dirtiest oil to the cleanest oil the world will use less oil in the future but it will still need some oil and it might as well be ours we have a right to compete many companies I talked to and faced with the carbon math will also talk about the potential full CCS in the trunk, literally the trunk of cars that eventually we will be able to simply contain carbon emissions from combustion vehicles this what I call post denial narrative created by the oil and gas sector accepts climate science supports carbon pricing and decarbonization pathways while arguing that future expansion is necessary to pay for the low carbon transition and arguing for the right to produce more oil regionally to capture a piece of the global demand constrained world it is, I believe, one of the greatest barriers to a managed decline pathway the second critical barrier is that supply side regions like Canada have no incentive to constrain carbon beyond reducing production emissions just meeting our INDC is a major challenge for Canada given the decades of an action and the growing emissions from the oil and gas industry yet I think we know here from the carbon math that it's not enough how do we keep two thirds in the ground from a policy perspective it's not going to come from a price of carbon to ensure a safe climate not in North America we've worked long and hard to get carbon pricing accepted in Canada, we've had major breakthroughs this year, we now have a carbon price on 80% of the population in Canada and soon a national price but that price will be at most $30 what would a price be that would constrain carbon in Canada for CCS to be viable we're looking at $100 to $280 so how do we chart a policy pathway to transition off oil when national and regional governments and export economies are only responsible for production emissions I will end by giving you a little window into our foray into a legislated emissions limit in the oil sands as an additional policy mechanism so a year ago this was considered a currency in fact the first time I raised the idea of an emissions limit with the oil industry chaos ensued in the meeting the government, even our new majority progressive government would not have considered it if we didn't have oil industry leaders supporting it our thinking was that we needed Alberta to acknowledge that today's reality required limits knowing that the carbon price was not going to be enough to constrain production significantly for another tool Alberta currently emits about 70 million tons which arguably should have been the limit if we look simply at the science the problem was three fold the government wouldn't agree to a limit without the oil industry leaders support without support it would have been political suicide industry wouldn't agree to a limit that didn't allow for some growth so that each company could reassure their shareholders that there were growth opportunities for Alberta in the last year as a result of the oil price decline Calgary is a ghost town suicide rates and women's shelter rates have skyrocketed and a good portion of the difference between 70 million tons and 100 million tons which is where we set the limit was already under construction steel in the ground so what does 70 million tons actually mean 100 million tons actually mean though I argue that in fact it is the first in the ground legislation because we have about 2.3 million barrels a day now in the oil sands 100 million tons with current technology is about 3.8 million barrels per day we have already approved permits given out 5.4 million barrels per day we have 7.2 million barrels per day under approval so this limit with current technology essentially moth balls a third of the existing permits hmm ok so let me wrap up then so from a culture and from a policy perspective the limit is extremely significant but it has forced divisions within the oil industry many calling the 5 CEOs traders but it has created a public conversation in an oil jurisdiction about limits in the climate era but it's not enough many argue that it's put Canada on the map but in DC Alberta has gone from this emissions trajectory to this with the new climate policy but at the same time we know that Canada is projected to produce more oil production than many other jurisdictions in the next 20 years and we also know that this is what it would look like if we produce no new tar sands because when you invest in the oil sands it lasts quite a long time once that infrastructure is in it produces for a significant time so the fact is we haven't done enough to ensure that we meet the challenge set out in the nature paper the challenge that we've talked about here on carbon budget and of course the conversation on global equity is not penetrating at all so how do we ensure that the conversation on carbon budget and global equity penetrates the national and sub-national policy development the bottom line is that there's a huge disconnect between what we know needs to be done and what even this stable economy this wealthy economy with a progressive majority government is doing as long as doing our fair share is defined by decision makers as meeting our INDC and constraining carbon is not counted in any way in a supply side region then we will only work on reducing emissions so what is the policy pathway until we can chart that course we'll continue to have these what some say is only incremental policy gains and growing civil society opposition to new infrastructure like pipelines which while quite successful I have to say in constraining new development is draining resources from frontline communities and further polarizing our communities at a moment in our history we need to be coming together to develop