 Good evening. On behalf of Beyond Law CLC and for the equipment associates, we welcome you all and it's always pleasure connecting with any resource person. But when we see that Mr. S.R. Soma Shekhar, a former district judge from Bangalore, comes the spirit and the joy amongst the listeners and the viewers is on a different tangent. And it's always a pleasure that despite his hectic schedule, he accepts our request. And the topic though it looks very simple. I was talking in my office. They said, Section 167 of CRPC, everybody would be knowing. I said, no, we are also taking sessions for the students of the law or those who are practicing as such for the judicial services or AD, etc. And be that as it may once there is Mr. S.R. Soma Shekhar. You will always get a different prism of thought process to understand things. I'll ask the victim to take out the baton since we believe that we shouldn't come in between when Mr. Soma Shekhar is there. Because, sir, first of all, my many thanks to you for organizing this webinar and we are so fortunate this evening to have such a wonderful resource person with us. And the topic so chosen 167 of CRPC, this would definitely help a lot of advocates who are practicing in the trial courts. So I can see a lot of audience already logging in here on the Zoom portal as well as who have joined us live. So I don't want to take much time. Sir, I am so grateful to you on behalf of Beyond Law CLC and my personal behalf, sir. I extend a warm welcome to you. And my many thanks to Mr. Subramaneh Kaushik and Mrs. Subramaneh Kaushik. Thank you so much, sir. Over to you, sir. Can I start? Yes, sir. Please. I don't know whether I should first thank Dr. Vitram or I should thank Vitash Chetrat. Always, Mr. Vitash. It is through Vitram, Dr. Vitram, I got connected to Vitash Chetrat. Anyway, I am seeing both of them. I thank both of them for giving me this platform to speak to the legal fraternity beyond Karnataka. Well, Vitash Chetrat said that some of the participants told him that section 167 CRPC is simple and then wait. And he also said, well, there is a different thing about it. The concept of bail referred to in section 167 is default bail. Therefore, by default, you would have known something about 167. If by design, we had known something about 167, there would not have been many problems. Because by default, we would have known something of 167. I think some kind of a refresher course like this is required. I'm also refreshing myself because for the last, I think, two or three years, I have not spoken about this. Maybe some fault on my part also in making this presentation. And I see one good judicial officer here who is always up to date in matters. And I'm sure that if he finds that some case law which I have cited is overruled or a later decision has taken the similar view. He would also immediately bring it to my notice and I can enter, pass it on to the entire audience. Now, to understand the scope of section 167 CRPC, you must first start with section 57 CRPC. No police officer shall detain in custody a person arrested without warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the case is reasonable. And such periods shall not in the absence of a special order of a magistrate under section 167, he had sealed 24 hours, gets clues of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the magistrate's court. Today, since I am asked to speak about section 167. I do not want to dilate any further on section 57 without 57 says in the normal course it is 24 hours shall not in the absence of a special order of a magistrate under 167. So we'll straight away go to 167. As Mr. Mitastathar said, some students are also interested in knowing it. I have for the last four or five years visited a number of law colleges, given some guest lectures on civil trial and criminal trial. The usual question that students ask is the difference between police custody and judicial custody. Police custody is one thing which a magistrate gives authorization to the police to take the accused to his custody for purposes of further investigation. As you have seen that intersection 57 CRPC police after arrest is required to produce the accused before the jurisdictional magistrate between 24 hours from such arrest excluding the time required for journey. Now, we have also seen this intersection 57 for a longer period than all the circumstances of the case is reasonable. For some reason, within the 24 hours, the police is not able to completely investigate the case. Well, he may require the accused for further investigation. In such an event, he has to make an application before the jurisdictional magistrate seeking his custody. If you do not need the accused for investigation, usually the prior would be the accused in the remanded to judicial custody. Of course, if a bail application is filed, what is to be done? There are different aspects of the matter that 437 would take care of it. We are not on regular bail today, we are only on this default bail. So therefore, when the accused is produced by the police and the police make an application and writing. They are seeking the accused to their custody and if the magistrate is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for