 I want to turn to my panel now and ask you, starting with the observation that I have, which is the invasion of Ukraine by Russia precipitated quite unexpectedly a cascade of commentary in the U.S. about how Ukraine and Taiwan have a lot in common. And China will take the lesson from what Putin did. This was mostly in the early months of 2022 after the invasion. There seemed to be a direct relationship between prediction of a coming invasion of Taiwan by China to the lack of knowledge of the person writing the commentary. We have a lot of non-experts offering so-called expert opinion on this. You're all experts on your own countries and attitudes. What do you think are the prospects for this kind of conflict over Taiwan? Jisa has just reminded us that the U.S. is going through change with the return of the Republicans in Congress. We have an election coming up. Taiwan has a presidential election coming in January 2024, which invites all sorts of new political games to go on in Taiwan. China has just sort of stabilized after the 20th Party Congress. So the action is more likely to be outside China than in, in terms of changing the relationship among the three parties. From your individual perspectives, how do you see the situation with respect to Taiwan? Well, don't you think that there are experts and experts, and not all policies are made by the right experts? I mean, I don't think if you've gone back way back beyond before February the 24th, few people would have thought of the invasion, even the Russian invasion of Ukraine, even though there had been a battle with the war in Georgia in 2008 lasted all of five days. I mean, we've got used to the idea that states do not get war against other states. They fight against non-state actors. So that's one thing. Secondly, I think that Donald Trump, now I wouldn't call Donald Trump an expert on anything, but he really did change the whole, perhaps a vice-vice-vice-vice Peter Navarro picture vis-a-vis China and the USA. And the measures that Trump brought in, basically a trade war, they're there and Biden hasn't taken away most of them, and now you have the chip choke. So I think with all due respect to Samir, yes, everybody wants to avoid things going wrong, but they can go wrong. And one of the problems of, I mean, Biden likes to think of this as democracies against authoritarian states, which I think is a pretty simplistic way of looking at it. But the problem with democracies is that they have very short-term horizons. The experts may not, but the politicians do. And I worry that things, you know, you get a sort of inexorable slide towards something which is worse than you'd want. Nobody in their right minds really would want to have a cold war between the US and China. But it's not exactly a warm feeling at the moment, and it's hard to see how the warmth will return. That, I think, is the real problem. And there's no real analogy with the old Cold War. You had the non-aligned movement, but in fact, the non-aligned movement really had to sort of change two sides in the end. I don't think that's going to happen this time, because history is not going to repeat itself. But nonetheless, I don't think we're in a happy place. And if, I mean, God forbid Donald Trump were to become president again, all bets are off. Plus, just a last thing. We really do not, I think, understand Xi Jinping. We don't have a real picture of him. If you are in East Asia or in India and South Asia, yes, you have this security architecture. You've got alliances between the US and individual countries. And you've got the Quad and Song, which I think was an excellent idea. So it's better to talk. I think it was Lee Kuan Yew who once said when elephants fight, the grass gets trampled, and when they make love, the grass gets trampled as well. So we're not really in a terribly happy position. Anyone else want to jump in? I think there are many differences between Taiwan and Ukraine. The first one we have to keep in mind is Taiwan is an island. There is no territorial continuity between men in China and Taiwan. So to take control of an island, even with a very modern and sophisticated military, it's a very complicated task. I don't think that the PLA today is ready to launch a landing operation against Taiwan. You can launch missile strikes. You can maybe impose a blockade, but the problem with a blockade is how long you can hold it. And the big difference between Ukraine and Taiwan is I don't think that the US can conduct a proxy war in Taiwan. It's very likely, it's highly likely that the US will be involved in a war in Taiwan, with those risks attached to the fact that you have two nuclear power involved in a direct confrontation. So I think that will continue to sort of compel China to think twice before launching an attack against Taiwan. What I see and I agree with one of these on that is that it's more likely that China will continue to, it's what has been called its Grey Zone strategy of coercion