 What you're about to see are the events that led to one fatality on the Macklake fire on May 5th, 1980 The Macklake fire burned on the Mayo Ranger District of the Huron Manistee National Forest Located in the lower peninsula of Michigan The fire was an escaped prescribed burn that spread over 20,000 acres in six hours In addition to the firefighter fatality, 44 homes were destroyed Much of this area is dominated by jack pine Live fuel moisture in jack pine is a contributing factor to most of the large fires that have occurred in Michigan Live fuel moisture is dropping early May as the jackpines concentrate all available moisture into the new growth This new growth is covered with a waxy coating that is very flammable Live fuel moisture is on the day of the fire were estimated to be about 105 percent which is low enough to sustain a crown fire The topography in the area of the fire is comprised of gently rolling hills There is a significant intermix of developed subdivisions within the forest boundaries weather observations at 1045 hours on the morning of the fire were temperature 82 degrees relative humidity 34% Wind southwest at 8 to 12 miles per hour In the forest-wide morning fire weather forecast a cold front passage was predicted for that afternoon at about 1500 This incident began as the Crane Lake prescribed burn Which was intended to reduce logging slash and regenerate a new jack pine stand for wildlife habitat Prior to the ignition of the burn wind and relative humidity factors were outside of prescription Several of the resources identified in the burn plan were not on site and no spot weather forecast was requested However pressure to accomplish district reforestation targets swayed the decision to go ahead with the burn The plan was to start the burn at about 0900 and have the 70 acre unit completely burned by 1200 Then some of the personnel on the burn could be moved into standby status to cover the higher fire dangers That would accompany the cold front passage that afternoon The district had been stripped of any Contingency resources because a number of red-carded individuals were in a training session that day Although slash burning had been conducted in jack pine for many years on the forest Several of the individuals on this burn were new firefighters that had limited experience with jack pine fuels and the equipment they were operating at 1026 hours the Crane Lake prescribed burn was ignited at the south end of the unit by 1115 three spot fires had developed in grass fuels along the southeast side of the burn They were quickly suppressed by the myo district tractor plow and the district 1,000 gallon engine As ignition continued three more spot fires occurred in the grass fuels These were also suppressed by the tractor plow and engine At 1206 a seventh spot fire occurred in an area of mature timber Located between the burn unit and highway 33 This area was a green strip left for aesthetic purposes At this time ignition operations were shut down and the fire crews went into a suppression mode The tractor plow began to build line east followed by the engine trying to tie the escape back into highway 33 Here you can see where the actual plow line was put in The tractor plow operator was a second-year firefighter and in his first year as a tractor plow operator The engine was a new piece of equipment and the operators were new forest or trainees who were not experienced with using the equipment You're looking south down highway 33 the burn unit is on the right at 1215 the fire spotted across highway 33 The wind had shifted to west and increased to 20 miles per hour as the cold front approached the area Sooner than was expected a sharp drop in relative humidity accompanied the frontal wind shift This spot fire grew to three-quarters of an acre and was suppressed by the tractor plow and engine However, another spot fire started just to the north This spot began torching trees almost immediately The tractor began to plow the north flank of this next spot fire, but could not get a line around it Radio traffic during this time described the fire behavior as heavy rolling black smoke It's highly probable that the fire had developed into a full-crowned fire by this time moving east from highway 33 As the situation escalated the radio became flooded with traffic all fire and district radio traffic transmissions were on the same channel Additionally, no aerial detection plane was available this left the inexperienced tractor operator and engine crew isolated without effective communication all The actions of the tractor plow unit and engine crew from this point on were initiated without the benefit of instructions from an experienced supervisor This was also about the time that personnel on the fire realized they could no longer stop the forward spread of the fire They had lit and that it was headed for heavily developed areas around Mack Lake to the east The tractor plow and engine again re-engaged the fire at approximately 12 30 They attempted a direct flanking attack north of a power line right of way in a stand of young dense jackpine The engine was following the dozer spraying water in an attempt to keep fire out of the tree crowns The fire was intense enough that the tractor plow could not work directly on the fire edge So it was decided that the engine would work in front to cool the flames and allow the tractor to plow the line with less heat impact The engine moved ahead of the tractor crashing through the jackpine thicket. This is the plow line. They were working at that time Spot fires continued to develop behind the tractor plow and the operator began to concentrate on catching the spots behind him Within minutes the fire intensity forced the engine to abandon suppression efforts and they made a desperate run to the east and then north There was no communication between the tractor and the engine regarding this action The engine and crew escaped without harm It should be noted that there were no other suppression resources working the control lines behind the tractor and engine Rapid fire spread from unsecured control lines and the numerous spot fires began to threaten the location where the tractor plow was working At this point the tractor operator left the original line and moved 75 feet to the north and continued in a flanking attack He began to plow but must have finally realized his effort was ineffective and tried to escape moving away from the flank of the fire At approximately 1240 he abandoned the tractor and began to run as his position was overtaken by the fire His body was found within 100 feet of the tractor Less than 30 minutes after the burn had escaped a firefighter was dead Significant horizontal roll vortex activity and associated rapid rates of spread along the fire's flanks occurred on this fire as evidenced by the burn patterns At its peak between 1230 and 1500 this fire burned at an average rate of spread of two miles per hour Spotting was occurring up to one third of a mile ahead of the fire and a column of smoke of up to 15,000 feet was created The fire was finally controlled at 24,800 acres This infrared satellite image shows the final fire perimeter You have just seen the events that occurred on the Mack Lake fire The instructor will now facilitate a discussion about the use of fire safety guidelines by the involved personnel The strategic and tactical decisions that were made and the human factors that contributed to this burn over incident