giving the accused to police custody, then the magistrate will pass such an order. Despite such application, if the magistrate thinks or magistrate finds that there are absolutely no grounds for the accused to be given to police custody, it would be open to the magistrate to decline that request to the police and take him to judicial custody in close parlance. It is prison or jail and then if the accused applies for bail, depending upon the contours of section 437 CRPC, the magistrate will take a decision in the matter of grant or refusal of bail. Judicial custody means for the benefit of students and others who are not exposed to criminal law is not something in the court or the chambers of the judge are in his home. Judicial custody technically means a prison or jail where the accused would be sent. Next thing is having known the distinction between police custody and judicial custody. What is to be done by the police and the magistrate when police custody is sought. 167 itself provides for some guidance. Let us start from 167-1. Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody and if it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of 24 hours pixel by section 57 and there are grounds for believing that the accused or information, accusation or information is well founded. The officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation if he is not below the rank of a sub inspector shall forthwith transmit to the nearest judicial magistrate a few of the entries in the diary herein after prescribed relating to the case and shall at the same time forward the accused to set magistrate. This is the mandate of law. When the police seek an accused to their custody. They are bound to physically produce the accused before the magistrate. And they are also required to give copies of the entries in the case dairy refer to in section 172 CRPC prescribed in the manner provided by each state. It is necessary for the magistrate to insist on that daily. The reason is this. Let us take a situation where the police have arrested an accused yesterday around 8 p.m. Today by 6 30 p.m. the accused is produced before the judicial magistrate because it is 6 30. It could be the home office. Police said the accused for police custody. When was he arrested? 8 p.m. yesterday about 22 and half hours earlier. What is it that the police did from 8 p.m. till he was produced before the magistrate? It is the case dairy which indicates it. It is the case dairy which reflects it. If nothing is done. Where is the funding given the accused to police the study for any further investigation. Therefore the case dairy should be insisted upon. And that would disclose what actually the police did in a matter of investigation. Where all they took the accused. Is there anything else to be done beyond the period of 24 hours for which because they can't detain the accused beyond 24 hours. They need an authorization from the magistrate to take him to their custody beyond 24 hours. Therefore they need to produce him before the magistrate between 24 hours. And if the case warrants giving the accused to police the study. A case has to be made up by the police. How does the magistrate come to the conclusion that it is a case which warrants giving the accused to police the study. That is by perusal of the case dairy. That indicates it. So in the magistrates warrants the group will ensure. That the case dairy are a copy of the entries in the case dairy. Is made available to them by the police. At the time the accused is produced. And police the study is sought. Well. Whenever a lawyer wants an adjournment for three days. He sits one week. When he wants adjournment for one week. He sits 15 days. When the court is inclined to grant adjournment for seven days. It says three days. When the court is inclined to grant adjournment for three days. It gives one day. Because the lawyer knows if he has only seven days the court will give three days. The judge also knows. If he says seven days he would take 10 days. This is what the police also do. The police also know. That the maximum period of 15 days is not sought. It is unlikely that the magistrate would give even four or five days. Therefore the usual request is to give them at least for 10 days and other things. It is here. The judicial application of mind is required on the part of the magistrate. And the judicial application of mind can be made. Only when the case is produced and perused. Produced by the police and perused by the magistrate. Whether the case really warrants the accused to be given to the police. Whatever may be the request made by the police. Without the length of time. It is for the magistrate ultimately to take a decision. Now I am in Bangalore. An accused is produced before me by 6.30 p.m. It is a case of counterfeit currency. Now from the interrogation made by the accused who is arrested. It transpires that someone else in some other state is also involved in this. The currency notes were got printed at a remote place. Well it may take quite some time for the police to take the accused to that remote place. It could be 24 hours. Maybe if it is Bombay for two days. Something of that kind. Therefore depending upon the distance to which the police are