 Can the U.S. control Japan? Why would China do this? It's not in their interest. Japan, America, China wants to see a unified Korea. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining the Zhonghang Ilbo CSI's forum 2015. Please give Dr. Hong Seok-hyun a big round of applause. Thank you for coming to the Zhonghang Ilbo CSI's forum 2015. We are in the midst of a major transformation, which is fueling global anxiety to a palpable level. From the geopolitical standpoint, it has become evident over the last 70 years since the Second World War that no one nation can go with the law now. It is time to map out next 70 years. In order to alleviate the pain and suffering that comes with this unprecedented turmoil, it goes without saying that we need the right policies and leadership. And speaking of leadership, it strikes me that the age of unipolar leadership or hegemony appears to be over. I'm sure you will agree that a major factor will be relations between the United States and China. The two countries are in competition in both the foreign affairs and economic arenas, with China demonstrating an increasing assertiveness in opposition to the American-led international order. I may sound like an idealist, but if we are bold and creative enough to forge a resolution to North Korea's nuclear issue, if the U.S. pivot to Asia hits a true balance, if China does not pursue a Sino-centric hegemony to arbitrarily replace the existing order, and if Japan stops this revisionist push to deny and rewrite history, let me dare say the next 70 years will be headed in the right direction. The big question is how. That is why I believe each and every one of us are here today. We have gathered once again in Seoul, not simply for the sake of being here, but to make the most of the opportunity to pull and share what we know and what we have learned for the sake of peace in Asia in the decades to come. Thank you. President Park Geun-hae has become very famous by coining the term Asian products. What did you take on Asian products? The first problem of our security and peace and prosperity is firstly North Korea. And secondly, I think what we usually call the Abenesia, Abenesia of history. More important thing than that is how we see Japan, how we Koreans see Japan and how Americans see Japan. We think Japan can become a liability for the peace and stability in this region because of this past track record. But the United States takes Japan as an asset. And then at the same time, more similarly important thing is the rising Chinese Sino-Centrism. This issue of history and in particular of comfort women, and this is a sensitive and important issue. I think on that issue Japan's alone. I think any effort by Tokyo to try to explain or somehow parse what happened will utterly fail. On the other hand, I think Korea's view of Japan is dissonant with the rest of the world, with one exception of China. In the US and public opinion polls recently, Japan was ranked the fourth most trustworthy country in the world. That number actually went down a little bit in the previous Japanese DPJ government. It's now at an all-time high under Abe, but it's not just the US. In Southeast Asia and polls last year, 96% of respondents in 10 Asian countries said they trust Japan. In South Asia, it's about 90%. In Australia, it's the highest ever. So the Korean description of Japan as a source of instability is completely dissonant and odd for almost every other country in this region with the exception of China and I suppose North Korea. South Korea is abnormal and Japanese normal. Do you agree with Professor Green's observation? I think we have to have a kind of the objective evaluation of what Abe is trying to do and what he's doing. He's very quite active in the strategic and dealing with the global diplomatic affairs and the regional affairs. But one thing that is missing is our Asian diplomacy. He's not dealing with Japan, the Korea and China in a proper way because of his conviction about his ideological conviction about the past. Kind of a glorifying and denying and distorting the past is causing some problems between us. But I don't want to blame Abe as Japan only. Between 1997 and for about 10 years until 2008, it was a multilateral moment. We had the constructed very multilateral mechanisms for cooperation and it seemed as if it's going well. But from around 2010 and 2012, we got into the negative spiral of the fighting each other, blaming each other. This is happening in the context of rising China, rising and assertive China. They are trying to gradually modify the regional order. I don't think China is trying to challenge the United States. And Japan is extremely proactively defensive and thinking China as almost a kind of a challenge to the Japan-dominated order in the United States. We want to have a very good relationship with China while developing a strength in the allies to the United States. What is missing in the Korean diplomacy is how to deal with Abe's Japan. It's missing at the same time. We are concerned about Japan's play in the game. It increases more chance of arms race. So from Korea's point of view, whenever there was an arms race in history in this region, we felt the first victim. So that is the point why we are concerned about Japan. I think it is not just Abe personally. Abe was elected by Japanese people. Is a strengthened Japan-US alliance a blessing for us or a curse for us or in between? At least it's not a curse. We shouldn't forget that Korea is the ally to the United States. And then for the defense of Korea, South Korea, from our potential North