 It's time for the Lawn Jean Chronoscope, a television journal of the important dishes of the hour brought to you every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. A presentation of the Lawn Jean Wittner Watch Company, maker of Lawn Jean, the world's most honored watch, and Wittner, distinguished companion to the world-honored Lawn Jean. Good evening. This is Frank Knight. May I introduce our co-editors for this edition of the Lawn Jean Chronoscope? Mr. William Bradford Huey and Mr. Henry Haslett. Our distinguished guest for this evening is General Frank L. Howley, former First Military Governor of Berlin. Well, General Howley, you rose to fame in Berlin when you talked tough to the Russians and did so much to make a success of the airlift. In your new book you answer some very important questions and I'm hoping you'll answer some more tonight. I'd like to begin by asking as a leading question, do you think we're going to win this war against Russian communism? Yes, I'm an American, Mr. Haslett. I'm not very good at being a pessimist. Well, what do you think we'll have to do to win it? We'll have to make up our mind that we want to win it. That's the first thing we have to do. Well, is there any general policy that we have to change to win it, have we been following the wrong policy up to now? Yes, we have to change from the point of view of getting an even break or a stalemate into the idea of winning. And that's very American, whoever heard of an American who wanted to have a tie score in a football game. Well, the $64 question there, sir, is can we win this war without large-scale military action? I believe that we cannot win this war without being prepared for large-scale military actions. In other words, if the Soviets can't have their way in any way except to use force, they'll use force. And they'll only use force if they have more than a reasonable chance of succeeding. Do you think we can get peace honorably in Korea still? Or do you think we can get our objectives honorably in Korea still? We can't afford to do anything which isn't honorable. The honor comes before peace, it comes before victory, it comes before anything else. You can't have a great nation win, lose, or draw if that nation is dishonorable or if they make major sacrifices of principle. Well, you go along with the idea that's been promulgated recently that the Koreans should be able to take over the whole front, that we should train them to take over the whole front and withdraw our own foot soldiers from Korea over that period. I'd say that was purely a military decision, but I will say that as a general policy, countries have to be able to do their share in defending themselves. You can help them, but any country that values democracy will fight for it. And if they won't fight for it, if they aren't willing to go through valley forges and things of that sort, I question that they deserve to have democracy. General Halley, you've had probably as much experience as any American has directly with the Russians and in figuring out how they think. Now do you think that there is any likelihood of their launching a war in Europe in the near future? There are great many minds that are trying to work that out. They'll only launch a military operation in Europe if it's going to succeed, and they can't get what they want in some cheaper way. A bunch of pamphlets is a cheaper way if they can cause an internal revolution in Iran. That's much cheaper than a military operation. Your feeling is that as long as these cheap ways show results, they won't try a more expensive man. That's right. And the more expensive military operations are, the less chance they'll use. What about the nature of their military preparedness in Europe? Do they have good divisions in Germany now, for instance? Yes, I would say that they do have good divisions. They certainly have good divisions in terms of 10, 15, and 20. I don't believe that their economy is such that they can have unlimited numbers of crackerjack divisions. I don't think the intelligence of their people gives them depth of mechanics, for example. Well, do you think the Germans can be trusted on our side in the event of a showdown? I don't trust anybody too much. I think we can trust the Germans to do what is best or what they think is best for Germany. And we're in the position that what is best for Germany is that Germany live up to agreements and stick with the West rather than the East. So it won't do the Germans much good to play hard to get and try to play us against the Russians. They probably won't do much of that, do you think? Oh, they'll do that. That's the international bargaining. They'll do it. The French would do it. And I think maybe we'd be smarter if we did a little more of that sort of thing. Back in 1945 and 6 or I believe you were one of the Americans who was trying to make pacifists out of the Germans. How well did you succeed? We succeeded fairly well and we were quite sincere. I mean we really believe that pacifism would work and it's one of the tragedies that due to the efforts of Russia we have had to resume an assumption that military operations may be necessary. In other words, that the policies that you followed in 1945 and 6 you think were correct. What was wrong was Russia's attitudes. Yes, and from our point of view we were suffering under a great illusion. We thought the Russians were the kind of persons we wanted them to be. Well, do you think the French will do what we expect of them? That is to say, do you think the French will really keep on preparing and increasing their divisions? The French have a very weak government and it always puts them in the position when they make a promise there can be no certainty that they'll