 Merthi wrth i gyd, a gweld i'r gwasanaeth peth o feithio cyfans y Fhyddon Cyfansol y Pwblwyr, a re дрwgol Cymru eich Gweithgdraffi Gwyddon Cyfansol ar nifer y diolch. Felly, rymionedd i gael eich Cymru i hyn i'r gaelor cyfryd gyffansol y f Bastau Belfart i gael i'r gwaith o fasabodol a ddwyllgor i yw ei gwych. Rhyw un astud o gyfansol y cyfansol yn ymddir hwn. Mae ydw i'n iddynt i ffasbodol aethwn i'r cyfansol perthegon yr unig. Item 2, Scotland Act 2016, Audit and Accountability Arrangements. We will now take evidence on the Scotland Act 2016 and those arrangements. I welcome Eleanor Ryan, director of financial strategy, Aileen Wright, head of corporate reporting, accountancy and governance, Andrew Chapman, team leader, fiscal delivery and constitutional change for all the Scottish Government. Caroline Gardner, Auditor General for Scotland and Mark Taylor, assistant director of Audits Scotland. I would like to invite an opening statement from Eleanor Ryan and then the Auditor General. Thank you very much, convener, and thank you for inviting us to come and discuss this audit and accountability framework. I think that the clerk's note sets out a very clear account of the origin and history of the document. Some key principles for the audit and accountability framework were set out in the technical annex of the fiscal framework itself. Those were that audit arrangements should be efficient and effective, should avoid duplication and should not result in auditors becoming overburdened. We have had those principles in mind, as well as the more succinct principles set out by the Public Audit Committee, that the framework should be proportionate, transparent and robust. Those have informed our discussions with HM Treasury officials, which have resulted in the draft. We have also had very important input from Audit Scotland and the national audit office. It is really important to Scottish ministers that the Scottish Parliament through this committee has an opportunity to review and comment on the framework and help to shape it before a final version is agreed through the Joint Exchequer Committee. We are here today to look forward to discussing any points the committee wishes to raise. Thank you very much, Auditor General. Thank you, convener. I know that some people might see this morning's subject matter as a bit dry and technical, so I am grateful for the committee's interest and will do our best to set out for you why we think it matters. I will also briefly summarise my views on the draft, which is set out in the submission that you have before you. The committee knows very well the fundamental changes to Scotland's public finances that are coming through as a result of the Scotland Act 2016. A number of UK bodies now have an important role in functions that are central to the Scottish Parliament's responsibilities, including Scottish income tax, aspects of devolved social security, the AT assignment and the detailed operation of the fiscal framework that governs all of that. The Audit and Accountability Framework will determine the ability of the Scottish Parliament and its committees to scrutinise those areas, including how UK bodies report to the Scottish Parliament, how they respond to requests for information and evidence, and how that is underpinned by the audit process. Those are all likely to be critical areas for the Parliament's committees as they scrutinise the operation of the new powers. In my view, the draft framework has got some important strengths. It provides a reasonable basis for direct accountability of UK public bodies to the Scottish Parliament, where that is relevant, and it reinforces the role of independent public audit both in fully devolved areas and where UK bodies are involved. I have also highlighted some areas where I think it could be strengthened further to better support accountability to the Scottish Parliament, including the provisions for value for money audit in UK bodies that undertake devolved responsibilities. Ultimately, it is for the two Governments to agree on the arrangements that are put in place, but it is important that a committee to be able to contribute to those arrangements on behalf of the Parliament as a whole. Together with colleagues from the Government, we will do our best to help you with that. Several years, the committee has been interested in the arrangements between the devolved administration and the UK Government in terms of how to implement the various acts that have come in. In all that time, we have had reassurances that all was well and that it was going smoothly. This is the first time that we have had anything negative. Could there be an occasion previously where this could have been raised to us during the time that this was being negotiated so that the Public Orch Committee could have its input? The first thing to say is that I would not see this as being negative. I think that it is an important next step on the journey of fiscal devolution. At 2016, as this committee has considered several times, Scotland radically increases the financial powers of the Scottish Parliament. It increases the amount of revenue that is raised here in Scotland from about 10 per cent of what we spend to close to 50 per cent when it is fully in effect. It devolves about £3 billion worth of social security benefits. That is a big step change that is happening at the moment. The committee will recall that, in the first meeting of 2018, you had the reports from the Comptroller and Auditor General and myself about the Scottish rate of income tax. That was the last year in which the 10 pence rate was the power that is in place. We are now moving into a world where, effectively, all of income tax on earned income is within the gift