 Hello and welcome to Mapping Fault Lines, a show by Newsclick, where we discuss some of the major geopolitical developments across the world, as well as its impact on the region. Today, we are joined by Ambassador MK Badrakumar, and we are going to talk about the Russia-Turkey deal that was signed yesterday, that is March 5th, on the situation in Syria. Thank you so much, Ambassador, for joining. Thank you. Thank you for inviting me. So, yesterday, we saw that President Putin and President Erdogan had a meeting, and there was an agreement at the conclusion of that meeting. And it basically laid the ground for a ceasefire after months of conflict in Idlib and Syria. Now, there were earlier been ceasefires as well. There was one in Astana. There was one in Sochi. There were agreements, at least. And those agreements never really came into fruition, and there was a fresh attack by the Syrian army. So, what was a specific requirement for this agreement at this point of time? Because also, why did the sides, especially Syria and Russia, agree to it, considering that they actually made advances in the offensive? To my mind, the ground was not prepared well enough for this summit or meeting, whatever. But both sides, Russia was, first of all, reluctant about this. Erdogan floated this idea when Steve floated the idea. Erdogan said that they have no such plans to arrange a meeting. And then Erdogan became rather rowdy in the last two weeks, sending more troops, weaponry, and then shooting left, right, killing Syrians and shooting down Syrian planes and all that. And it almost seemed that a flush point is arising. But that's something that neither side wants, neither Erdogan nor Russians want, regardless of what the Syrians are doing, they're very careful. So then the Russians said that we are considering a meeting. This is how the meeting took place. It must be very clearly understood. There's a parallel move also where Erdogan to see if he could get Macron and Angela Merkel and Putin together to discuss. Putin's point blank said that they are not interested in that because that would have been really to put pressure on Putin. So this much has to be understood in the beginning. It was a reluctantly arranged summit. And usually it's in the nature of summit that there will be some kind of ground preparations. Nothing was done. So this became evident if you look closely at it. The body language was very poor at the press conference. And these are two statesmen who have a very warm personal relationship. Nothing of that was there when they appeared after six hours of talk. And Erdogan just blurted out very openly that they had very frank discussions, which means that short of quarreling and hitting at each other, they had irreconcilable differences. This is what he said. And I was watching Putin's face at that time. It was very grim. One or two things I'll just mention. Then within no time of Erdogan's departure from Moscow, he probably was in the air. He hadn't even reached Turkey. The Russian Sputnik, which belongs to RT and Kremlin-funded media agency, they already put out a podcast calling this just political fiction, this summit. So this is just about summit. So what was the conclusion of that Sputnik piece that this ceasefire is not going to last? We don't need to analyze that the Russian side is very candid about it. And even the Turkish side openly says that the differences are so profound. But as I said earlier, neither of them wants this to go into a confrontation. If Erdogan had another option, such as, for example, NATO support or NATO intervention or US intervention, he might have gladly taken it. And in that case, they might have been a different kind of a showdown with faceoff with Russia. But much as they are encouraging Erdogan to have a scuffle with Putin, they are also wary of him because of his mercurial nature and his policies are completely antithetical to Western interests. So they are not in a tearing hurry. Let me put it like that to get involved in it on his side. So that's a restraining factor for him. So he has no option because he can't take on Russia himself. He knows the limitations. But he can make things difficult for Russia. And Russians also know it that Putin is very sincere about his wish to end this war. To 2015, they intervened. And there's much expenditure involved in it, financial underwriting this one. And Assad came almost within sight of a total victory. And Putin at one point even said that the war is over. But now what is developing is the specter that is haunting Russia is also that there could be a quagmire. Everything is suddenly up in the air. This is the summing up of the summit from a bird's eye view that you get. So to talk a bit more on the situation on the ground, so we have one of the key agreements of the summit was that there would be a buffer zone around the M4 highway. And this has been one of the key concerns as far as Syria's concern, how to make sure that the M4 and M4, M5 highways, which are a vital strategic importance, are completely under