 Good afternoon. Welcome to CSIS. My name is Andy Kutchins. I'm Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program here at the Center for Strategic International Studies. And it's a great pleasure for me to welcome you here this afternoon to discuss After South Stream, Turkish Stream. Now, I think I've heard some people refer to this as potentially a pipe dream. I've even heard some colleagues use another modifier before dream to refer to this issue. But we're not going to go there. We have a terrific panel today. Let me just say a couple of comments. It was, I think, a surprise for most of us in December 2014 when Mr. Putin in Russia announced that it was canceling its South Stream Gas Pipeline Project, a project that the Russian government had been promoting for since at least 2006, a project which, by my understanding, I think the Russians had invested about $5 billion into. And but on a trip to Ankara, Mr. Putin unveiled a new pipeline project that would send additional gas to Europe through Turkey to the Greek border, which was dubbed Turkish Stream. There's been a lot of speculation as to the potential winners and losers of this decision. There's been speculation as to whether South Stream is indeed fully canceled. There are questions about whether Turkish Stream is a more viable pipeline project. Will it lessen or exacerbate Europe's energy security concerns? And what are the broader geopolitical concerns about this project? I think it would be hard to find a better set of panelists to discuss this today. And let me briefly introduce them, all three of them, before we turn over to Dr. Najep Adikova to make the opening presentation, kind of outlining what the project is all about, supposedly. Najep Adikova has held senior positions in the Turkmenistan government, served on a number of high-level trade and energy commissions of former Soviet states and dissipated in feasibility studies for hydrocarbon development. Her knowledge of European, US, Russian, Iranian, Turkish, and Chinese policies in the former Soviet Union have contributed to assessments of political and financial risk, geopolitics, energy development, and business and government relations. She has served as the senior advisor at the Institute of Developing Economies of JETRO, Japan External Trade Organization in Tokyo, and many, many other institutions and other positions. She is the director and president of Antares Strategy, and even more relevant for our purposes today, she is a non-resident senior associate affiliated with the Russian Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, us, CSIS, in working with us as we develop our Eurasia Initiative. Following Najep's introduction, I will turn to a longtime colleague and friend, Ed Chao, who is an international energy expert with more than 30 years of oil industry experience. He's worked in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, South Africa, Europe, and the former Soviet Union, and he has developed policy and business strategy and successfully negotiated complex, multi-billion dollar international business ventures. He specializes in oil and gas investments in emerging economies and advised the US and foreign governments, international oil companies, multinational corporations, multilateral agencies, and international financial institutions. And following Ed will be also longtime friend and colleague here at CSIS, Bulent Alaritza, who's the director and senior associate of the Turkey Project, which he has been directing for a number of years here at CSIS, lectured widely in the US as well as in Turkey as a frequent media commentator on Turkish foreign policy and Turkish domestic politics. Let me just say in a word, if I wanna know anything about Turkey, I go to Bulent. So with that brief introduction, let me turn the floor over to our speakers who really know what they're talking about. And first of all, Nadya. Thank you very much. So thank you very much, Andy, for such a kind introduction and was interesting, sometimes interesting to listen about yourself and so on. So today our subject is Turkish stream. Probably we should not talk about, more talk about what happened before. But anyway, I will try, it's a very complicated topic, but anyway, I will try to touch on only some issues and after that we will see how it will work. So you see on the screen, South Stream, it was a huge project, very big and three parts, it was canceled. So it was canceled not because of the price of oil, not because of it's too expensive, but it was canceled exactly because it was serious. The gas from face serious legal issues in Europe just could not continue because in 2011, EU introduced the third energy package. So that's why it was canceled. But it's still alive or not, I think it's canceled completely because it was useless to continue to work, to have a huge project. And the third part in EU, the third part of the pipeline, it should be in EU territory and a face, a lot of restrictions. So that's why the project, next project is Turkish stream pipeline and this information which you see right now, this is information based on, provided by Gasprom in January 27, 2015, based on that information. So it is the same project, but much smaller. And if you look at the offshore part of this project, if I go back, you see about the same shape of the pipeline, only the small part of this project, it will just turn and direct it towards the Turkey. As you see 600 kilometers, more than 600, it will be the old route of the South Stream on only 250, it will be new one. The same pipe, it's I believe 32 inches and as well three, four strings. It's very smart to use the same route because before Russia already spent money to for feasibility study for preparing all jobs in order to start build the project. As I know that Gasprom already had two contracts with the two companies, one is Italian Saipam and another European company to build this pipeline and spent, yes, it's about five billion US dollars, but what spent for buying pipelines and fracking some barge. So they can indeed recoup some equipment, maybe not completely, not all of this. So the first string, it will be only for Turkish market, but there's no intergovernmental agreement. Agreement will be signed on the second quarter of 2015 only. But according to information which was provided by the Gasprom and as well the officials, that Turkey, okay, Turkish market will received in December 2016 gas, the first gas, but beyond 2019, no Russian transit gas will cross Ukraine. So it seems to me it's this very optimistic plan. So if you see the share of the Russian gas transit to Europe through Ukraine, it's already dropping. And every time when they have a new pipeline or new direction or new entry point, the share of Ukraine, I mean transit of Russian gas through Ukraine, it's getting smaller and smaller. And they believe that after 2019 it will be zero. But as I said, it's too optimistic for this timeframe and why I will try to explain. Yeah, definitely they can build two strings and maybe one or two and there's a market for that. It's a Turkish market and as well they can provide from the second string to the southern part of the Europe. But anyway, if you look at the Russian major pipelines and you will see that the pipeline which across the Ukraine and which supposed to be canceled after 2020, you will see that the main energy hubs in the center of Europe. So, but as soon as they build the pipeline Turkish stream, the energy hub will switch immediately to the south. It will be in Turkish territory. And Gazprom announced that they will sell gas on a border between Turkey and Greek. There is no additional pipelines will be in the European territory. If the European customers need gas they have