 Good afternoon and welcome to this webinar. My name is Cassidy Samuel, a program manager at the Rosalaxen Back Office in Darasalam. Thank you all for joining us. This webinar is on record and the recording will be available on the Rosalaxen Back Berlin Office YouTube page. And if you need to share it with your colleagues later, it will be available hopefully in a week. We are also live on the Facebook. So you can call your friends to join in. Please click the, for translation, we have some translation. There's an icon below for translation. If you look below at your screen, we have translation for German, English, and French. So please, I hope you can find the icon below on your screen. For your questions, please use the Q&A box. It's also below. Or if you have a question or a comment, please go to that box. Today, we are talking here and we have an exciting panel which I'll be able to introduce later. We are going to discuss the Africa continent of hatred area in the context of other critical processes like the economic partnership documents, which as you all know, you may be aware, remain largely inconclusive. We also have the post-continental negotiations that are taking place. But also we are going to discuss the Africa continent of hatred area in context of the current shifts in the global multilateral system. You all know there is a stalemate in the World Trade Organization. So we shall discuss this in context of what is going on. To start off, we are delighted to have Maria Schreiber. Maria Schreiber is a member of the Left Party in Germany, Die Linke. And she has been a member of parliament since 2017. She is the chairperson of the Left Parliamentary Group in the Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development. And one of the focus of her office is on privatization, development cooperation among others. She is a critic of the neoliberal and has criticized approaches towards the South, including Africa. And she has worked on initiatives such as the Compact with Africa and the role of development financial institutions in Africa. Her opening remarks will also address why it is important for us right now to have this discussion on the Africa continent of hatred area, but also to share our vision on the future of the future economic relationship between Africa and Europe. Honorable Maria Schreiber, I invite you to take the stage of the platform for this guest. Thank you very much. Bonjour, good morning and good morning, all together. Ich grüße, seh und euch alle ganz herzlich zu unserem Webinar. Wenn E-Pass das Problem sind, ist die afrikanische Freihandelszone die Lösung. Jetzt haben uns in den letzten Wochen einige Leute darauf hingewiesen, dass wir einen etwas sperrigen Titel für das Webinar gewählt haben. Aber ich denke, wir konnten dennoch Gebühren des Interesse wecken. Denn die Diskussion, die wir heute führen, ist aus sehr vielen Gründen wichtig. Und ich möchte die kommenden Minuten dazu nutzen, etwas genauer auszuführen, warum. Erstens, die Beziehungen zwischen der europäischen und der afrikanischen Union, zwischen den europäischen und afrikanischen Ländern, die sind in Bewegung. Ende Oktober hätten am EU auch Gipfelgrundzüge einer neuen strategischen Partnerschaft zwischen den beiden Kontinenten diskutiert und verabschiedet werden sollen. Der Gipfel wurde zwar Corona-bedingt auf nächstes Jahr verschoben, doch die Debatten zu der Partnerschaft laufen ja weiter, im Hintergrund und langsamer. Ähnliches gilt für das Postkortunu-Abkommen, so wie die Zukunft der sogenannten wirtschaftlichen Partnerschaftsabkommen der E-PASS, die bisher 14 afrikanische Staaten ratifiziert haben. Das kommende Jahr könnte also wichtige Entscheidungen für die zukünftigen wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Afrika und Europa bringen. Und es ist höchste Zeit, darüber wieder mehr zu sprechen. Denn und damit bin ich beim zweiten Punkt eine kritische Begleitung der laufenden Verhandlungen zwischen den europäischen und afrikanischen Ländern findet derzeit kaum statt. Corona hat nicht nur diese Verhandlungen gebremst, es hat auch die kritische Begleitung und insbesondere einen internationalen vernetzten Austausch dazu nahezu zum Erliegen gebracht. Die Veranstaltung von WEMRO, dem Dachverband deutscher Entwicklungsorganisationen, Mitte Oktober war eine wichtige Ausnahme. Das heutige Webinar, das in Kooperation mit Ciatini Uganda, den Rosa Luxemburg Büros Dar Es-Salam, Dakar und Brüssel sowie mit meinen Parteikollegen und Abgeordneten des Europaparlaments Helmut Scholz und von uns entwickelt worden ist, ist Teil des Versuchs, einen internationalen Austausch wieder stärker mit anzuschieben. Dieser Austausch ist umso wichtiger und damit bin ich bereits beim dritten Punkt, da in Afrika selbst ein gemeinsamer Wirtschaftsraum im Entstehen ist. Die afrikanische Freihandelszone. Sollten die Pläne der afrikanischen Union zu einer schrittweisen wirtschaftlichen Integration mehr Freizügigkeit, ja eines Tages vielleicht sogar einer gemeinsamen Währung Realität werden, würde dies auch die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Europa verändern. Zugleich steht dieser panafrikanische Integrationsprozess in einem gewissen Spannungsverhältnis zu Handelsabkommen wie den E-Pasti, den afrikanischen Kontinent in unterschiedliche Wirtschaftsblöcke teilt. Doch eine tiefer gehende Auseinandersetzung mit der afrikanischen Freihandelszone findet in Deutschland und Europa bisher kaum statt. Das gilt, wie ich Ihnen vorgesprächen zu der heutigen Veranstaltung erfahren habe, auch für große Teile der afrikanischen Öffentlichkeit. Hier, wie da wird die afrikanische Freihandelszone in der Regel als panafrikanische Initiative grüßt. Und ich glaube, das ist zu wenig. Natürlich unterstützen wir als Linke jede Initiative, die eine eigenständige und selbstgewählte Entwicklung der afrikanischen Länder und Volkswirtschaften zum Ziel hat. Und ja, ich wünsche mir, dass die afrikanische Freihandelszone dazu einen Beitrag leistet. Aber das ist keine ausgemachte Sache. Und warum nicht, möchte ich an zwei Punkten kurz klarmachen. Der europäische Wirtschaftsraum, die Europäische Union hat die eigenständige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Kontinents sicherlich gefördert. Die EU betreibt heute rund 60% des Handels mit sich selbst. Doch von der wirtschaftlichen Integration haben nicht alle Länder und Wirtschaftssektoren gleich profitiert. Vielmehr lässt sich ein Auseinanderdriften von Zentrum und Präferie bemerken. Deutschland zählt definitiv zu den großen Gewinnern der europäischen Integration. Bei Ländern wie Griechenland oder Italien ist eine Einschätzung aber schon viel komplizierter. Radikal verändert hat die EU auch die Landwirtschaft in Europa. Diese ist heute zwar extrem entnäwerbsfähig. Ein Großteil der Bäuerinnen und Bauern hat die wirtschaftliche Integration aber nicht überlebt. Die europäische Freihandelszone kennt also Gewinner und Verlierer. Und die afrikanische Freihandelszone? Welche Auswirkungen wird sie für die einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten und Wirtschaftssektoren haben? Und darüber müssen wir sprechen. Und mein zweites Bedenken gegen eine einfache unkritische Unterstützung der Idee einer afrikanischen Freihandelszone die entsteht ja nicht im luftleeren Raum. Die afrikanischen Länder sind durch unzählige Freihandelsabkommen bereits fest in die Weltwirtschaft und in globale Wertschöpfungsketten eingebunden. Und wie wir wissen auf sehr unvorteilhafte Weise. Und wie unter diesen Bedingungen ein panafrikanischer Wirtschaftsraum florieren soll, ist eine offene Frage. Klar ist die zukünftige Gestaltung der europäisch-afrikanischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen beispielsweise im Rahmen der E-PASS wird entscheidenden Einfluss darauf haben ob und in welcher Form ein panafrikanischer Integrationsprozess gelingen kann. Und genau das ist auch der Grund warum eine Debatte über die afrikanische Freihandelszone nicht nur in Afrika, sondern auch in Europa geführt werden muss. Wollen wir eine wirtschaftliche Integration zwischen den afrikanischen Staaten von Europa aus unterstützen, dann dürfen wir nicht nur wohlwollend auf die afrikanische Freihandelszone verweisen. Vielmehr müssen wir eine Debatte in Deutschland und Europa führen, wie wir unsere Handels- und Wirtschaftspolitik gegenüber den afrikanischen Ländern verändern müssen, um eine solche Integration zu ermöglichen. Es würde mich sehr freuen, wenn das heutige Webinar einen kleinen Beitrag zu einer solchen Debatte beisteuern könnte. Ich freue mich jedenfalls schon sehr auf die Beiträge und die Diskussion und übergebe wieder an Samuel