Korean tech, we need the support from the United States and Japan. We have to utilize seven United Nations bases in Japan. Without them, we cannot effectively deter against North Korean tech. In that sense, strengthening US-Pan alliance is not against Korean interests. But the problem is that you asked the question about whether Japan is normal or abnormal. I think most aspects of Japan is normal. But there is one aspect that is abnormal in obvious diplomacy. That's the history issue. That's too much. I think he is trying to glorify the past and try to deny kind of the forceful mobilization of the comfort women and focusing only about the physical enforcement was there or not. This is a kind of minor element, but it's sticking to the issues. He visited Yasukuni Shrine, and even though he's abstaining from Yasukuni Shrine visit at this moment, he's allowing his cabinet members to go to Yasukuni Shrine. Is it really serious about taking the histories in a proper way or not? So I don't think that's a kind of asset for Abe. I think that's a liability for Abe. I don't think any of your American friends have any doubts about the depth of the feelings in Korea about history, and we understand how raw the emotions are. So be assured of that, please. But on the question of arms race, yeah, and arms race began in Asia, not just northeast Asia, because of the fear of China, not a fear of Japan. China is the reason that people are purchasing arms to such a high degree. Can the U.S. control Japan for its unruly behavior? The reality is we've never really been able to control Japan to a sovereign country. Japan's defense budget was flat or declining for well over a decade, and Mr. Abe has increased it to about 2% a year. Korea's defense budget is increasing 4% a year, should be more. China's defense budget, the official figures are 15% or so a year for the last two decades. So, you know, there is an arms race and it's coming from China. Of course, we know the distinction between remilitarization of Japan and the revival of old 1930s militarism in Japan. But what we worry about is given the particular situational logic in Japan, the American tolerance of Japanese military strengthening could bring about very negative consequences, not only for arms race in the region, but actual fear coming from Korea, China, even Southeast Asian countries. What did you take on that issue? Southeast Asian countries aren't afraid. They're actually asking to buy patrol boats and equipment from Japan. Japan faces a challenge from the rise of China. The Chinese are using coercive pressure, and then Japan now is targeted by probably 300 North Korean missiles, at least chemical nuclear weapons, which they weren't a decade or more ago. So, I think it's worth asking, what path is better? Is it better for the U.S. to say to Japan, you're on your own? You don't militarize and you're on your own. In which case the Japanese government, any government, would be more likely to militarize on its own. Or is it better to take a path where the U.S. says we reaffirm our commitment, we reaffirm our commitment to the security of the area in the east, in the Senkaku area under Article 5, we reaffirm our nuclear umbrella, we reaffirm our commitment and defense guidelines, we want to work together more closely. And Japan has agreed to change its constitutional interpretation due to that, and therefore we're together. And if you ask really which is in Korea's interests, or Japan's or the U.S. interests, I think the path that we, that Republican and Democratic administrations have chosen, the second path is better. Should we join the MD or not? No, well at this moment, if we are going to join the, have this thought system, then this thought system should be proved to be very useful, useful in depending missiles coming from North Korea. If that is the case, I don't think China can oppose it. I don't think Chinese officials come to Seoul and say no to this. How could they say no? But if not, if not, we cannot. How can, if not, if it's not technically and militarily proved, how, why do we, why do we deploy this kind of very expensive and very provocative and disruptive system? The area where North Korea is, you know, exponentially increasing their capability is in ballistic missiles. And then, of course, their nuclear program. So, so the Republic of Korea is much more threatened by North Korean ballistic missiles today than it was five years ago or 10 years ago. That would provide protection. That would not do anything to Chinese missiles. As John Henry has pointed out, there's public record showing that Chinese have moved their long-range missiles back. And already. So, THAAD wouldn't affect the Chinese ballistic missiles. It is not in any way a military threat to China and in no way undermines China's deterrent. I think the reason Beijing doesn't like THAAD is because China's view is, over time, U.S. alliances beginning with Korea in the Chinese view in Asia will start to wither and weaken. And THAAD, an integration of missile defense to the Chinese, represents a strengthening of alliances. And they don't want that. And your comments, Minister, were very reasonable. If it's shown, if THAAD has shown to protect Korea, then China has no right to tell you what to do and how to protect yourself. But we've not mentioned one aspect of THAAD. It might be that it defends the United States from ballistic missiles from North Korea. And if that's the case, it would seem to me that the Republic of Korea should at least look at it. I didn't say to do it, but you ought to look at it because if we were hit, if the