their control. So this does seem a step in that direction if the ceasefire, if this agreement holds to any extent, the buffer zone itself and the joint patrols. You see, if you just go through this document very carefully, you will find that there are lots of ambiguities there. Evidently, these ideas have not been fleshed out. Now big questions come up here. One is, are the Turks still holding on to their stance that the Syrians must retreat to the line beyond their so-called observation towers, 12 observation towers, that is the line that was drawn by the Sochi agreements before this offensive began? Or if this patrolling takes place, does it imply that the territories which have been regained by the government forces, Syrian government forces, will continue to be in their position, or rather in other words, that this is going to be, that they are freezing the situation on the ground and a new normal is coming to prevail there. This is a very important distinction. Now it doesn't throw much light on that. And on this, if this document had mentioned something about the status of this observation post, we could have deduced, but it is completely silent on that. So by March 15 or something, the defense establishments, defense ministries of the two sides are supposed to flesh this out. By then we may get a better picture. But if the Russian assessments is that the ceasefire is not going to hold, all this is hypothetical. Now this joint patrolling idea is not new in the Russian-Turkish tango. It, at least as you know, is in the northwestern part. Now there is the northeastern part, Euphrateside, where at one time Trump said that he was withdrawing the troops and the Americans withdrew. And into that vacuum, Russians were very smart. They just moved in with the Syrian forces. So the Syrian forces are there and then in October last year, Turks and the Russians worked out an agreement for joint patrolling. But joint patrolling takes place, but Syrians are present there on the border. Is this also going to be on the same pattern? Is, in other words, the question, big question. Then another aspect is there is complete silence about Al Qaeda, you know, in this one. So the Turks have not committed themselves. You see, as far as I can see all that considering that, you know, they had a profound relationship with the Al Qaeda groups. You know, these fellows who are now under some other name in Idlib, they essentially they rebranded themselves. So it's not a very difficult thing to do. Putin can, I mean, everyone can give word that they will now do more forcefully. And these groups can just disband and reappear tomorrow day after tomorrow under some other name and the show can continue. In fact, the Russians themselves have openly said also Russian commentaries that they expect these people because, you know, now the Turkish troops are operating almost embedded with the groups, the rebel groups. That's how they got killed. This 33, some people say up to 100 people got killed. So all they do is they disband these people and give them Turkish uniforms. You cannot make out. Al Qaeda groups can operate again, you know, there. So there is no certainty as to the basic, the fundamental Russian argument that the Sochi agreements never really gave any kind of a leeway for the Al Qaeda groups to operate. These are groups which are in the terrorist list of America, United Nations, Russia and even Turkey. So the Syrian government forces are only acting against a terrorist group which has been permitted under the Sochi agreement. So you see there is a lot of sophistry there in the Syrian position, in the Turkish position and there how they are going to perform in the coming period bears watch. So according to what you're saying, what it looks like is maybe a couple of, at the best, a couple of weeks or maybe a month of ceasefire for the Syrian soldiers to sort of get reinforcements, some rejuvenation and then probably launch a fresh offensive against some of those areas. It's a very valid point, you know, that Russians also may have settled for this because the Syrians have been moving at great speed and frankly I think that they are fallen short of expectations in the sense that the Turks have reinforced and have brought in very modern weaponry into it. And you know the Turks are one of the, they have one of the best stockpiles of drone attack aircrafts. So they have moved in a lot of them, weaponry into that. So they have a lot of firepower today and something like 7,000, 8,000 regular Turkish troops are inside. So you see the Syrians, Russians also would be keen to see that the Syrians consolidate. See there is a theory that, you know, that the Russians influence on Assad is not total and there could be problems between Russia and Syria. I don't much lend credence to it. I think they synchronize well, they communicate with each other well and they have a big picture. There are no doubt about it. So the Russians also may have thought that it will be useful for the Syrians to get some time to consolidate there. So finally