required to travel and take the accused. The nature of the case. The involvement of others. This is required. Liars who have practiced on the criminal side. Particularly in the court of sessions would have known. That it is only after arrest of one of the accused in the case. The involvement of the complicity of the other accused. Would be known. The accused who is apprehended and interrogated. Metser says that someone else other than him is also involved. Whether he deliberately implicates you. Or really he is also an accomplice is something which the police have to investigate. And ultimately the judge has to decide. It is too early for the magistrate to say that he is not involved or something. So these are situations where. Request of the police to give the accused to police custody. Is really warranted. As I repeatedly said. The magistrate has to insist on case writing. And also reuse it. And if satisfied only judicial application of mind is required. Add he has to pass. A fairly recent order not too long. Then for how long this police custody can be given. Let us go to subsection two. The magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded in this section. May. Whether he has. Or has not jurisdiction to try the case. From time to time. Authorize the detention of the accused in such custody. As such magistrates in sweet. For a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. The maximum period for which. The accused can be given to police custody. Is 15 days. We find one expression here. Whether he has or has not jurisdiction. The reason is this. Section 57 requires. That the accused should be produced. Before. Before the magistrate. Within 24 hours. Now. For some reason. The jurisdiction magistrate's place is something far away. Now these days it will not arise because in almost all places. That is the court of the magistrate. There are at least two or three magistrates. Anyway law has taken care to see. That he could be produced before the nearest magistrate also. Who in turn will do something else beyond that. So the maximum period for which. The accused can be given to police custody. Is 15 days in a given case that is important. Now let us say. In crime number 100 of 2023. The accused is arrested and produced. In crime number 100 of 2023. The maximum period for which. Can be given to police custody is 15 days. But during the police custody of 15 days. The complicity of the accused in crime number 150 of 2023 is. Disclosed. Therefore. For investigation of that case. Well this 15 day rule will not apply. Therefore for some other case. For some other case if the accused is required for police custody. It could be certainly beyond 15 days. This has been clarified. By the Supreme Court. In a year 1992 Supreme Court 1768. Its sec equivalent is. 1992. Volume 3 sec 141 1992 volume 3 sec 141. This decision is also. Retreated. In a year 1994 Supreme Court. 1447. For some of the. These two decisions are important. For some other purpose. Now we have seen. That the maximum period for which. The accused have been given. To the police for their custody is 15 days. Today the accused is produced. Therefore. Till 17 for 2023. The accused can be given to police custody. Today when the police arrest the accused. They may find. That there is no need to take the accused to their custody. They may not make a request to the court. To give the accused to their custody because according to them. At the time. There was no point in taking the accused to their custody. Therefore the request to the court is. To take the accused to judicial custody. Now the accused is remanded to judicial custody today. Say for eight days 10 days 15 days or whatever it is. Tomorrow or the day after. The police during the course of investigation. The police. The police during the course of investigation. Some material. And they need these accused for their custody. So even though today the accused is given to judicial custody. Tomorrow or the day after. Within this first 15 days. You're on the last 14 today. The police can make a request. To the magistrate. To give the accused to their custody. In this. CBI versus. Ninety ninety two Supreme Court 176 site it is held. During the first 15 days. The accused can be. Shipped from police custody to judicial custody custody can be. Interchange police custody to judicial custody. Judicial custody to police custody. In fact, I jokingly tell. Now can a patient is taken to the custody. In his place. The custody is being sent to the custody. Now, when a patient is taken to the doctor, first in the outpatient, then he is immediately taken to ICU, if need be, from ICU, he will be put into special ward, special ward to general ward, back to ICU, and ultimately to march in. This is what happens. Therefore, of course, the doctors have enough time, but the judicial police custody only during the first 15 days, police custody can be given. During these first 15 days, even if the accused is not taken to police custody today or tomorrow, at any time during these 15 days, though the accused has been remanded to judicial custody, the police can make a request to the court to get the accused from judicial custody and hand him over to their custody. This is perfectly permissible in