 Before we start, I'm pleased to announce today is the release date of my latest bunch of music, the Temple Street EP. You can check out on Bandcamp, iTunes and Spotify. Right, that's my self promotion over, let's start with this week's scheduled video. It is the morning of the 19th of April 1989, and there is a fleet exercise underway in the Caribbean Sea, just next to Puerto Rico. One of the ships involved is the USS Iowa, and she is getting ready to fire her 16-inch guns. Turret 1 attempts to fire its three guns, all go but one. Quickly, the order to fire turret 2's guns was given, but 81 seconds later, an unexpected explosion erupted from the turret's centre gun. My name is John, and welcome to Plainly Difficult. Today, we're looking at the USS Iowa disaster. War on the horizon. Our story starts 40 years before the tragic day in April 1989, with war within spitting distance of the USA. It is the 1930s, and Japan is rampaging around parts of Asia. The USA, anticipating a clash with the emerging empire, has been war planning a naval clash. This was called War Plan Orange, and during this, it was found that the US needed a counter to the Japanese Congo class of battleships. This would come about in the form of the Iowa class, or fast battleships, capable of speeding along at up to 33 knots, or 38 miles an hour fully loaded. Now I'm not going to go too much of a deep dive into the Iowa class battleship, as the brilliant battleship New Jersey YouTube channel covers these ships' history in much greater detail than I could attempt to achieve. But what we do need to talk about is Iowa's guns, and a brief look at her service life. The guns. So the USS Iowa had nine breech-loaded 16 inch 50 calibre Mark 7 naval guns. They were placed in three gun turrets, of which the Iowa had three. Each gun in the turret was independently elevatable and fireable, and weighed 267,900 pounds, or 121,500 kilograms. The turrets were armoured and contained a whole hive of activity. Even though you can only see the gun, the turret actually extended between four and five floors below the ship's deck. Right at the bottom of the turret was projectile and bag charge storage. Each room was protected behind fireproof bulkheads. So how did the guns fire? Well first they have to be loaded. This begins in the bottom of the turret where the powder bags are placed into a hoist. There are six needed for a full charge. The hoist takes them up to the gun room. At the same time the projectile is being selected in a separate room. There are generally two types of ammunition, armor piercing and high explosive. There was also a nuclear shell later on in the Iowa's service life, but for this video we don't need to know about that. So when the projectile arrives at the top of the hoist and goes into the cradle, the gun is moved to an elevation of 5 degrees. The breach is opened and the cradle and spanning tray are moved to the horizontal plane. A mechanical rammer pushes the projectile into the gun. Then the six powder bags are placed on the cradle and pushed via the spanning tray into the gun slowly by the rammer. The rammer was used at 14 feet per second for pushing in the projectile and 1.5 feet per second for the fragile powder bags. If the faster speed was used for the powder, it ran the risk of creating excess friction and compression, which potentially could cause it to set a light. The rammer also didn't have any safety system for preventing the wrong speed being used. The breach is enclosed and the primer is added and the gun is moved to its firing position and it's now ready to go. After firing the gun returns to the loading position, the breach is opened and any debris and burning embers are blown out of the gun. The breach is also cleaned and the gun is ready to go again. Loading to firing can be done in an impressively quick 30 seconds. So back to the Iowa's service life. Well, the things she was built for, you know, the predicted war in the Pacific, lo and behold, actually happened. She was commissioned in February 1943 and initially saw service in the Atlantic Ocean. She was moved to the Pacific in January 1944 as the flagship for the Battleship Division 7. During a typhoon in December 1944, Iowa suffered damage and was sailed back to the US for repair work. In August 1945, she would be one of the ships to enter Tokyo Bay to oversee Japan's surrender. After the war, she was modernized with better radar, but her first service life would end in 1949. She was then added to the country's rather vast fleet of mothballed ships, but not for too long as she was reactivated for the Korean War on the 14th of July 1951 and formally recommissioned on the 25th of August. After the Korean War, she was used for training cruises and NATO exercise strike back, but yet again she would be decommissioned in 1958. The Iowa would languish in the Atlantic Reserve fleet until once again she was brought back to life in 1982. This was thanks to Ronald Reagan and his campaign promise of a 600 ship strong navy to face off against the commie fleet. The ship was modernized and recommissioned in 1984, amazeling within her $500 million budget, but this was because of a few cutbacks in repair works, most notably in her guns. One other cutback was that the US Navy Board of Inspection and Survey in-serve inspection was not completed. It would take