to come and buy but it's too optimistic and not probably responsible even for this time. Because it's about, I'm not sure 14 or 13 EU countries receive the Russian gas through Ukraine. So some of them, all of them, it's a long-term contracts. But some of them, it's a long-term contracts delivery points with exactly delivery points. And you see this mark on the map and will continue in force beyond 2020. So there's a question how Gazprom will manage this. I know that the Gazprom very responsible supplier and I don't believe that they will drop any contracts. So there's a question whether Russia, whether Ukraine, whether the Gazprom will be able to find some other sources or how they will manage this. So that's why I think that if the Russia build the third and fourth strings it probably will be something beyond 2020. Maybe they will come up with something more interesting. So what happened to Ukraine? So when we talk about the losers and winners it seems to me the main loser in this case will be Ukraine. So Ukraine and there's no point and no ground anymore to call Brussels and ask to block any projects, pipeline projects which will bypass Ukraine. As for instance, Yatsenyuk said last year he called Brussels a block to South Stream because South Stream is against Ukrainian transit routes. So I don't believe that they will ask Turkey to do the same and definitely Ukraine will lose more income and finally probably will be zero. And trade moves if we check with Turkey. Turkey will get about the same amount of gas but they can of course buy more from Russia but only the difference will be that trans-Balkan pipeline, trans-Balkan gas which comes through Ukrainian territory it will go through directly Turkish stream. So there's no gas in Turkey which will come will go through the run through the Ukraine. But it's okay, there's a lot of speculation that Turkey will depend on Russia it's not maybe good or bad. I don't think that it's a problem will be, no problem with that. And Turkey can get more gas from Russia but if Russia build the 13 force stream and Russia will more depend on Turkey there's will be mutual dependence so there's no point even discuss it. So and after that it's domestic markets okay and find that Turkey will get more gas and will directly and it's security. But Turkey is winning this project because Turkey already recognized by EU as a key state in as a key transit state and turn up it's runs through Turkey. So it's a huge project. And of course it's still not well developed but anyway Turkey already transit state and try to talk and negotiate with the countries like for instance Turkmenistan and it has already framework agreement to supply gas more gas to Tana. So if the Turkish stream will build and Russian gas will send to Turkey transit to Europe through Turkey and as well at the same time Turkey will stay and will be the key transit country in a southern corridor. In this case in a while we can see that Turkey can become the huge gas, the country which will control the gas flow to Europe not just the gas hub because will be at the same time control two different major gas transit routes. But the difference between the south stream and the Turkish stream and southern corridor that southern corridors project supported by EU it looks like EU helps itself but it helps as well Turkey to become key player in this region. So in Turkey in a very good position right now and one hand it's Russia, yes, needs the Turkish territory to send gas to Europe and other hand it's EU. So if we and it's again it's only speculations and I believe that the first maybe two strings will be built and because there's as I said market there's some market for Russian gas in Turkey and as well the second string maybe it's around 15, 16 BC and they can find market in the southern part of the Europe or maybe even use the same pipeline to for reverse floor. I mean the pipeline which now serve to get the gas from Russia through Ukraine. So in these numbers but maybe 2019 when you see that number maybe I should put there 2020 and I believe that 2020 it will be only two strings because I'm doubt that there will be market for additional for 30 PCM gas just because the Russia will sell gas on the border not because of no demand over there because Russia really wants to cancel all transits through Ukraine. But anyway you can see that Southern Corridor and this is a trade movements. The gas which will flow through Turkey to Europe it's a Russian gas and a gas as well from the Southern Corridor. As a gas maybe potentially Turkmen gas maybe potentially it will be Iranian and Kurdish gas as well. But it's only potential even if you take it all of them and keep only as a re that means that anyway it will be it's a huge difference. Southern Corridor will be for instance only 10 BCM but the Russian transit route it will be 50 BCM so a huge difference. You can see the power which for instance Russia could have in this case. But as soon as the Southern Corridor will develop if develop and in this case Turkey will become more powerful in this case. So and the last point is that Turkey tried to convince Brussels there's no threat no problem with the Turkish stream that everything is fine. There is no threat to the EU interest in a Caspian area but we will see if the EU shares the same level of comfort as Turkey. So maybe I will stop here and. Thank you very much Nadia. That was very comprehensive and concise. Excellent opening. Ed the floor is yours. Thank you very much Andy. When Andy had this brilliant idea to host this event I campaigned very hard to have it on Groundhog's Day. And those of us who've been watching the pipeline developments since 1992 have seen this movie before have seen this movie before. And maybe as Bill Murray did in that movie we will learn as more facts become known. I thank Nadia very much for a very good summary of what we think we know about the project so far. There's a lot of information that's still we're still waiting for even since the meeting in Ankara last week. And it does have a feel it seems to me of Russian improvisation in all of this. I may be wrong but the announcement seemed to have shocked if not all of Gazprom's Italian, French and German business partners as well as governments along the route of the original South Stream in particular Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary. And from the looks on television of the announcement maybe Alexei Miller was a little surprised as well. He certainly wasn't able to answer questions that reporters asked him after the announcement on December 1st. So it's been kind of a polar game recently in the west including in Washington to talk about what is Mr. Putin thinking? What does he really want? Not what we think he should want but what does he want and what's he thinking? So I've been trying to channel Mr. Putin recently to a point where I actually dreamt last night that I was Mr. Putin. And I woke up three times during that nightmare last night. So I have three distinct scenarios on what Putin is thinking. So take a flight of fancy with me if you will. So scenario number one is I Vladimir I am a man of my word. Vladimir I am a man of my word. If I say we're gonna build a pipeline to Turkey we're gonna build a pipeline to Turkey. Since the pipe gas prom ordered for the first strand of South Stream is already at the yard in ironically Varna, Bulgaria. And the lay barge from Saipan is already in place in the Turkish Straits. That money is already spent. We may as well build this pipeline to Western Turkey. That way the additional volumes, and I just pointed out that currently goes through Ukraine and the Trans Balkan Pipeline can bypass that road altogether to the Turkish market which is the only market