that regard. So now, the next thing is about this statutory bail. We will see subsection 2 again. The magistrate to whom an accused is prevented under subsection 2 this section may. Whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorize the detention of the accused in such custody as such magistrates in suite, for a term not exceeding 15 days in the court. And if he has no jurisdiction to try the case are permitted for trial and considers further detention unnecessary. He may orderly accused to be forwarded to a marriage state having such jurisdiction. Now, the maximum term of police custody that is 15 days which I have said is provided in the subsequent provisions. Now, 16728 indicates that provided that the magistrate may authorize the detention of the accused person otherwise than the custody of the police beyond the period of 15 days. So 16728 mandates that the maximum period for which the accused can be given to police custody is 15 days. If he is satisfied, the credit grounds exist for doing so. But no magistrate shall authorize the detention of the accused in person in custody under this paragraph. For a total period exceeding 90 days where the investigation relates to an offense punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years. So the maximum period for which the police can wait, I mean the court can wait is 90 days. 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offense. And on the expiry of the set period of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be. The accused person shall be released as a matter of right if he is prepared to and thus punished by. And every person released on bail under the subsection shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of chapter 33, 33 relates to bail and bailments for the purposes of the chapter. Though the word default bail is not used in 167 or statutory bail. Why it is called default bail is because of the default of the investigating agency to file the final report within 90 days or 60 days as the case may be. The accused gets a right of bail. It is called statutory bail because the statute itself CRPC 167 provides that the accused as a matter of right is stated to bail because of the default of the part of the police to submit the final report within 90 days or 60 days. Of course there are some inroads into this maximum period of 90 days and 60 days in some special enactments one or two special enactments I'll make a reference at the end. Then the next question is from which date the 60 days or 90 days has to be calculated. Let us reread section 162 a 167 to a the magistrate may authorize the detention of the accused person. Otherwise, then the custody of the police beyond the period of 15 days if he is satisfied the credit grounds for exist for doing so. But no magistrate shall authorize the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding 90 days where investigation relates to an offense for the six days otherwise. This starting point is not mentioned here. This has been a matter of judicial interpretation. We need not going to be judicial history in this regard or the presidential history. They have a they have a very leading decision of the Supreme Court on this point. It is Chaganti Satyanarayana and others Chaganti Satyanarayana and others 1986 3 SCC 141 1986 3 SCC 141. Some earlier decisions are all referred to and ultimately the Supreme Court has held in this decision that this 90 days or 60 days will have to be calculated from the date of remand and not from the date of arrest. This is an interpretation placed by the Supreme Court. So 90 days or 60 days will have to be calculated in the date of remand that is production before the magistrate. Obviously, when he's produced before the magistrate the same day to pass an order of remand. Subsequently, there were some changes here and there. Recently, as recently as 27 3 2023. Just six days back, the Supreme Court had an attrition to re-examine the entire judicial history in this regard. It is the decision of three judges of the Supreme Court. A larger bench was constituted because there were some conflicting decisions. This decision is also directed to be reported. It is too early to get this reported because it is just a six days old. It is in criminal appeal number 701 702 criminal appeal 701 and 702 of 2020. As I said, the date of the judgment is 27 3 2023. Enforcement directorate, government of India. To appeal what I want and another. Of course, apart from the statutory provisions. What ultimately is the right of the accused liberty as the accused. What's the object of criminal law everything is stated. The judgment starts with a quote from a political philosopher John Locke and very detailed judgment. So those who are interested in legal literature, English literature philosophy can also read it. It's worth reading. Ultimately, this is what we find in the penultimate era of this judgment. We therefore declare that the stipulated 60 or 90 day remand period and the section 167 CRPC. ought to be computed from the date when a marriage state authorizes demand. The first day of remand is excluded. The remand period as we noticed will extend beyond the permitted 60 or 90 days period, resulting in unauthorized detention beyond the