of the Scottish Parliament plus VAT plus social security. I have said to the committee before that, in my view, the arrangements that we had in place for the 2012 act have served us well, but that step change means that it is time to reconsider how they need to develop. The structure off-frame work is the process by which that is happening. Unless I'm wrong, Eleanor Ryan was indicating that yourself, Auditor General, or Scotland had input into this document. Given the reservations that you have listed here, does that mean that you were overruled on that or that there was a disagreement on that? I wouldn't characterise it that way at all. I think that the primary discussions have been going on between Eleanor's colleagues in the Scottish Government and UK colleagues in Her Majesty's Treasury. Both of those parties have been discussing with their national auditors, Scottish Government with me as Auditor General for Scotland, Treasury with the Comptroller and Auditor General and the NAO. As I said in my submission and in my opening remarks, I think that there are some significant strengths. Many of our contributions have been taken on board. I think that we are in front of the committee this morning, so the committee has a chance to input its views and secondly, so that you can be aware of the areas where I think it could be strengthened further. I wouldn't want that to be taken as me sounding an alarm bell, but I think that the framework isn't fit for purpose. Some of the things that you see here are a bit more than asking for it to be strengthened. You're actually picking out some weaknesses here. I think that's important. Eleanor Ryan, you said that Auditor General Scotland was fully engaged in this. Why do we end up at this point with a document that the Auditor General has some issues with? I think that it's important to recognise that earlier drafts have really benefited hugely from the points that the Auditor General and her colleagues have raised. You have a much better draft framework at this point. This is a negotiation between two Governments involving two national audit bodies, so one individual set of views cannot necessarily change everything in the framework. We recognise several of the points that the Auditor General has raised, and we will very happily go back and represent those again in further discussion with the Treasury. There's no sense in which Scottish Government is trying to resist the points that Audit Scotland has raised. The points must have been raised before with the Treasury, presumably, and they must have disagreed? Some have, not necessarily all the points that the Auditor General has raised before. We're looking at the actual document itself. I must say that it would benefit from plain English. It's fairly obscure in places. Governments these days are supposedly trying to bring in documents that can be read and understood by the layman. I have to say that some bits of this are very close to gobbledook. However, we have what we have. I'd like to bring up just one or two specific points. On page 6 of the draft, item 4, the second paragraph about the secondary auditor ensuring that it's confirmed that the primary auditor's content for the work to be carried out, does that mean that the primary auditor has a veto if the secondary auditor feels that there is some examination or investigation that is required? Is there a mechanism to resolve that? We would expect that the primary auditor would take account of the views of both parliaments in setting out their programme of work and that there would be good co-operation between the two. Are there guidelines for that, or are you speculating? I think that that point is raised in the draft framework. If you feel that needs to be strengthened, that's another point that we can obviously take back. I'm trying to ask again whether there's something that will create a guideline for this or a mechanism for this, or whether it's simply you think that's the way it should be. I think that the other principal point is the independence of audit bodies, and there's something in the drafting that officials between the two Governments need to be careful of. We're drafting a framework. It's absolutely essential that it doesn't cut across the freedom of the audit bodies. The Auditor General may well have a view on that also. Which means that it would benefit from clarity. If I can just add to Eleanor's point, it's one of the areas where I do think that the framework could be strengthened to reflect the interests of this Parliament and the views that the predecessor committee has expressed. I think that while the National Audit Office, the Comptroller and Auditor General, and I have every interest in making this work in practice, there are circumstances in which the requirement for the Comptroller and Auditor General to agree that I do some work in HMRC, for example, and for that body itself to agree could limit my rights of access. We will do our best to make it work, but I thought that it was worth flagging to the committee here that I think is more limited than the Parliament might ideally like. Taking the example that you've got there, if the National Audit decides to veto the work, that's it. I have no rights of access under the proposed framework except with for value for money auditing, performance auditing, with the agreement of the Comptroller and Auditor General and with the agreement of HMRC. Now, that has not been a problem so far. I think there are incentives in the system for the CNA, GNI to continue working well together to serve the interests and needs of both of our Parliaments, but I thought it was right to highlight to you that there is a potential limitation there on the extent to which I can provide