in Europe that's really growing. If things go well we will build a second line to serve the Southeastern European market, the Balkan market to which we also have a monopoly. Together that makes up 31 BCM, billion cubic meters which is the original conception of South Stream those of us who remember will know that it was 31 BCM project all along until I really scared Miller one day by raising the capacity to 63 BCM after the 2009 Ukraine gas crisis. Well one day when oil is at $250 which at Lake Say actually predicted in June of 2008 maybe we can build a 63 BCM system. Then I woke up and set to myself what that option is still too expensive. It still will cost tens of billions of dollars. The original South Stream project was supposed to cost 40 to 50 billion, yes. We've sunk a fair amount of change already in this project but can I really afford to do this big mega project? So let's play it safe. Let's build a line along the shorter and therefore cheaper blue stream route which you can see on the map in front of you to serve the Turkish market. Then if things go well, we will build a second line. The problem with this option is that we would then have to rely on the already inadequate Turkish internal pipeline system to transfer gas to the Balkans. And I would have to trust the Turks. Well, maybe that's still better than the Ukrainians. Then I went back to sleep and I woke up with a start and I said to myself, what am I crazy? We don't have money to build any new pipeline under the Black Sea. We better concentrate on building that gas pipeline to China. It is just as expensive, but we need it for the power of Siberia project which is so integral to my vision of developing the Asian part of Russia. Most of that cost will be rubble denominated and my friends who do contracting in Russia are desperate for work. At least they are not, dollar or euro denominated as German pipes and Italian Leibarge tend to be. And I keep looking at this new Chinese president, Xi Jinping, he looks really serious. And I've signed two agreements with him last year. How did he ever acquire four trillion dollars in international reserves? I've got to remember to ask Kudrin that question the next time I see him. His foreign reserves are more than ten times mine even before the oil price drop. I'd better stay close to China while this war in Ukraine is going on. I'd better tell Miller to name this pipeline Turkish Stream so that when it fails at least it's not a Russian Stream project. And I hope Erdogan has forgotten that I've reneged on pipeline projects in Turkey before. Remember the Samsung-Jane Han oil pipeline when we were all seemed to be so eager to bypass the Bosphorus? In the meantime, we'll muddy the waters for the Azeris on their TANAP and TAP ambitions to bring Azerbaijani gas to compete in our market in Turkey and southeastern Europe. I'd better remember the call Athens when I wake up in the morning. So in all seriousness, I actually did wake up last night and wrote a commentary which is on the CSIS website this morning. So you can see a more slightly more serious version of these three scenarios which are as scenarios are supposed to be not predictions so much as three separate cases and the key factors behind the three separate cases for all of you to consider. My big takeaways are, and I agree with Najir on this, is that at best we're talking about a 31 BCM system. There is no 63 BCM project anytime soon. Therefore, Russia and Ukraine are stuck with each other for a while. Ukrainian transit last year, even in the very down year, was 59 BCM of transit from Russia through Ukraine to European markets. So you're not going to be able to replace all of that in the next five years like it or not. Those two countries are stuck with each other. There's real questions on Turkey's gas storage capacity. Turkey has barely enough gas storage capacity to handle its increasing imports of gas. It would cause hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions, if you really want to build up gas storage to the level of being able to transit 50 BCM gas across Turkey. To markets beyond. Najir already brought up the point of contract delivery points. Mr. Shevkovic was amazed when he was in Moscow on the 17th, I believe, of January, where Novak and Miller and Dvarkovic told him that it was Europe's job to take that 50 BCM of gas away from Turkey. Well, who's going to do that? The fact of the matter is, unlike oil pipelines, gas pipelines are not financeable without creditworthy parties providing financial guarantees to ship a volume of gas through at least the amortization period of any loans on the ship or pay basis on the part of the producer-shipper, in this case it would be Gazprom, which, if you look at their earnings last quarter, the third quarter, which is what they reported, a week ago earnings in ruble terms dropped by more than half. You can imagine what it would be in dollar terms. And also, the pipeline to be financeable would require financial guarantees for buyers of gas on a take or pay basis. And who's going to do that at the Turkish border? So there are a lot of questions that remain unanswered or unanswerable for now. And, of course, I'm sure all those answers lie in Ankara. So, Buland, what were you dreaming last night? I wasn't dreaming about Putin, thank God. Yeah, I tend to be much more on the EDD skeptical side than the Niger optimistic side when it comes to this new project. As Ed said, we go back a long way to the breakup of the Soviet Union and how Caspian region oil with Chevron where Ed used to work in Kazakhstan in Tengiz and then Amaco, and then, of course, Amaco with BP, as BP Amaco got involved with the mega project in Azerbaijan and that brought Azaray oil, which along with Kazakh oil was inaccessible to the outside parties interested in exploding this oil onto unconsciousness, into calculations, and eventually into realization in the form of BTC. Anyway, what I propose to do is to go beyond the two presentations before and look at the broader picture. Of course, I'll touch on the Turkish aspect of the equation, but I'll also talk about the implications for the anchor Brussels-Washington, as to say the Turkey-EU-U.S. triangular relationship and how this fits into the energy component of that relationship. Particularly when it comes to diversifying gas supplies to Europe, which all three agree on, by further developing the East-West energy corridor and thus bringing European consumers Caspian gas. Let me go back a little bit. I think it's important to look back at how the East-West corridor came into being because it has relevance to our discussion today. Exactly 20 years ago, Turkey and the United States began a very close and frankly unprecedented collaboration in the post-Cold War phase of a long relationship as allies on the issue of energy transportation. This cooperation helped Turkey to gain for the first time a role for itself in the global energy equation as a key. It's not a producer, but it was a key. It became a key energy transit country. It also helped to bring into being what eventually came to be known as the Baku-Tublisi-Jeyhan pipeline to take Aseri oil to markets through Turkey, specifically through the Turkish Mediterranean port of Jehan. Although the project was vociferously opposed by Moscow, it frankly was too weak to block it. The U.S.