period initiated into 167. In cases where the charge sheet of the final report is five on or after the 61st or 91st day. The accused in our considered opinion would be entitled to default by. In other words, the very moment the very moment the stipulated 60 or 90 day remand period expires an indefeasible right to default. Of course, in this case, some final report was sent through mail. The accused also had made an application through mail for default. The details are given. The data for us and everything is mentioned that affirming the view taken by the decision. The decision was just in question of prosperity and saying that other decisions are not laid out the correct way. This larger bench has reiterated the legal position saying that this 90 days or 60 days will have to be calculated. From the date of remand and the first today needs to be excluded. Then the next question is when that is to be exercised. Here again concrete in decisions. First, let me cite the leading decisions on the point or rather the decisions which are laid out the law. And thereafter explain to you what exactly is the law on the point is. Of course, as I said, there are some special enactments where this 90 days and 60 days has been given some relaxation instead of 90 days. There is something else. Whatever be it, the legal position is clear as to when that right is to be exercised. The leading decision is on the point on the point is Sunday that's case Sunday that was the state. 1994 5 SCC 410. It's a decision of a constitution bench. 1994 5 SCC 410. It's a fairly non decision. And I don't find any dissenting note here. And I also would not find that different judges have ought to be given their views. No agreeing with the majority. I think the justice day as Varma has spoken for the bench. And this is. I would request the participants to read para 48 at page 442. Para 48 at page 442 and para 53 to be. It is like a section para 53 to be at page 444. Let me read para for para 48. No doubt that the common stance before us for the nature of indifeasible right of the accused to be released and by. So is based on a correct reading of the principle indicated in that decision. The indifeasible right authority to the accused in such a situation is enforceable only prior to the filing of the challenge. And it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challenge being filed. In South India, we refer to it as charging. In North India, it is referred to as challenge. But the South Indians challenge is something where it's a form where we use for crediting money in a bank. Or the treasure. And it does not survive or remain unenforceable on the challenge being filed if already not. If already not, what does it mean? If before the challenge or the charge sheet is filed, the accused has made an application under 167 subsequent filing of the charge sheet will not take away his indifeasible right. But if he has not done it, then if the charge sheet is filed, he cannot insist on grant of bail under 167. And if he is otherwise entitled to either under 437 or 439. Once the challenge has been filed, the question of grant of bail has to be considered. And decided only with reference to the various of the case under the provisions related to grant of bail, that is 437, 439. The custody grant of bail to an accused has to be filed under the challenge. The custody of the accused after the challenge has been filed is not governed by section 167, but different provisions in the court of criminal procedure. That is not right. If that right had a clue to the accused, it remained unenforced till the filing of the challenge. Then there is no question of its enforcement thereafter. Since it is extinguished the moment the challenge is filed because section 167 CFTC ceases to apply. And then, of course, sometimes it happens some deviations here and there. And therefore, a three judge bench took a similar view subsequently in 2001. 5 SCC 453. 2001 5 SCC 453. Uday Mohanlal Acharya. Uday Mohanlal Acharya versus state of Maharashtra. Page 473. At page 473, the legal position is summarized. In six paras, it commences at page 473 and ends with page 474. Now, in this, this you find in paragraph 12, paragraph 13, paragraph 13 is a fairly long paragraph. In paragraph 13 at page 473, the legal position is summarized. On the aforesaid premises, you would regard our conclusions as follows. And a subsection to a 167, a magistrate before whom an accused is produced while the police is investigating to the offense, can authorize the attention of the accused in such a way as the magistrates in spirit for a term not exceeding 50 days of the whole. Paragraph 12. Under the proviso to the aforesaid subsection 2 of 167, the magistrate may authorize detention to the accused, otherwise than the custody of the police for a total period not exceeding 90 days, where the investigation relates to an offense punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years and 60 days, where the investigation relates to any other offense. Point number 3. On the expiry of the set period of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be, an indefeasible right to prove in favor of the accused for being released on bail on account of default when investigating the agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on bail if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the magistrate. Point number 4 is very aposite in the context of reading, where an application for bail is filed by the accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have been approved in his favor on account of default on the part of the investigating the agency in completion of the investigation. The magistrate of the court must dispose of it, work with, on being satisfied that in fact the accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days as specified and no charge sheet has been filed by the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the part of the magistrate will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the act and the legislative mandate of an accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in complete in the investigation within the period stipulated. This is very very important. Now when the accused or his counsel meets an application under 167 before the marriage trade, may be to satisfy himself that before the application was filed, charge sheet was not filed. He may pass over the matter a certain time from the office whether that the charge sheet is filed. So the charge sheet is filed prior to the filing of the application for 167 CRPCs, certainly it does not survive. Many times or at least sometimes what happens is when the application is filed, there is some tendency on the part of the court that we hear the prosecutor post it for objections or the prosecutor is not available, it is passed over. In the meantime, the charge sheet is filed. Let us say today morning by 10.45 the application is filed. The time at which the application is filed is not noted. In the office, the final report is filed by 11.15. Office doesn't know the time at which the charge sheet is filed. These problems do arise. Therefore, the moment the application is filed, the magistrate shall forthwith assertive whether any charge sheet had been filed prior to it. If it is not done, then there is no question of giving time to the prosecutor to file the charge sheet and do this indefeatable right could be defeated. Therefore, this care the magistrates will have to take. There is no question of hearing the public prosecutor. The only thing is, if some interpretation is required, whether it is a case filed in other clause, whether we are in the sense 60 days or 90 days, maybe to that extent prosecutor may have a say, nothing beyond that. It is a matter of right bail is given here. There is nothing, the public prosecutor cannot oppose the application of the usual ground that we are accused as a habitual offender. If left on bail, he will tamper with evidence, threaten the witnesses of spot. Those grounds are not available. Here, whether the final report is filed within 60 days or 90 days from the date of remand is all the consideration. The only assistance which the court may require from the magistrates, if some interpretation is required with regard to what is the less than 10 years, more than 10 years, something of that kind, only to extend the court may hear the public prosecutor in any event that order will have to be passed on the very same day. Now, this decision in Sanjay Jatt and Kudai Mohanlal Hatharya, well, they stood for a very long time. But as it happens many times, some decisions are not brought to the notice and the court, some binding decisions are not brought to the notice or not notice or on facts a different view is taken. That happens in every field. So too, here also it happened. Again, that was clarified in 2014-9 SCC 457. Union of India versus Nerala Yadav. Ultimately, the Justice Deepak Mishra speaking for the event said that the law has already been laid down in Sanjay Jatt and reiterated in Kudai Mohanlal Hatharya. And if any decision has taken a counter-review, that would be very impure. And therefore, the legal position is to the application is filed before the charge sheet is filed. That indefensible right cannot be defeated by allowing the prosecution to file a charge sheet. The next question is, Bail is granted under 167. Obviously, on the ground, the charge sheet had not been filed between the period of 90 days or 60 days. After Bail is granted under 167, the charge sheet is filed. Whether we are filing the charge sheet after Bail has been granted under 167, entitles the prosecution to seek for cancellation of bail. This is an important thing which we need to discuss. I repeat, Bail was granted because of the failure of the prosecution and the police investigating the agency to file the charge sheet within 90 days or 60 days as the case may. Then subsequently, charge sheet is filed. On the filing of the charge sheet, whether as a matter of course, the prosecution can seek for cancellation of the bail. This has been considered long back in 1977 for SCC 410. 