assurance to this Parliament about the way that UK bodies like HMRC are delivering significant devolved responsibilities on behalf of the Parliament. I don't doubt the goodwill on all sides to make this work, but surely there should be some sort of mechanism where one party can't just say no without there being some sort of a forum where that can be discussed at a higher level, surely? The current memorandum of understanding between me and the Comptroller and Auditor General does include a dispute resolution mechanism that effectively escalates it to the two of us to resolve it. Beyond that, the safeguard that's in place, I think, would be my ability to report to this Parliament that I felt there was a need for a particular piece of work to be carried out, that the CNAG didn't agree, or in fact that HMRC hadn't agreed and therefore I hadn't been able to do it. So there is a safeguard there in terms of public reporting. I don't think it's a do or die around the framework as it's currently drafted, but I do think it's something that the committee may wish to express its views on. If there's any sort of difference between this document and the document that you've negotiated with the NAO, which document prevails? There's no doubt that this framework agreed between ministers would be the starting point. So that would prevail? So any agreement that you have with the NAO would be subject to whatever terms are in this? I think that the next step would be once this framework is agreed between ministers, the memorandum of understanding between me and the CNAG would need to be updated to reflect this. So we would have in there again a process for agreeing differences of view between us. I think there would be no further option within that other than a safeguard of me being able to report to Parliament if I felt that there was work that I would like to do, that I wasn't able to do under the framework. Would there not be a benefit if your document was at least referenced in this document so that it has some validity in terms of what the ministers are agreeing and it's taken into account? I think that there might be merit in doing that and I'm just checking with Mark. I think that the existing agreement already includes a reference to the MOU. Mark, do you want to fill in the broad aspect of the agreement? The Audit and Accountability Framework is in front of you today that sets out provisions for different parties to put in writing the detailed arrangements that we have. If you like, there's a provision in the framework that says that ourselves and the National Audit Office can put in writing a memorandum of understanding. So there is a link to existing memorandum and its understanding and how it's referenced to the framework as it's set out in the draft. I think that Ian Gray wanted to develop this point specifically, so I'll bring Ian Gray in and come back to you. I wanted to ask the Auditor General a bit more about this issue around particularly the situation where the Scottish Government uses a UK public body and has no choice, and the obvious example is the Scottish rate of income tax. Just to try it right back to the Auditor General's introductory remarks, you made very clear the step change that was taken place between the 2012 current position and the new position just beginning. In paragraph 34 of your submission, Auditor General, you say that the draft framework does not significantly develop the Audit Model for Scottish Income Tax. Are you saying that we have this huge step change taking place and the framework does not recognise or reflect that in any way whatsoever? It's useful to have the chance to expand on this point. There are two dimensions to it. One is in relation to the financial audit of HMSE and within that, the collection of Scottish Income Tax in future. There are already within the accounting standards and the auditing standards well-developed arrangements for effectively a group auditor to place reliance on the work of the auditor of the bodies that make up that group and vice versa. Those arrangements are in place and work well. You have the mechanism in place by which the CNAG and the legislation report to this Parliament about the financial statements and I provide additional assurance, which tells you that I think that the work has covered the right issues and can place it into the Scottish context. I think that works well and I can't see good reasons for changing it. Where I think that the framework could be strengthened is in relation to performance and value for money audit, which could be looking at things like the efficiency with which the taxes are collected, the service provided to Scottish taxpayers, where at the moment I have no rights of access and this framework doesn't go very much further around that. I've said in evidence to this committee before that I think the step change we're seeing in the amount of fiscal responsibility this Parliament has means that that's worth reviewing and this doesn't move it very much further along the lines that Mr Beattie has expressed. That's what you mean in your submission in paragraph 28, when you say, in my view, broadening the provisions for access to UK bodies in these circumstances would strengthen the framework and better satisfy the needs that the Scottish Parliament has identified. I suppose that my question then is how that would happen and whether it's simply a matter of negotiation and agreement in the framework. Or if something more profound is required, because going back to paragraph 34, the next sentence reads, in my view, meeting the statutory requirements which were established in relation to the more limited powers in the 2012 act, which then, in my mind, begs the question, do you think there should