 Hello and welcome to this episode of Mapping Fault Lines. In this show, we'll take a look at the situation in Northeast Syria on the ninth day of the Turkish invasion. To talk more about this, we have with us Prabir Prakash, hello, Prabir. Prabir, so as we know, this is the ninth day of the invasion and Turkish forces have entered into northeastern Syria. They've captured some small towns. And the Syrian government, on the other hand, is advanced following the US withdrawal. So they've taken, the Syrian forces have come into Kobane, they've taken Manbij. So before we go into the larger implications, how do you analyze the ground situation right now? Well, I think the most important point is what we had discussed earlier, that will the YPG be able to reach an accommodation this short time with the Syrian government? Because there is, for them, no other alternative. That actually has happened on the ground. They have been able, with a very short span of time, to reach an accommodation, allow the Syrian government forces to come in, take positions of at least the major concentrations where the Kurdish population is. And this has changed the complexion of Syria today, particularly because if SDF goes, the SDF is led by the YPG, if SDF goes with the Syrian government, Assad's government, then we have liberated another 20, 25% area of Syria which was under the occupation of SDF. And this was also the gas and oil rich areas. Coming back to the question that you asked, what about the Turkish invasion? It does seem that the Turkish invasion is not really being led by Turkish armed forces in large numbers. They may be supporting it, they may be giving it logistical support, but it seems to be largely what used to be called the Free Syrian Army, which has now got another name. So, but essentially it is what we would have called al-Qaeda light forces which were backed by, from the Saudis to Qataris, also by the United States and NATO allies, and of course, sheltered by Erdogan. He was, Turkey was the main backer of these forces. Now, this raktag band, which has been camping for quite some time in Turkey, and is also a significant part of that is also there in some pockets in Idlib. They seem to have joined the Turkish forces and they seem to be spearheading this. And this is the fight between actually the Kurdish forces and the so-called Free Syrian Army. In fact, one of the HDF women leaders was brutally killed as a part of this on the M4 highway. And it's again, from what we see, it's again the so-called Free Syrian Army, which is spearheading this kind of attacks. So, at the moment it also appears that the Turkish forces are reaching some kind of an accommodation with the Syrian government, as well as with the Russian government. And this is somewhere being brokered by Russia, who is playing the honest intermediary in this particular case, between Syria, Turkey, and also the Kurdish forces, the IPG. Because if you remember, the Kurds always had a very good equation. The Russians, they have an embassy in Russia. And their equation with Russia has always been there in spite of the fact that they were under American umbrella. So I think the quickness with which this has happened has shocked everybody because we didn't think that there was a chance of Kurdish switch over in such a quick way and they could coordinate this so quickly. The other important part is, it appears that both the Syrian Air Force and the Russian Air Force have declared that Turkish Air Force cannot enter that area. So there is no air cover that these forces will have when they enter northeast Syria. So with all of this, I think the picture that is emerging is that Turkey is using the Free Syrian Army as cannon fodder, essentially. I think they're also uncomfortable with having large numbers of these on their territory and let the Kurds and the Free Syrian Army fight it off. I don't think looking at what's happening, they're going to confront the Syrian armed forces. So in that sense, I think this is really not about northeast Syria anymore, where I think the Turkish government and the Syrian government will reach some accommodation because Turks really did not want a Kurdish enclave over there. And if the Syrian government takes it over, I think it's much easier for them to accommodate that. And really the change is the American withdrawal from Syria, which now Trump has announced, except Al-Tanaf, that enclave which is still there, which makes it difficult for the communication between Syria and Iraq. So that is still there. But apart from that, they seem to be withdrawing from most of the places. They don't have much in any case. So the east of Euphrates, which is something the Syrian forces earlier could not enter. They have now entered. They've taken the Tabqa Dam. They have also taken their approaching Raqqa. They have entered Raqqa. So with all this, I think a very quick change that is taking place is really east of Euphrates, which they have not gone till date. They're really going to take that over, it seems. And the Americans certainly are not going to prevent them. So it's a huge change. And it's also a great example of how the whole world was actually wrong in thinking the Kurds will be decimated. The Turks will actually take over all of these areas. And suddenly we find a completely new realignment that's taking place in Syria. And Erdogan has said that he would be meeting Putin, probably in Sochi on the coming Tuesday. And we also have the fact that Russian troops are in Manbij, preventing the possibility of a confrontation between the Turkish forces and the Syrian soldiers. So in some senses, this also strengthens the regional alignment process that we have discussed in earlier videos, how Russia, Iran is also definitely somewhere involved