Casire, Mitorganisator und Moderator der heutigen Veranstaltung. Ihnen und euch allen wünsche ich eine spannende Veranstaltung. Thank you, Honorable Maria Schreiber. I think you are raising very critical points. I think the panelists will be able to expound on what you have said. First is the scrutiny of the negotiations. And on this platform we also have a lot of journalists who want to report more on the Africa continue to free trade area. And also civil society has faced a problem of scrutiny of these negotiations. Most of the time they are not privy to the text of these negotiations. So it has been hard. I think that is a critical point. Thank you very much. I think we shall be able to expound on that. I would like to thank you for opening this webinar. And I would like to thank your office as well as the office of Honorable Helmut Scholes who will be a panelist today. We thank Siatini, that is the Southern and Eastern Trade Information and Negotiations Institute in Uganda. The Roosevelt-Senberg office in Berlin, Brussels, Dakar, and my colleagues here in Dar es Salaam. The webinar is structured as follows. We shall have three panelists who I will introduce one by one. They'll all first present. Then we can ask questions or have our comments as the webinar goes on. First, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome Miss Jen Nalunga, who will be our first presenter. Jen Nalunga is currently the executive director of Siatini, Uganda, a progressive Pan-African NGO working on trade and investment policy. She has more than 20 years of experience in research analysis and advocacy and has authored a number of policy-oriented studies and articles. She has closely followed the negotiations in the WTO, the Economic Partnership Agreement and their implications on Africa. She's a member of the official delegation to the World Trade Organization. This is, she's a member of the Uganda delegation. She has observed status there and also has observed status with the Uganda delegation on the Economic Partnership Agreement and other regional processes. So, Jen, your task today is to give us just a little brief about the Africa continent of free trade area, the current state of play of the negotiations, the pros and cons from a Southern and Eastern African perspective. I'm very aware you have been very involved in these negotiations. So please, Jen, you are welcome. Thank you so much, Sam, for that very kind introduction. Good morning from Uganda, my fellow panelists and listeners. As Sam has pointed out, I'm just going to give a brief, a brief on the status of the CFTA and also give the pros and cons and also give you some proposals on the way forward. I will start with a genesis of the CFTA. When we look at issues around Africa unity and the formation of the Africa Economic Community, it goes back to Africa's struggles for independence and also the struggles for economic decolonization of Africa. These aspirations were translated into the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development, which was launched between 1980 and 2000 and also they are clearly articulated in the budget treaty. The aspiration also for Africa's Economic Unity is also clearly articulated in the formation of the Africa Union and other initiatives, like the one for having a continental infrastructure, other initiatives around boosting of intra-Africa trade and other initiatives. All these initiatives are precursor to the formation of the CFTA. There were also efforts to strengthen the regional economic communities like SADAC, the East African Community, ECOWAS in East Africa, and these were to be used as the building blocks to the CFTA. It should also be noted as it has been articulated in Agenda 263, the Africa we want. Africa's quest for structural transformation has also been clearly articulated in that so what I want to say is that the CFTA has roots within Africa. The timelines. The CFTA negotiations were launched in 2016 and finalized in 2018. This is very critical to not just two years and the framework CFTA text was opened for signature in March 2018 in Tigardin. And at that summit, 44 AU member states signed the agreement. The other members signed later. The regional economic communities like the East African Community, ECOWAS in South Africa, ECOWAS in West Africa were supposed to be the building blocks for the CFTA negotiation and implementation. And it was agreed that by July 2020, trading will start under the CFTA. So those were the timelines. Very, very short timelines. The current state of play. 54 African Union members out of five members have so far signed the consolidated text of the agreement. Only one country. EDITREA hasn't yet signed. Out of the 55 members, third members of the Africa Union have so far ratified. But what should be noted is that no single regional economic community has ratified the agreement. For example, in East Africa, Zania hasn't ratified. And Burundi, they haven't ratified. In ECOWAS, for example, Nigeria hasn't ratified. So there is no single regional economic community which has ratified the CFTA. I will now look at the pending issues. At the Africa level, by September 2020, Syrica Storm Unions, that's EAC, SADAC in the southern region, ECOWAS in West Africa, are yet to submit their initial draft offers. I want to go back to what's happening at the ESC level. The ESC level where I'm speaking from, the partner states are yet to discuss their seduces of tariff concessions and their seduces of specific commitments on trading services. They are also yet to discuss and agree on rules of origin. So the ESC member states are yet to submit their revised offers so that they are consolidated and harmonized into an ESC offer which they will submit to the EU that hasn't been done. Therefore, when you look at the deadline, the new timelines now, as per now, is that trading under the CFTA arrangement is commenced on 1st January 2021, which is very, very unrealistic. I will now go to the challenges. One of the challenges facing the CFTA, the CFTA negotiations, as the previous speaker pointed out, COVID has been a challenge. But for us in the region, there has also been limited capacity of countries to negotiate online. We have so many challenges. Like now, we are having challenges, connections, weak internet. So they are challenges of negotiating online. Although the African Union was insisting that negotiations should be undertaken online. There is also the challenge of taking the capacity of the RECs to negotiate. In fact, a number of countries and region economic groupings have requested for technical capacity to be able to undertake meaningful negotiations. There are also other ongoing negotiations. For example, the EU, EU, ESSA, EPA. EU, the ESSA region, the East Africa, East and Southern African region are negotiating a deep EPA with the EU. This is very, very problematic. Because the EPA is putting on table issues like investment, competition, government procurement, which go beyond what we have agreed on in the WTO, but which also we subscribed what we are going to negotiate in the CFTA. Because these are issues which have been pushed under the CFTA in the second phase of the negotiation. So this is also a challenge. There also the global compact with Africa, which is where Germany is negotiating with. Just a few compact countries. There is also the US Kenya FT. So Africa is also, there are other ongoing negotiations which are making negotiations under the CFTA a bit challenging. Who are the demanders of the CFTA? I wanted to, I don't know whether you should discuss that later when it comes to the demanders and the winners should die, Africa. I think that is also part of the question that has come. Maybe you can address this later in the Q&A session. Okay. So we discussed later the issue of the demanders and who are the winners but maybe I will make my conclusion and also give some proposals on the way forward. My conclusion really is that when it's critical to make the CFTA meaningful and beneficial to all AU members and to all CFTA members and to all AU members, Africa Union members and also to all Africa citizens and when we talk about Africa citizens we are looking at MSMEs, the small order farmers, the women in the rural areas the cross border women traders. It has to be beneficial to those people and we also need to ensure that the CFTA achieve the long-standing African aspiration for structural transformation. And as a way forward as Africa we need to balance the political aspiration but also the technical realities on the ground. We have seen politics dominating the CFTA. The timelines are very, very unrealistic