 Welcome to part two of our discussion on Kashmir. We are joined today by Professor Mohammad Jened, who is a Kashmiri scholar, activist, and cultural anthropologist. He is also assistant professor at the Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts. Thank you so much for joining us, Professor Jened. So continuing our conversation, and we sort of left off of sort of talking about Kashmiri aspirations, because again, most of the discourse around Kashmir and what should happen to Kashmir is centered around Pakistani and Indian perspectives. So you've talked a little bit about what Kashmiri aspirations are, and it's primarily for independence, and like an independent entity. Can you talk a little bit about the role of the plebiscite that was sort of introduced way back in 1947, and then in various UN Security Council resolutions, that the people of Kashmir through a referendum should be able to decide what their future should be. And initially, I believe in 1949, India had tried to hold that plebiscite, but India and Pakistan could not agree to the rules of the plebiscite. If it does happen, it will have to happen in all of Kashmir. So Pakistani administered Kashmir, and also Indian administered Kashmir. Now, this is something that Pakistan has over the years pushed for as well. And I'm wondering what your notion is in terms of what Kashmiris think about having a plebiscite. Is that something that still resonates with them? And is that a realistic option to pursue? So as I said, the accession of the Maharaja, not Kashmiris, but the Maharaja with the Indian state was conditioned on the fact that there would be a referendum. This was reflected later on when India took the case to the United Nations, and it was reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 47. It called for several steps. One was the immediate ceasefire between India and Pakistan, which took place in 1949. It called for demilitarization on both sides. On Pakistani side, it was supposed to be complete. On the Indian side, it was supposed to leave a minimum number of troops enough to maintain law and order, but very minimum and eventually full demilitarization. And finally, the holding of lebiscite under UN auspices. Now, this would have taken place. The ceasefire took place, but demilitarization did not take place. Demilitarization would have taken place on the Pakistani side if India had agreed that they would hold up lebiscite. As soon as the ceasefire took place, India started retracing its steps and did not accept Kashmir as a dispute. In fact, it started negotiating with national conference leadership to find constitutional ways to integrate Kashmir with India. The Article 370 that you mentioned earlier was simply a reflection of those negotiations and carried some of the spirit of the accession, the three areas that I mentioned earlier, defense, communication, and external affairs. And while Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of National Conference, had assumed that India was going to hold up lebiscite, India never conducted lebiscite in Kashmir. And it clearly had no intention of conducting such a lebiscite, because in 1953, it immediately arrested Sheikh Abdullah on the charges that he was conspiring to claim independence. Since that time, Kashmiris have, of course, spoken about lebiscite as the bedrock of their politics in many ways, because what the UN Security Council resolutions did was it acknowledged Kashmiris as a people, that they were visible in that resolution, which means that their will had to be registered. Now, how that will was supposed to be registered could be done in a variety of ways. If India and Pakistan had agreed that that will would be paramount, the will of Kashmiris, as it should have been, then it could be done regionally. It could have been done across different boundaries. I mean, and from that time on, you have had many solutions. We know that Kashmir, the historic state of Kashmir, was also geographically diverse. In some parts, like what was called Kylgid-Baltistan, majority may have favored to remain part of Pakistan. And what became Jammu after the massacres of 1947, perhaps may want to be the Hindu majority area, may want to be remain part of India. But rest of the state could have, perhaps, either if they wanted to decide to go to Pakistan, decide to go with India, or remain independent. Right, right. So there are a variety of solutions. Different configurations, wherever possible. So you think that it can still actually happen. If we have regional, sort of like mini-referendums within the different sub-regions of Kashmir, both Pakistan administered and Kashmir administered, that can still happen. I mean, that is something that is considered a realistic option even today. Yes, I mean, why shouldn't it be? I mean, it's a huge territory. It has a long history of being autonomous and independent. It is a pluralistic place. And it can govern itself, you know? And there should be no problem in assuming that it's not realistic. I mean, I think the only unrealistic thing is to assume that the present state of war will continue forever. I mean, you have two countries, India and Pakistan, who are at each other's throats, both armed with nuclear weapons. And I mean, we know as Kashmiris that if that war took place, well, that will happen. And it's bleeding both countries. These are like some of the poorest countries in the world. Despite all the hoopla about GDPs and whatnot, they are really poor. And they're spending fortunes