 Well thank you very much, Rory, and many thanks to the National Security College and ANU for including me in this conference. I of course have to start with the usual disclaimer that my remarks today are my own and do not represent the views of the United States government or any government agency or any other entity. Sometimes I throw my dog in there too. It is indeed a pleasure to be here this morning. It's also a great pleasure to be visiting Australia as the Alliance 21 Fellow. This fellowship is sponsored by the United States Study Center at the University of Sydney, where I'm based, the Perth U.S. Asia Center at the University of Western Australia and by the Australian and U.S. governments. As part of the fellowship each year, one Australian travels to the U.S. and one American travels to Australia to spend three months, three months in each other's country, learning more about the U.S.-Australian security relationship. The program provides, among other things, an opportunity to grow and strengthen the security relationship and study certain aspects of that relationship in more detail. This is the third year of a four-year program and I certainly hope it continues beyond next year. The fellowship has so far, and I'm just reaching the halfway point right now, allowed me to talk to and learn from some very thoughtful writers, thinkers, foreign policy analysts, academics, and government practitioners. All have been gracious to share their time and their thoughts with me, but I know that I've only scratched the surface of the complexities and depth of the Australian security relationship. Several of the people that I've had the good fortune to meet are here today, so I want to thank you for your time and hope that you will permit me to continue to call upon you for your thoughts and guidance. Rory, I put you in that category, including some very interesting discussions about Australian politics, and I thought the U.S. had a monopoly on eventful politics. In January of 2017, I completed a 36-year career in the U.S. federal government, all of which was dealing with some aspect of national security. From starting as a lawyer at the Department of Energy, moving to the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and completing my career as an Obama administration political appointee at the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. So naturally, you might be thinking, what does the Department of Energy have to do with national security? While energy security plays a significant role in national security, the Department of Energy's roots go back to the Manhattan Project and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. The DOE, specifically the National Nuclear Security Administration, is the successor entity responsible for U.S. nuclear non-proliferation programs, the research and development programs that support the U.S. Navy's nuclear reactor propulsion, and the safety, security, and the reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. This conference today emphasizes the role that women can, should, and do play in all areas of national security. And it has been my privilege to participate in many aspects of national security, but with a primary focus on strategic issues, including nuclear and space policy and programs. I have seen firsthand how decision-making is more informed and more resilient when the participants are diverse. Diversity in all aspects is needed for sound decision-making. Gender, ethnic, cultural, socioeconomic, and even academic disciplines make for better policy. Certainly for me, the growth in diversity, particularly the increasing number of women in national security, is gratifying. And while there is still a long way to go, particularly in getting more women at more senior levels, there has been considerable progress. Even the U.S. military, one of the most difficult places for women to be successful, has made some progress. Opening the military service academies in 1976 and the reserve officer training programs in 1972 to women was a major step in building the pipeline to senior officers. Graduates from those early classes have accomplished many firsts, including the first woman to be a vice chief of the U.S. military service, the first commander of the U.S. combatant command, and just recently the first acting commander of the U.S. Army's largest command. And yet the full scope of military positions were not open to women until 2016. So much progress has been made, but there's much more to come. The current secretary of the U.S. Air Force, who is the third woman to actually hold that position, is also a member of the United States Air Force Academy's third graduate class that included women. Women, however, remain unrepresented in all ranks in the U.S. military, but particularly in the senior ranks. Today the U.S. military is 16% women, 18% of the U.S. military officers are women, but just 8% are flag and general officers. Unlike here in Australia, we in the U.S. still wait the appointment of our first woman minister of defense. Today I would like to talk a little bit, though, about nuclear security and the challenges that we face today. So there are always two halves of this topic. Nuclear deterrence is one half, and nuclear proliferation prevention and arms control is the other half. When President Obama gave his famous speech in Prague in 2009, he emphasized the importance of both elements through, although deterrence is the part that often gets overlooked. In that