against Taiwan than to start a full-fledged invasion of Taiwan. Now the problem with Grey Zone strategy is that it's not without risks. And what I'm worried about, of course, is that I think it was alluded to by T-Series, the fact that the Grey Zone strategy can get out of control. Imagine if the PLA Air Force enters Taiwan's airspace. The Taiwanese fighter will have to scramble and to force these fighters to move out of the airspace in one way or another. So there are risks of incidents and even of military crisis. The big question is how we both, I mean, the US and Taiwan and China, first of all, will be able to manage that crisis. There is no child of communication now between China and Taiwan. I mean, because China has refused to talk to the Taiwanese when. And that's a real issue. You know, on Taiwan there is a growing, you know, Taiwanese identity, which doesn't mean that everyone is favor independence. But I think the idea is that Taiwan is not the PRC. It's another entity which has an official name, which is the Republic of China. And even if it doesn't recognize the nation state, it's a de facto state. So we have to admit the reality that they actually, even if there is one China, there are two states or two governments which should be, you know, should interact on equal footing. And even if the KMT comes back to power in Taiwan, I don't think that the issue will be solved because everyone in Taiwan is against the idea that Taiwan becomes a special administrative region of the PRC. Taiwan is very part of the PRC. So it will, I mean, both sides will have to negotiate another deal. And here I think it will be much more productive of the part of China to sort of open a channel of communication with the Chinese authorities, whoever sits in the presidential palace in Taipei. And here we far from it. So if there is a rule of Honest Broker that the US could place to sort of convince China to talk to the authorities in Taiwan, whoever they are. It was Honohu who mentioned the Thucydides trap. And I mean, Graham Allison, of course, says it's not inevitable, but it's likely, which I think is rather worrying. Yes, but the fact that we are having two nuclear powers, I think it's a disincentive. It should sober people up. But we don't know because that was true at the time of the Orchal War, whether it's going to be remanded through the nuclear war. It's another story. From your two responses, I get that you'd say 60% unlikely there'll be an attack on Taiwan, but there's enough unusual circumstances and potential conflict opportunities that it might be 40% lead us into an undesired conflict. Do others have a reaction to that? I don't think there's going to be an attack, as our Chinese colleague said, in the near future of Taiwan for several reasons. The first is that it doesn't correspond to the Chinese strategy. The Chinese strategy is to win the war without a battle. And so, to arrive at a time when the Chinese fleet will be so considerable that the Taiwanese themselves will say, well, OK, we're going to go to Beijing and the Chinese of Beijing will say, well, my dear friends, of course, you can keep your autonomy and manage yourself. I think that's the Chinese strategy. The Chinese were merchants. They weren't warriors. And when they wanted to play the warriors, it went very badly. It was against Vietnam in 1979, when they wanted to give a lesson. It was rather Vietnam that gave a lesson to China. So I think it's not their idea that they were merchants and so they wanted to protect their trade. They know very well that if they attack Taiwan, there will be repercussions, considerable sanctions. And they avoid it. And I noticed that the big Chinese companies, and we can contradict here, but the big Chinese companies, who are very afraid of the sanctions of Washington and Brussels, respect the sanctions. I'm talking about the big companies that were decided against Russia during the war in Ukraine. So obviously, an attack of Taiwan would be possible. It would be possible when when the Americans had the head elsewhere. We have already had this phenomenon. We have already had Turkey that took 40% of the island of Cyprus in the summer of 1974. Why was Turkey able to take 38% of the island of Cyprus? Because Washington's power was completely paralyzed that day due to the Wattegate affair. So I think that if the Chinese attacked Taiwan, they would do it for example during an American election or a contested election or something like that. But I don't know. Today, it doesn't seem to me that being their first policy seems to me, to protect their trade. Thank you for introducing those factors right now. Listening to Jise and all of the conversations and thinking about, we don't know Xi Jinping after 10 years in office. If we don't know him after 10 years, I'm worried because we ought to know something about the man by now. But I don't think he's had any single interview with a length interview. No, that's not going to happen. I