have been statutory requirements in the 2016 act to cover the broader position but they're weren't? I don't think that's the case. I think there is scope in the ways that I've suggested in my submission to give more assurance to the Scottish Parliament about the audit work that's carried out of UK bodies. I think that the framework takes us a fair way along that road and I'm highlighting to you this particular question about the value for money audit. There clearly will be, in future, quite a range of different relationships between UK bodies and the Scottish Government and Scottish public bodies. The one that I'm highlighting for you is being potentially short of what this committee and the Parliament has expressed it would like is around the value for money audit responsibilities in relation to UK public bodies where the Scottish Government has had no choice but to use the services at HMRC. I'm still struggling to try and envisage what it is which would give you comfort that that access would be, in your view, sufficient in order to provide that comfort to us, I suppose, and to the Parliament. Is it a different section and an additional section—a change to one of the principles contained here—if it's not a change in statute? In some ways, it goes back to Mr Beattie's questions. The starting point for all of this is that the CNA, GNI, HMRC and the Scottish Government have got many incentives to make this work, but we want the framework to be designed to take account of problems that we haven't yet encountered. We don't want to be designing what the arrangements look like when problems come up. The framework as it's currently drafted gives me access subject to the agreement of the Comptroller in order to general and of HMRC. Although we haven't encountered problems yet, it's possible to envisage situations where this Parliament might feel that it would like a piece of work doing that the CNA, GNI feels isn't necessary or more likely that the timing isn't right for, and at the moment there is effectively a veto around that. What would be required would be to remove that veto? The conditions, yes. I'll touch just briefly on a couple of points, but one comment that I would make about the paper overall is that, as a layman reading this, I would expect to see clarity and easy understanding. I don't see that. From that point of view, I believe that the document actually fails. I'll touch on a couple of points. On page 13 of the draft, second bullet point, how do you define a distinct and significant impact on devolved matters in Scotland? How do you define that? On point D at the top of the page. That's correct. Yes. The text that is there is the attempt to explain that. I understand from your question that you don't consider that a sufficiently clear definition. You've given one or two examples to immigration and so on, which have a distinct and significant effect on Scotland. Obviously, there are other things where there could be less ease of clarity as to whether they are having a significant impact and where that could become a contentious issue. There should be some definition, some way of understanding that. I would agree that the difficulty in writing a framework like that is trying to encompass all the different sorts of circumstances that might arise. Clearly, as you have said and simply, but at the same time in a comprehensive way. We can take away the point that we need to try to clarify that. I'm not sure if I, at the moment, see a way to make that absolutely precise. It's more having a process of how to define it rather than trying to define a list that will change over time anyway. The last thing that I'd like to raise is the same page. If you look under the heading of public bodies with more than one category of service delivery and look at the third paragraph, at the judgment of the relative accounting officer, how does that work? That sounds like the judgments are going to be made by the accounting officer where there's no appeal or no comeback. It sounds arbitrary. I would take that as relating to your same general point, which is how our disputes and disagreements or differences of opinion about how things should apply, how should they be resolved. We can certainly see if we can come up with a way of making that clearer. Again, about the warning to accounting officers that they should take particular care when responding to any recommendations of a devolved legislature or executive on reserved policy areas. Would recommendations and so on go to the accounting officer? What level are we talking about here in terms of, for example, if the Auditor General had a concern and she went to the accounting officer and the accounting officer said, no, that's a reserved matter. We're not going to get involved in that. Where is the process for that to be escalated if it's something that's important? What I'm looking for here in this document is clarity as to how, where there is a conflict, where there is a disagreement, how it's escalated and how it's resolved. I would say ultimately we have two parliaments who each have an interest. The document has been drafted between officials of the two governments, but I would certainly recognise the Scottish Parliament's interest and the UK Parliament's interest as primary here. I think that we're in the territory of how would one resolve a difference of opinion between two parliaments. We don't know if it would necessarily go to parliamentary level. I'm throwing this out to you that there is lack of clarity in this as to what happens. 