1977 for SCC 410. Bashir was the state of Paryana. Three judges to the Supreme Court. Two judges, yes. Two judges to the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this, consider the legal position in this regard. And the law laid down, the ratio laid down used to be found at para-5 paid 414. Para-6 paid 414. To understand that, we will have to go back to 167. I have already read it. I am refreshing my own memory in that regard by rereading it. Subsection to 167. We have read the proviso. And on the expiry of the set period of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be. The accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. And every person released on bail under this subsection shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of chapter 33. Chapter 33 deals with bail and bail once. So as if the accused has been released under 437 or 439. So the consequence of release, see, right to get bail is independent. While granting bail or while seeking bail, the considerations which weigh with the court while dealing with a bail application for 437 or 439 are not taken into account. But when bail is granted under 167, it is deemed that the accused is released under chapter 33 under regular bail. Now we have seen under 437 and 439. When bail is granted, the accused can be re-arrested. Though the world cancellation is not used in CRPC, he generally said for cancellation of bail, that is the accused will be re-arrested. Now what the Supreme Court has said in this Basheer's case is, though bail granted under 467 has the consequence of granting a bail under 437 or 439, automatically the prosecution does not get a right to get the bail cancelled merely because the charge sheet is filed. Even when bail is granted under 437 or 439, prosecution has to make out a case for a cancellation of bail. The legal position is well settled. The considerations which weigh with the court while canceling the bail are more stringent than while granting the bail, totally different considerations. So even when bail is granted under 167, that bail can be cancelled and the accused can be re-arrested, provided grounds are made up. What which are those grounds? They have been explained in this position. I will read the entire paragraph. Section 435 empowers the court to direct that the person so released may be arrested if it considers necessary to do so. The power of the court to cancel bail if it considers it necessary is preserved in cases where a person has been released under bail under 437 or 32 and these provisions are applicable to a person who has been released under 167 also. Therefore, even when bail is granted under 167, it can be cancelled. But merely because the charge sheet is filed, it cannot be cancelled, which are the grounds under which it can be cancelled. Under Section 437-2, when a person is released pending inquiry on the grounds that there are not sufficient grounds to believe that he had committed a non-bailable offense, may be committed to custody by court which released him on bail if it is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for so doing after the inquiry is completed. As the provisions of 437, 1, 2 and 5 are applicable to a person who has been released under 167-2, the mere fact that subsequently released a challenge has been filed is not sufficient to commit him to custody. In this case, the bail was cancelled and the appellants were ordered to be arrested and committed to custody on the grounds that subsequently a charge sheet had been filed and that before the appellants were directed to be released under 167, there bail petitions were dismissed on merits because before bail was granted under 167, when the accused had moved for bail under 439, both the High Court and the Sessions Court had dismissed the bail applications. Therefore, the court thought now that charge sheet is filed, the bail under 167 can also be cancelled. The fact that before the order was passed under 167, the bail petitions of the accused were dismissed on merits is not relevant for the purpose of taking action under 437-5. Neither is it a valid ground that is subsequent to release of the appellants a challenge was filed by the police. The court before directing the arrest of the accused and committing him to custody should consider it necessary to do so under 437-5. This may be done by the court coming to the conclusion that after the challenge had been filed, there are sufficient grounds that the accused had committed a non-failable offense and that it is necessary that he should be arrested and committed to custody. It may also order arrested, committed to custody on other grounds such as tampering of the evidence or that his being that large is not in the interest of justice. But it is necessary that the court should proceed on the basis that he has been deemed to have been released under 437-192. This decision has been subsequently followed in Raghubir Singh v. state of Bihar. Raghubir Singh v. state of Bihar, 1986, 4 SCC 481. 