-Turkish cooperation encouraged and protected the two newly independent ex-Soviet states involved, namely Azerbaijan as producer, and Georgia as the key conduit through the Caucasus to Turkey. To proceed to the completion of the BTC project in 2005 as the first manifestation of the East-West energy corridor. Of course, it also, in addition to tying them to the West through this pipeline, it underlined their independence from Moscow, saved them from or, you know, obviated the need to use the ex-Soviet pipeline network, which, you know, Moscow was pressing them to do while leaving aside the Iranian option that, as Ed could tell you, was much cheaper from the point of view of the producers at that stage. But the political cooperation between Turkey and the United States helped to create the right circumstances in which the project came to fruition and established, as I said, the East-West corridor. The plan was for this to be followed by a gas pipeline that would bring Aseri gas from Shatni to Europe. To be sure, in 2006, Aseri gas began to flow to Turkey through the South Caucasus pipeline, otherwise known as the Bakur-Tiplisi-Arzum pipeline, with a firm expectation that this would be the first stage of a pipeline system all the way to Europe as the now dead Nabokov project and the current TANAP project envisaged. Needless to say, both the EU and the U.S. gave their support to Turkey and Azerbaijan and to even Turkmenistan in the hope that this gas, that their gas would eventually go into what became known as the Southern corridor pipeline. For its part, Turkey also talked about Iraqi Kurdish gas and Iranian gas eventually being added to the mix and there was even speculation about Israeli and Cypriot gas once the major political obstacles in their way, if ever, were solved. However, just as the East-West corridor was getting on the way and this is really important over Russian opposition, Turkey moved in 1999 to balance its energy links. The Blue Stream Agreement in that year strengthened Turkey's existing North-South energy connection to Russia by bringing 16 BCM of additional Russian gas to Turkey through a pipeline under the Black Sea. This amount was on top of the 14 BCM that Turkey was getting through a pipeline and it perversed the name, the Western pipeline, because I guess when you're pumping it in Russia, it is the Western pipeline, although it really is part of the North-South corridor. Traversing Russia is, excuse me, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria and thus ensured that Russian gas would continue to account for more than half of Turkish consumption. I checked through the figures. We don't get to have the final figures for 2014, but for the last, for the two years before that, the overall Turkish gas consumption in BCMs and it's not growing yet. It's pretty much stagnant. It's 46 billion cubic meters in both years. There are thereabouts. It went up just slightly. The total Russian share was 58% in 2012, which is 26.49 BCM and 57% in 2013, which is 26.2 billion. And the breakdown for that was the Blue Stream component of that was 14.7 billion in 2012 and 13.35 in 2013. The maximum for Blue Stream is, of course, 216. It came close to that. The Western line for the two years was 11.79 and 12.85 in those years. In comparison, the other gas, of course, was much more limited. It was 3.35 in 2012 and 4.2 in 2013. Now, my understanding is that the figures are not going to be very different in 2013, excuse me, 2014. And interestingly, the projected consumption in 2015 is at 51 BCM, and I doubt, in the low economic growth in Turkey, whether they're actually going to reach this. Now, leaving aside for a moment, the feasibility of the Turkish Stream project to bring Europe the projected 47.25 billion cubic meters of the 63 billion cubic meters that is supposed to be delivered at a Turkish grid border and Ed went into this at length, so I won't. Gas problem expects to begin delivering annually increasing volumes as of December 2016 to Turkey, ultimately reaching 15.75 billion cubic meters. The question, therefore, that I'm focusing on is the extent to which the Turkish market would be even more dominated by Russian gas if Turkish Stream materializes, or even if it doesn't, then we go with Blue Stream 2. And how much room it will allow for additional Azure gas to Turkey? Frankly, there is a complication when it comes to Azure gas coming to Turkey and Azure gas going through turnip to well markets that we simply did not have before Turkish Stream came through Putin's visit into the equation. It's worth noting that last year, Turkey and Russia agreed to increase the capacity of Blue Stream to 19 billion cubic meters. So there's already plans to expand on Blue Stream. To be sure, Turkey has been assuring Azerbaijan and the companies involved in the turnip project along with it that Turkish Stream will not affect turnip either with respect to the Turkish purchases through this pipeline or the projected volumes through the pipeline through its territory to Europe. However, it's worth noting here that just yesterday the Turkish energy minister conceded that the two projects would compete and he characterised that competition as healthy. Now, it has to be stressed that Turkish priority from the outset has been on playing the role of an energy hub. And the firm believed that in addition to its commercial benefits of involvement in the transportation of energy to markets, the multiplicity of pipelines traversing its territory would enhance Turkish importance in international relations. Turkish Stream fits naturally into that narrative whether it comes into being or not and it's interesting that Ed reminded us that there was the Samsung J-Hound Pipeline which was launched with much Balehu and nobody talks about it today. And going back further, we had Nabucco. How much ink was spent talking about and analysing Nabucco which came into being and then of course we had South Stream. So just drawing lines on maps does not bring pipelines into being. My other goal for Turkey is to maintain good relations with Moscow, form a historic foe in imperial days as well as during the Cold War. This has been an important goal not just the government in Ankara, not just the current government in Ankara but also to its predecessors. Russia is a very important trade partner and is over $30 billion in trade which is skewed very heavily in favour of Russia. I think it's $24 billion to $8 billion because of the gas which is purchased by Turkey. And this is something that then primates the Agnan stress during the Georgian War of 2008 as they explained why Turkey would not take sides in that dispute. Although the two countries find themselves on opposite sides of a number of important political issues, most notably the Syrian Civil War, they have been adept at putting those to one side as they continue to cooperate closely on energy. It's worth noting in this context that Turkey had given Russia permission to use this exclusive economic zone for the now dead South Stream project. Finally, a few thoughts on the broader geopolitical implications of Turkish Stream, especially for U.S.