live up to it. If they have to go to the people for increased taxation, as they did after the promises at Lisbon, the government may very well fall and then the agreement is passed by. What relation has this to the European army idea, this weakness of France? But as you know from this latest book, I'm a little skeptical of this long range idea of a European army. The integration is all right if the units are big enough, but the original notion of small units of different nationalities, I think that that was a good way to get licked against an aggressive enemy. Now we have the European army concept up to divisions of one nationality. It's still risky, but at least that makes sense. On this recent trip of yours, sir, through Europe, did you find a rising feel first of un-American, of anti-Americanism? There is a rise in resentment. I don't believe it's really anti-Americanism, but it's kind of a feeling that we're using our money to tell them how to live. Well, did you also find a rising feeling of neutralism in Europe more count me out than who existed a few years ago? That's a bit spotty. The Germans a few years ago, of course, had this onumic count me out. And according to Theodore Blanc, who's sort of responsible for whatever re-arming they do, at the moment the sentiment is, unfortunately, not without me, lighter onumic. In other words, they're getting a little more fatalistic. They don't want to join anybody's army, but well, how about the internal condition of the countries on our side is communism gaining or losing in France, for example? In the first place, the Frenchman doesn't know he's a communist very frequently. You mean the one who is? Well, the one who's following the ticket? He's following the line or voting the ticket. I like specific cases. It's like an argument I had with the cab driver. He said he wasn't a communist, but every point of view he had, he'd got out of reading the communist paper. From the point of view of circulation of the two communist papers, the circulation has fallen of the morning paper to l'humanité, and the afternoon paper says it's fallen from about 800,000 down to about 300,000. So that's indicative of a decline. He actually voted and fall much in percentages over a period of four years, though, did it? It's pretty hard to tell much about French voting. It's so complicated. Well, how about the Italian situation on communism? I don't believe that I'd like to comment on the Italian situation. I didn't visit there this summer, and while I didn't do any visiting in order to get new ideas, at least I checked up on my notions and convictions, and I didn't go down to Italy. Among our own troops there, sir, on your visit, the six divisions that we have in Central Europe, are those good troops? What's the condition of our troops there? I'd say, Mr. Urie, that our soldiers, we can be proud of them. They look good. They're magnificent in behavior on trains. You can't tell the difference between officers and men. They're so well-dressed. And thanks to the training methods of recent years, I believe they're good combat soldiers. Of course, there's no final test except combat, but they're given plenty of training. Is there any reason why we should maintain six divisions of troops in Germany now? I think right now we have two, yes, but I think it's an unsound position that Americans stand there defending Germans. Let them fight their own battles. At the moment, though, we have to have them there to give the French a feeling that we won't back out on our commitments. You speak of a policy of aggressive righteousness in your book, I believe. Now, what do you mean by aggressive righteousness, General? I mean, let's do what's right. Let's think it out and do the American thing, the principal thing, and start with that and then convince our allies that it's good for them. Let's not start and set a policy based on what we think we can convince somebody that they ought to do. Let's start off with the correct basis of what is right. Now, your book, which is titled Your War for Peace is getting a good deal of attention, sir. What is the purpose? Why did you write this book? I wrote it to cause the individual citizen to think about our foreign policy. And do you feel, sir, as a final question, do you feel that we will ultimately understand the nature of the enemy and the nature of the war and that we will ultimately win this struggle? Yes, I do. And, well, sir, thank you very much for being with us this evening. The opinions that you've heard our speakers express tonight have been entirely their own. The editorial board for this edition of the Lawn Jean Chronoscope was Mr. William Bradford Huey and Mr. Henry Haslitt. Our distinguished guest was General Frank L. Howley, former first military governor of Berlin. 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So, if you'd like to own just about the finest watch made anywhere in the world, you will choose well to choose Lawn Jean the world's most honored watch, the world's most honored gift, premier product of the Lawn Jean Witner Watch Company since 1866, maker of watches of the highest character. We invite you to join us every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday evening at this same time for the Lawn Jean Chronoscope, a television journal of the important issues of the hour, broadcast on behalf of Lawn Jean the world's most honored watch, and Witner, a distinguished companion to the world honored Lawn Jean. This is Frank Knight reminding you that Lawn Jean and Witner watches are sold and serviced from coast to coast by more than 4,000 leading jewelers who proudly display this emblem, agency for Lawn Jean Witner watches. Wednesday night, the big bites on the CBS television network.