speech, he said, today I stake clearly with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. This goal will not be reached quickly, perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence, but make no mistake, as long as these weapons exist, we will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversaries and guarantee that defense to our allies. President Obama laid out four concrete steps that the U.S. would take toward the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. And they were, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same, negotiate a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia, and set the stage for further cuts. And seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor. Third, to achieve a global ban on nuclear testing immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty. And finally, to cut off the building blocks needed for bombs. The United States would seek a new treaty that verifiably ended the production of fissile materials intended for the use in nuclear weapons. So in 2009, the United States decided to go down a road that would reduce the nuclear threat, prevent proliferation, and secure weapons usable fissile materials. Maintain a strong, albeit smaller, nuclear weapons stockpile while providing extended nuclear deterrence to our allies, including, of course, Australia. To strengthen the nonproliferation treaty, the U.S. embarked on a series of transportation, or sorry, of transparency measures, including declassifying the total number of warheads in the U.S. stockpile and publishing, for the very first time, the nuclear posture review. Some of the previous ones have been classified. Some of the efforts were successful. The new treaty, the new strategic arms reduction treaty, New START, was entered into force with Russia, and the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy was reduced. And today, both the U.S. and Russia remain in compliance with that treaty. In retrospect, though, the U.S. was on the road to zero alone. Neither China nor Russia reciprocated the transparency measures, and Russia made it clear that it was not interested in a new arms control treaty beyond New START. Negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty reached an impasse, and the Republican Senate in the U.S. refused to take up the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China made no move to ratify the treaty, and North Korea became the only state to conduct a nuclear test in this century. The 2015 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference process failed to deliver a consensus agreement, and the U.S. determined that Russia was not in compliance with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Russia, as set out in the 2018 nuclear posture review, and I quote, may also rely on threats of limited nuclear first use, or actual first use, to coerce us, our allies, and partners in determining a conflict on terms favorable to Russia, in other words, possibly lowering the nuclear threshold. The 2018 nuclear posture review also confirmed what had already become apparent. Despite concerted U.S. efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs and to negotiate reductions in the number of nuclear weapons since 2010, no potential adversary had reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy or the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The only bright spot was the Iran deal, although of course President Trump has now decided to abrogate that agreement, leaving the other parties to the agreement to implement it. And during this time, the situation in North Korea went from bad to worse. This past weekend's announcement that the U.S. is planning on withdrawing from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty as a counter to the Russian violations and that the New START Treaty may not be extended will no doubt further undermine regional and global stability. Unless this is a move designed to return Russia to compliance with the INF, which frankly I think is doubtful, withdrawal will mostly be a win for Russia and a lose for global security. So the question is can the U.S. and its allies get the world back on the road to zero by changing the current threat conditions? There is work that can be done and so North Korea might be a good place to start. Last year it looked as if a war on the Korean Peninsula would become a reality. With the start of U.S.-North Korea and South and North Korean discussions kicked off by President Trump and Kim Jong-un this past June, tensions have calmed substantially. While a recent poll of U.S. military personnel showed that nearly half of those polled believe that the U.S. will be drawn into a major war soon, notably only 46 percent this year as compared to 72 percent last year, seeing North Korea as the significant threat. And there have been some other hopeful signs. The hostile rhetoric on both sides has stopped, diplomatic discussions are ongoing, and we are no longer on a path to imminent war with North Korea. But the question remains, will this current love affair collapse when serious permanent detailed and verifiable commitments are sought as has happened in the past? North Korea, the U.S. and China each have their own view on what denuclearization means. Denuclearization is a term that of course is popular and attractive, but until there is consensus as to what it means and a plan to get there, it's just another talking point. There have been many attempts to rid North