 I'd actually want to go a bit broader. OK. Looking at it from a food security perspective, and of course, the environmental aspect is part of that, because we cannot feed ourselves if we don't have a healthy environment. And I'll try to be short, so you're allowed to cut me if you feel I'm taking up too much time and not leaving enough time for the debate. Very briefly, I think the context being very well set by the two previous speakers in terms of presenting the EU proposal and showing the effects, the situation on the ground in specific countries. But just to place it in a global perspective, I think we have to recognize that we face unprecedented challenges. That has to do with one in seven people that are suffering hunger in the world. It has to do with the prospects of a global population that's going to grow to $9 billion, but we have to increase food production by 70% by the middle of the century. We're in the middle of what seems to be something that's there to stay. What the FAO has labeled it as the longest sustained cyclical rise in food prices in 50 years. So basically, it seems we've left a long period of relatively low and stable food prices to enter a long period of high and unpredictable food prices. And those prices, according to models that have been produced for Oxfam are set to rise 70% to 90% for the main food crops without factoring in climate change that's starting to set in and that could double those increases again. And then finally, as was given with the case of Kenya, we're dealing with the problem of the limits of the resources we have in the environment. We have a depleting land and water resource space. In its 2012 report, the FAO says that basically, the best land is already in use or is very difficult to access. And a quarter of the agricultural land in the world is very severely degraded. So that's the world we live in. And I know it's very, very, very remote from the discussions that are taking place for the moment in the ad hoc ILOC working group in Brussels, as it's called. But I would wish that this kind of context would be conveyed because that's the kind of things we have to put into our minds when we take the policy decisions for the next 10, 20 years. And I will try to make the link with the concrete commission proposals and try to look at three main aspects. The first one is the issue of food prices. The commission said when it tabled its proposal that it wants to set a limit on biofuels made from food crops because those biofuels are at the same time high in direct land use change biofuels. So basically, I don't know, killing two birds with one stone. I don't know if you can say that in English. So the commission explicitly put the issue of food, competition with food on the table. So I think it's worth to take just a minute to look at that. I think that if you look at any agricultural reporting nowadays, there's no report without a chapter on biofuels. Biofuels has simply become a new market fundamental in the agricultural sector. The latest FAO report on the state of the global food and agriculture says the biofuels sector has been the largest source of new demand for agricultural production in the past decades and represents a new market fundamental affecting prices of all cereals. The question, of course, is whether production will keep up with demand in the coming years. At the EU level, it's basically the same. The latest report was published in January by DG Agriculture. It's a report that dates from December of 2012 that looks at the agricultural prospects for the EU for the next 10 years, so 2012, 2022. What does DG Agri say? It says that when looking at the prices of agricultural commodities, biofuels are the most dynamic demand factor for the EU market. And secondly, looking at the land angle, DG Agri sees that there's been an oil seeds production boom, so an expansion in the land that's dedicated to oil seeds in the EU. Together with that, despite that increase in EU production of oil seeds, EU remains a very strong net importer of soy and palm. So that has to do, of course, with biodiesel. Because as you probably know, the EU fuel market is very much a diesel market. So it's about 80% diesel. And that's why oil seeds and vegetable oils are so important. Just to give you an idea, the share of biofuel feedstock demand in the overall EU agricultural output. The top line there is the vegetable oil. So according to the December report of DG Agri, we use currently between 14% and 50% of our vegetable oil to put into our cars, basically to make diesel. If you look at the sugar, the sugar beet, it's 15%. If you look at wheat and other cereals, it's between 5% and 10%. And that's, of course, a schedule to rise as we progress towards our 2020 objectives. That graph illustrates the phenomenon of the incredible rise in EU biodiesel production. So that's the red line or the very steep line. And together with that, we see that the vegetable oil imports have also increased accordingly. And that, I mean, we can have long discussions on what exactly is the impact of this policy on food prices. But I would hope that nobody would contest that this is a fundamental factor in determining agricultural prices. I mean, that's just simply not impossible to negate that. The question is, how do you measure and predict the impacts? And that's very difficult. There's a lot of models out there in studies trying to predict the impacts of biofuels mandates, either globally or the EU. And the ranges between the studies are quite wide. So the Institute of European Environmental Policy has done a review of the studies out there. And you see that the brackets are very wide. So according to where you stand, what your interest is, you're going to use the 5%, for example, for vegetable oils, or the 36%, depending what your interests are or who you're defending. So let's forget about those studies for a moment. And let's go back to the most recent source, which is the DG Agri report of last month. And it's a very peculiar report, because it seems that they've been trying very hard to hide the figures they've come up with. So you need to reconstruct, because they don't give you the actual baseline. I won't get into the details. But they give you figures if the EU reaches the 20% and if the EU stays with 5% following the proposal that's on the table of the commission now. So basically, why did I put vegetable oil plus 10, plus 4? The 10% is what DG Agri says that would be a lesser price increase if the commission proposal is adopted. So basically, if we don't go to 10%, but we go to 5%, DG Agri says the prices of vegetable oil will rise. The rise in those prices will be less than 10%. So we can assume that the price impact of the situation now and reaching the 10% now is just below the 5% of EU energy is an increase in 10% of the prices. Sorry, it's 10 plus 4. Because actually in 2020, according to DG Agri, we're not going to reach exactly the 10%. We're going to reach 8.7. So sorry, the additional impact to reach the 10% is 10 plus 4. So it's 14% price increase. For cereals, they don't put all the figures in there. But again, we have 2 and 1 half. That's the difference between the 8.7 they predict in 2020 and the 5% that's on the table by the commission. But they don't give those additional figures