to hold on to a region that does not want to be part of them. Absolutely. And so when we're talking again about the Kashmiri people and their aspirations, and when you imagine an independent entity, you would imagine something that includes both Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Indian-administered Kashmir, right? Or are you imagining independence just for Indian-administered Kashmir? I'd like for you to sort of talk a little bit about the relations between Kashmiris on the Indian side of the border and those on the Pakistani side of the border. And whether there's any cross-LOC contacts, are there families that have been broken up because of this line of control? And what would they like to see in terms of more relations sort of increasing in the next few years? So listening to activists and scholars who have worked in what is called Azad Kashmir, which is the Pakistani-administered side of Kashmir, there is a diversity of views. Some people see the condition of Kashmiris on the other side and think they probably lucked out and are with Pakistan. A number of other groups and people on that side might actually express a desire to unify with Kashmir and create an independent space in a country on their own. That region has also a diversity of people. There are Kashmiris-speaking people. There are Bahri-speaking people. And they have a history of staying together. And 1947 did break families. Like, you had a house here, the line was drawn by this military conflict and your lands were on this side. There are a lot of people who have been displaced, in fact, from 1990 to 2015, more than 35,000 people have been displaced. From in 1965 to 1971 wars, another 50,000 were displaced. Not to mention the half a million I mentioned earlier in 1947. So yeah, this line of control is artificial, it divides families, it bisects a region that has a history of being together. Yeah, and there have been multiple rounds of negotiations between India and Pakistan around Kashmir. I think that perhaps the one that went far this was the one in 2006 between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bravesh Musharraf. And they had sort of talked about sort of making this line of control a soft border where people from Kashmiris from both sides of the border sort of, you know, interact with one another, they could have free trade, they could be a lot of freedom of movement of people and that they would sort of, both countries would draw down their military forces. Because of domestic turmoil that Bravesh Musharraf was experiencing because of something completely separate those negotiations were then derailed. Do you think that is something that would be acceptable to the Kashmiri people? As an interim solution, everything could be on the table, you know, there are no hard lines. Of course, this is not a permanent situation. You know, we know that no solution can be imposed on Kashmiris where they don't have a say. Right, so I wanted to actually ask about that. So I mean, there have been so many multiple rounds of negotiations between the two countries. Have they included Kashmiri voices, Kashmiri civil society, Kashmiri leaders within those discussions, those dialogues? No, so I mean, Kashmir is like still like, you know, even in Pakistan imagined as bilateral dispute within between India and Pakistan, you know, or internationally it's seen as international dispute between India and Pakistan. But really it's a dispute between Kashmiris on one side and Pakistan and India on the other side, you know, and Kashmiri people and all the peoples of Kashmir, not just Kashmiri Muslims, have demanded at the seat at the table that, you know, you sit on the other side and resolve your issues, but you have to negotiate with us because we are the primary party to this question. I mean, it's our land, it's our history, it's our people, it's our future that you are discussing. And we cannot let you, your bureaucrats, decide our fate. Even in those negotiations that you mentioned between Manmohan Singh and Parvez Mousharov, there was hardly any input from Kashmiris, you know, and those solutions are not workable. Sure, they're not sustainable. They're not sustainable because Kashmiris do not give the assent to such imposed, you know, solutions. And is there any coordination between, you know, Kashmiris that are elected to the State Assembly in Pakistan, administered Kashmir, and those in not necessarily the political leadership in Kashmir, but other, you know, resistance leaders? Is there any coordination in terms of, like, you know, having a united front to sort of put forth if such negotiations were to take place and they were invited, or do you feel like there is not that much collaboration around those things? I don't know how much legitimacy the Pakistani-administered Kashmir Assembly has in that region. In Indian's control side, it has very limited legitimacy, too. In both, on both sides, to be able to contest elections, you have to pledge allegiance to the Indian or the Pakistani constitution. You know, I mean, when you are contesting sovereignty in this region and you pledge allegiance to the sovereignty of these countries, you clearly are not representing the interests of your own people. Right, right. Yeah, you know, so I don't think, I mean, not that there is any coordination possible, you know. I don't think they have a fully representative character. Right. So let's talk about Pakistan for a second, because we've talked quite a bit about India and India's