99 per cent, there's going to be no problem at all. It'll all be done amicably. There could be a real difference of opinion where, for example, the Auditor General felt that there was a real problem that had to be investigated and, for some reason, technical or otherwise, the accounting officer isn't going to engage. How do we resolve that? I think that that's a very fair challenge. I should say that I think in this Scottish Government's interest, Audit Scotland's interests and indeed the Scottish Parliament's interests are aligned. It's not in our interest as Scottish Government for Audit Scotland to be unable to carry out audit work that is considered necessary on any kind of devolved matter or any kind of matter that impinges on a devolved area of interest. It's not in our interest either that there should be some arbitrary decision taken that an accounting officer or anyone else is not willing to or a UK body is not willing to allow Audit Scotland to access. We recognise all those points. Some of them have been made in drafting before. I think that this conversation with the committee today will strengthen our hand to go back to try to reflect some of those points more strongly in the draft. Auditor General, do you think that the lack of clarity here is inevitable given the current devolution settlement and the powers that have come, but not all powers? Or do you think that there are areas of this that could be strengthened or clarified by the Scottish Government? It's a really good question, convener, and I think it's worth us all remembering the broad context is that the 1998 Scotland Act set a pretty clear devolution settlement. If a matter wasn't devolved, it was reserved, and you could draw a clear line between the two. We've now gradually, over the last 20 years, also moved towards a situation where that line is much more wavy down the middle, but control over income tax in Scotland on earned income belongs to this Parliament and to the Government, but under the legislation it has to be collected by HMRC. The social security benefits that have been devolved are quite clearly defined, but they interact with universal credit and the Government has choice about the extent to which it wants to use DWP to administer some of that. That line is much wavier, and I think that that inevitably brings some of the complexity that we're talking about here. In terms of the audit arrangements, which is my main interest in supporting the interests of this committee and this Parliament, I think that the framework goes most of the way to fulfilling what's required, and we've just highlighted the one area where I think that the Parliament's interests could be safeguarded further. I think that this section on page 13 that Mr Beattie's been referring to in some ways is the most difficult one. I think that for the first time this framework recognises that now many more UK public bodies have some degree of accountability to the Scottish Parliament for services that they provide that have got a significant relationship with the devolved responsibilities of the Parliament, but that will vary a great deal from case to case. I think that Ellen is right that there needs to be a bit of flexibility in there. I think that what this Parliament and the committee will be keen to ensure is that the interest is firmly registered and that it is scoped to develop and review the arrangements over time as they unfold. Thank you very much. Willie Coffey. Thank you very much, convener. We're clear to start with this. I remember when I was on the finance committee at the early stages of our consideration of SRIT, convener, and we discussed this exact issue about how Audit Scotland would interact with the NAO, then the memorand of understanding emerged. My impression was at that time that there was a sensible and working relationship, but I have to say now that I'm a wee bit more concerned that there isn't. When I look at your summary auditor general on page 2, it's quite worrying when you're saying things like there is no provision for me to be able to audit value for money in areas such as the administration of Scottish income tax and Ian Gray led on that discussion. It says just before that that, effectively, there's a veto by the controller of auditor general. If we can't audit what we think we should audit and we can't require the national audit office to come and talk to us, how on earth do we provide that scrutiny and accountability to the Scottish public? I'd start off by saying that I wouldn't want you to take the impression away that relationships between us are anything other than very professional, very cordial and very effective in my views. As I said earlier, I think what we're looking for is making sure that, if problems do emerge, there's a strong basis in the framework for resolving that and that this Parliament's interests are respected and reflected as far as possible. We've highlighted the one area, which is provisions for value for money audit in HMRC around income tax and potentially VAT in future. Our experience, your experience, I think, has been that the Comptroller and Auditor General and his team have been very willing to come to this committee to talk through the work that they've done and to take away suggestions for future work. In my view, we can make this framework work as it stands. I think it's worth you being aware of where I think the scope to strengthen it, not least so that in future, if you say, why can't you do that, I can tell you what the process is that we've been through. Secondly, as I say in my response, I think it's important that it is part of the review of the fiscal framework that's due to take place by 2022. By then, we'll have a bit more experience of how it's working. I may have brought to your attention areas where I think it would have been good to do some audit that I've not been able to or there may be areas that you would like to see audited that we've