in the situation. So how these forces are basically now playing a key fact, have a key role to play in deciding what happens in the future in the region. If you remember, there was an Adana Accord, which sort of fell by the wayside. In the Adana Accord, there was a five kilometer corridor, which there will be no YPG forces, no fortifications. And this will be treated like a demilitarized zone. And Turkey would not enter that, but it would not be militarized. That was the protection that Turkey wanted from any incursion of the Kurdish forces into southern Turkey. So that seems to be the line, which the Russians are saying, that the Turks should not extend anything beyond that. And that's where the border demilitarized zone across the border might still be. So it does look like the Adana Accord, which really had Russia, Syria, Turkey, all of them as somewhere in agreement with. That Astana process of the Adana Accord seems to be what it is coming back. The important part is when Trump was talking about all of this and when Turkey was threatening to enter, you see the basic issue for Turkey was not entering this area, but they did not want Rojava, an independent self-governing enclave to come upon its southern borders, which obviously has a good equation with PKK if it is not really a part of PKK. Let's not get into that. But that is something they were not happy about. And the fact that the United States was using the Kurds to really create an enclave controlled by the United States with Kurds as a fray face of it, this policy was something which is not acceptable to Turkey. So it was not about fortifications. It was not about A, B or C. It is really about Rojava, the independent self-governing canton, which was essentially controlled by the Kurds, which is what Turkey was opposing. So the whole issue of Trump saying, okay, we'll demolish the barriers, we'll demolish the fortifications on the border. You come in, but don't come in too much. Let the rest of Eastern Syria be with the SDF and we will be there. All of this was not going to sell. Increasingly, US, which is illegally there in Syria, let's recognize they are not there legally. The Syrian government has not invited them. And whatever legitimacy they may have claimed under the UN resolution that there's Al Qaeda, ISIS, we are fighting them, that no longer stands. So therefore, their whole reason for being there today is not held up by any international law. But then as you know, United States does not believe in the international law. It believes that it's strategic needs or whatever it thinks it should do is superior to international law. The question is, with 5,000 troops, which is what the US had, 2,000 regular and... Some special forces. Special forces. But another 3,000 mercenaries and maybe a smattering of French and British troops. With all of that, you can't really fight a war. So you cannot confront Turkey with that kind of force. And the fact that you are still a NATO partner with Turkey also makes it very difficult. So Trump really had no winning card in his hand. So what he has accepted finally in the Turks' intervene, then the US is out of the game. And that's exactly what has happened. And initially, he threatened, he blushed as usual, he blustered, and when Turkey did not listen to him, now has brokered a deal with Syrian government and Russia. Now, Trump is saying, I'll sanction you. Okay, the sanction you for what? Because after all, Turkey was going to invade Syria. At that point of time, we didn't hear about sanctioning. So now suddenly they're being sanctioned. Well, the invasion is actually on a much smaller scale than what we thought it will take place earlier. So I don't see any of this a consistency with Trump. But nevertheless, one definite issue is there that the United States as an entity, armed forces entity in Eastern Syria is now going to be over. And that now finally has been accepted by the US armed forces as well. Because the argument is that when two years back or three years back, Trump said we should withdraw from Syria. Actually, it wasn't carried through. But now it does seem it will be carried through. Al-Tanab still remains, because Trump has made some noises about Al-Tanab. So I think this is also what you said, a complete rearrangement of the map in which the regional powers will seek accommodation with each other. And they see Russia is a far more consistent player, brokering this deal. And in some senses, the guarantor of the deal. Even the French have said that they're going to work with Russia to take this forward. You know, what else would you do anyway? Because they have good equations with Turkey. They seem to have good equations, even the Kurdish forces. And of course, they are supporting the Saudi government. So all sides, they have seemed to have gained good will. And the U.S. certainly was against the Syrian government. They have been asking for his downfall forever. They are in breach in the relations with Turkey, a NATO ally. And certainly Russia, Iran are not friends of the United States. So they seem to be rather friendless. And having thrown under the bus the Kurds, the last of their allies in the area, which any case people have been saying that at some point, U.S. is going to sacrifice the Kurds, which is what they have done. So with all of this, they don't seem to have either any allies or any friends in this war, except Israel. Israel's ability to intervene in this war is extremely limited. And Russia having said, you know, you can't do more than this, occasional bombings, yes, but no attacks on Syria. I don't think that even Russia and the United States really has any maneuverability left. I think what you are going to see is what exactly what you said, growth of regional talks. Even if