role in Indian-administered Kashmir. So Pakistan has one-third of the territory, right? It's had since 1947. And so not only does it control that, but it has, since the very beginning, been very much involved in what's happening in Indian-administered Kashmir as well. And so, right, I mean, again, from when the, in October 1947, when Bhattan tribesmen went into Kashmir, and there was a lot of looting and plundering that was done, it's still somewhat debatable whether the Pakistani government was behind it or the military or whether it was just like, you know, a spontaneous sort of movement of these Bhattan tribesmen into Kashmir. Then in 1965, there was also Operation Gibraltar that was orchestrated by the Pakistani military, where it sent in 30,000 military and paramilitary forces that then triggered the 1965 war. And then again, in 1999, cargo happened. Again, when there was incursion by Pakistani military forces into Indian-administered Kashmir. So I'd like to sort of ask what Kashmiris think about Pakistan's role in Indian-administered Kashmir. And then we can also talk a little bit about how Pakistan governs its own territory of Kashmir. But if you could talk about how Kashmiris feel about Pakistan's role, has it hindered or helped their sort of movement for self-determination? Can you give us an evaluation of that? Yeah, so, I mean, of course, Pakistan is not an external actor in this case, you know. It has interest in the peace in the region because some of the most vital resources is water, flows from Kashmir into Pakistan. And in recent years, and for a pretty long time, India has kind of threatened Pakistan with blocking that water, which will be devastating downstream. Pakistan has launched, as you mentioned, several of these incursions, which have mostly been unsuccessful and unemendful. I mean, I do wanna push back against the initial, the so-called Kabali raid and that looting and plundering. I think some of that may have been disorganized and chaos, and that was taking place. But a lot of that representation is an Indian representation of that, you know. I mean, of course, they were interested in presenting them as, you know, savage rebels. I mean, it's just to make a case for their own military intervention in Kashmir. Indian military actions in Kashmir have been no less looting, plundering and looting as well. Oh, of course, of course. You know, for Kashmiris, Pakistan has been partly nuisance because Kashmiris think that Pakistan does not understand Kashmir very well. They're unaware of Kashmir's history, our unique cultural traditions, our, you know, we're not part of that partition logic. You know, we don't think necessarily in terms of Hindus and Muslims. Our aspirations were different. They were not, yes, we were suppressed as Muslims by the Hindu Maharaja, but these struggles were also class-based. You know, so our aspirations from 1940s, 1930s onwards have been very different from the Pakistani elite aspirations. On the other hand, we also know that India is not a benign power. You know, especially with the rise of Hindu nationalism, and that story goes way back to the late 19th century and early 20th century and the formation of India itself. We know from the very beginning that Indian nationalism has acted malignantly and Kashmir tried to squelch away, take away any shred of autonomy and our rights. And for those reasons, many Kashmiris think of Pakistan as like an ally, you know, which has our back. Like India would have, for instance, gobbled us up like the Chinese did in Xinjiang and everywhere if the Pakistani state hadn't been there. So it's like this twin dilemma that we have. On one side, we know that Pakistan is indispensable. Otherwise, India is gonna completely absorb us and take away all of our lands and resources. On the other hand, we know that the Pakistani elite and its military act gormlessly about Kashmir. Like, you know, its support seems to be tied up with this notion that Kashmir banega Pakistan, which means Kashmir will become Pakistan. And I think that's self-defeating. Nobody in the world understands that logic. Why would Kashmir become Pakistan? Right, but that is a narrative that is dominant in Pakistani society and what we've grown up with. And I feel like that really suppresses the voice of the independent Kashmiri voice that needs to come through and doesn't often in Pakistani society. So also, when we let's talk about Pakistan-administered Kashmir as well. I don't know whether you've ever been there, you grew up on the other side, but what do you, again, you had sort of mentioned this a little bit earlier about that assembly or people who are elected over there. There's a 53-member assembly on the Pakistani side that is elected as a uni-cameral legislature. But you believe that it doesn't have a lot of legitimacy. So can you sort of elaborate on that? I didn't mean to say that it does not have any legitimacy, but what I know is that to be able to contest elections on that side of the border, you have to pledge allegiance to Pakistan. You cannot be a member of a party that seeks independence and unification. So at that level, it does not really, I mean, I don't know how much they represent the aspirations of those people. But in terms of like, are they representative? Are the elections free and fair, perhaps? In terms of whether they will be able to be on the negotiating table discussing Kashmir sovereignty at some point, I don't know if they will have any legitimacy to be speaking as Kashmiris. In the