-Turkish relations and the Turkish relations. Turkey's willingness to host Putin at a time when the West on the U.S. leadership was seeking to isolate him as much as possible, try to force him, as President Obama said on TV yesterday, into changing his behavior through sanctions because of the crisis in Ukraine. And then to proceed to give him an important energy cart to play against the West as well as Ukraine itself has annoyed both Washington and Brussels. In a recent speech, a good friend Jonathan Elkind, now Assistant Secretary at the Energy Department, who's been following the East-West Corridor issue like us in and out of government from the very beginning, had quote, the U.S. was worried about Turkish Stream, though pleased by the cancellation of South Stream and expressed puzzlement as to what was happening with this project. There was similar criticism that I'd refer to from EU Commission, Vice President for Energy, Mr. Sokovic. However, Turkey can justify every point to the fact that the current U.S. administration, unlike the Clinton and Bush administrations, has rarely devoted the sustained high-level attention to the development of the East-West Corridor. And that is a criticism that I think is worth underlining from this podium. And it is also to the fact that the EU has not even been able to open the energy chapter in the Turkish-EU accession process. To sum up, the announcement of Turkish Stream irrespective of whether it comes into being or not has shaken up the calculations relating to where the supply of gas to Europe would come from, which group would follow, and the future of the East-West Energy Corridor. However, the biggest immediate question it raises may be those relating to the Russian domination of the Turkish gas market, and Turkish continuing willingness to balance its military and political alliance with the West through its growing economic partnership with Russia. Back to you, Andy. Terrific. Very interesting. And from a moderator's standpoint, congratulations to all three of you, for keeping to the time framework that we set forward. Particularly as I was listening to you, Bulent, it struck me that there is the situation of Mr. Putin in 2014 with China, in which in May there was the signing of a big gas deal at which I would still say there are more questions than there are answers and clear information about it, but that the Chinese appeared to be ready to take advantage of a weakened Russian position in negotiations. There was the talk, of course, that there would be the $25 billion forward payment for future deliveries of gas, which did not occur. We don't know what exactly would be the financing for the power of Siberia pipeline, and then even more so the memorandum of understanding that was signed in October in Moscow about the supply of western Siberian gas through a new Altai pipeline. I mean, this seemed to be even more of an improvisation, perhaps, in which there are even more questions about. So I'm wondering if to what extent you may see Mr. Erdogan in a similar position as the Chinese leadership right now, perhaps ready to kind of accept a memorandum of understanding and the possibility of another alternative, but one in which Turkey would be having considerably more leverage than Russia and be ready to take advantage of a relatively weakened Russian position. Let me just leave that on the table. There are far more people in the audience that are, there are many people in the audience that are much more knowledgeable about this, so let me open the floor to questions and comments. Please identify yourself for the panelists. We'll collect a few from the start. We have, first of all, right here and then right there, yes. One second for the microphone. I have two questions for clarification and one idea for discussion. Clarification on delivery points of contracts between Gazprom and European countries. If entry points are fixed in the contracts, that means the Ukrainian transit cannot go to zero. Because you cannot reach Slovakia, Czechia, Austria, or even Italy if you do not go through Ukraine. So if it is fixed, that means Ukrainian transit will exist. Otherwise, if Gazprom has negotiation power to change these terms in the contract, it may disappear. So that's why I would like to have clarification. Are those entry points fixed and are non-changeable, non-exchangeable, or it's negotiation? Second, if we look on this map and if Turkish stream is built, that seems the supply of Russian gas to Bulgaria may be done via Turkish stream, just to make a reverse supply. It's rather cheap and very fast to be done. So Russia, Gazprom, may supply gas to Bulgaria via Turkey, but not via Ukraine and Romania as well. And the question, just being Mr. Putin and the fourth idea for you. Yeah, yeah, yeah, look, look, there are many rumors about this east-west corridor, gas corridor to Europe. And Europe is definitely looking for some alternative supplies of gas from the Caspian region. And let's imagine that in 10 years from now Iran will supply gas somewhere. And Iranian gas to Europe, 10 years from now, it's a good idea. I think it will be rather cheap and it will be possible to build, even if turn-up is built, that means just going next to turn-up another string or two or three or four. Yeah, and there is a flow of Iranian gas to Europe. That's what Europe is dreaming about and that is what Iran is dreaming about. Mr. Putin is afraid of this because for him, any alternative supply of gas to Europe it's a problem for Gazprom. And he's buying, he's purchasing the bottleneck. He's purchasing the entry point to Europe. So supply of gas to western part of Turkey is just keeping your position. You block the entry of any other gas to Europe from south. Yeah, and afterwards you have a strong negotiation position. Either with Iran, you combine forces and you say, okay, Europe, please build a pipeline to access. You have no money, we are ready to pay, we are ready to build. And this situation will be 50% as the third energy package requires. So from my point of view, it's not so stupid if we look a long-run view. Yeah, at least Putin can block the entry of any other gas to Europe or for further negotiations, he can keep position. Thank you. Okay, yes, we're right over here. Another call to Pacific North's First National Lab, U.S. Department of Energy. I have a question to Ms. Badikov. First slide of your presentation. First, thank you. So I was wondering why Crimea is marked as a part of Russia? Why Crimea is marked as a part of Russia? Do you think that the U.S. government is wrong in saying that it was illegal annexation? Do you believe that international community is wrong in saying that Russia is aggressor? You should apologize to a million Ukrainians who are suffering from Russian aggression. Please. Yes, I'm sorry about that. But I was looking for South Stream Pipeline map exactly from the official site. So I took this map exactly from the website. It seems to me over there it's a gas problem. So that's why they draw this map. It's not a political statement. Yes, it's not... I was not looking for the countries or something like that. Even I didn't pay attention on that. I was just looking for, you know, the pipeline. Point well taken. Yes. Could I address the agenda? Delivery points, the contracted delivery points are all west of Ukraine. So certainly delivery points can be changed, but they have to be changed by mutual agreement. Gas problem cannot unilaterally change them. So yes, it's possible to change. On the reverse flow to Bulgaria, true, but Bulgaria is insignificant as a gas market. It has an import gas market about maybe two BCM altogether. It has already committed about one BCM to TANAP and TAP. So it really has no room to take more gas. And what's more about Bulgaria, Bulgar gas already owes gas from lots of take or pay penalties that they have never paid. So Bulgaria is not a bankable market for anyone's project. It is true, as I intimated, I think, that this could be a blocking move for other gas coming from, I would say, Azerbaijan, Iran, eastern Med, northern Iraq, not Iran. The Iranian gas, pipeline gas to Europe is a fantasy. It makes absolutely no economic sense to move long haul gas all that way. If your gas is offshore and you can liquefy it and have east and west market to arbitrage from. So it is something that Iranians are very fond to talk about, because it costs you nothing to talk about them. And it makes it seem like you have something to give Europe, but it is no immediate threat to Russia for sure. The immediate threat to gas problem is actually the fact that gas prices are going to be steeply declining in Europe as a result of oil price declines, which usually gas prices lag oil prices. And European