and we haven't given enough time to the technical negotiations. The timelines are very unrealistic. So as a way forward we are looking at proposing that the timelines they should be addressed then also the involvement of the stakeholders. Today it's a preserve of government. The private sector is not involved MSMEs are not involved civil society is not involved. So it's a very critical issue as we move forward. Another issue is also balancing the issue of liberalization and the productive capacity of Africa. The CFTA has concentrated so much on liberalization. When you look at the proposals for liberalization they are very unrealistic. And if we don't have our own products to trade that means we are going to trade products from outside. So we need also to think about liberalization and also balance it with productivity. Then lastly we need also to balance the interests of the smaller countries and the interests of the bigger countries. When you look at the liberalization schedule countries like Uganda will not survive they will not be able to compete so that balancing of the poor in fact the CFTA document talks about the hegemonies but they don't look at practically how to balance the interests of the hegemonies and the interests of the smaller economies. So I will stop there and I will look at the other issues and I will look at the other discussions. So thank you so much over to you Sam. Thank you very much Jen. I think you have summarized it very well especially looking at the aspirations we have for structure transformation and then how we go about it with liberalization. I think the questions are coming in on this who is Dr. Ndongo Silla Samba. I think he is going to look at the economic assumptions of the African continental field trade area so he is going to extend on the ideological kind of assumptions and data of what Jen has been trying to talk about. Dr. Samba is a Senegalese development economist who is a research and program manager at the West Africa office of the Rosalaxenbach Foundation. His publications cover topics such as fair trade, labor markets in developing countries, social movements, democratic theory, and he has written a number of books and co-authored a number of books. I have some copies here. I don't know if he can tell us Silla, you have been a critique of the African continental field trade area at least the economic assumptions of it so please give us your presentation on this and what you think of the initiative. Thank you very much. Hello to all of you. It is a great pleasure to be here today. My presentation will be brief and it will turn around the economic hypothesis behind the defense of the continental free trade area. We must first say that the continental free trade area has very perfected the subject of debate in Africa and it is rather well seen by the African races who are aware of their existence. How can we explain the absence of critical discourse on the African continental free trade area, including the lack of intellectual pan-Africanists and left-wing intellectuals in general? In my opinion, there are two critical assumptions that exist there. It is important to carefully review these two critical assumptions so that we can see the risks and potential dangers of the Zleka for African countries. The first assumption is that the Zleka is an initiative for the Pan-Africanists and that it will be located in the right line of the Pan-Africanist's vision of the Pan-Africanist's founding fathers, such as the President Ghanayi and Kwa Mekromo. The second assumption is that the free trade between African countries is not feasible, but between Africans, free trade is beneficial. In addition, free trade can allow African countries to respond to the challenges of their development. For example, beyond the increase in trade between African countries, free trade can increase economic growth, industrialize Africa and create employment. That is how free trade is sold. So the first assumption that needs to be demystified is whether the free trade zone is an initiative for the Pan-Africanists located in the right line of the vision of the Pan-Africanist's figures, such as Kwa Mekromo. The answer that does not seem surprising is no, the free trade zone is not an initiative for the Pan-Africanists. Why? Because in the original vision of the Pan-Africanists, such as President Ghanayi and Kwa Mekromo and other intellectuals such as the economic, commercial and monetary integration must be necessarily preceded by the political integration. Without the pre-alarm of the political integration, the Pan-Africanist project cannot go far. In an interview in 1977, it was said very clearly that the CDAO, which is the Economic Community of the West and which in English was created in 1976, 1915, was interviewed in that context. And he said that the CDAO is a form of banking integration on which there was no illusion because we cannot conceive the economic integration without the pre-alarm of political integration. So why political integration must be preceded by economic integration? There are several reasons. First of all, because it allows the peace within the continent and it also allows the continent to assume its own independence. The second thing is that political integration allows to have a unique African voice on the international scene. So, for example, African countries will be able to coordinate the sale of the first market to stable and remunerators that will allow them to finance their industrialization and also to take advantage of the scale economies. This industrialization would be led to the scale of the continent and not country by Kenya, Senegal or Uganda which would industrialize each other. So the industrialization would be planned based on resources, complementarity and the advantages of each and the others. And finally, this integration necessarily will create winners and losers. But losers will not be turned by the project by the African because political integration will allow to compensate the losers because there is a political, democratic and collegial case that will allow them to take care of these types of questions. And so this is a big model that builds the model of pan-African integration at the Crouman, at the Chyre-Rendezdour etc. And so there are at least three major differences between this pan-African vision and the project of free and continental exchange which is for me an afro-liberal and so the first difference is that political integration is supposed to be a consequence of the integration by the markets according to the Azleka. The second difference is that there is no planning at the continent in the case of the Azleka. It is the markets, that is the enterprise that determines the volume in the direction of commercial flows. So it means that there is no planning by the states, by politics that will be progressively deprived of their commercial and industrial political tools. So it means that it is the main invisible market that will create a spontaneous socialization within the continent. The third difference is that there is no generalization mechanism at the continental exchange to compensate the losses. In the case of partner and economic agreements, the European Union will say that there will be a form of compensation for African countries because there will be predictable losses of customs. But in the case of the free and continental exchange there is no compensation mechanism planned to my knowledge. So not for this first point, I would say to conclude that the free and continental exchange repositions of integration and planning by the markets in the context where the states are progressively deprived of their commercial and industrial policies. In the pan-Africanist view integration requires political coordination and economic planning at the continent's scale to see a form of compensation for the losses. So the second question that should be addressed and the third myth that should be destroyed is that free exchange allows African countries to respond to the challenges of development thanks to free exchange, the connection between African countries will increase African countries will become industrialized and create jobs. So what we have to say first is that in the context of economic theory like what we saw in the literature in the Greek literature, there is no reason to prioritize that free exchange increases economic growth. This is an important result that has been made evident by the anthropologists. The anthropologists have not been able to show that the commercial liberalization has allowed to increase the growth. This must be understood. The second thing is