resiliency plans for community safety in the face of a changing climate well thank you very much I'd like to thank the presenters for being so obedient and following the 10 minutes or 12 for some case I'm going to open for discussion now but I want to use the position I have here just to raise one question to Mark Mark is your model capable of capturing the impact of oil prices of oil prices on the cost of producing oil because normally when prices go up the cost of producing oil also go up so internal consumption of oil no simply because normally you have more demand for equipment more for everything and this has a huge impact on oil cost so for example if I can reflect what you're saying in Alberta when we rapidly expanded oil sands at an earlier time the cost of production went up because of inflation but we see that this is a long run model so I wasn't going to touch that okay thank you let's open for questions we have one here two, okay three, so far let's say three and four and let's stop for the next run okay let's say oil change international I'd like to ask one to Mark and one to Henrik if I may to Mark the thing that jumped out at me was your 65 million barrels a day in 2050 of demand which sounds very high presumably you are using a 50% chance of staying within two degrees and certainly it can't be any more than that according to the numbers I've seen but the question is the bigger question this raises is given what we're told about the severe dangers that occur beyond two degrees what is a reasonable level of confidence that we will stay under it is it 50%, is it 66%, is it 80% or even 90% the question for Henrik is I'd certainly agree that shale wells don't have a lock in effect that many other types of production have the exception to that though of course is pipelines which have the same lock in effect and to be topical an example is the Dakota access pipeline the question I wanted to ask you though is how does this interact with other ways of looking at climate limits lock in is of course an important one but the limited carbon budget is another and isn't the issue that climate change is as much a political problem as an economic one don't we have a problem in climate politics that everyone looks for a reason why they can keep producing and why someone else should cut and so isn't there a difficulty there in saying maybe this kind of production is okay for expansion my initial questions for Sephora sounds like Alberta is doing some very positive changes and I was interested in hearing whether there's a risk of backsliding there was a new administration that made these possible if someone else comes in are some of them going to dissipate and then the second sort of flip side of that which is more general to the panel we've heard a lot over the last few days about how none of these changes are going to do enough and I guess the general question is there positive feedback loops in technological development that you see that if we take small steps we'll actually start to see some acceleration and the developments on the ground in the right direction can you yes please and then Peter let's go okay can you go Peter first and then you can go okay good exercise hi well with Cicero just a very quick question also for Sephora I wonder if you can expand this 100 million ton limit and specifically how it's a message being enforced will it have consequences for approval of specific projects or how is that going to work thanks and then Peter hi Peter Erickson with SCI Mark this is really exciting what you're doing because there's so little information out there about what oil price might be under a 2 degree pathway and I think you well could you just expand a little bit upon how you would apply that as a climate test I think it was you were getting there at the end or maybe I just missed it but I think what happens is you know essentially if the project would be a go at that price then it is quote consistent with the 2 degree pathway if not then not but if you could expand upon that that would be great thanks okay so let's move to Ben this Mark can you start sure I'll go backwards so in the particular case where I was developing this for was that there were regulatory processes to approve pipelines and in fact the pipeline that's going to come down to Vancouver in the 90s I was the chair of utilities commission and I regulated that pipeline so it was all very familiar to me but and especially the way our regulatory process works for these major projects the federal government would have to have the final approval but they're following the logic that regulators have always done for utilities which is that you have to be able to demonstrate that it's economically viable so we call it used and useful some term from North America and so that would be the argument it's non-economic and I admit I raced so fast through that graph that my PhD student promised me I could do in one minute that I think I finished without saying and now you can see the oil sands are higher in cost than the oil price so that would be the evidence brought before that process the question was 65 million barrels a day so that's all external exogenous to what we do so we were just taking energy modeling forum 27 now I can't remember if it was 50% probability of 450 parts per million or what but then we surveyed a whole bunch of other modeling exercises as well and it's all over the I do a nice probability distribution around that I can have but in some scenarios say we do an incredible amount of electricity where it shows 90 million barrels a day in 2050 or almost still up there and one of the models in the EMF 27 had that outcome and these were models that had carbon capture and storage but