not been able to respond to. I think that what I'm doing is highlighting an area where I think it could be further strengthened not a fundamental concern about the framework as a whole. I mean, I have to be honest as well. I would have thought that these kind of agreements would have been enshrined in the first draft rather than as having taken you through a process of expressing concern about something as fundamental as this, because as we look slightly ahead to the future post Brexit, there are going to be a number of operational frameworks that we are led to believe. That will manage certain processes and devolved responsibilities that come back from Europe and so on and so forth. If this is the first example of an agreed framework, I'd be a little bit concerned, particularly if we are clearly saying that we do not have the powers that we think to enable us to audit and scrutinise functions carried out on our behalf. I'd be concerned about that. I'm very happy to. As I said in my previous response, this is an area where we would see the Scottish Government and Audit Scotland and the Scottish Parliament's interests as all aligned. We have obviously raised that point. The draft that you have in front of you is the compromise so far. We will raise this point again and we will represent the views back from the Parliament. Given the quite reasonable strength of feeling about this, if the committee were particularly wanted to underline the point, the chief secretary has written to the convener to draw attention to the draft framework, it would perhaps be possible for the convener to consider writing directly to the chief secretary to the treasury to highlight any of these important concerns from the committee. On the main principles of the draft paragraph 3, it's about information sharing from what I can read there. It's quite difficult to understand the language here. If we request or require information, we're not allowed to. We've got to request it of our own Government to make a request of the other Government to then make a request of their public body. I mean, this is like building in red tape. Surely, to goodness, we don't want to agree to a process like that that makes it more difficult for a committee like this to obtain information on an issue such as the Scottish rate of income tax, for example? Again, I think that we would entirely agree. Why would we in Scottish Government wish the committee to have to ask us and then we have to go and ask someone else? Perhaps if what is provided does not meet the committee's needs, then we're acting as a go-between. We would be content, obviously, to have the provision for a direct contact, and it's another point that we can raise back again with. Why is this in there in this draft? It's so silly to have that in there. Surely we saw that that was ridiculous to have that kind of arrangement. Why is it in there? Well, not everyone necessarily has the same perspective. So this is not our perspective? Is this somebody else's? There are other parties to the drafting of this agreement. Can I have your opinion on that, please? It's primarily a matter for Scottish Government rather than for audit, but I think that in discussion with my team, our view is that that's an unnecessary step in the process. It should be possible for the Scottish Parliament to request information from a UK body that is significantly involved in delivering devolved services. Alex Neil That very specific point is buried in here as a suggestion, for example, that if this committee wanted information from HMRC, we would have got to go through the Scottish Government. Why? Much to add to my previous comment, Mr Neil, that there ought to be a provision to ask. I would regard that as absurd. We would go straight to the HMRC and we would expect them to respond to us in the same way that they would respond to the Public Accounts Committee in the House of Commons. In relation to devolved matters, absolutely, I think that that would be a sensible way of doing it. I think that we need to be very explicit about that. We need to explain to the reserve bodies that that's how we would intend to operate. We're not waiting on them telling us what we can and cannot do as a parliamentary committee. We'll tell them. I think that the only thing that I can add to that is that over the development of Scottish income tax powers, HMRC has been very willing to come to this committee to talk about progress. That's a change of attitude because I remember when HMRC wouldn't even come to a committee in the Scottish Parliament, so we have to build in a process. The people who came from HMRC, as you rightly say, Auditor General, were very co-operative, very cordial, same with the national audit office, the Auditor General from down south, the Comptroller and Auditor General were very pleasant, very co-operative and all the rest of it, but we cannot rely on the personality of the current office holder. We have to have a system that guarantees our rights as a Parliament and as a Scottish Government, no matter who's in office, either up here or down there. I think that that's why this framework matters. I only have a couple of follow-up questions based on the line of question that we've just had. Looking at the principles for accountability and devolution on page 10, there's a principle 5, which talks about a public body may provide, or let me change the emphasis, a public body may provide information, advice or reporting direct to the legislature of another jurisdiction voluntarily. When might it do that? Do you have any examples? I think I'm going to ask Andrew if he's got an example from the work that we've done on the drafting. So, of course, there's a range of work going on across Scottish Government