that the argument for free exchange is not an argument consisting of saying that free exchange will stimulate growth or create development at all. The argument for free exchange according to its participants is that it increases efficiency. Thanks to free exchange, the prices of companies will decrease and in a certain way this decrease in prices will be reflected on consumers. However, for free exchange to favor efficiency, there are several conditions that must be met. For example, there must not be unemployment or unemployment. With commercial liberalization companies must be able to adjust their production to the demand of the international market for free exchange. For example, a company exported a thousand tons of cotton and now it is freeing and the international market requests 10,000 tons of cotton. This company must be able to export 10,000 tons of cotton. The third condition is that there are mechanisms for producers. Another condition is that the loss of commercial liberalization will be compensated. There is no cost without any cost. So if these five hypotheses are not filled then the proposed efficiency will not be filled. So free exchange will not generate efficiency. So obviously, all these hypotheses are not filled at all. Not even in rich countries and in poorer countries. But what many know, journalists, civil, etc. is that all the work of simulation of the economic impact of Las Lecas is based on such hypotheses and others even more delirious. For example, all the work that has been done by the African Union and by the World Bank to defend the economic background of Las Lecas is based on the hypothesis of full employment of resources, the hypothesis that the loss of resources must not reduce public spending and economic growth. The hypothesis that trade difficulties of African countries will be able to resolve automatically thanks to the flexibility of all changes and therefore the foreign currency does not cause any problems. And so we have seen that the information on which the implementation of the continental free exchange zone will increase the trade between Africans by 50%. In fact, few of us believe that this figure has been produced from very old data, very rudimentary, and with simple extrapolations. Jacques Berstelot, who is there following us in the public, made a very useful comment on all these questions. Consequently, when ordinary people think that the continental free exchange zone will increase its development, in fact, it is wrongly wrong to ask yourself if the continental free exchange zone will help Africa to get out of this development. Because the work that justifies the economic well-founded of the continental free exchange zone is part of the hypothesis that Africa does not have a development problem. So you have to understand this. There is no unemployment, there is no problem in terms of balance, Africa does not have a development problem, and it is part of this that we are justifying the well-founded of the continental free change zone. I have to say that of the continental free exchange zone is part of the economic well-founded of the continental free exchange zone which is the direct assembly of the continental part of Africa. And let's take account the water river to consider that a nationalноваfortable social housing les gouvernements africains sont conseillés par les économistes orthodoxes. Et ce qui explique qu'il y a ce biais pour le libre-échange. Et donc le dernier point que je voudrais évoquer rapidement est que les travaux pour le libre-échange, qui justifie le libre-échange, malgré leurs hypothèses incroyables et les limitations des données sur lesquelles ils s'appuient, génèrent souvent des résultats qui sont à porte-à-faux avec le rétorique libre-échangeiste. Un premier exemple, c'est une étude de Simon Mavel et Stéphane Karinghi qui a été publiée en 2012. En fait, cette étude-là conclut que les pays importants de la nette de produits alimentaires, les pays importants de la nette de produits alimentaires comme Langola, la République démocratique du Congo, le Mozambique, le Botswana, les pays d'Afrique du Nord, le Nigeria de manière générale, tous ces pays vont perdre au libre-échange parce que le revenu va diminuer. Et l'étude même conclut que en fait près de la moitié des pays africains vont perdre au libre-échange. Mais malgré tout, la conclusion c'est que le libre-échange entre guillemets va bénéficier au continent. Une étude plus récente de la Banque mondiale a été publiée récemment au début de l'année. Cette étude indique également que la Zleka ne va pas faire augmenter la taille du secteur industriel dans le PIB, en fait, la part du secteur industriel dans le PIB doit diminuer dans 18 des 24 pays étudiés par la Banque mondiale. Donc pour conclure, en fait, il y a trois choses qu'il faut retenir, c'est que la Zleka est vendue comme une initiative pan-Africaniste, ce qu'elle n'est pas, elle relève plutôt de l'afro-liberisme. La deuxième conclusion c'est que la Zleka est vendue comme un projet qui va permettre au continent de se développer alors que les travaux de simulation sans ses justifiés sont bien fondés partent de l'hypothèse que l'Afrique n'a pas de problème de développement. Et la deuxième conclusion c'est que les travaux sans ses justifiés, les bien fondés économiques de la Zleka, malgré le manque de rigueur et les hypothèses incroyables sur lesquels il repose, montrent que les perdants sont nombreux et que l'industrialisation et les emplois ne sont pas au rendez-vous. Je précise que cette critique n'a pas pour objet de dire que l'Afrique ne doit pas s'intégrer sur le plan commercial et que la rédiction des entraves à la liberté de circulation des biens et des personnes est une mauvaise chose en soi. Cette critique a plutôt pour objet d'ouvrir une discussion sur les alternatives où vont-ils être explorés quand on sort du carcan de l'économie orthodoxe. Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much. You have taken a little bit of time but it has been very exciting. And what I get from there is two main points. First we should be integrating production instead of trade because we have not integrated our production but we are integrating trade and liberalising trade. Then the other is on political integration. I think what you are proposing is an imbatted kind of approach where we start with political federation instead of economic federation. We do not have a lot of time. We are running out of time. So let me quickly introduce our third speaker who is Honourable Helmut Scholz who is a member of the European Parliament where he has served since 2009 as a coordinator for the Confederation Group of European United Left and Nordic Green Left which brings together left-wing members of parliament in the European Union. He is a member of the Committee on International Trade. He is also the vice chair of the European Parliament's Fair Trade Working Group where he has successfully been in charge of promoting an establishment of the city of the fair and ethical trade award. He is also an EU's parliament standing rapport tour for the environmental goods agreement. He is also an active member of the parliamentarians for global action as well as the global inter-parliamentary network of representatives worldwide supporting the UN Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights. I know many people here who are working on the UN Business and Human Rights Treaty so we have a good resource here. And today Honourable Helmut is going to discuss if the African Continental Free Trade Area is discussed in the European Parliament and if it is how is it discussed in the European Parliament. And also he'll give a discussion on the comprehensive strategy for Africa. Honourable Scholes, you're welcome. You have 10 minutes. I hope you can be able to wrap up within 10 minutes. You're welcome. Thank you very much Samuel for this opportunity and I want to thank the organisers for this very timely and very challenging seminar or workshop. It is a very interesting and important topic which deserves all the attention not only of us probably coming from a left, from a background, rethinking trade cooperation between the European Union and the African continent with all the regions with different political stakeholders, economic stakeholders and so I want to say frankly that I'm more or less interested in listening to all your experience, your judgements about the challenges ahead of us. Let me start at the beginning that as Eva Maria has said in the beginning that the title of our workshop is a little bit not so easy sounding, but I would say I like it because it's provocative. And