customers, just in the last month, have taken 20 percent less gas from gas problem than previously, because European gas storage is full. And anticipating lower, much lower gas prices, six months from now, European buyers are not buying much Russian gas right now. Yeah, and to pick up on the third point that you were making, and it's a very important one about the extent to which Mr. Putin may be playing energy chess, in this case, to try and block the further development of the east-west corridor. Now, I referred briefly in my historical portion of my presentation to when the east-west corridor right there first emerged. The Russians, remember, the energy, then energy minister was Mr. Schafranek. He was Schafranek, was opposed to it. But Russia was going through a very difficult period. Russia was too weak. And ultimately, this was just oil. And when I say just oil, you know, this is, you know, maybe Russia would have preferred it to go through Novogorsk, but it wasn't as threatening then, 20 years ago, as the gas project which would compete, which will allow Azeri gas, maybe Turkmen gas, to compete with Russia in its most profitable market in Western Europe is a threat indeed. So, you know, given his willingness, I'm not a Russian expert like Andy, but given his willingness to use force to protect his national interests in Ukraine and given the importance of energy, and particularly gas, in Russian national power, would not, Mr. Putin, regard the development of, the further development of the East-West corridor and ton up with its provision of alternative gas to Western Europe, a threat. So, the willingness of Turkey to cooperate in what I call this North-South axis is, of course, very important for Mr. Putin. This is why he's made the trip in 2012. He came at the end of 2014. I think he came again in 2010. So, you know, three trips, he's hosted, he was there a number of times as Prime Minister. I'm not sure whether he went as President, but this is obviously important for Mr. Putin. And one note that I would add to this is, even when Nabokov was being discussed, there were statements coming out of Ankara that Ankara would be willing to put Russian gas or help put Russian gas into that pipeline. Now, that seems to negates the very purpose of the East-West corridor, which Nabokov was supposed to be. You know, you were supposed to diversify supplies, and if what you did was put Russian gas into a pipeline going through Turkey, what you had was not diversification, but a different route for Russian gas. This is, in essence, what we're talking about right now, because again, if this materializes, it would come to Turkey, Russian gas would come to Turkey, and then go to markets. So, you know, going back to 20 years ago, when the East-West corridor came into being, it was trumpeted as allowing the countries in the gas main region to become independent of Russia, to underline their independence from Moscow, and to use the energy transportation issue as a way of underlining that independence. This threatens it, and how it threatens that process? We'll just have to wait and see. Yeah, about the entering points, yeah, it's changeable, but the problem is that European market is not well developed. So, interconnected is just a problem. So, if you try to fix it, if you try to fix it, you cannot easily send gas from one place to another. You know, it's just very complicated, not easy. If it were well developed, in this case, you would not have a problem such they have right now, the problem which they have. So, that's why when they have an end-contract, when they have an entry point, of course it's changeable, but not such dramatically. It's just impossible by, you know, technically it's not easy. At least for 30 BCM it will be not easy. As I said, I don't know exactly how many contracts will be enforced after 2020, but anyway it's not then 10 BCM, it's much more than 10 BCM. I believe something around 30. Okay, yes sir. Thank you. Zoran Konstantinovich from Christian Embassy and Economic Advisor to the Croatian Government. Just to the point of financing these things, at a danger of not knowing the details of the Russian statement regarding the changes and giving up on a self-stream, they have come out to the statement which, on surface, indicates that they're willing to subsidize and provide cheap financing for building the infrastructure necessary to connect to this whole story. And considering how difficult and parcelized and basically gas is to finance, how realistic is that? Because I cannot get to the numbers that Russia has a capacity to even finance this thing in any way without sacrificing some other priorities. I mean, to what extent is there some ability of Russia to help finance this thing which is generally very difficult to finance on its surface that I just don't see how they can build a losses on a market basis. Thank you. So the question concerns the realistic prospects of how much Russia can finance. We have two more questions right here in the front. The young lady there and then the young lady in front of her. Hi, Erica Dunham, the Rendon group. I was just wondering if you could elaborate a little bit more on the position that Azerbaijan will be in because of the Turkish stream. You mentioned a few things, Blunt, earlier, and I was just hoping you could give some elaboration. Brenda Schaefer, Georgetown University. I'd like to ask one question and one comment about the idea of a Turkish hub. We use the term Turkish hub, but if you look at how the contracts are built, it's actually Turkish transit state. There's no, you know, un-contracted gas coming into and to un-contracted consumers. So one should we, sorry, just the comment that I think really we should talk about a transit state and two, two of the speakers have talked about the geopolitical benefits of being a hub or what I would call a transit state would give to Turkey. But do we have any precedence that being a hub actually connotes any geopolitical value? I mean, has Baumgarten become, you know, a cosmopolitan center since it became a hub or is really as Ed Chow and said, you know, if you try to become a hub, it means you're not selling something else, you know. So what is the geopolitical value? You know, I think I'll check what I wrote down from my notes, but I think I said the Turkish government's view is that of itself as a hub. And I also said that the Turkish government believes that it has, it enhances its international clout. I mean, both are, for the very, because of the points that you made, both are, you know, debatable. But nonetheless, the Turkish government is, this government, along with the previous ones, thought that it was important for these pipelines to traverse Turkey. This government as well as predecessors believe that it enhanced Turkish prestige, but your point is well taken. Again, you know, how much would Turkey's position in international politics be enhanced by hosting these pipelines? I mean, we have the president of 1990 when then President Dazal shut the Turkish Iraqi pipeline even before the UN decision. Now, did that hurt the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq before the First Gulf War? Presumably, did it also hurt Turkey? Yes. So it's a two-eyed sword. At a broader level, the question from behind you about Azerbaijan, I think it's a fascinating question, and we don't know the answer. Now, Azerbaijan is cut off from Turkey except for the, you know, the process of Nachivon, which itself is cut off from the rest of Azerbaijan. So therefore, it has to go through Georgia in order to get its oil into Turkey. Georgia is a troubled country, as we know from back in 2008. It's also susceptible to Russian pressure. Now, Russia did not cut off that pipeline in 