then there were two that had BEX biological carbon capture and storage I forget the right name and of course those ones could be even higher with oil demand but I excluded them from our data set so we had a consistent so it can be all over the place down to 40 up to 90 and someone asked about tipping points I shouldn't even try to comment on that I would hope that there is I would hope that if that's why I'm a strong advocate of zero and low emission vehicle requiring that to happen quickly in the way that California is and we're trying to do that in Canada now because maybe there'll be a tipping point in electric and even biofuel vehicles and likewise somebody talked about CCS earlier miles that too can have a tipping point regarding other infrastructure supporting title that's true I agree and that's maybe one of the major reasons why title increases so fast in US large large existing pipeline networks for example supporting the production and whose oil to produce I'm very difficult to say I think I'm only I guess I'm only stressing that this flexibility could be favorable for like the end game of oil production for example or exit strategy for companies that the flexibility in itself is a positive thing so considering some discrete supply-side policy so we aim at title probably or it could be counter-productive to overall transition strategy so I think that's the point we're just trying to make but whose oil to produce and a bit of a question, no question mostly excited about the cost right now yeah so I'll address the back-side question first so I kind of can't underscore enough what a big shift this is from especially inside Alberta part of the reason that I have notes today is because we are live streamed and every comment I or anyone from the Alberta government makes at this point relative to climate change or the future of the oil industry is scrutinized by the opposition there have been three press releases in the last 30 days calling for me to be fired in Alberta from the opposition and so it's a very it's a tinder box a year ago we had a government that ridiculed climate change policy a year and a half ago and and so there is a massive backlash inside the province now against especially the coal plants being shut down and also the carbon tax there's signs up all on the highways this tax will kill families and things like that and so I raise that because I think that there are two ways to deal with back-sliding one is through hard legislation so this government is committed to passing legislation on each of these initiatives and I've already passed legislation in the house on the carbon tax and on the renewable portfolio standard and there is legislation currently being drafted on the emissions limit it will be a hard cap, it will be a positive but the second is the cultural shift the polling shows that Albertans do care about climate change and they're tired of feeling guilty and feeling like the bad guy and so we're working to create a narrative and a conversation in Alberta that makes people proud of these steps and makes it very difficult for any future government if there's a change in administration to move backwards on 100 million tons and how it's going to be enforced is up but how that works under the cap is still being discussed so I'm the co-chair of the all-sense advisory committee one of my other co-chairs is Dave Collier the former CEO of Shell and Cap Canadian Association of Drawing Producers and this panel is looking at how it's going to work and there's a lot of opinions, everything from the markets will take care of it you know we can just dial up the carbon tax or the performance under the carbon tax if it doesn't work for near the limit to many academics proposing that we have a mini cap and trade system for the all-sense companies inside Alberta under the 100 million tons and we are tasked with making recommendations to the government on that topic by November On the question of positive feedback looks of extraction I don't know if extraction itself has these positive things that can lead like magically to the path we want but I definitely think it's about framing the issue right it's not easy of course I was thinking it's very similar to the climate negotiations the great look that they they got some years was precisely because the issue was framed as annex A, annex B China somewhere it's hard to get out of there so I think part of this conference the objective is we have to think about how to put the problem I think Greg was saying that OPEC can be a catalyzer I completely agree the oil countries can be active in this way but then you have to think about how to put it but they actually participate it's not something banned or prohibited I don't know, let's think Thank you, Katja We still have time for both a second round of questions here and then here there Yes, this is a question for Sephora these are very good news about Alberta and the shift in policy and it's very admirable to have all those actors together in agreement and it's very positive in terms of Alberta and Canadian emissions now as we were talking over lunch in terms of extracting tar sands they will still continue to be extracted because 90% of them are exported so what I was wondering is whether the local issues are addressed because the extraction of tar sands has high impacts I believe or I think on communities and the environment so how do these actors feel about that and are they in agreement are these costs being addressed Kristoff from the IEA one quick question for Henrik Henrik, the evidence of the tight oil production over the past 18 months shows us that although individual wells might decline very quickly the industry as a whole across the US hasn't