Korea of its nuclear weapons and materials, and so far all have been failures. Even when North Korea blew up the cooling tower at the Yong Yong plutonium production reactor in 2006, a move hailed at the time as a dramatic and visually symbolic step towards dismantling its atomic arsenal and a key element of denuclearization, it turned out to be all for show. At the time the U.S. thought blowing up the cooling tower was the first step in shutting down the reactor. Although dramatic, it was just another failed effort. In 2013 North Korea announced that it was restarting the reactor, but just using a different cooling methodology. The road to denuclearization is littered with failed efforts. But what is the strategy this time and what's the desired end state? There are of course many possible outcomes, but simplistically and really just for the sake of conversation today, I've thought of four. First, in the end nothing changes. Yet another round of talks ends in failure and North Korea as it has done on many occasions in the past returns to missile a nuclear weapons testing and continues to produce nuclear materials and weapons. Second, North Korea obtains what it always has wanted, U.S. acquiescence of its status as a nuclear armed nation in exchange for some limited amount of transparency and an agreement to curtail some aspects of its nuclear weapons program, such as limitations on production of physical material. Third, North Korea, the U.S. and others in some new form of six-party talks begin a decades-long process of incremental steps, some successful, some not, on a wide variety of issues that could include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, human rights, economic, and trade matters, other security issues, and maybe even a formal peace agreement for the peninsula. And fourth, the ultimate, North Korea is persuaded in the near term by a yet to be determined package of incentives to fully denuclearize in a verifiable fashion, relinquish all chemical and biological weapons, sign, ratify, and comply with the comprehensive test ban treaty, the chemical and biological weapons conventions, and rejoin the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. The first, status quo ante, is unfortunately the most probable, while the third, decades of talks may be the best we can hope for. On the other hand, elements of each would go a long way towards a neutral normal. So to help formulate a strategy, I have a few suggestions that might be included or one or more of the various end states. So even though the conventional wisdom is that states that give up their nuclear weapons end up like Libya and Iraq, it is possible to become a former nuclear weapons state. In August of 1991, the Soviet Union was crumbling, and there was a failed coup attempt against President Mikhail Gorbachev. Shortly after Gorbachev returned to Moscow following the coup, Senator Sam Nunn, who at the time was chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and my boss, visited with him. During that visit, Senator Nunn raised one of the key questions that had been on his mind, the status of the nuclear briefcase, the football, the nuclear control device in the personal possession of the head of the country. Senator Nunn wanted to know had Mikhail Gorbachev really been in command throughout the coup attempt? Did he maintain total control over the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons? Senator Nunn had met with Gorbachev on numerous early occasions, but this time Senator Nunn thought that Gorbachev's answers to these questions did not have the same ring of conviction as his statements during their earlier meetings. And that he wasn't, it seemed to Nunn, comfortable discussing the matter candidly. So after that trip, Senator Nunn concluded that the Soviet Union was in great peril. He felt that the United States needed to do everything it could to help Soviet authorities gain control and keep control over their own nuclear weapons. So when Senator Nunn returned to Washington, he sought out Richard Luger, the Senior Republican Senator for Indiana, to help him find a solution to what he believed was a very dangerous situation. The pair wrote legislation to allow DOD and eventually DOE to spend money in conjunction with Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union to destroy or secure nuclear weapons, destroy other weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, and prevent the proliferation of weapons, materials, and technical know-how. Despite a good deal of initial opposition from the Bush Administration, the Congress, and the press, the provision passed and was signed into law in December 1991, just days before the Soviet Union collapsed. Over the course of the next two decades, that program, on which I worked for a good part of my career, worked not only in Russia, but Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. It eliminated over 7,600 nuclear warheads, destroyed over 2,500 missiles, including ICBMs as well as sea-launched ballistic missiles, over 1,100 missile launchers and silos, 155 strategic bombers, and 33 nuclear submarines. The program consolidated nuclear weapons and material storage sites, designed and provided modern security for those sites, stopped the production of weapons-grade plutonium and improved nuclear weapons transportation security. It also helped destroy Russia's surviving arsenal of chemical weapons. Over 4,000 tons of chemical agent were destroyed, and it secured and