as a left-wing politician in the European Parliament, one is tempted to shout out, of course no, and to lean back and rely on the many books critical of neoliberal free-trade agreements which you all have been reading and to an extent even writing ourselves and yourselves. And to be honest with you when the ACFTA is mentioned in the Committee on International Trade in the European Parliament, this happens indeed in the context of classical trade policies as it is already characterized by the speakers before me this morning. The EU Commission considers the endeavor to form an all-African free-trade area as an important step towards market liberalization. They say they supported it from the beginning logistically and financially and probably we all agree that it is without doubt that we know that there is of course an investment in going into this direction in the understanding of the neoliberal free-trade logic. The European Union is still practising for the time being as it is probably a long wait there. The Commission still relies on the EPAS that have been concluded. Sabine Weijern, the new Director General of the DG Trade, expressed her hope that one day there could be a region-to-region free-trade agreement built on the current EPAS as stepping stones. And frankly speaking, the DG Trade, Jane knows it, maybe very concrete and explicitly also from her experiences in accompanying the negotiations around the WTO, is not the most progressive department in the European Commission. For decades, the surveillance of the or in the DG Trade measured the success to work by growth rates for Europe and increase profit for companies based in Europe. And they were successful in this regard. We have spoken about that already with your experiences and every single FDA concluded by the EU led to a change in the balance of trade to the benefit of Europe. And yet it must also be taken into account that these negotiated agreements with sub-partner countries in this regional trade agreements had given them a chance to gain profit or benefits for parts of their societies compared with those in other countries of the same region. For example, the East African community EPAS is of course leading to more benefits for some stakeholders in Kenya or in Wanda compared with Burundi or Tanzania, etc. So we are creating by this EPAS, the regional EPAS, also disparity in the region itself. What I am working for is opening chances and realities to achieve in the shifting of the paradigm for measuring success. And we need agreements, and I hope that we can agree here, that help to achieve an advancement of our societies. I suggest building on something that has already been achieved. All our governments have agreed on the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, and our ministries should feel obliged to achieve these goals by 2030. That is, I think, how we should measure success. And how is this trade policy? How has that health policy? Or how has that competition policy and labour policy contributed to achieving the SDGs by this year 2030? And probably we have to rethink also the relationship between the parliament, the civil society representatives, the regional structures and organizations to control their ministers when they are negotiating agreements, etc. So that this measurement becomes transparent and understandable in the society themselves. We all know that EU-Africa trade has been characterized by for years, decades, centuries in equality and unfair trade relations. And knowing this, I have two things to do. In the EU-Parliament, and probably not me alone, but we left a progressive mind of people, and also those who are critical in the state of play where we are, that we have to find a new approach and to make it possible, realistic basis for the current policies, which is ending traditional exploitation. And as a business in Europe, as a business in the United States, business in Canada, Japan or China, continues always to talk about the right to access to raw materials in Africa soil. And in particular, when it comes to the so-called strategic resources, many in Europe are willing to use all means necessary to secure supply. So this is a concrete challenge, what we have to take up on the surface of our deaths in our societies to make it understandable for everybody what is on the stake. Neither the Africa I have to learn to listen, as I already said. What are African proposals to break the circle of poverty? Which avenue is in your mind when you are pursuing the African CFTA? Is it the pan-African nature, as it has just been said, of this project that will help you to break free from the dependence on exports to Europe and the US and China? So the political integration is really an interesting point of discussion, and we should try to go even this morning deeper into this reality. And there are very, I see that there are very interesting elements and what the African Union has decided was regard to the different phases of establishing the AFTCFDA. Let me take, for instance, the aspect of free movement of people. We know it from Europe. In 2018, the African Union and its protocol to the treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to the free movement of persons right of residence and right of establishment outlined a set of general rules to facilitate mid-migration between the African Union member states. And in particular, this protocol noted that the free movement of persons in Africa will facilitate the establishment of the continental free trade area endorsed by the EU. But will this provide us with an avenue to end the suffering of so many millions of migrants on both on our continents? From a European standpoint, the main preoccupations are with irregular migration towards Europe, while for Africa, issues to do with continental free trade and free circulation are central. Today, and then we are coming back to the point which I mentioned by the approach from the European Union to keep on the economic dependence. Today, more than 50% of African migrants in OECD countries are from the north of Africa. More than 75% of sub-Saharan migrants stay in other African countries. Nobody is speaking more or less in Europe about that. Can we develop and organize the relationship between the people on our continent, which goes beyond a free trade agreement that can accommodate migration, including rights and respect? Not to be too long. It seems to me to be still a long way to go, but it is so important to look at trade area, not only from the perspective of a merchant, from commercial interests. And by the way, this is something I'm also telling to half of the British people who wants to relate to the rest of Europe only in strictly business relationship. And we have learned what the Brexit means for the relationship between people at the European continent. The European Union is also an example that any deeper economic integration must be paralleled by social environment and regulatory integration. A comprehensive understanding of cooperation needs in the Union is essential for achieving social economic cohesion. But the European Union is also an example for a single market, which has been benefiting advanced economies and strong and large companies more than others. If Maria has spoken about that in the morning in her attractive remarks. People in Bulgaria and Romania, for example, did not see a strong increase in their wages after joining the European Union. Chinese workers are on today, in the meantime, more and better as a result of their Chinese inclusive growth model. There's a lot of internal migration from central and eastern European states to the west and to the north. Finally, we now have a proposal on the table for a European minimum wage system. So tell me how you are going to develop the African Union and your AFC, FDA. How will you avoid disproportionate benefits for shop-right supermarkets from South Africa, for Nigerian or oil billionaires, or one expert in financial services? So I mean the reality of the economic disparity in also the African societies in different countries is of course a challenge, a big challenge to you and probably also to all of us. Will social justice, will protecting the climate, will labour rights, will democracy, will transparency, will the achievements of the SDGs offer guiding principles for Africa's economic transition? And here I see the big responsibility also from the European Parliament, from economic, political, social, civil society stakeholders from the European continent to support you in discussing these questions, to contribute our experiences into the reality of today's development. And