you don't like each other, you need to sit down and talk about each other. And I hope it also extends to Yemen, because today we seem to hear that Aden and the Houthi and other forces might also reach some agreement. So if these regional agreements start taking place, we might see the end of armed insurrections, wars, civil wars, et cetera. And I think for everybody, the issue is not who has lost, who has gained. As the international press, mostly the American press is making out to be that, you know, Trump has lost Syria. Well, Trump never had Syria. The United States never had Syria. And what's the meaning of a country having another country? And as far back as I remember, except the 1950s, early 50s, Syria has never been a part of the American protectorate, so to say. So what is this question of losing Syria? Yes, their war to throw out Assad has failed. Regime change has failed. They have no more cards left to play. They have no legal standing in Syria. And finally, they're recognizing that this is where it stands and withdrawing from a battle which anyway was never theirs to win in the first place. So I think this whole argument is sort of being put on its head by the American media of Trump betraying the courts. Yes, but the point is, the courts were not made in the woods. They knew that the United States, which is record of betraying the courts and others also having betrayed the courts earlier, that they were not going to be, they were not going to be long-term partners. But I must grant this. The way courts have been able to do this, they have shown a maturity and a finesse, diplomatic finesse, which I didn't think would happen. And the fact that Russia has been playing this long strategic game against the Americans which seem to be playing a ball-by-ball game, so to say, not the larger strategic vision, I think this is going to make a sea change in the West Asia now. And it's interesting also at the PR level because the Turkish are spreading the narrative that Trump's letter to Erdogan, which was in the strangest letter you can imagine, actually was dumped in the dustbin and it may even have sparked the war, so to speak. Whereas on the other hand, you have the US media trying to, and the foreign policy establishment, trying to sort of create this impression of dialogue, of debate inside, but really nothing is likely to change on the ground. And even with Mike Pence meeting Erdogan today, do you think, is it more of a PR stunt, just an image, so to speak, or do they have any cards at all? You know, the US cannot, they're forced to put Turkey completely with the Russians. They have to court it because after all, the second biggest military in the NATO is Turkey. They still hold 50 nuclear weapons in Ingerlich, the air base which the United States has, it's strategic bombers. So given all of it, you know, there's a huge stake that US and NATO has in Turkey. So what and how it will play out is difficult to see. But I don't see the US, at least in the Syrian theater, coming back to as a player. So I think that phase is over. Can they manage to keep their equation with Turkey from sinking completely? Does Turkey go over to an independent position? Or does it side more with the Russians in this area? We'll have to see. Obviously Russia and Turkey do not have identical interests. Neither do Syrians and Turkey have identical interests, but I think they are recognizing that now war is no longer an option. Erdogan's new Ottoman dreams, if he had one, is not an option. He supported the Islamist forces in Syria against Assad and wanted, was a part of the regime change operation. That's no longer an option. So I think all sides are coming to an understanding of this kind. I see yet to have yet to understand what the America's strategic vision is. And if you don't have a strategic vision, why is Pence going there? And what is he going to discuss? Only thing he can say, hey, don't, you know, severe relations with us. We still like to be friends with you. Is that what he's going to say? After all, his only ally is the Kurds. He has really, Trump and the United States has thrown them out of the bus. So after that, what is left for them to negotiate with Turkey? I really don't know. And I think the world is also quite mis-defined, shall we say. Where is this strategic understanding going? So I do not believe that this has been a major four-dimensional chess that somehow Trump has played and won. I see that I think that he was looking for when he withdrew from northeast Iraq. He was hoping that the Syrian army and the Turks would clash. And then Russia will be forced to choose between the two. I don't think he ever expected. The Russia would be able to bring the Kurds, the Syrian government and the Turks together. And that has shocked not only the US, but shocked us as well. I don't think we anticipated that this was on the, this was what was being worked out behind the scenes. And the speed at which it has been worked out has actually shocked all of us because it would seem that these talks were going on for quite some time behind the scenes. And this move of the United States was not unexpected. And therefore there were contingency plans in place for what has happened. The only thing the Turks had to give up further advance in northeast Syria. How much that will play out? What will happen? We have to see that's not clear as of now. Will they take some territory? Will they try to settle refugees over there? These are all apograps as of now. But I think broadly it is that the Syrian government and the Turkish government are going to sit down and negotiate this. And America has very little wiggle room over here. Thank you, Prabir. That's all we have time for in this episode of Mapping Forged Lines. Keep watching NewsLeague.