it leaves Erdogan in a very difficult position because if the offensive is to resume soon, he either has to commit more of his soldiers, more of his forces and resources into what could be a all-out war or he has to deal with the withdrawal of all these elements and he has to find out ways to accommodate them which is actually likely to be a big crisis. You know, in my opinion, they are actually sailing in the same boat that neither of them is in a position to compromise on this. First let me mention the Russian side. What will happen if the Russian side listening to please by Erdogan, if they retreat, as I said, Turkish performance on the Al-Qaeda front has been very dismal. Now if that repeats, then what will happen is and those Al-Qaeda groups, by the way, are not only getting support from Turkey, they are also getting support from Western intelligence agencies and there are reports that even the American supplies are coming to them, to these groups, which is a very terrible thing to say, you know, if that is really the case, but you know, such things happen in Syria. So if that is the case, then what will happen is those ships will keep firing now, missiles and things at the Russian bases and other places. So then Russians will have to either attack them, vanquish them, if they vanquish them, this kind of a confrontation can take place. And now the Russian control over the airspace, Syrian airspace is being steadily challenged by the Turks. So then the Russians actually get bogged down in a quagmire there. And on the other hand, if they do it like this, it can damage the relationship with Turkey seriously. And I think we are getting somewhere close to that. And despite their wishes, the relationship is getting damaged and there is a trust deficit developing. For example, Russians say that these 34 soldiers that you mentioned were killed by the Syrians and Syrian jets, Syrian missiles and so on. The Turks also are saying, on the one hand they are saying that they were killed by the Syrians, so they are badgering the Syrians. But on the other hand, they know very well and most people believe that they were actually killed by the Russian jets. But so Turks don't say the Russian jets because in that case, retaliation has to be against Russia. So this sort of situation is there. When you come to the Turkish side, in fairness to Erdogan, he is having a problem there. It's no small number, 3.7 million people as refugees. And they are putting a lot of pressure on the social sectors, economy, and Turks are not liking it. Turks means the natives are not liking it. So Erdogan's popularity is sliding down. And this intervention in Syria has become controversial in Turkey. When a closed door session of the parliament took place last week, the big rioting took place in the parliament chamber, opposition and government. That is the kind of heated arguments and so on ensued. So that is the kind of polarization that has taken place within Turkey. So he has to act because if more people come and according to the United Nations, over a million people are somewhere near the Turkish border threatening to come in. That is there. And then he's not getting any support, as I mentioned earlier from the western country, so he's on his own. And let us face it, it's a neighboring country. For Russia, it's not a neighboring country. Russia is involved there in terms of fighting the terror groups. But for Erdogan, it is the neighboring country. And in all this, ultimately, the core issue is the Kurdish problem. That is lurking there. And they are in control of vast tracks in northern Syria. And they have American support. And that area is out of bounds for Turks and Russians and Syrians and everyone. So a kind of a Kurdistan is forming there. That is what is some for Turks. So you see, I don't think it is so much imperial ambitions, Ottoman ambitions, land grab. I don't think it is that. Their concerns are quite genuine. But I don't see how a compromise is possible because the Russians cannot stand in the way of the Syrians when Assad says that he's determined to reunite the country. Yes, reunite the country. It's a very legitimate ambition. So this is how it is. So both sides are in a predicament. Now, if this continues for some time, what will happen? I think the Americans are wanting some definitive indications of a willingness on the part of Erdogan to break with the Russians. And they are waiting for that. And one signal that they have already hindered, if Turks can resile from their S-400 missile deal with the Russians, then anything is possible. So you see, pushed to a point, I think Erdogan has already changed course from his look East policy. He is going back to the Western powers, his natural allies. And that option is there. And that happens is very difficult to foresee what happens. Because there is a NATO involvement, then it becomes a first rate world crisis. Because NATO was Russia kind of thing. NATO doesn't want it. Thank you so much, Ambassador. That's all we have time for today. Keep watching Newsclick.