in the context of drafting this framework as regards audit and accountability. Now, you already have work going on with regards to the Crown Estate. That was the Crown Estate Transfer Scheme, which began on 1 April 2017. You have the Railway Policing Bill, which is now an Act. It received Royal Assent in August 2016. You have the statutory arrangements in section 66 of the Scotland Act, which means that reserved bodies also lay their accounts with the Scottish Parliament. These are bodies such as Ofcom, Ofgem, the commissioner of the Northern Lighthouses, as for non-statutory provisions, which I believe is at the heart of your question, Mr Kerr. Of course, there's a range of work going on in social security at the minute in terms of concluding MOUs, in terms of concluding service level agreements, where we need DWP to carry out devolved activities on our behalf as part of the safe and secure transfer of social security powers. So, I suppose it's going to mean some, yes, there's a range of both non-statutory and statutory work between various policy leads in the UK Government and the Scottish Government, which is ongoing in the context of us drafting this order of accountability framework. That's helpful, thank you. Sticking with the clarity point that we've examined a few times, looking at the six principles, there are various terms spread throughout them, which will no doubt mean something to perhaps you, Chaps, but don't necessarily mean something to me or don't tightly mean something to me, like parliamentary bodies requesting legislature, an equivalent body, and even we could extend it, Colin Beattie talked earlier, about the distinct and significant impact. It doesn't really mean something, or it might mean something to you, but not to me. Will there ultimately be some kind of glossary, some kind of defined term section, which will clarify those sorts of issues? If you would find that helpful, I'm sure that that could be added. Andrew wants to say something about that, go on. So, we have tried to clarify some of the terminology up top in terms of, i.e. in the first section of the document, in terms of what accountability means, in terms of what service livery means, in terms of what a UK public body is, but certainly, as Alan Orr has said, we're here to listen today, this is a draft, it still needs to go to the John Xeca committee, which is the formal form of the UK government we have for agreeing these things. So, again, building on Mr Beattie's point, if a glossary of the terms would be helpful, then we are more than happy to provide that and further refine some of the wording and make it more accessible in what is quite a technical area, of course. My personal view with that is that that would be helpful. Before I read the framework, I was expecting a bit more of a legal document, and I don't know if that developed slightly on Liam Kerr's. Maybe we don't need the where-to-fars, the where-to-froms and clause 3C21, but it just needs a bit more structure and adding in the definitions and then looking at the terms that may be common in use but may not have an exact legal definition, which might slightly contradict the clarity aspect, but may make it easier in the long term to understand. I wanted to ask the Auditor General just a point where, if I understand it, there will be areas where you're relying on work done by the National Audit Office. Not quite in the sense, I think, you're asking the question. The arrangements that are in place around HMRC for the financial statements audit are very clear that the control and auditor general carries out that audit. He has statutory rights of access, which I don't have. Under the existing memorandum of understanding, when he reports on the Scottish rate of income tax, I provide an additional assurance report to Parliament, which provides assurance that I think that they've done the work according to the professional standards and in the right areas and can set it into context. I'm not taking reliance in quite that way. In that circumstance, would you have a discussion beforehand as to the level of work they would do? Mark, do you want to talk through how that's worked over the first three years? In terms of how that's worked, there's a conversation between ourselves and National Audit Office where they very much carry out the work. They're interested in our views and the sort of issues and risks that are important. The control and auditor general made a point to this committee that, from their perspective, that's a helpful process. He recognised that he would be very keen to make sure, when we'd suggested that they covered a certain area, that they did address that in the course of that work. In the UK context, the numbers might not be particularly material, but in the Scottish context, they could be very material. If they weren't using the right level of materiality, what could you do about it? Again, the way in which the system works at the moment is that we'd have a conversation through the course of the audit to make our views known. At the end of the process, the auditor generals had the opportunity to give to state our view, where we felt that they weren't using the, in those circumstances, they hadn't used the right level of materiality to be able to reflect Scottish interests. There is no process to resolve a disagreement there. That the process is, as Mark said, for me to report that formally to this Parliament. I don't audit HMRC's collection of taxes, and there are statutory restrictions on rights of access to HMRC. Because in your comments, you talk about agreeing approaches, discussing approaches, working together, but there doesn't seem to be a way to actually resolve that if they don't do the work that you want