2008, although they got very close to a geographity to it. And going back, the Russians did not seek to physically prevent the pipeline from coming into being. But, you know, I made the point in my presentation that oil, that gas is different to oil. I think gas is more important to Russia. Therefore, notwithstanding the apparently cordial relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia, Azerbaijan's desire to develop the ton-up pipeline is or may be interpreted by Russia as a threat to its interests. Now, I don't know whether this would lead to trouble in the Caucasus. There's certainly enough potential flashpoints at the Karabakh issue that could create problems in the region. There are other issues that, presumably, if Russia was so inclined, it could use. But if you look at what it's been doing on the other side of the Black Sea in Ukraine, its willingness not to take the off-ramps that President Obama talked about yesterday and to actually behave the way it has done in spite of the sanctions, which certainly caused Russia in Crimea and then in eastern Ukraine, you certainly have to wonder whether Russia may be inclined to make, shall we say, Azerbaijan uncomfortable as the ton-up project develops. And particularly after putting forward what we have to see as an alternative, even if neither the Turkish or Russian governments are saying that this is an alternative to ton-up per se, the issue is certainly more valid. The issue of what happens to Azerbaijan is a producer of gas that might compete with Russia in world markets is, I think, a more important one than it was before Turkish Stream was announced. On the question of financing, it is my understanding that the Russian position is that they will pay for fund the undersea portion of Turkish Stream and that Turkey and Russia together would fund the onshore facilities for Turkish Stream. It doesn't really answer your question about, you know, what happened to the South Stream model where Gazprom, you'll recall, had 51% ownership of all these joint ventures along the way through the Balkans and the countries like Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and so on had 49% ownership of a joint venture to move that gas. The Russian position as stated on the 17th of January in Moscow was that that's now Europe's job given that the third energy package prohibits the producer from controlling the transportation at the same time. Brenda, you know I have fun with hubs. People who want to be hubs have just never been to Henry Hub before. And I think in all seriousness, what Turkey is really talking about is not being a hub in the sense of a Henry Hub but so much as in the sense of a Singapore or Rotterdam. And for that, it just seems to me that Turkey is a long ways off for the kind of well-developed banking system, well-developed commercial law, independent courts that allow international players to want to use Turkey as a trading hub for energy. So I just wonder sometimes when Mr. Yodis said that these two projects were going to have to compete with each other where the Turkey is looking at the two birds in the bush being better than the bird in hand in the case of TANAP and TAP, which is what Azerbaijan has to offer. A real project that has gone through a well-documented investment investigation phase has contracts with gas buyers that needs to proceed or an opportunity would be lost. I would think that from Azerbaijan's point of view, that would be there are SOCAR and BP representatives in the room who can speak much better on this subject. If Russia were to choose a something other than a full Turkish stream option, like a blue stream too, kind of option, there actually may be rooms to cooperate. A TANAP can transit Russian gas. A TAP can transit Russian gas. There's nothing inherent in the arrangement so that it couldn't be a win-win proposition for Azerbaijan and Russian gas given the economy of scale that's important for the industry. Unfortunately, the track record in this part of the world is more lose-lose propositions than win-win propositions. So I think that's really the problem. So I agree with evaluation of what's happened, stuff like this, but I don't agree that it's possible that Russian gas will be in TANAP. I don't think so. If TANAP will be out of the Southern Corridor and regulations of EU, probably yes, but right now I don't see any points that it's possible to have Russian gas in TANAP. I don't think so. But when it comes to Azeri gas and Russian gas, any competition right now, I don't think so, any competition right now because when we're talking about Azeri gas, it's only how much right now is 6 BCM and plus 6 BCM, 12 in the Turkish market and 10 will be in Europe, yes. But Azeri already has agreements, so they have security. There's no competition right now. But in the future, we'll see. Just a quick comment on the Russian financing. Timing's important. On December 1, the prospects for the Russian economy looked bleak. On January 17, they looked pretty catastrophic. And so I think that when Nadja said at the outset that the announcement of the decision on December 1 was mainly in response to, was not so much of a financing decision because I guess we don't really know how much less Turkish stream would cost than blue stream in any event. But it could be explained by simply the legal problems they have in Europe. But it's quite telling by January 17 when the announcement's made that, well, once it gets to the border of Europe, well, that's their issue. They do all the financing for that. And there I think the financial outlook has got to make a difference. Andy. Andy. Can I ask you to address the issue that I addressed as a non-Russian expert on putting perceiving Tanap as a threat to himself and to economic interests? I'd love to hear your take on it. Well, I would agree absolutely that in my recent nightmare where I imagined I was Mr. Putin and how much less I was worth. Yeah, I think any alternative to gas supplies to the European market that are not Russian are viewed as threats. I think that I remember four or five years ago when we were working on the Turkey-Russia-Iran project and we had discussions about the prospects for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan resolving an agreement, a disagreement, excuse me, of the Caspian Sea and sending Turkmen gas west when we talked about it with our Russian interlocutors. I mean, that was almost, it was almost a spell-eye as was the response as to what they would do to prevent that from happening. So I would certainly agree with you on that point. The only caveat I would make is that when you mentioned that, I mean, gas is more important geopolitically, but certainly for the Russian budget, the oil is much more important. It's about 4x the contribution to the Russian budget, but those are sort of different matters. Yeah, let's go back to the audience. I think we have time for one more question. Bob Linden with Seams Corp. I have a very self-interested question. I have a friend who's a Bulgarian who has dreams of LNG. And so I'm wondering with the trans-Balkan pipeline and the limited demand in Bulgaria whether there would be a backflow option to get gas, assuming Turkish stream happened in some way of getting gas into the other end of trans-Balkan if that could be an alternate route. Of course, you have to bet on the probabilities of whether that thing is going to be built or not. So any thoughts on that? Is Bulgaria just essentially caught off? As I said before, Bulgaria has no bankable commitment it can make to take gas of any volume for anywhere. So they can make any kind of promises that you want. You just can't take that paper to a bank and get money for it. So, you know, it's the idea of an LNG terminal