that can tell you the difference between the current situation and the full 10%. Anyways, I think that this shows that despite the very wide-ranging studies and what they say, I would say a source that's certainly not anti-buy fuels comes up with very, very significant price differentials. Going on to the aspect of land, which is the second very, very important issue. And I'll move very quickly because David gave examples. There's been a major project that's been going on for a couple of years that's really done a global survey of land deals. And it's called the Land Matrix, which is a joint project of universities and various organizations. So if you look only at the cross-reference deals, so the reliable sources, it deals the amount to the surface of Germany plus 10 million hectares. So it's close to 55 million hectares. So that's much bigger than the Federal Republic of Germany. The key drivers, by I feel, is one of the key drivers. And it falls into three categories. The example that Jatroffa was given, those are non-food crops. That's 26% of the deals. If you had the flex crops, which is a very, very important market, so that soybean, sugarcane, palm oil, that's another 23%. And then deals for multiple uses, that's 17%. So again, you can discuss about the exact percentage, but just the sheer scale tells you that biofuels is, again, a new fundamental in the global rush for land. All these deals are mostly export-oriented. Local markets are a marginal concern, and we've seen the example now in Kenya. The preferred countries that are targeted are countries with high incidence of hunger and weak land institutions, we've seen that. And with densely populated areas, so high competition for land, very low competition, and no consultation of the populations. That's a global phenomenon. So moving very quickly now onto the ILOC. I don't want to bore you with two technical stuff, but again, this does have to do with food security. It has to do with greenhouse accounting. It's essential. So basically, what's on the table by the Commission now is just ILOC reporting. So we have an ILOC proposal without ILOC factors. So the Commission has said, we're not going to add what the models tell us ILOC is producing in terms of additional emissions. We're just going to ask countries to report on them. And that makes a huge difference. So basically, the light blue shading above, these are all biofuel feedstocks. The ILOC amounts to everything in light blue. And the lines are basically, so the top line is the fossil fuel comparator. And the two lines below are the thresholds. So with ILOC, basically, several biofuels are just more polluting than fossil fuels, especially the biodiesels is very banned from an ILOC perspective. This also has to do with food prices, because how do you reach ILOC? ILOC is basically the gross area of land that you grow. You withdraw the byproducts for animal feeds. You withdraw the increase in yields, because higher prices, in some cases, also lead to more investment and higher productivity. And you reduce also the surface, because there's less food consumption because of higher prices. And actually, that share of lesser food consumption is a very important part of the reduction of the area. So this graph shows you the ILOC with, if you take into account the reduction in food consumption, which the models do, and which the proposal of the commission does, it's basically you're taking a huge share of ILOC off from the table. Now, what does that mean in terms of food security? That means that a lesser food price impact is not necessarily something good. It means that it might actually be worse for food security. If you have relatively lower increases in food prices, that might mean that there's relatively higher reduction in food consumption. So we should be careful when we fight about what exactly is the impact on food prices, even if we come to the conclusion that it's a relatively low increase in food prices, that might translate in very adverse effects in terms of food security. So I'd like to conclude very briefly. The basic policy options to promote food security that have been put forward by international organizations are site two sources, there's many others. There's an interagency report of 2011 by all major international institutions on food price volatility. The first policy recommendation they make to G20 governments is to remove subsidies and buy fuels mandates, so blending obligations. The second very important source is the UN Committee on World Food Security. They've produced one report and they're finalizing a second. The first one is on price volatility. Again, the first recommendation is to... The first objective to curb demand is to stop mandated incorporation of buy fuel and financial support. In their report on buy fuels, they're finalizing in the draft. They say, again, the same thing, reduced food consumption by the food insecure is substantial and could be extremely substantial. As a conclusion, what international institutions tell us, if you translate those international recommendations into EU language, that would mean very clearly that we should remove the 10% binding target for renewable energy and we should remove subsidies for buy fuels that compete with food for land and water. What that means in terms of amending the Renewable Energy Directive and the Fuel Quality Directive, what we think that means is the following, and I think we can discuss that, I'll just run you over it. We think we need a genuine cap on the use of land-based buy fuels. A genuine cap means that the cap applies not only to the Renewable Energy Directive, as the Commission now proposes, but also to the Fuel Quality Directive. Second thing is that the cap should be subsumed under the Sustainability Criteria. Currently it's not. That means that state aid is allowed above the cap, which means that we do not know what the effect of that accounting limit will be. And it's very clear, for example, in that Digi Agri report, they predict that we will go above the level anyway. And then we need actually lower cap. If the Commission is serious about saying after 2020 there should be no more support for these buy fuels, then we should phase them out and have a trajectory towards a phase out of those unsustainable buy fuels. And then finally, of course, we need correct greenhouse gas accounting. And that means settling the question of ILOC models one and for all. Once and for all, there's no perfect model. We just need to settle on one, the best available science, and then update the models every, for example, every five years. And then finally, the latest thing is that the current proposal does nothing to fill the very big gaps in terms of the social environment sustainability criteria that are in the legislation. The current legislation basically only has very limited sustainability requirements that have to do with carbon stocks, forests, and highly diverse areas. Says nothing on other environmental sustainability criteria like water pollution, which is a huge problem, affects the livelihoods of communities enormously, and says nothing on social impact. So for example, food prices or land and water rights. That should also be fixed in the RED and the FQD. Thank you very much. I'm very sorry I had to rush you through.