particularly it's gone down slightly in it the rise stopped but if we were to take Mark's long term oil price of $40 which is where we were at for a while there that would suggest that the tight oil industry would keep going so I was wondering if you could comment to some extent on the fact that the empirical evidence suggests that tight oil might not be quite so responsive to climate policy as you suggest and for Mark I was just wondering a technical question can you count of the capacity which is available in each year so if you make an investment in 2025 you then don't have that investment that capacity available to come online in 2035 and then also how does that is that reflected in the costs and then do the costs over time reflect technology changes and the pollution changes yes we have someone behind there yeah we have two people there then Shiva and then so I have two questions one is the all tight oil the same or is there any differentiation between that and how you calculated that I think it's a similar question to what was just asked and then for Katya thank you for your presentation I think it was extremely important addition to what we've seen today maybe linked to the questions that we had at the opening the session is you know often ends up as a bullet when it's maybe the most important part of the discussion and so I just have a question if you could speak a little more to what more research possibilities is there in this space and how could we link that to more explicitly to some of the economics modeling and discussion so that we don't have them happening in separate streams I don't even know what I'm asking except that it seems like this could be important and I'm curious from an expert okay please the lady here yes for Henrik another question about tight oil how the increase in methane emissions factors into the analysis that you've done and then for Sephora from your experience engaging with the companies around the market in Alberta what if any lessons can we draw in terms of in terms of global companies aligning their own business models and looking at ways that they can limit their emissions and commit to hard caps on their own emissions Sephora, thank you when you refer to suicides and mothers and children living in shelters you really bring home the dislocation that's associated with keeping in the ground and so I'm wondering if you could one mention any measures that the Alberta government has taken to try to help absorb that hardship and two if you can speculate about what would a solution to keeping it in the ground that's equitable to the say tens of millions of people in communities who are aligned on extraction and what would a approach look like that could be equitable then the final question and then we have to stop and move to the examples thank you very much I was wondering how in countries like Katya said the climate change is not a priority feeling or problematic question to solve as you said Sephora in Canada people are tired feeling guilty about climate change and the pollution and so on how to go there because in Colombia or in Mexico we are not people are concerned with more other questions I wonder if it is because not Colombia or Mexico are better states not even oil economies because the weight GDP and employment is lower than that but perhaps it is that oil in our region is located in not densely populated areas very backward areas in Mexico in Colombia Indian population and they have different problems British spectacular in Colombia the biggest oil fields after Alberta about 7 billion barrels but people there ask BP British petroleum to build hospitals to build roads to build schools and so on and that is their social responsibility it doesn't matter that if they ask for those expenditures to be discounted from the taxes but those are the problems people are not concerned there but it is in the forest or it is in the planicias sky is green blue there is no concern about that people in the European areas feel that oil is a question of British petroleum or the state company and that is a question of the regions and so on we are not concerned how to increase our budget it is about our common problem but this climate change how to feel guilty thank you now we have to move to the panel who wants to start maybe I will start I only had one question Kristoff you were asking how does the model account for let's say I had a category there called OPEC and there is depletion going on so we are going to move up over that time because of investments to renew on that depletion so I think this might come from a conversation I had with you about a year ago UCL but I made sure that was well researched and I know we don't have the detail you have in your model but basically we found that any change because we are talking about the oil demand heading down towards 65 million barrels the total reserve to the depletion over that time frame and because we are lumping them together as well so some people could draw down and somebody turns on the taps a bit more we found that the price effect would be of our scenario that I showed you would be less than four or five dollars at most so in other words the depletion effect gets swamped by the carbon price effect and so we left it out of the model on the question of research there is definitely a connection between the natural research course and climate change the natural research course literature is wide it has a lot of implications some of them contradictory but climate change is not very present in a little bit in fact we only found the famous carbon course literature which is the one relation between them here in Oxford it's being done but as far as we know there is just one article and