same way, the legislative assembly in Kashmir, and will they have a place on the table negotiating Kashmiri sovereignty, how can they when they have aligned themselves with the Indian state? Sure, sure, sure, and also in the Pakistani side, you've also heard and there've been reports of Kashmiri activists who've been intimidated, harassed and subject to surveillance if they have aspired for an independent Kashmir. So that's something that's also ongoing. So I'd like to sort of end with again the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. Where do you think the best hope for self-determination lies when it comes to the people of Kashmir? Is it through the political process? Is it through India-Paktsa negotiations? Is it through a plebiscite? Or is it in the resistance movement itself? Where do you think the best hope for the Kashmiri people lies? So I think the hope lies in South Asia itself. We have to reimagine South Asia. Of course, India and Pakistan work and continue forever. I mean, they are willing to annihilate each other. Uh-huh. I'm so sorry about this. Yes. The hope lies in the South Asian context where the two countries are not at loggerheads with each other. They're not at each other's throats. And I mean, so the solution is regional. Kashmiri independence cannot survive on its own if India and Pakistan do not come to an agreement. Kashmiri resistance is at present defensive. Kashmiris are trying to defend themselves. They're not trying to hurt anyone. They're under assault from the Indian state primarily right now. And so that's what they're trying to do, defend themselves. We have to reimagine South Asia. It's a place of great poverty. It's a great place of great inequality. India itself is like one of the most unequal societies in the world. It's been taken over by a vicious ideology of the Hindutva. While the Pakistani state itself has flirted with Islamist groups at different times. And none of them provide hope for the people anywhere in that region. And so Kashmiris are hoping. And this is what I believe the majority of the people in Kashmir think that the solution to the issue of Kashmir lies if India and Pakistan become better. That instead of hurting each other, they can try to turn inwards and look at the problems that they are facing. That instead of buying weapons from all of these countries who are egging them on, spending valuable resources and material resources on things like that, that they just withdraw. India does not need to occupy Kashmir. India does not need to spend its fortune holding on to a territory that does not want to be part of it. But with the BJP administration as it currently stands, do you feel like there's any hope for change, any hope for dialogue or negotiations either with the Kashmiri leadership or with Pakistan? Well, these formations like RSS, BJP, and all of these, they've emerged also as an effect of what is happening. The way nationalism has emerged in South Asia, especially India, as an ideology opposed to not only Pakistan, not only Kashmiris, but Indian Muslims themselves. So it defines now itself against the interests of Muslims. And we know that between Pakistan, Kashmir, and Indian Muslims, this is a population of around probably 400 million people. And how can that last? How can that continue? We are talking about one-fifth of the world's population here, so it's self-defeating. And I don't have any hope, of course, with Modi. He's just the worst nightmare that has happened to India itself. I mean, as Kashmiris, we've faced the Indian state in its various manifestations. We've seen Indian crackdowns before. This is not new. But I think that India itself is like facing an existential crisis right now under Modi and Hindutva. Do you think with all of the conflict that's happening communal, issues that have erupted in India after the citizenship laws and with Muslims being attacked and targeted, more recently, people are no longer focused as much on Kashmir? Perhaps, I think that in the West, where attention spans run low, it may be the case. But Kashmir has always not attracted too much attention in the West, unless Indian Pakistan are at the brink of a nuclear war. But that has not determined the dynamics of the Kashmir issue. Kashmir issue is not an issue because of media attention. Kashmir issue is an issue because of the Kashmiri people demanding their rights and demanding their political and economic and social rights. So yes, that may be the case. But the new protests in India, the assault and the pogroms against Muslims, especially the recent pogrom in Delhi, only go on to show that the state of exception that has been created in Kashmir, the violence that has been honed and in Kashmir is now being exported to India itself. The guns are now being trained on minorities, Dalits, Muslims. So same tactics that were used in Kashmir are being used elsewhere, which I think should wake up if there are any reasonable Indians left, which I believe are many of them. They should fight it to their nail and not let their country slide into fascism, as it seems like it's almost falling off the deep end. I know. And we can only imagine where all of this will end. But we can only hope and pray that the Kashmiri people find the self-determination that they've been fighting so hard for for the past 73 years. So on that note, we'd have to conclude our program. Thank you so much, Professor Jinneet, for your insights. And with that, we will end our program today. Thank you so much for joining us.