ballistic missiles from North Korea, Kenya, the United States, as some people are saying, and we were attacked, and this would really raise questions about our alliance. If our premise is that this is to defend the United States from the North Korean missile attack, then we have to set the premise in that way. Korea and the United States are allies. We are militarily helping each other for our mutual safety. So in case there is a threat coming from Korean Peninsula or somewhere else to the United States, if we can join and help you, I think we have to do that. But if that is the case, we have to set the condition on that aspect, saying that, okay, there is a missile threat from North Korea, probably attacking United States. So we are allies of United States. We are going to help. And then so we want to set up here the ANT-PY2 radar system and some other preventive equipment here. That should be the focus of the debate. Now the focus of the debate is that with this system, we can defend ourselves from incoming missiles from North Korea to South Korea. So premise itself is not correct. That is the point. What I'm saying, particularly since the 9-11, the United States has a mentality of be with us or against us. That kind of mentality makes a country like Korea very much uncomfortable, uncomfortable. Our position is we like to be with you. And also we like to be with China. But at the last, we like to be more with you than the others. So this kind of difference should be accommodated by the United States. Is it okay for us to maintain status quo instead of trying to change? And would it be possible and would it be a possible way to manage the Asian paradox? That's a question to you. I don't think that anything remains as a status quo. As Bob Jones said, U.S. is certainly not a status quo nation. So no, it's not possible to see status quo. We've expressed views here this morning about being more of a global power in Korea, one which we would certainly support. The United States, we see ourselves right now just like China in a way. China is re-rising. We're re-rising out of the recession. So if you were to maintain the status quo, you'd be left behind. It won't work because everyone else is changing, including Japan, trying to change, whether they're successful or not. It's still an open question. We should, the South Korea should join the United States in balancing against the Chinese rights. Not at all. I would have answered the question on Vice President Biden's remark by saying it was a bad choice of words. It's not choose us or choose them or with us or with them. Certainly Korea can maintain a good relationship and alliance with the United States and have a good relationship, certainly economic with China. And they'd ought to do that. Can the U.S. go in tandem with China the way you described today? You are portraying China as a potential threat to the region. As I say, we don't find necessarily today that China is our enemy. If we fail in diplomacy, then China could become our enemy. I don't think we'll fail because both of us have so much interest in the international system. But to go in tandem with China, a country which is autocratic, doesn't share our values, etc. is probably not in the cards. But to be able to cooperate where we both agree on things and it's in the interest of not only our countries but the region, sure, we do that to a small extent with infectious diseases and things of that nature. China says things to the United States, like, don't worry, the Pacific is plenty big enough for both of us. But there are real questions. Is what they mean by that, does that mean that from Guam East is the area of interest to the United States and Guam West is of China? And these are questions that all our friends in Asia ask. So I don't think it's going to quite be a combined moment, but we'll make it through with China. Okay, Park Seo-hee, if you are national security advisor to president, what kind of choice would you make? First principle to decide every issue we are talking about should be Korean strategic interest rather than anything else. And then we should not be perceived as a potential swing state that the swing between the United States and other countries. So we should not go against to the American interest. But we can resolve the issue. The first, we have to, the source of the threat should be clear. It's not China. It's not Japan or United States. It's North Korea. So we should be prepared for any kind of potential threat from North Korea, including missiles and others. China is playing great power diplomacy. Japan is trying to become a great power, trying to exercise great power diplomacy rather than middle power diplomacy. The rivalry between the two countries are really concerns us. That's the reason why we are talking about this Asian paradox. And here, the role of Korea is absolutely important because we don't have any debt or burden. We don't have a history burden at all. We are a democracy country. We don't have any system burden. We are relatively affluent. So we don't have economic burden. So and we are not isolated nation like North Korea. So we can go global. So in that sense, I think Korea should play a very active and proactive role to facilitate cooperation, mediate and breach all the conflicts among the nations. That's the thing that Korea can play in order to phase this Asian paradox. It has become so familiar to everyone here in Korea as this concept of unification as a bonanza or a jackpot adopted by the Park Geun-hae administration. But I think it represents an evolution of thinking here in Korea, but as well