not much has been said about it that's a very interesting proposal and definitely the Stockholm Environmental Institute already has identified in their page many research things that can happen for example the external forces the external institutions the way they can orient developing countries like Mexico Mexico would definitely respond to a lot of the things that the US does for example in this direction so external institutions and forces is definitely another topic yeah so first Kristoff yeah so the aggregate production the real production in US is flat or decreasing slightly so not very fast and I guess it's a combination of factors first we have a lot of wells that have been drilled that you can just take into production and also as I first of all this work is only conceptual so it's just to show the dynamics in reality there's quite different there's a distribution of productivity in different wells so I only show the average well for example so you can shift if you know in this region this kind of area particularly good wells you can shift your effort to the most productive parts and also a little bit of financing maybe some companies even going with the deficit or they have hedge prices things like that so more or less the industry is telling they are getting more efficient on every point but I think they do as well but also at some point it depends on the marginal production cost you said 40 dollars I don't know exactly where it's going to be but somewhere between 40 and 70 I think title is going to start producing at the margin again what else so yeah we only looked at Texas Eagle Ford wells for this study there's not for average wells there's not huge difference between different place so they look similarly the same but they can be quite big difference between individual wells so as a company you have like a portfolio of wells so the average is profitable but some wells maybe a really bad deal otherwise some are really good for example and then we have methane emissions so that's very important I haven't looked into that in my own study but so that can undermine the argument saying title is good so there's a lot of studies looking at that the first were kind of concerned about leakage that it was quite high so it could be really bad even compared to oil sense for example but this recent study is done by Stanford and Carnegie Endowment they they do some kind of oil climate index they try to look at the production emissions from different kinds of oils and then shale oil is quite low actually compared to many conventional fields actually but it depends on leakage and how much flaring you have actually and that was my question I think yeah thank you so first on Maria on the local issues well so first of all I will say that the environmental community has been working now for many years to forge alliances with the indigenous community and many different nations in Alberta and so part of what we did was insist when we started talking about the climate plan that we couldn't separate out those issues so on the oil sense advisory committee our mandate our terms of reference includes a review of regulatory issues relative to cumulative impacts and scientific thresholds on toxics water air and biodiversity and so that will be the task that the committee takes on after the emissions limit recommendations and we also supported the indigenous communities call for funds for low carbon economic development for their nations that come from the carbon tax revenue the carbon tax by 2018 will be bringing in 3 billion dollars a year into the Alberta government and so some of that money will go to indigenous communities for low carbon economic development as well as an indigenous climate learning center in Alberta so that's some of the ways that those issues are being going to be looked at on the just transition the Alberta government has responded by increasing the minimum wage highest in Canada now 15 dollars an hour extended unemployment benefits and is on the cusp of developing a process with the federal government for a just transition strategy and looking at retraining programs as well you know what how we address this globally in an equitable manner I think is the subject of this conference and I think we'll address it in the closing panel to some extent to some extent I really believe that we need to figure out rules for supply side accounting that this is the massive disconnect we have in the global conversation that there has to be some kind of category for avoided emissions I mean I'm not saying that developed countries like Canada should receive funds in the way that Maria's proposal looks at funds for high biodiversity areas and developing nations but there has to be some incentive for constraining carbon or the system doesn't work it relies on carbon tax and regulatory environment and we have a time gap it's not going to be enough and so how we do that in an equitable way I feel like we're just in the beginning of that conversation so I don't have those answers and on the how do you make people feel guilty well I'm an expert at that having spent 10 years designing environmental campaigns I actually but I think that is the rub right Alberta was the subject of an international campaign and from Keystone to and for 10 years and so people knew that there was a problem that had to be fixed however the response was just a defensive response until we started changing the conversation until this government started changing the conversation and what's changed now is a shared sense of purpose that this is the writing on the wall and of course I mean it helps everyone from the Pope to the World Bank is talking about climate change now and so it's a sense of the