redirected the Soviet chemical and biological weapons programs, which were spread across all of the countries of the former Soviet Union. Many of the involved facilities the West knew nothing about and were only discovered as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Most importantly, it allowed Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to relinquish their nuclear weapons and join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. What many may have forgotten is at the end of the Cold War, these three newly independent states became nuclear weapon states, with Ukraine being the third largest possessor of nuclear weapons in the world, behind only the US and Russia. Belarus and Kazakhstan were not far behind. So, using CTR as a model, a similar program, funded by China, Russia, the US, its allies and partners, including Australia, is a viable option for North Korea, should they agree to it. So, not only did CTR eliminate, secure, and consolidate weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, it started some jointly funded research programs, and it helped to refocus some of the scientists, engineers, and technicians who had worked in the WD programs, the WMD programs, and helped redirect them to related, but more peaceful jobs. The program was a partnership that was transparent about lasting scientific and technical relationships. CTR took decades and a few billion dollars, but it is a model that could be applied to North Korea. Even if the end result is not complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, CTR could be used to eliminate chemical and biological weapons facilities, eliminate them permanently this time, fizzle material production facilities, and improve weapon security. And there are other steps that North Korea could take. An immediate step would be to sign and ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty. So, if North Korea is really serious about stopping their nuclear weapons testing program, this would be a highly visible and verifiable commitment to not test. And much better than blowing up a few tunnels. As we saw with the cooling tower, blowing things up is dramatic, but it doesn't stop the program. The U.S. and China could offer to ratify the CTBT if North Korea ratifies. It would end the ratification standoff between U.S. and China, and finally give the comprehensive test ban treaty opponents in the U.S. Senate a strong rationale for ratification. Moreover, it would bring the comprehensive test ban treaty a step closer to entry into force, as all three nations are part of the so-called annex two states that must ratify the treaty before it can enter into force. By the way, Russia and Australia are also annex two states, but both have ratified. North Korea could also be asked to adopt a transparency policy. This could include declaring the number of nuclear weapons in its inventory. The U.S., U.K. and France have all adopted a policy of transparency, declaring the total numbers of their warheads in their stockpiles. At the end of 2017, the U.S. had 3,822 warheads in its inventory and another 2,500 additional weapons that have been retired and are waiting dismantlement. Neither Russia nor China have reciprocated in this transparency measure, but if North Korea took these transparency measures, maybe Russia and China might even be more forthcoming. Under the terms of the new strategic arms reduction treaty between Russia and the U.S., both countries must declare the number of deployed offensive strategic warheads. In the most recent declarations, Russia has 1,420 and the U.S. has 1,398 deployed offensive warheads. North Korea could enter into a treaty to declare and limit its weapons and delivery systems. Such a treaty would have to be subject to rigorous inspection and verification, but it would bring some degree of stability. An additional measure of transparency will call for North Korea to declare their location and the full amount of weapons usable fissile materials, plutonium and highly enriched uranium that it has produced. Having made such declarations, it would commit to ending productions and have the U.S. and Russia as well as North Korea signal a willingness to sign a fissile material cutoff treaty. To ensure the world that any declarations were in fact true, North Korea should invite the International Atomic Energy Agency back in to inspect and verify the declared facilities and materials. Ideally, North Korea would sign an agreement with the IAEA to put the fissile material production in storage facilities under full IAEA safeguards until dismantled and agree to challenging inspections. An additional concern from the news over the weekend that the U.S. may withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty is that it may jeopardize North Korea's willingness to enter into any agreement. The U.S. has pulled out of the ABM Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement, the Paris Climate Accord, the Iran Deal, and now, most likely, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. The serious question is, why would North Korea believe that any agreement in which it entered would remain in force? Back to more current things. The U.S.-Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed in 1987 and eliminated all ground-based missiles in the 500 to 550 kilometer range. The treaty reduced significant tensions in Europe at the end of the Cold War as the U.S. and Soviet Union destroyed all missile and launchers in this range. Over 2,000 missiles were destroyed. Russia has been in violation of this treaty since 2014, and despite multiple discussions refuses to admit its violation. On the other hand, when the U.S. pulls out of the treaty, which it can do with six months' notice to Russia, and the other former states of the Soviet Union that actually still remain parties to that treaty, the question is, does Russia follow or does it bite its time? Either way, a new arms race, sadly, may be the inevitable result. Unless, by chance, this threat of withdrawal is a coercive tool to get Russia to return to compliance and bring China into the treaty. If this is a goal, I hope there is a real strategy and an implementation plan hiding behind the announcement. But as early as 2011, even before Russia's violation, National Security Advisor John Bolton advocated for withdrawal from the INF. So, in his words, that the U.S. could be unconstrained in dealing with threats from China and North Korea. So when announcing the U.S. withdrawal, President Trump said the same thing and that the U.S. will have to start building these missiles. Yesterday, President Trump confirmed that he would build up. Just one problem. The U.S. doesn't have any non-compliant missiles. Although there is a small research and development program, it will take years to build and deploy this kind of ballistic and cruise missiles in meaningful numbers. Withdrawing from the INF treaty so that the U.S. could build and deploy ground-based missile systems that could target North Korea, could push them away from the table before any further discussions even ensue. North Korea announced and has been following through on its testing moratorium on nuclear weapons and missiles. And this moratorium is important, even though not permanent. But if the U.S. announces and begins a new ground-based missile development program, which includes testing, what does North Korea do? And what is China's view? It would seem logical that China would want to pressure Russia to stay in the treaty and comply so that neither it nor North Korea would have to respond to a new U.S. weapons program. And where is Russia going to, where is the U.S. going to deploy these new ground-based missiles? An already difficult situation with many current and historical missteps just got a lot more difficult. Unfortunately, the conditions do not exist today for a world without nuclear weapons. But there is progress that can be made. Collectively, nations must decide that the progress is worth the effort. And all states with nuclear weapons, not just the P-5, will have to go down this road. And nations without nuclear weapons can and should play an important role in persuading and pressuring states with weapons to reduce the number of warheads and delivery systems, comply with relevant arms control treaties, enter into new verifiable arms control treaties, strengthen the IAEA, and strengthen the non-proliferation treaty, ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty, and extend the new START treaty. Reducing global and regional tensions, respecting the sovereignty of nuclear nations and of neighboring nations, and working to reduce conflicts are actions needed to set the conditions. So I'd like to close with a thought and a quote from President Obama's Prague speech. When nations and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays forever beyond our grasp. To denounce or shrug off a call for cooperation is an easy and cowardly thing. That's how war begins, and that is where human progress ends. Thanks for that. That was really, I think, really compelling and in some ways pretty disturbing survey of the scene. And I know that in Australia at the moment there's quite a lot of thinking about what would, I guess, a new Australian policy framework on non-proliferation arms control and disarmament look like, bearing in mind that there may, who knows, be a change of government within the next six months. And I think particularly the Labor side of politics is always very interested in that side of things. So I suspect that voices like yours will be in demand one way or the other advising the Australian debate. We've got a couple of minutes of time if you'll allow me to take a few questions. And let's take a few questions from the floor. You've touched on INF already, which I think was going to be the hot topic. But can someone get my attention if I have a question? It's a little hard to see out the back of the room. Please don't be shy. I think we've got a great opportunity to interrogate the issues here. We've got a question at the back of the room just there. Thank you. And if you could introduce yourself to the group. I think by the end of the two days we'll all know each other pretty well. Good morning. Brooke Sharfley from the Defence Intelligence Organization. Thank you very much for those comments. That was really inspiring and it's great to see that we've had some progress in the past that we could build on for the future. I'd just like to ask you about the examples that you gave about former states where we have precedent for relinquishing nuclear weapons. And I know that in each of the Soviet examples that you gave, and I add to those also the example of South Africa, that the relinquishment of nuclear weapons had only also taken place when in conjunction with a change of government and in most cases quite a significant one. So I'd be interested in your views on whether a similar situation could only be achieved in North Korea with regime