by that giving us a chance to rethink also the whole concept and issues. Finally, we have adopted in October, even under the COVID-19 challenges in a remote procedure of the European Parliament, the positioning of the European Parliament concerning the African strategy of the European Commission. So there is something on the table where a lot of, as you know, it is a compromise between the different wings in the European Parliament, but where we are offering certain new ideas to accompany that we want really a change in the strategy of the European Commission, of the European Union Member States, Council and at the national level towards the African continent. And that it is clear that the African continent's strategic importance and the need to strengthen the partnership with and not for Africa should offer new approaches, but maybe we are discussing it now later on. Thank you for your attention. Thank you very much, Honorable Helmut, for that detailed presentation. And I think you have raised the point about hegemony, which Jen had earlier alluded to. We have, in our case, we have a South African hegemony in Nigerian and then an Egyptian hegemony because they are the big brothers in Africa. And then I would like to connect these two questions that has come into Jen, if we have such a hegemony, who are the winners and the losers, and how is this hegemony being treated within the Africa continent or free trade area? Please, Jen, go ahead. Thank you so much, Sam. And thank you so much to Sila and to Honorable Helmut, the issues they have raised are very, very critical. Who are the winners and who are the losers and who are those people who are demanding for the CFTA? Because the winners are, again, the people who are demanding now for the CFTA. So we start with the demanders of the CFTA. And what we have to note is that African states and African people do want a CFTA because it's a normal progression of the African people's aspiration for African unity and for structural transformation. And that's a fact that the African people want a CFTA but not in its current form. The demanders of the current CFTA are called the Afrochampions. And these are the big businesses like Equity Bank, the Equal Bank Group, and we know they are interested in the Panamanian system. We have such groups like the Dangote Group, the African Arab Incorporation who want an open African sky. So we see big business being interested in the current CFTA, which is about opening up the continent. Another group of people demanding for the CFTA are the political heavyweights. Who want to be seen? They want to be seen supporting African integration agenda and who want to be seen as Pan-Africanists? I want to mention their names but we know them. They are also the technical arm, people who are working in the AU who want to finish their assignment. But we also have negotiators who have put in a lot of money and resources in these negotiations. They are for the people demanding for the CFTA and putting on table very unrealistic deadlines and not the small scale producers, not the MSMEs, but those groups of people. So who are going to be the winners? The winners again are going to be the big businesses. And the losers, like Sarah pointed out, are going to be the small and the fragile economies. The MSMEs, the small scale producers, the Fisher folks, the workers, those are the people who are going to be losers. So we need to rethink the CFTA. But what I also want to point out, there is some on the chat, some people have been asking that the CFTA is an African initiative. So what's wrong with it? The CFTA is truly an African initiative, but it's just a tool which we need to modify to suit the challenges facing the continent. So we need to ensure that the design of the CFTA works for the people. So is it enough to say that just because it's an African initiative, it's good for the continent? So I will stop there, Sam. Thank you. Thank you very much, Jane. We have two questions here, and they are addressed to Ndongo. One of them is some people want to know about the West African perspective because they are signed EPS by Ghana and Ivory Coast. And how do they constitute genuine hurdles for the implementation of Africa? That is the first question. There is here, if I can read a more interesting question here. Do you think that the continental free trade area could help support the disconnection of Africa from the world economy as supported by Samir Amin? So those are the two questions for you. I hope you can address them within five minutes or so. Thank you. Thank you very much, Sam. I'll start by the second question about whether the AFCQA is a tool to help Africa healing. And when we say dealing thing, it's not otaki, but rebalancing of domestic and external relationships. I myself asked the question to Samir Amin two years ago. I went to his office and I interviewed him. I said Samir. I don't feel that the AFCQA is a good AFCQA and I think I am alone thinking like that. He told me, I share the same opinion with you because when you have free trade zone, they will have enterprises which will install on the coastal zones and enter your countries like the poorest one. If there was something Africa, they would not benefit from that. He said, I am against free trade zones. So the answer from Samir Amin itself is that the AFCQA is not a tool for dealing. That doesn't mean that trade integration is not a good thing for Africa, but that only implies that we could have other mechanisms of trade integration. For example, in West Africa, we know that from 20 to 65% of the imports of countries are devoted to just two items, food products and energy products. I think African countries could do their best to achieve food and energy self-sufficiency. It's not clear how free trade could help African countries obtain both sovereignty and energy sovereignty, but with as a form of integration, it's possible. To stay with West Africa, yes, the situation is complicated because two countries, Ghana and Kodiwa have signed entering EPAs with the European Union. And in those entering EPAs, there is this close of most-revered nations, and normally they granted 80% of trade liberalisation through the European Union. In the framework of the African continent and free trade area, it is expected that the trade liberalisation will cover 90% of Thai plants. That means that Ghana and Kodiwa will have to extend the same, let's say, preferences to the European Union. And one of the consequences is that normally this could not be handled within the ECOWAS, the European Community of West African States, as they normally belong to a custom union. And in the framework of the CFTA, this is a huge hurdle. I myself asked the question last November to a trade commissioner in ECOWAS, the European Community of West African States. He told me we are negotiating, but this is a huge issue, and for now it's a stalemate. We don't know how to deal with that. So it's a question we'll have to follow, but it's sure that African countries have to have a common policy regarding how they will deal with such kind of trade agreements like the EPAs. Thank you very much, Dongo. I have other questions for you, but they will come in the second session of this plenary. The next question goes to Honourable Helmut Scho. One question has come in, is about the economic partnership agreements. How are they being treated now? Being that they remain inconclusive, many remain inconclusive, and yet they are guided by the Kortuno agreement. So we have another kind of trade arrangement in the Kortuno initiative. So how is trade being treated now and beyond 2020? Thank you. It's a very interesting question, because as you know, as it has been already said, the EPAs are in a certain standstill mood in their realization. So they are aware they have the interim agreements concluded by the European Union and certain states of certain regions, which have been negotiated and concluded in the EPA, giving the European business a certain access. In the meantime, there is a hope, as I have said already, that with the development of the AS58, the chance for European business to use the new phase for having access to the African markets is the strategy of the moment. So as there is not yet a clear picture how to deal with the Kortuno agreement, so what will be there, the orientation is trying to use what is existing. So for example, there is, and I would have introduced it in the later point, a strategy that the European Union and African countries could work together in promoting a new legislation concerning the digital text. Because there is an understanding that