world is changing and the narrative that we've been trying to use more and more in Alberta is one of forgiveness we didn't know what we know today when we started developing the oil sands when you trained as an oil sands engineer now we know what are we going to do together and that shared sense of purpose is I think the nub of how we'll move forward and then finally on the companies the women from the union I'm sorry I've forgotten your name two things relationships matter and specifics matter so all too often we go into these company conversations and we have representatives from organizations a different one every time and we wonder why it doesn't work and so creating a conversation with individuals across huge ideological barriers and lived experience required two years and and the specifics mattered all companies now most oil companies will say they support carbon pricing but what carbon pricing and we framed our work in their language right we talked about certainty and stimulating innovation those were things that they could understand and we created a common conversation on that and I think what's also really important is we have to stop treating industry like a monolith because they're not and the reason five companies supported the emissions limit is they all see their projects going forward underneath of it so they're going to all compete with each other but that's okay because certainly in a jurisdiction like Alberta and I would argue in almost every jurisdiction around the world it changes the political calculus if you have those CEO standing on stage supporting that specific policy and you know we don't see the pathway to 2050 in the same way but we'll argue that when we come to it we have time for two more questions okay one there and one here and that's it please now Paulie Kintz, UCL, this is Fort Sephora and thank you for a really inspiring presentation I wondered how important in your getting consensus around the idea of a carbon tax in Alberta I have to say if you'd asked me ten years ago if Alberta would be having a carbon tax I thought you'd taken leave of your senses which is why hope is always there because these kinds of changes can happen really for them how important was the British Columbia experience with carbon tax because I was in Vancouver talking to the guys who had designed that some years ago and it seemed to be very successful albeit coming from a quite different part of the political spectrum and that was kind of really interesting to me and I just wonder if you can talk a bit about that because carbon pricing is something that's come up once or twice it's problematic, it's difficult and yet here we have an example in a part of the world that I would have said it is least likely to emerge and you're the neighbour of British Columbia which has been a beacon in North America for carbon taxation for the last five years or even longer perhaps thank you and then the final question behind there thank you I have a question also too on Canada because I see some similarities with what we had in our panel discussion on challenges for the Norwegian industry just before earlier today on this how although the industry also acknowledges the limits of climate change both within the Norwegian patrol and Norwegian government per se it kind of describes there is no connection really between our ambitions to the government's ambitions to develop further petroleum fields in the Barents Sea and the commitments that have been made in Paris and that also have been made before so I'm just kind of wondering if you can expand a bit on the specifics of how you've got this conversation together across all of these differences and how that can be potentially transferred to other countries like say Norway or other countries that have that kind of carbon development so let's move to the panelists well I'll try that one first so the first step I think is really trying to find those leaders within industry who can hear you you know who are already there there's people within every company who really actually want to have this conversation they're good people they want to do the right thing they're inside those companies and they understand and are studying carbon pricing and good climate policy and so part of it is finding the right people to have the conversation with who can be champions inside the inside the company and then sticking with it so it took two years to get agreement on what kind of carbon pricing each of the communities could support and what I mean you're already there on carbon pricing but like on the emissions limit etc and not trying to jump over the hard parts of the conversation that may seem not as critical we often go into these meetings and we're immediately talking about this policy or that policy we probably spent six months talking about how do we define fair share what do we really think about climate change we had conversations like how do we see technological change I can remember a specific conversation when one of the CEOs blew up at me and said you're saying that you have tremendous faith in the destabilizing technologies that you like electric cars and battery storage and you have zero faith in our potential for technological change and we're the ideological ones you know and so those types of conversations led to the creation of principles so okay we want to create policy that stimulated innovation that give everybody a chance to compete but they have to have limits they have to ensure Canada does our fair share and we laid out principles and from those principles then we started talking about how to meet emissions reduction goals or what does carbon pricing look like and so it's not fast and it really involves creating