change. Do you want to answer that one right away? We'll take another question. We'll take one more. We won't let you run away from that. That is the challenging question. So okay, we'll take one more. We've got time for one more question. Please, down the front. Thank you. My name is Chantaleon Arthat from Women in International Security, also known as wise. I want to ask you what role do you see for countries like Australia and the EU European countries in this, you know, difficult situation we are in and where arms control seems to be sort of going nowhere. So very quickly on Korea, of course, there is no answer really nobody knows, but I would say it would depend. I mean, it really it really does depend on how serious the leadership in North Korea really is about denuclearization. And more importantly, what does it really mean? Is there some is there some way to take concrete steps such as signing the CTBT or or entering into some sort of limitation on its physical materials? I mean, these are all these steps that really could be taken down a road that really looked like zero. But it is. But it really is completely dependent on their commitment. And certainly in the past, the commitment hasn't been there. And there have been short starts and really long stops. So I don't think it's completely dependent. I know in those examples, it was it was a collapse of an entire country, if you will. But it wouldn't have to be. So hopefully it there's at least some progress being made. And on the arms control, I know that there's an awful lot of talk these days that arms control is dead. And it may just be in hibernation for a while. But I think where other countries can really come into play is making arms control in all types in all shapes and all varieties. Bring it back. Bring it back to the table. Bring it back to the discussion. Let the let the countries who aren't complying. Let them know that this is important. You know, sometimes I think when there isn't progress, the folks not making progress, don't hear the voices of of those who are not happy with the absence of progress. So in a constructive way, I think like Australia that has a very long history of nonproliferation activity could be very instrumental in letting in letting particularly the U.S. and others know that it is important to take some of these to take some of these steps. Look, we're we're getting a bit short of time. We take one more question if there is another burning question in the room, otherwise we'll move to morning tea. Does anybody else have a question? I have one otherwise that I just will put to you, if that's okay, which is just taking it further on the the INF Treaty. I think that's, you know, obvious hot topic. You set out a kind of a road map both in terms of engaging North Korea that also I think seeking to re-engage the nuclear powers on a road map to reducing nuclear dangers in a whole range of areas that requires, you know, a certain degree of predictability and maybe not strategic trust, but certainly understanding among the leaderships that we're not seeing to see at the moment. I guess, do you see, what prospects do you see for the U.S. to find a way to to work with others like China? Because I think in this region we are very, you know, interested in and concerned about the rise of China to either find some sort of alternative arrangement or find some kind of acceptance of the fact that perhaps, you know, perhaps that treaty's time is done. Just provoking you a little bit. So, you know, it is it is a difficult question. The interesting thing is Russia has at least very recently made some initial overtures that it might be willing to discuss an extension of the New START Treaty. So the New START Treaty by its terms allows a five-year extension without any further ratification actions. In other words, the two leaders just have to agree to go forward to that five-year extension. So that extending the New START Treaty would really contribute to the stability of both the U.S. and Russia. It sets caps on deployed strategic warheads on deployed and total delivery systems. It provides a lot of transparency into new systems and inspection methodologies. So it's a very good treaty for stability. The reason I bring this up is that if the discussion about withdrawing from the INF is more of a discussion, a coercive discussion to try and get Russia back in or back into compliance, then those two things, I think, can actually be related in terms of the China thing. So there's probably one more round of bilateral discussions with the U.S. and Russia on total reductions in stockpiles just because the U.S. and Russia have so many more warheads than does China. But the second piece of this is if the INF Treaty does remain in force, then they're and Russia and the U.S. are serious about either extending the New START Treaty and not pulling out of the INF, because frankly, I think there's a linkage between these. Then maybe together they can go to a second round of reductions and then go to China on the nuclear warhead side. And if the INF is brought back to life again, if you will, I know there has been some interest in multilateralizing that treaty, and that would also be something that could then start to have discussions with China. But the two of them, I think, really go hand in hand. Thank you. Thanks. Thanks for that. I think there's a lot more ground we could cover, but time is short. So could you please now join me in thanking our speaker, Madeleine Creighton.