European Union is endangered by the United States, that they will sanction European Union if it is really putting the big tech giants under taxation law. And the same as it is an attempt by African states to introduce digital techs, giving them additional possibilities to get surplus money for dealing with the direct impact of the COVID-19 crisis and to find money there. So here is a way of creating a new cooperation form between European Union and African countries. So for example, there is a new organization set up within the frame of the OECD and the African Union to compose such a permanent cooperation form using, for example, the experience of the South Africa-based African text administration forum for forming the African position on that. So what I want to express by that is that the EPAS are of course still the benchmark for the economic cooperation, but there are search for additional and new forms of continuing the cooperation form. And finally, you know, we have four free trade agreements negotiated in particular with North African countries. So that is of course also one part of the strategy of the European Union. Thank you very much. In relation to that, there's a question that has come in for Jen. And you are alluding to that the East African communities in the process of preparing its tariff offers. But in the case that economies have been hit badly by COVID, is should there be a review of these offers for every country? Do you think this is a possibility? Then the other question is a more radical one is how do we stop it all? Maybe you can address this question. Thank you so much, Sam. And thank you so much for those questions regarding the ESC tariff offers. In fact, the ESC is also discussing a review of the common external tariff. And the whole issue is that the current common external tariff is not effective in protecting certain products. And those are the processes we are talking about, which are also mitigating against negotiations in the CFTA. Because if the ESC is negotiating among themselves the common external tariff, how then can they go ahead and make offers to the Africa Union? So it's true the COVID pandemic has raised a number of realities and there is a need to review. So that means that it's important for countries to go through when they are making their tariff offers to the Africa Union. So first of all, we think liberalization within the regional economic groupings. And this is what in a way that the ESC is doing. Another question was how do we end it all? That's what you were asking. It's a radical question, but I pointed out that the CFTA is a tool and we can't design it the way we want. We, meaning Africans, it's just a tool. So we need to trade among ourselves, but it's the how, how do we do it? And I also want to go to that issue which Honorable Helmut has raised, that the relationship should go beyond just commercial interests. I was looking at the protocol because when they launched the CFTA, there was also the protocol for the free movement of people. But to date, on the self-signed, that protocol, signed but not ratified. So we need to look at a relationship which goes beyond commercial interests as Helmut has pointed out. And we need to look at how we integrate our production. That's the issue which Cilla has raised. How do we integrate our production? And that goes to the question some of you have raised. How do we deal with the hegemonies? If we can be able to flip it, look at production before we liberalize extensively, we can be able to deal with the hegemonies, we can be able to end this whole trade meal of liberalization. My, my submissions on these two issues. Thank you, sir. Okay, thank you very much. You have pointed out about the trade agreement going beyond just trade. And I would like to indulge and don't go on this. The hegemon is asking which process, which trade process is more important for Africa? Where should it focus? Which is more important? The EPAs, the Africa free continue to trade area. Then, of course, in East Africa like Kenya is has opened up negotiations with the United States and Britain. Where should we focus? Don't go, please. I think the focus should be to put an end to the colonial legacy of primary specialization. That means that African countries have to try to increase their domestic production, their domestic capabilities at the same time diversify their production and exports. I am not advocating autarchy, but we know from history that all the countries that initialize all the country that developed, they have a phase where they protected their infant industries and allow for industrial development. So, what is important for Africa is to have a kind of economic and economic and commercial trade integration, which will maximize, let's say domestic space. But in the case of the African content of the trade area, it's a kind of integration which will, let's say reduce domestic space. And I think this will not be a good thing for economic development and also for for democracy. The professor Danny Roderick has a very telling formula. He's speaking about a trinity of impossibility, meaning there is that three things you could not have at the same time. You could have a nation state democracy and deep economic integration. You have to choose to among these three. If you want the nation state and deep economic integration, like for example the FCFJ. So you will be in a situation of let's say where the world economy will dominate your economy and you will have no democracy. So this will give rise to optimism, etc. But in his way of framing things, if you want to have the democracy and deep economic integration, you need something like a federal structure. If countries are not ready for federal structure, so they need some form of let's say protection and not deep economic integration. We have to be clear about what we want. I think there are many possible things we can do. If you want to increase trade, we have to increase first production. And we could increase our production by having for example the appropriate financial systems. In many countries, the SMEs are not funded at all because they are not appropriate financial structures. At the same time, we know that the payment systems within Africa are not working. We could have a payment system which will facilitate cross-border trade. We could also build infrastructures which will help also the flow of goods. There are some studies by the AMF which shows that the impact from let's say creating infrastructures for trade are higher than for example what is expected from just removing tariff and non-tariff barriers. There are many things we could do which will help African integration at the same time enlarging domestic space, but unfortunately that's not the case with the AFCHA. Thank you for your response, but also maybe if you could also add a little bit on your work on currencies. How does it play in within the Africa continent of free trade area? Thank you. I'll give just two aspects. The first aspect is about the exchange rates. In all standard trade models, the exchange rates are supposed to be flexible. When you have a trade deficit, this trade deficit will come to equilibrium through flexible exchange rates. In reality, we know it doesn't function like that, but this is a standard assumption. If you want to benefit from free trade, you have to have at least a flexible exchange rate. For the countries using the CFA franc, 14 of them, their exchange rates is bad to the euro, so they cannot use the exchange rate to absorb shocks. That means that, for example, in West Africa, all the countries using the CFA franc, except for Kodwa, which is an agricultural rich country, all the other countries have structural trade deficits. That means within the framework of the AFCHA, their trade deficits will explode and this will create, let's say, more problems for their balance of payments, including more debt, but these aspects are not taken into account by standard trade models. The other aspect is about the financing of, let's say, SMEs and domestic activity. If you take, for example, the case of Guinea Abyssal, a small country, the volume of credit to the private sector is less than what the Central Bank of West Africa gives as credit to its own staff. They have 3,000 more or less, and Guinea Abyssal has an economy of 2 million people. The private sector of Guinea Abyssal receives less credit than 3,000 people from the Central Bank. That means if Guinea Abyssal liberalizes its trade, Guinea Abyssal will be destroyed because there is no funding for production. And this also applies in many parts throughout the