conversations that are not necessarily linear because people are just people right and I definitely had CEOs say to me after one meeting you know as a CEO I don't on any other issue I don't surround myself with people who agree with me and I didn't realize I was doing that on climate change until these conversations and that you know because you don't get to be a CEO of a major oil company unless you're quite brilliant and so appealing to those people as smart people and trying to have that conversation really changed I think the conversation in Alberta and and we had a rule that it had to be the same people and that it had to be like once people started seeing value in the conversation it had to be every couple of months it had to be the same people and we had to block out three hours each time because we knew the conversations were going to go long and for two years they were not public conversations we literally met in the one restaurant we had to walk through the kitchen to get to because we had to come in a back door so no one in Calgary could see us meeting together because the debates within the media are going to be positional they're not going to be conversations and so we kept it out of the public and so then on the BC Carbon Tax yes it provides an incredible example that I would offer more people should be using around the world there are several really good studies that have been done on the BC Carbon Tax I feel weird even talking about the BC Carbon Tax I'm going to hand the microphone over to the man who designed it in a minute but I will say because I know politics and communications more than policy design that you know we're not talking enough globally about how the GDP has not fallen in fact it's stronger than almost any other province in British Columbia yet emissions have gone down we've stimulated innovation the Carbon Tax worked in BC we have eight years of data it stopped working when the Premier refused to continue to increase it so she froze it our Premier that we have right now and the result is that emissions started going up again and we've started to see flight of clean tech and high tech because they don't have the certainty that a stepwise approach on the Carbon Tax so hopefully that will be unfrozen soon with the national climate plan but the fact is this guy didn't fall but in Alberta Alberta culturally is just so different from BC that that model didn't matter as much I would say if there's one thing I can point to that mattered it would be the work of the Eco-Fiscal Commission in Canada in working with conservatives and so you had conservatives and folks from the right and business leaders talking about how good a Carbon Tax was for stimulating innovation and stimulating the economy and we needed that to reach people in Alberta for them to consider a tax wasn't just going to be something that would hurt businesses Thank you. We have to come to a close I want to say something just to add on the Norway Canadian or Alberta comparison just to so Norway I don't know how it breaks out regionally but I know the oil is off the coast whereas in Canada there is enormous regional diversity in ideology and favourable thoughts about how we ought to act on climate change and so even right now we have Ontario and Quebec that have joined California's cap and trade system so we've now got we now got about 60 million North Americans under a cap and trade that covers transportation as well so I don't think the European cap and trade has even gotten to that yet and those we had nine dark years of government that was by someone who was elected in Alberta and is very conservative and was able to get a majority government because we have the British first pass the post system he never got more than 39% of the vote and the 60 to 61% of the other people voting for the other parties were all part of the Greens a Quebec party, the Liberal Party and the Social Democrats who are all very strong for climate policy so in a way Canada kind of floated back again that the Alberta government should be like that is quite fascinating and I think Sephora is able to explain a lot of that but I just wanted to point out that regional aspect the last part is of course you can talk a long time about climate policy preferences we know it has to be effective policy and effective policy has to be some kind of price or an implicit price from some kind of regulations and ironically when the Premier and his deputy minister and it was where the deputy minister that I worked with Graham Whitmarsh came to me and said we want to do carbon tax I said are you sure you want to do that because I've been around people who are political scientists who will say will this backfire will it have staying power will it keep growing over time will you get unelected as may happen to the Alberta government in a couple of years because of its carbon tax so I'm not someone who says it's got to be the carbon tax just because I'm an economist and I want everyone to listen to me I'm willing to take a bit of an economic hit to put in policies that might be flexible but regulatory and might not be that much inefficient compared to a carbon tax like the vehicle emissions the flexible vehicle emissions standards in California a renewable portfolio standard so we do a lot of research on what is the efficiency hit of doing things that might score way higher in popular you know way less troubling than a carbon tax for a politician because basically British Columbia put in that carbon tax it was it was 11 10 years ago now and no one's really follow this until Alberta is trying to do it right now but we can talk for a long time on climate policy and that's not the point okay thank you very much we have to