the best part of two years until the inspection was undertaken on the 17th of March 1986 and probably not much of a surprise when it failed, mainly due to the engine not being as good as it should be and severe hydraulic fluid leaks in all three of the main turrets of the ship. She wasn't taken out of service, however, instead opted to be repaired while still in use. A couple of years later and after spending some time in the Persian Gulf, Iowa returned to Norfolk, Virginia for maintenance on the 10th of March 1988. In May 1988, Captain Fred Musalli took command of the Iowa and one of his first decisions on board was to cancel a $1 million planned repair job on the three main turrets, in which they had over 75 known faults. The decision assisted by the executive officer Mike Fahey reallocated the money to power plant repairs. When in August 1988 came around, the Iowa set sail for Cheapskate Bay for refresher training in sea trials. During this time and leading into January 1989, the Iowa's main guns were used sparingly. As such, training was not as good as it should have been, leading to poor morale and confidence in the three main turrets. But although, with not the most confident gunnery crews, the Iowa would take part in a fleet exercise off the coast of Puerto Rico. The ship would have to sail from Norfolk on the 13th of April 1989. The exercise was named Fleet X-389 and was under the command of Vice Admiral Jerome L. Johnson, in which the Iowa filled in the role as the Admiral's flagship. Four days after leaving Norfolk, the Iowa was in the Caribbean Sea and the exercise was set to begin, a gunnery exercise. A firing exercise was planned for the 19th of April. As such, during the evening of the 18th, the turrets crews prepared their guns for firing. This would involve blowing compressed air down the barrels of the ship's guns to clear any debris, all well and good apart from turret two's centre gun, where the system was not functional. Around the same time on the evening of the 18th, during a briefing, Master Chief Steven Skelly announced that turret two would participate in an experiment of his design, where a type of propellant called D846 powder would be used to fire 2700 pound shells. You see, D846 powder burned faster than the regular powder charges. It was amongst the oldest in the ship's infantry dating back to the Second World War, but its extra power came with an issue. It was only rated to be used on lighter 1900 pound shells. This was to not exert extra stress on the ship's guns. Using six charges of the D846 and the heavier shell could result in over pressure, and a type of explosion you don't want on a gun deck. The bag charges even had warning do not use with 2700 pound projectiles written on the side of them. Skelly had a simple solution to this. Instead of six bag charges, he planned for his experiment to use just five simple. The goal of the experiment was to improve accuracy of the guns, and for the 19th gunnery exercise, he devised 10 shots of the heavy shells and D846, two from the left gun and four from the centre and right guns of turret two. Senior Chief Ziegler was concerned about the experiment and the readiness of turret two's crew. Many were inexperienced, a job where a small mistake could lead to disaster. A particularly dangerous part of the loading procedure was ramming. As I mentioned before, an inexperienced rammer man could over ram the bag charge at the faster speed. The rammer man had never used the rammer before during a live fire shoot, and hadn't had any experience with non-standard bag loads, which increased the risk of a misfire by making too big of a gap between the final charge bag and the primer. To add even more danger to the mix, the rammer was known to randomly move on its own. The explosion. It is the morning of the 19th of April 1989, and the gun crews aboard USS Iowa are getting turrets 1, 2 and 3 ready for the firing exercise. At 9.01am, the crews reported they were trained to starboard in firing position and ready to start the exercise. At 9.33, turret one fired its centre and right guns. They worked as they should, but its left gun misfired. The order for turret two to load and fire a 3 gun salvo was then given. Within a minute, the left and right guns were ready to fire, but the centre gun was having some issues. Zeigler announced over the turret telephone, left gun loaded, good job. The centre gun is having a little trouble, we'll straighten us out. Centre gun captain Richard Eric Lawrence called out we're not ready yet. Something was happening in the centre gun. Over the intercom, mort mort mort calling Dale Mortison in turret one was heard. Zeigler shouted oh my god the powder is smoldering. Shortly after, oh my god there's a flash was heard over the intercom. Then just 81 seconds after the order to ready turret two for firing was received, the centre gun exploded. A fireball between 2,500-3,000 Fahrenheit or 1,600 degree centigrade blew out from the centre gun's open breach. Debris was blasted around the gun room and out of the front of the turret. The explosion was contained within the turret and it spread across all three gun rooms, even though they were separated by walls. The armour door for the middle gun's powder lift was left open at the time of the explosion, which helped spread the explosion down the turret. Usually crews would stage more powder on the lift, which again assisted in the spread of the fire and explosions. 