 All right. So, we are all set now. So, my name is Jukka Birthila. I'm from University of Helsinki. I'm also a part of the Union Wider Network. So, I was very pleased to be asked to comment on this excellent report, but it was so well presented here. So, I think, I mean, tax economists and many other tax practitioners had long to view that the, I mean, we started to think about international tax. It was sort of depressing because on the other hand, there were very few instruments to target those rich individuals who are using tax havens to evade taxis. On the other hand, we also knew that international corporate income taxation is plagued by profit shifting and the tax competition. So, it was a depressing picture, really. So, that started to change, really, when it comes to the individual side. First, less than 10 years ago, with the onset of these information exchange agreements. So, now tax authorities know way better than beforehand about foreign incomes of individuals. But the corporate income tax competition and transfer pricing problem remained. But here, now, this tubular approach is the very first step to a major change to the international corporate income tax structure that is hopefully now going to start to remedy the situation that we have had with the tax rates declining and profits being shifted. So, this is big in the area of taxation. And this report, really, is an excellent addition to the analysis of some of the implications of this major reform. So, I think that we can congratulate Unktat for making a very good service to the profession on providing this very meticulous comprehensive analysis. And I especially the revenue estimations that come from this granular country-by-country reporting data are especially valuable. So, some of the key findings from the report is that the other following. So, the revenue gains for developing countries could be substantial. They are not automatic. They require implementation. So, then, this additional income or tax revenue that's generated by the minimum tax either goes to the country where the owners of these multinationals are located, typically in the north, or then they go to the host country in the global south. So, clearly, I mean, making a decision on who gets this revenue is an important one. But the striking feature of this report really is that it's even more important what happens via this indirect effect of curbing profit shifting. So, that doesn't mean that countries in the global south shouldn't try to grab the revenue itself mechanically, but that's only part of the story. They could be because tax rates are going up. They could be a small negative impact on the overall investment level. But on the other hand, then the allocation impacts could be even greater and the non-haven countries are all set to gain. And as I already said, this is not far from clear because it requires implementation. This comes fast. This comes on top of the existing regulation. So, this needs attention now. Let me comment on some of the things regarding the actual pillar two before I go on to the analysis in the paper and then I conclude. So, I understand that this 15 percent is a compromise. But you can academically ask, I mean, what the actual rate should be. And there's actually an interesting analysis by Hebu and Kiin who showed that even for the low income tax, low tax country in a joint equilibrium where countries collaborate, the Pareto improving tax rate could even go beyond the 15 percent. So, the 15 percent, it's unlikely to hurt them and we could go even further. So, it would be interesting to know is this just to start and is the discussion of further increases coming up. How about then the still a lot with the large firms between the categories, let's say more than 500 million, could be perhaps lower the threshold as well. And then there are some peculiarities which I don't completely understand. So, this minimum tax affects quite a bit of the tax incentives but not all. So, those that are like transfers to firms are still allowed. And I'm a little bit uncertain. I mean, why is that lower still there? But of course, this is nothing to do with the report but this is just some commentary on the contents of the second pillar. So, there are also in implementation there are potential pitfalls. So, first of all, the tax base is not the same as the corporate book profits because the tax base is the corporate book profits minus the so-called carveout. And the carveout is an allowance for things like some payroll expenditure, etc. So, the idea is that this minimum tax would then be akin to a rent tax. Of course, I mean, if the carveout is extremely large, then there's a very narrow base. So, this is going to be crucial. I'm not certain. I mean, how the carveout will be calculated. Are there risks that firms I can manipulate so that they would be including some maybe cover taxes or some expenditures that shouldn't be there, relaping expenses. I don't know if that's a concern. And finally, something that was not mentioned in the report at all is incidents. So, the corporations actually don't pay the tax. It's either the corporate owners, their workers, or the customers who pay the tax. There's evidence from developed countries that the corporate income tax incidence is actually quite a lot on the workers. Is there a concern that these large or effective tax rates would actually harmful impact the earnings of those who work for these companies? So, this is something that was not mentioned, but something that we should be aware of. This could be something that is relevant. Very small comments on the actual analysis. I really like that and these are small nitty-gritty points. Maybe the main one is that the elsewhere in the report is discussion on how widespread these tax incentives for corporate income tax are. So, then I was surprised to see that the difference between the statutory rate and the effective rate was actually not that large. So, colleagues of mine from Univider, they did a paper on Uganda M&E's or those multinational companies that are located in Uganda. And they found strikingly that because of all tax holidays that Uganda has given, multinational companies in the country face 20 percentage points lower effective tax rate than domestic firms do. And there's anecdotal evidence that this is not a Uganda specific story. This is something that is the fact probably many other sub-Saharan African countries. So, against this backdrop I found that effective tax rates are perhaps surprisingly large or high. And then there could be more comments on the coverage of country by country reporting on which these are based. I skipped the final bullet there. So, finally let me comment on the monitoring and evaluation because we have many of here are researchers. So, first of all, because this comes so fast it would be interesting to see to know how the implementation is progressing especially whether countries are adopting this rule which and this difficult acronym is the rule for which says that then the developing country host countries would get the revenue. So, they should be adopting this rule. I don't know what the progress there is. When it comes to research and looking at how the previous policy actions that are taken to curb profit shifting via the BEPS process have actually worked in developing countries that research space is extremely thin. So, it would be very interesting now to scale up that research activities on the existing policies and I completely agree that there is a need for now increased technical assistance for developing countries to manage all this. And maybe there could be also benefits of combining research activities on some of these technical assistance because if the research teams collaborate early on with the technical capacity people we could perhaps monitor the implementation and early on take corrective action if things are not progressing as they should. So, let me end there and then I'll hand over to the other discussion. So, thank you.