as in the international community about unification. The main driver is what's happening in North Korea. There's a lot of uncertainty in the North. And that much as we might wish and hope that unification could be pushed off for generations into the future, the reality of the situation might be it could fall into our laps tomorrow or a week from now or a month from now or a year from now. And therefore we need to be prepared for it. We need to think about it. My point here is I don't think the change is so much ideological as much as it is pragmatic in a response to concerns about what's happening in North Korea. And I just feel like there's going to be something that will happen in inter-Korean relations. Something, some major event is going to happen in inter-Korean relations. I feel like before the end of President Park's term in office largely because it's been pretty dormant thus far. And I just feel like something's going to happen and that may be the next big shock in this whole process. As we all know, the North Korean problem particularly in nuclearization issue and the human rights issue is becoming very hard and difficult and serious. Some surveys show that most Korean people are worried about North Korean possible attack to this South Korea. And North Korea's internal anxiety caused by some economic inefficiency and some humanitarian issues has already become the big problems in South Korea as well as in the world. Even world, I think very important thing is the South Korean's attitude toward North Korea is sharply changing. Last year, according to our survey, North Korea was identified as the most dangerous countries to South Korean people and about 80% of population concerned about the future possible some conflicts or tensions between two Koreans. In that sense, I think we need to think about peace more seriously than before. Since Kim Jong-un officially took power in 2012, I guess, I believe economic performance of the leadership has been quite impressive not bad at all. The economists, for instance, predicted a economic growth rate figure of 7.5% for this year which is quite impressive given the fact that in the last decade North Korea grew only around by 1%. I believe that in the agricultural sector what they call May 30 measures the government has proclaimed a measure made last year which was designed to make the family as the basic level of agricultural production and also other incentive measures designed to promote the market activities in North Korea. And also, more importantly, perhaps this economic performance by North Korea this year may be suggested of the future direction that the North Korean economy is going to be headed. I believe Kim Jong-un is different from his grandfather and his father. Kim Jong-un went to school in Europe in Switzerland for some said seven years in his tender years and he saw in Europe how the Western system was working. So I do believe China can be modeled for North Korean leadership. 25 years ago and I remember my mentors and colleagues who were training me saying you got to understand about China and North Korea. This is not the lips and teeth alliance that it once was. This is a very strained relationship underneath. There's a great debate in China as to whether or not the cost benefit of this relationship really works in their advantage anymore. They're seeing North Korea more as an albatross than as an advantage and so on and so forth. And I start with that because that conversation happened for me 25 years ago but it could have happened last week. It could have happened yesterday. I remember a recent visit with my business partner Rich Armitage meeting with a very senior Chinese official and it occurred to us after the meeting. You know he couldn't even bring himself to say the name. He would only say that young boy and Pyongyang, that young man. And so clearly there's a lot of frustration and annoyance but the question is is there any sort of tipping point or any trigger or any threshold that North Korea could pass or anything that could change the Chinese calculus on this so that they might change their approach because I think their current approach is basically to sustain the status quo which means they would be an inhibitor or at least not a help to unification. So this is not a good trajectory and I expect what we'll see is more of the same. I think they will continue their support for North Korea at sort of a subsistence level. Keep the regime on life support. They certainly were willing to do that after the sinking of the Chonan and the Human Rights Report and so on. The six-party talks are very important to China. It's something that they have some control over and that they act as host and intermediary of sorts. It also for them I think is a mechanism to buy some time and exert influence in ways that don't require them to put more pressure or coercive pressure on. If North Korea conducts another nuclear test do you think China is still maintaining the same position? It's not at all clear to me that a fourth nuclear test is so much worse than a third nuclear test that somehow crosses a threshold that China can no longer bear or even the sort of combination. Do we have to tighten up economic sanctions on North Korea or we have to explore kind of a dialogue with North Korea? I don't think we have to tighten up sanctions on North Korea anymore as it's been under sanction seriously enough to have suffered economic activities. We had a conference at CSA where we looked at sanctions that had been placed on Iran and compared them with sanctions against North Korea and the sanctions against Iran are much... Yeah, that was our conference, yeah. The sanctions against Iran were much, much bigger in scope and in breadth and so there still is a lot that can be done there and it's still I think an important tool. Kim Jong-un needed to realize that there is the third way rather than choosing either regime collapse or state of school. It would be good to help North Korea to accept the change without concerning for regime collapse. There is some good sign from North Korea. Surveys showed that there are some significant changes in North Korea. Last year, more than 80% responded that individual interest is considered more important than group interest or national interest. 