47 men were killed, including Zeigler. 12 crewmen in or near the turret's powder magazine, located to the bottom of the turret, were able to escape without serious injury, saved by the blast doors used to protect the ship from the explosive propellants. Aftermath In the immediate aftermath, firefighting crews entered the turret and blasted everything with water. The ceiling, the walls, the floors, and even the guns were soaked. After the fire was extinguished, the grim task of body recovery and identification took place. However, notes and body locations and photos weren't taken. This would hinder finding out where many of the sailors had fallen. The bodies were flown to Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Puerto Rico, then off to Charles C. Carson Centre for Mortuary Affairs at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware. The bodies were released to the families on the 24th of April, even before some had been positively identified. Meaning that it is likely that some were buried by the wrong families. The Federal Bureau of Investigation assisted the US Navy to identify all 47 sets of remains, and by the 16th of May 1989, this was apparently complete. This was done by the FBI cutting off fingers of the unidentified bodies, but back to the Iowa. She still had two loaded guns, and that needed to be well unloaded. Operation Specialist First Class James Bennett Drake from the USS Coral Sea led the unloading operation. Upon seeing the middle gun, he saw what he thought was evidence of overramming. The Iowa set sail to return to Norfolk, reaching there on the 23rd of April. A memorial service was held on the 24th, and was attended by President George H. W. Bush. But as the families mourned the dead and the Iowa's damage was inspected, the question of how could the middle gun have exploded in such a dramatic way had to be answered. And this would result in a little bit of a scandal and a bitter taste in many service personnel's mouths. The Investigations So as you may have noticed, I said investigations. This was because it would turn out that the Navy's answer was a little bit, shall we say, unbelievable. So initially an investigation was undertaken by the Navy itself. This was in the form of an informal one-office investigation. The man for the job was Commodore Richard D. Milligan. Milligan and his team interviewed a number of the staff of all the Iowa. Skelly's experiments were brought up, by some, but were quickly suppressed. Some of those interviewed found their statements scrubbed or altered. During his interview, Skelly admitted that he was aware that he shouldn't have been making the gun's fire for D846 powder with the £2,700 shells. Not much else was pursued as Skelly had managed to convince Captain Fred Musalli that the experiments were official and legit. But the investigation would be given a new path to walk down. You see, Captain Fred Musalli received a letter from one of the dead sailor's sisters, Kathy Kubikina, on the 7th of May, explaining that Clayton Hartwig, double indemnity life insurance with a Kendral Truett named as the cell recipient. You see, Hartwig wasn't meant to be in the turret that day. He was asked to assist the middle gun crew due to their lack of experience by Ziegler. The case would be passed on to the Naval Investigative Service as the initial investigation was informal. Hartwig's sister, Kathy Kubikina, was taken for interview and almost right off the bat was questioned about Hartwig's sexuality. Truett was then brought in for interview and heavily pressured him to admit having a relationship with Hartwig. Truett's wife Carol was also brought in for questioning, pressing her about the sexual orientation of Hartwig and Truett, and asking pretty horrible questions about how often she and her husband had sex and what type of sexual acts they had done. They also threw in whether she had sex with any of Truett's crewmates. Truett, upon hearing of the interview with his wife, withdrew from helping the investigation completely. At around the time of these interviews, someone within the NIS started leaking the homosexual relationship and, by extension, murder suicide theory with the media, and it featured in a number of newspapers. However, one fact was omitted by both the NIS and the media. In fact, the insurance policy was taken out several years before the explosion. On the 24th of May, NBC News identified Truett and Hartwig as criminal suspects in the Iowa explosion. The NIS put pressure on one of Hartwig's known friends aboard the Iowa, David Smith. He was interrogated for 7 hours and 40 minutes, during which he was told he would be charged with 47 counts of murder. After this interrogation, he was sent back to the Iowa, where he was forced to do a 9-hour shift, and when that was done, shipped back off to the NIS for even more interrogation for another 6 hours. Probably very sleep deprived and scared, he made a statement claiming Hartwig had made sexual advances towards him and had shown him an explosive timer, claiming he was planning to blow up Truett too. Three days later, Smith recanted his statement in full. His original statement was leaked to the media, but the whole recanting bit wasn't leaked. The NIS went