to serve Bulgaria is frankly ludicrous that John Kerry apparently talked about when he was there. Well, I agree with you, sir, but this is a paying client so I have to do my best. Yes, in the back. Rich Kosler, George Mason University. I'm going to come back to this competition issue between Azeri and Russian gas. I mean, I could see why Russian gas going through North Stream, for example, wouldn't be competing with Azerbaijani gas. But if they're both going essentially through the same or parallel systems to exactly the same market unless the customers are different, it's got to be competition. And Russia is always going to be in a position where it can undercut the Azeris on price just because they can do it. Rich, they can do it, but it's expensive. It's not cost-free, particularly if you have to build a new pipeline to do it. I mean, right now Turkey essentially gets a... Let me choose my words carefully. Is discounted price for Azerbaijan? It gets a discounted price by reason of geographic monopoly. It gets a discounted price by virtue of the fact that if you want to go beyond Turkey, you have to go through Turkey. So it gets a pretty nice price from Azerbaijan. It's interesting the EU rules, of course, prohibits transit fees. You can pay pipeline tariffs, but you can't pay transit fees for monopoly, not that apply directly to Turkey. But the concept remains that rather than... And I remember negotiating with the person I call the smartest man in the Caspian Valley, Alex Scaroff, that if you don't pay a transit fee, then at least you can either be selling affordable gas to Georgia or Turkey, which is in effect what's happened right now. So yes, Russia has been the incremental supplier. It's been the swing for the Turkish market, which interestingly, Bulan pointed out, it's not growing as much as Turkey always wants to claim. Turkey has a history of overbooking for gas, including Iranian gas, as I recall. And just before Blue Stream... Yes, to the point where the Iranians had a flare at the Turkish... Iranian border that showed that Turkey did not fulfill its take or pay commitments to Iran. So there is this history, but yes, certainly Russia can compete for the Turkish market, but it's at some cost. Okay, let me ask one concluding question for the panelists. Let's dream we're sitting here in 2020 or even 2025. What do you think are the most likely projects that will get done that relate to the Southern Corridor? Let's go first. Okay. I can dream. One new Russian pipeline to Turkey. I would do Blue Stream 2, since I'm actually not Mr. Putin. We'll probably do Turkish Streams Line 1 by 2020 and TANAP. And I think the TAP situation is complicated because of the new Greek government, which is now talking about reviving ITGI again. And so that needs to be sorted through, but I would guess by then that TANAP and TAP will be flowing. Okay, TANAP, TAP. And one line of a new Russian pipeline. Okay. I'm maybe a little bit optimistic. Yes, it was discussed at Blue Stream as well. But for some reason, at least for now, they decided that the line which they are using right now maybe is the best Turkish Stream because of everything which goes through the sea, subsea pipelines always cheaper, much cheaper than onshore lines. So that's why probably Russia believed that it will, they will have at least two lines. In this case, that line which they proposed, it's much interesting to them than Blue Stream because in a Blue Stream it will be a little bit difficult, and it will be a little bit not difficult, it will be expensive and have a pipeline from that point to the Europe. And I believe that it will be two lines anyway, I think, because it's one line, it's just the same amount, about the same amount the gas which Turkey right now has received from them and trans-Balkans, they can just immediately read off this line. But it seems to me they can find a market for the second stream, but maybe not immediately, but maybe work in progress will be the second stream. So I believe that it will be at least two. Maybe one is completely finished, but second one maybe halfway. Bula, Nadja, did I hear you say that it's cheaper to build underwater pipelines? It's always when it cross the pipeline, when it cross not only your own territory, but cross the neighboring country or something. Yeah, it's always, it's cheaper when you have some, but from, you know, because you need to, you spend more time, you need to go through the regulations. I mean, I deferred to Ed on this issue, but my understanding is it's much cheaper. You want to go and then I'll pick up on the question. I mean, the fact of the matter is the Russians built the pipeline that would have served South Stream all the way from western Siberia to the Russian Black Sea coast plus boosted the compression station for a total of five billion or so. I mean, the subsea portion would have cost 20 billion at a minimum I would have thought. And just to mention something that I think should be mentioned long before the end of this meeting. I mean, we're all assuming that South Stream was for real and that Turkish Stream is for real. What if both were designed to actually provide, put in the appearance of an alternative, but he's actually hoping that somehow that Ukraine will crack, the resolve of the West will crack, and then the pipelines that go through Ukraine to Ukraine and through Ukraine will continue to be functional with a more compliant government. So we call it the finalization of Ukraine perhaps in the minds of Putin that none of these, so to get to your question maybe just like South Stream, Turkish Stream will not get built. And I think the Blue Stream, they've already boosted the capacity from 16 billion cubic meters to 19, that might be boosted even further, because I think the Turkish market is important in itself to Turkey. Turkey's an important ally for Russia in so many ways. I mean, Turkey's balancing its commitment to its Western allies with its relationship with Russia, and I think that will continue when not in the Cold War. It's something that Turkey has every right to do, but when you look at the relationship from the other side, it may be that Putin is using the Turkish connection in order to leverage himself into a better position vis-a-vis Kiev and vis-a-vis Kiev's backers, and maybe he ultimately does not intend to spend all that money building South Stream, but is hoping that the little green men and their buddies can actually make Ukraine more pliant to his geopolitical goals. This still remains the question of whether TANAP will provide an alternative source of energy, and there I'm pessimistic. I think Mr. Putin's willingness to use force indirectly or certainly take this very tough line on Crimea and Ukraine makes it, I think, more likely that he will be willing to use that elsewhere. I mean, it's already shown in 2008 that he's willing to make trouble in direct trouble in Georgia, and I would not be too surprised if the Caucasus begins to heat up again in a way that serves Russian interests. Anyway, I'll stop. So, you know what? Do I see a TANAP happening? Yes, if I'm being optimistic, but in my pessimistic moments, I think that there might be trouble as it begins to be built. Okay, I noticed that nobody mentioned the possibility of a Turkmen-Azeri connector. Yes, okay. Well, after what's transpired in the past year, I'd be surprised at almost anything. And I think we're in some very, very, very unpredictable and dangerous times. So, but to not end on such a pessimistic note, let me thank Nadja and Ed and Bulent for leading such an interesting discussion, and thank you for attending today. And we'll look forward to continuing the discussion at some point in the not too distant future. Thank you very much.