68% responded and said that they had experienced using some kind of items from South Korea. Even though it's not so obvious but we need to use their possibilities to promote North Korea's internationalization or normalization their relations with outside work. At least I can say we have reached three kind of tentative conclusions. First, we have to be pragmatic rather than driven by very rigorous ideology. Second, we have to prepare for peaceful unification as well as for kind of a sudden change under Korean Peninsula. Lastly, we have to get China on board even though we are not quite happy with Chinese behavior in dealing with the variety of North Korea related issues. It seems to me that what's happened since the end of the Cold War is that the West, the United States and others have hoped to expand this liberal international order to encompass the entire world and to incorporate within it systems that weren't yet liberal democracies and the system is under strain. It's being tested in various ways primarily by illiberal states especially the larger ones particularly Russia and China. The question that's being asked is whether Asia will be satisfied with the challenge of the U.S. leadership of China or the U.S. will be satisfied with the secondary role? I think that's the most important issue. In terms of the post-war period, it was a fairly unified world order. However, the security initiatives that were led by the US were fairly complex international collaborations that were quite difficult. In the last 70 years, Korea's economy has only protected the U.S. and thanks to South Korea, Korea has been able to achieve the largest domestic profit thanks to the minimum cost. However, the most serious problem in Korea is, as many people have pointed out, the security issues in the U.S. and the economic issues that are more serious with China. This is a very serious dilemma in the U.S. and its allies. Many people are pointing it out. However, what I want to ask to the U.S. and its friends is whether Japan or the U.S. keep worrying that China will be a threat to the U.S. Instead of leading us, China is a strong pool of power. How can we not get caught? How can we register? I want you to talk about that. How can we not get caught? How can we register? What is Korea? In Korea, there are a lot of black-and-white choices. Are you going to stick to China? Are you going to stick to the U.S.? There are a lot of short-term discussions. The current problem in Korea is that the U.S. and its allies have been fighting against the U.S. But now, we have to create multiple flexible partnerships with other countries. I believe the current situation facing Korean Peninsula in the name of international liberal order has been some anachronistic and does not work anymore in terms of a previous standard view in the international liberal order because traditional trilateral ties among Republic of Korea, Japan, United States do not seem to work very well. Traditional PRC and DPRK relations does not seem to work very well. Russia and China try to cooperate in strategic interests but they are a fundamental view toward global order and regional order seems to be some deviant with each other. Korea concern on security relations with China and Russia and North Korea but when you look at market and free trade relations seems to be working very well with socialist regimes or collective authoritarian dominant countries. In that sense, I think we have to sometimes differentiate commercial cooperation from security relations with these a non a liberal, a democratic countries quote-unquote. Let's talk about America just a little bit. There's been a lot of talk about China and obviously Korea because here we are. Just the US going to go somewhere else. It's pivoted back here. It's not going to pivot away again. Is it going to pivot? On balance, I'm very optimistic about the trajectory of the United States. I think we have ample problems in the short run. The sense that the United States is somehow pulling back from the world is in the period of decline is vastly overstated. There's a certain fatigue that has to do with having been involved in two wars over a period of a decade. We're still living with the after effects of the Great Recession. We have these budget problems that I refer to but they're not in my view profound, fundamental terminal weaknesses. I think in the long run the United States is going to be fine but we have to get through a period when we are going to be perceived to be relatively weak and preoccupied and that's dangerous, I think particularly in this part of the world. Whether the US will sustain its staying power or not that's not the question but the tidal wave at the moment is the rise of China and the number of people who can make a living sense to China is greater than number of people who can make a living sense to the United States. This is an important question we have to