to the FBI to do a psychological evaluation on Hartwig. Entry transcripts were given, including Smith's, but again admitted that it was recanted. The FBI began testing to see if the NIS's theory of an electric timer device was used to create the explosion, but no evidence was found in either the NIS investigation or the FBI's laboratory experiments that such device was present in the remains of the middle gun. Captain Joseph Dominic Micelli Naval Sea Systems Command quickly terminated the assistance from the FBI. A 60 page report submitted by Commodore Richard Milligan in July 1989 found that the explosion was a deliberate act, most probably committed by Hartwig, using an electronic timer, even though the FBI had debunked this. The report concluded that the powder bags had been overrammed into the center gun by 21 inches. This had been done so under Hartwig's direction in order to trigger the explosive timer, that he had placed between two of the powder bags. But although the FBI results were sidelined, on the 28th August, technicians at the Naval Weapons Support Center at Crane, Indiana actually agreed with the FBI's conclusion that an electronic timer, batteries and or primer were not involved in the explosion. So Captain Joseph Dominic Micelli then said it must have been a chemical timer. So guess what the Navy did? Of course there was nothing wrong with the ship's guns, as such on the 11th August 1989 the Navy recertified 16 inch guns for service. This did not sit very well with the victims, not with the public and definitely not with Hartwig's family. As such Senators Howard Metzenbaum and John Glenn, concerned with the Navy's conclusions, arranged to hold a meeting on the Navy's investigation. The lack of adequate training, illegal gun experiments, use of ancient powder and cutbacks in gun maintenance all came to light. During the congressional inquiry it was announced that Sandaya National Laboratories of Albuquerque, New Mexico was requested by the Government Accountability Office to assist the Navy's technical investigation. This was to see if there was an accidental explanation for the explosion. Sandaya focused on the case of an overram. The Navy had admitted to it in its report that it had happened. They determined that the five powder bags in turret two's centre gun had been rammed to 24 inches into the gun, 3 inches farther than the Navy had estimated in Milligan's report. A drop test was devised to simulate an overram situation and on the 18th test the powder bags exploded, importantly without any explosive timer. A final technical report was published in August 1991 and concluded, it is concluded that there is no explicit physical evidence that the hypothetical chemical ignition device was present in the centre gun of turret two. It is also concluded that the high speed overram is a possible cause of the April 19th, 1989 explosion aboard the USS Iowa. The Navy reopened its investigation and Myceli conducted more Navy tests and the bags exploded at a variety of different ramming speeds, but he tried to play down his results. As such when the Navy investigation lead Frank Kelso released his findings it would follow the Navy's original conclusion. The initial investigation was an honest attempt to weigh impartially all the evidence as it existed at the time and indeed despite the Sandaya theory and almost two years of subsequent testing a substantial body of scientific and expert evidence continued to support the initial investigation finding that no plausible accident cause can be established. He also stated however that the Navy had also found no evidence that the explosion was caused intentionally. Bearing in mind that both the Navy tests and the Sandaya tests had shown overramming could cause an explosion. So to me in my uneducated mind it feels like a bit of a responsibility dodge. Kelso also concluded in his press conference sincere regrets to the family of Clayton Hartwig and to the families of those who died. That such a long period has passed despite all efforts no certain answer regarding the cause of this terrible tragedy can be found. The families of the victims and of Hartwig filed lawsuits against the Navy. The Hartwig case was filed on the 19th of April 1991 but it didn't come to fruition and was dismissed on the 19th of November 1999 due to pure defamination claims being barred by sovereign immunity. The Hartwig family also sued NBC but this was thrown out due to the information being supplied to the media had come from the NIS. The other sailors family suits were also summarily dismissed. The USS Iowa wouldn't last much longer in service with the Navy and the damaged turret was trained forward and sealed off never to be used again. She was retired in Norfolk on the 26th of October 1990 and she is now a museum ship in LA. This is a plain difficult production. All videos on the channel are creative commons attribution share light license. Plain difficult videos are produced by me John in a currently very sunny and warm corner of southern London UK. I have Patreon and YouTube members and I'd like to thank you all for your financial support as well as the rest of you for tuning in every week. I have Instagram and Twitter so check them out for photos from behind the scenes. And all that's left to say is thank you for watching and Mr Music play us out please.