would propose that this is a good time if China wants to change its tactics. We're seeing in various subtle ways China pulling back on its aggressiveness in the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands and others. They're not changing fundamental positions, but they're being less aggressive. Maybe that will be true on the Indian line of actual control as well. I don't know at this point. But for me, it would be a great time for China to show some tactical flexibility if Kevin McCarthy shows up in Taipei with a delegation. China says, what? Another speaker of the House shows up. Who cares? Secondly, China can quietly begin to recommence communication with Taiwan's authorities. Send some faxes with their former contacts who were in regular contact with the mainland before Tsai Ing-Wen got elected as president. China could lower the temperature a lot during this crisis, or to head off a crisis in the time ahead, if it wants to think creatively. I want to turn to the audience in a couple of minutes, so please be brief. You see, this year, the U.S. has made two very important declarations regarding China. One is made by Janet Yellen, U.S. Trade Secretary in April, that U.S. will pursue free but secure trade with French shoring. It's a very significant declaration. That means the U.S. will not address China issues within the context of WTO. Second, the important declaration was made in October by U.S. National Security Strategy, which designated China as the only competitor which both have intent and capability to reshape international order. It was preceded by sweeping ban on sales of advance chips to China a week earlier. Thomas Friedman of New York Times described that it is the factor declaration of war of the United States against China. But I would like to draw your attention that U.S. rhetoric is very strong. However, with regard to IPF, the core strategy of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, in the Pacific economy framework, U.S. has not invited Taiwan. IPF is the factor FDA negotiations minus market access. However, it's an FDA which is totally legal under the WTO, even if U.S. invited Taiwan, because since the FDA is negotiated under the framework WTO, WTO membership is not for sovereign states, it's for customs territory. So it is totally legal for U.S. to include Taiwan in IPF, but they do not. They instead pursue bilateral trade and investment agreement with Taiwan, which I think U.S. is mindful of the red line with regard to Taiwan by China. U.S. strong rhetoric against possibility of China's aggression to Taiwan is to deter China's aggression into Taiwan, I may suspect. Thank you. Two short points and I think you can go to the audience. The first, I am really worried when very wise people around the world somehow assume that she is a very rational and sane actor. And there are no data points to prove that. Nothing that he has done since he has taken charge would lend you to believe that you're dealing with someone who is rational and mature. And yet we are painting him in the colors of great wisdom. He is a wolf warrior diplomacy. Yeah, so that is quite wise, right? So if that is the data point that makes you believe that he is a wise actor, I am worried. Now that's one part of it. So I think let's not be premature in our assessment that we are dealing with someone who's wise and sage and will bide his time. He's not interested in biding his time anymore. I think that is the only single message no need to hide, no need to bide. It is time to take claim and it's time to reshape the politics of the world. I think that is the single message. If you're not hearing it, then I want you to come to some conferences we host in Delhi and start hearing that because I think some of us don't get the message. That's number one. Number two, and this is important. I think forget about Tehwan. The question should be what do you do when China decides to change the territory, territorial map of any country in the world? I think that's the question you should ask. They gave you a fate, a complaint in South China. See what did you do? They disregarded the tribunal verdict. What did you do? They decided to change the map of the Himalayas. What did you do? You told us trade more with China. I have a dialogue. If I was Tehwan, I should be very worried. None of your behavior should give any sort of confidence to Tehwan that there is going to be any sort of response from any quarter. You will tell Tehwan, we will have a new trade deal with you, join them. I suspect that is going to be the voice coming out of Europe because that is what we heard. Now, I'm not even going further west. Ask the Afghanistan folks what they think about believing in anyone who believed that they were going to create order and value-based foreign policies. You threw them under the truck. In prime time television. Who is in that part of the world going to rely on any sort of...anyway, sorry. Thank you for those two interjections.