take a look at but for the time being Chinese power will have a substantial impact upon the neighboring countries as well as in the world. That's why I raised the question how can we resist to Chinese and the question South Korea is facing in North Korea is that whether we have to turn North Korea into a sort of our style country or democratic country or we have to we have to take a policy that forces North Korea into a position that we can live with. This is a serious conflict in Korean society. We have a vision for the ultimate direction but we have to be pragmatic about the path. This is a very badly damaged country. There's no way that overnight it's going to be a flourishing robust democracy. I'm very careful not to use the word democracy because to me the most important thing is rule of law. I'm having a system of predictability where my rights are protected by a system that I can understand. That's what the liberal international order is. So I think when it comes to North Korea this is going to be a long and difficult process. It can't it can't be just South Korea's burden to bear. The rest of us have to be a participant to its solution but ultimately I have no doubt in my mind it's going to happen. So I'm going to ask just in a very informal way for a show of hands for a couple of questions. How many of you are optimistic about Korea's future as opposed to worried? Optimistic. How many of you are optimistic about Korea's future? How many of you are worried about Korea's future? Almost half and half that's interesting. How many of you think that Korea is uncertain about itself? Okay Dr. Hong I want you to give your reaction to what you just saw. You know we've last 47 years I think we've accomplished quite a bit as you pointed out that we accomplished both democracy in every sense with some overdose of freedom of expression even compared with Japan I'm very proud that we achieved higher level of democracy and at the same time we've achieved quite impressive level of industrialization forms enjoying global brand power but at the same time I think we are facing enormous challenges on our economic front those young men and women are facing difficult challenges in getting decent jobs in my generation and generation behind us we're not enjoying high standard of living as young generations do now but we didn't worry about getting a job we get recruited by various companies so job security is not there they're better qualified than our generations but getting decent jobs is not an easy thing so planning their future is not an easy thing that's why they portray themselves facing a certain future let me now ask a little harder question how many of you think that China wants to see a unified Korea the rest of you do you feel that China would rather see Korea divided? raise your hand how many of you think Japan wants to see Korea unified how many of you think then Japan wants to see Korea divided this is interesting how many of you think America wants to see Korea divided there are a few I think that's how many of you think America wants to see a unified Korea you are right but I think we have to pay attention to those of you that question it now one of my colleagues over here was going to pose a question as we all know DPRK is a proper state in China and the US in my opinion China would never allow a unified Korea because they need a proper state that would be possible only when China has a complete upper hand in other words a complete hegemony in north east Asia or lose its also influence in north east Asia are you implying that China's political position will change next 70 years from numerous second track dialogues with Chinese scholars that it is in some ways a litmus test or a way to understand how the Chinese think about themselves and for Chinese who are insecure about the strength of the Chinese Communist Party and think that that is the only way to secure China I find they are much more open because they want that buffer state the idea of a unified democratic Korea on their border it is a very powerful magnet within China itself other Chinese scholars who are not so wedded to the current system you can tell they are much more open to the idea that it is in China's long term interests to have unification I think the reason that many Chinese want to keep the peninsula divided it is what it would mean to have a democratically unified state so successful right on its border the impact of Korean unification upon China in terms of pluses and minuses I think a plus effects include for example if unification happens China will no longer provide economic assistance to North Korea on the other hand China is likely to lose North Korea is a buffer state China even at this moment must be weighing these pluses and minuses of the impact upon unification that means we have to convey kind of a plausible message to China so that China may think it is more powerful than pluses than minuses why still Korea is not unified is because of lack of commitment lack of commitment of the United States I think America's role was so below than our expectations well I mean we're not that powerful I think we have the effect of unification but the risk would be so enormous and the greatest risk would be the people of the Republic of Korea and so that's why I think the U.S. has not been able to use its power and has not been ready to put the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula at risk I think you made a very interesting conclusion to our conference thanks our panelists for everything you did and let's just say warm applause for all of us okay thank you