continent. Thank you so much for highlighting on that. We have a question in, I think it will be the last question to our panelists, and it goes to Honorable Helmut. It's a simple but very complex question is your view, your perspective about the vision of EU-African relations, especially one that maintains African policy space. Thank you so much. I don't know exactly if it is an easy question, but surely it's a very complex question. And I can't speak for Europe, so I can only express certain reflections about what is on the stake and what we have to think in this direction. And probably we have to agree that the relationship between the European Union, which is not Europe, and African countries also very different and full variety is one of the central challenges for the future. How we are living together and that we are stopping to treat people in its African continent as a cheap labor, as those who are supplying us with raw materials, etc. So if we don't, I would say, together, European Union and the African countries within the African Union, let it be even in the AFT-8, to think what are our crucial global challenges for both of us. And let's try to establish a linkage between us to answer these challenges. We will not have a future for this relationship, a productive one, a constructive one, a progressive one. So how we are mitigating the loss of biodiversity, how we are dealing with the climate change issues. So what is the energy policy? Because African people also want to have a supply, a power supply in the wall and then take it to energy. So that's, as a human right, to have clear water, to have waste treatment, etc. So these are normal expectations of citizens in our societies, which we have to answer. And that must be done together, as I would say, because we have to reflect what does it mean, environment protection, what does it mean for reducing the CO2 emissions and probably as soon as possible, even better. And in this way, I think we have a lot of common and joint task to deal with it. And that we have to put into the focus also of the commercial, of the economic, of the financial, monetary, as well as of the political cooperation. And maybe this should be marked the future of agreements we are concluding together. So for example, the European Union has in its trade agreements always a sustainable development chapter included human rights environmental issues, etc., etc., social aspects. But they are teesless, because there is no concluding tool in these chapters, which is, if there is a violation of these aims put into the agreements to those who are committing these, that they are not realized. And here I see the responsibility of us, in particular in the European Parliament. So we are striving to put into the real economic practices of today's chapters for sustainable development, which have a mandatory obligation structure for economic stakeholders, that the corporations have to stick to that what is said by the legal representatives, by those who are trying to frame the market, to limit the power of the market. And I think this year we have to think together and maybe one conclusion of our workshop would be that we are organizing really a chapter by chapter, a comparison what has been good and bad in the development of the integration process in Europe, which is in the capitalist society shaped. But it was also shaped under conditions to overcome the strategy of the Second World War. So this peace issue, which has already shortly discussed in the morning, should give us a point, a paragraph where we have to say, yes, how the economic cooperation between very different African countries within the African Union and within the ASFTA to find ways that there will be peace in the future. So how to establish it by very different expectations by citizens in the different countries. So that is one experience we have in the European Union and let's now talk about what is correct in the way on how the integration process was organized and where had been the biggest mistakes. The dependence from economies from different countries has, of course, contributed that within the European Union, in the European community of steel and coal, there was a common interest not to lash war against each other because our economies are interlinked. So what does it mean under today's conditions for the African states. So where we have such an issue. And of course, the left in Europe is very much also in discussion about in which direction we should organize a further integration process. So what is the future of the European Union, how we have to reshape the treaties to give a more social or a social face to the European policies in the interest of each citizen. So what we are creating for giving them access to education for, for health care, etc. In particular, in the situation today when people are affected by the COVID-19 crisis and suddenly everybody is realizing yes, the state has a role and he has to take care for the health care system for everybody. So I mean, these are experience of citizens and we should include the citizens readiness to participate in shaping their societies in dealing with their expectations and our wisdom to find new ways and answers. I think this would be the main task for the future relationship between the European Union and the African continent as such, but of course it is very concrete and precise for each African country because South Africa is far not the same as Mali or Burundi, etc. I mean, we have to find new ways, but we should find the common points in the challenges ahead of us and here to deepen the cooperation. I don't know exactly if the answer to the question, but I would always argue in that direction to find new ways of cooperation among us. Thank you very much, Honourable Schultz. Maybe in the following webinar, this is part of the questions we shall be addressing. We have come to the end, but I'll give a few minutes to Honourable Ivor Schreiber to wrap it up, maybe two minutes, and then we can end the webinar. Honourable Schreiber, please give your wrap up. Yes, thank you very much. I thank you for the exciting discussion and the good cooperation between actors and institutions, at least three Rosaluxenburg penitentiaries. Yes, thank you very much. I take some of today with me. My office has been working very hard with German initiatives such as the Compact with Africa. This is, and it remains important, but we have to get back to the question of action. These are, so to speak, the grammar of our economic relations with the African countries and the exchange between different partners and institutions, from civil society organizations in Kampala to parliament offices in Brussels. This is unbearable, both for the exchange of information as well as for the development of a common political strategy, and we will continue to search and accompany this exchange. Today's discussion has become very clear, how do the themes really affect all areas of life? It is not just about trade, the economy must not be reduced to trade. The economy is much more, it is about the question of what we want to produce under which ecological and social conditions. How do we want to distribute it? And that is a very political question that goes far beyond the demand for free trade. And this demand even stands against it in many ways, and therefore we have to use a wide political concept. And that is why it is necessary to accompany the discussions, also with the necessary criticism, and to formulate them accordingly and bring them into our parliament. If the political establishment force wins over the economy. Donko has pointed out that political integration cannot be followed by economic integration, but politics must lead economic integration into the right lanes, for example through the Pan-African industrial policy. Helmut Scholz has also demanded very, very important that trade agreements must be oriented towards the fulfillment of the SDGs. Very briefly, we have to fight for the privacy of politics. And we have to stress again and again that the people, the civil society, do not stand back against the concerns, but get a bearing voice. I hope to see you again in a very rainy exchange. Thank you very much. And until the next webinar. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. I will thank you very much. I will end it here. Yes, for we shall have more webinars. We are preparing more webinars. There are many questions that have not been answered. We shall answer them in the next sessions that we shall have. Thank you very much everyone for attending and for your comments and questions. Be safe. Thank you very much.