them to do, you could do anything about it. I think it's worth just taking a wee step back. The financial audit is governed by statute in the ways that I've described for good reason. There is a separate statement, an account of Scottish income tax, and in due course I'm assuming the assigned VAT revenues as well, which the CNAG audits in terms of the materiality that relates to that account, not lost within the overall revenues and much smaller expenditure of HMRC. So there are professional safeguards there. I think it is extremely unlikely that we would see circumstances where the Comptroller and Auditor General wants to be in a position where he was reporting on HMRC's activities, and I was reporting to this Parliament saying, I think that that work doesn't cover this Parliament's interests. In practice, I think that that's actually quite a strong safeguard. I think that we've heard comments from others that we're relying on how it is now and how the good relations are. You don't feel that there's a need to have some form of fallback position. I feel that much more strongly in relation to value for money audit than I do the collection of tax revenues because of the provisions that are already in place for separate tax accounts for those revenues. Can I just go back to the comment, I think, earlier about, and you can maybe remind me, we were talking about if the Auditor General disagreed with the accounting officer on an issue, or you relied on the accounting officer deciding that they wanted to take a suggestion or a recommendation. I think that you're referring to the question that Mr Beattie asked, which was about the accounting officer's decision about which accountability model they would apply. That's less likely to be in relation to one of my recommendations than simply in the operation of a UK body and the accountability relationships that it puts in place. But if there was some disagreement between you and an accounting officer, you would then just report it to us, the Parliament. I'm struggling to think of a situation where I would have a disagreement with an accounting officer of a UK body because I don't audit any of them. I would be much more likely to have... The situation is more plausible that I would have a disagreement with the CNAG about the need for a piece of value for money audit in a UK body rather than a disagreement directly with the accounting officer. There may be a question in there for the Scottish Government team about what happens if they disagree with the model that an accounting officer chooses to apply under the category of public bodies with more than one type of service delivery. I don't think that it's something that I'm likely to be to have a concern about from my perspective. I'll just ask a general question to the Scottish Government people here. Having come to this and seen it's been going on for a number of years, how long have you all been involved in it and have you been involved throughout? Throughout, yes. I have been involved since I came back into this role about a year ago and Andrew's similar time, I think. You're working involves from the start with Aileen. Can we just clarify your question, Mr Bowman? Is the moment involved in the preparation of this document? It talks about going back over a number of years and referring back to previous committee meetings in the Parliament. We are picking these up now. Some of us are new to this. I was just wondering if the Scottish Government officials have been involved throughout this process. Did you all answer there? I think so. Aileen, was Justin... had you finished? Yes, certainly since we have been drafting this framework document. Page 26 contains further information on model D and the flowchart says, Scottish MPs challenge on devolved impacts, but there's no explanation as to what this means. Can you tell me how it's decided whether a UK Government decision might have a distinct and significant impact on devolved matters in Scotland and also what the role for Scottish MPs is in this, if any? Andrew may wish to expand on this, but I read the Scottish MPs challenge on devolved impacts as the normal role that Scottish MPs would play if they felt that some matter that was under the jurisdiction of the UK Parliament was very relevant to Scotland, they would raise that, they have their mechanisms to do so. Through questions in the House of Commons or the Scottish Fair Select Committee, just those existing mechanisms? Those existing mechanisms is how I read that. Was that correct, Andrew? Yes. Am I understanding? Do you want to say something, Willi? It's clearly through the Public Accounts Committee, the Westminster, to the positional way that it would have overall sight of this, as we do here, that it is represented in that. Thank you. Can I ask Eleanor Ryan? Are there any concerns that the Auditor General raises in her report that you disagree with? We have no fundamental disagreement with any of Audit Scotland's points. We will happily represent them yet again in the conversations with. With UK officials, but we recognise that Treasury officials are also in discussion with the National Audit Office, and there may well be comments from the Public Accounts Committee as well, so that the eventual framework is likely to be a compromise amongst all the points of view expressed. So, we're likely to see that Auditor General's concerns reflected in the next draft or final draft. I can undertake that we will feed them back and we will seek to have them reflected. I can't guarantee that that will be the outcome of the discussion. Do members have any further questions for our witnesses this morning? I thank you very much for your evidence. I now close the Audit Committee to the public session.