1986, 4 SCC 481. Raghubir Singh v. state of Bihar, pair of 22 at page 498 is relevant for our purpose. Orders for release on bail are effective until an order is made under 437-5 or 437-192 that is cancelled. These two provisions enable the magistrate who has released an accused on bail or the court of session or the high court to directly arrest the person released on bail and to commit him to custody. The two provisions deal with what is known as what is known in ordinary parlance as cancellation of bail. Since release on bail under the proviso to 167-2 is deemed to be released on bail under the provisions of chapter 33. An order for release under the proviso to 167-2 is also subject to the provisions of 437-5 and 439-2 and may be extinguished by an order under either of those provisions. It may happen that a person who has been accepted as a surety may later deserve not to continue as a surety. Section 444 enables such a person at any time to apply to a magistrate to discharge a bond either wholly or so as it relates to the surety. On such an application being made, the magistrate is required to issue a warrant of arrest directly in the person released on bail to be brought before him. On the appearance of such person or on his voluntary surrender, the magistrate shall directly bond to be discharged either wholly or so far as it relates to the surety and shall call upon such person. This is one of the groups then on the discharge of the bond responsibility then the order of release on bail is not extinguished and is not to be defeated by the discharge of the surety and inability of the accused. Then at paragraph 22 page 502, this is what is stated. The result of our discussion and the case law is this. An order for release on bail made under the proviso to 167-2 is not defeated by lapse of time, the filing of the charge sheet or by remand to custody under 3092. The order for release on bail may however be cancelled under 435 or 439-2. Generally the grounds for cancellation of bail broadly are interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the course of justice or abuse of the liberty directed to him. The due administration of justice may be interfered with by intimidating or subordinate witnesses, by interfering with investigation, by creating or causing disappearance of evidence, etc. The course of justice may be evaded or attempted to be evaded by leaving the country or going underground or otherwise placing himself beyond the range of the sureties. He may abuse the liberty granted to him by indulging in similar or other unlawful acts where bail has been granted under the proviso to 167-2 for the default of the prosecution. In not completing the investigation in 60 days after the defect is viewed by the filing of the charge sheet, the prosecution may seem to have the bail answered on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed a non-bailable offense and that it is necessary to arrest him and commit him to the study. In the last mentioned case, one would expect very strong grounds indeed. These decisions have again been followed in 1992 for SCC 272, Aslam Babalal Desai versus state of Maharashtra. 1992 for SCC 272. There are 11 and 14, there are 40, some pass under. The provisions of the court, in particular 57 and 167, manifest the legislative anxiety that once a person's liberty has been equipped with by the police, arresting him without a court order or a warrant. The investigation must be carried out with utmost urgency and completed within the maximum period allowed by the proviso 8 to 167-2. It must be realized that the set provision was introduced in the court by way of enlargement of time for which the accused arrested could be kept in custody. Therefore, the prosecuting agency must realize that if it fails to show a sense of urgency in the investigation of the case and omits and departs to file a charge sheet within the time prescribed, the accused will be entitled to be released and bailed and the order passed to the defendant 167-2 would be an order under 437 or 2 or 9 or 439-1. Since 167 does not empower cancellation of the bail, the power to cancel the bail can only be traced to 437-5 or 439-2. The bail can then be cancelled on considerations which are valid for cancellation of bail granted under 437-1 or 2 or 439-1. The fact that the bail was earlier rejected or that it was secured by the thrust of proviso 8 to 167 then receipts in the background. Once the accused has been released on bail, his liberty cannot be interfered with lightly that is on the ground that the prosecution has subsequently submitted a charge sheet. Such a view would introduce a sense of complacency in the investigative agency and would destroy the very purpose of instilling a sense of urgency expected by 57 and 167-2. We are therefore of the view that once an accused is released on bail under 167-2, he cannot be taken back into the study merely on defying the charge sheet but there must exist special reasons for so doing besides the fact that the charge sheet reveals the commission of a non-bailable offence. The ratio of so and so is with some earlier decisions. Now the latest in the series is 2021. Before that, I have one more to cite. That is 1996-1 SCC 722. 1996-1 SCC 722. Mohammad Iqbal, mother sheikh. Mohammad Iqbal mother sheikh versus state of Maharashtra. Hearing Tara tell. This is the context of Tara. The latest in the series is 2021. SCC online. SCC 270 2021 SCC online SC 270. Date of judgment is 5-1 2021. Tamalesh Choudhary versus state of Maharashtra. Therefore, merely because the charge sheet was filed at currently a ground to cancel the bail once granted under 167. Let's try forget one thing I want to clarify to the jury or members of the bar. There is some mistake and motion. That the period of 90 days and 60 days provided under 167 is a period of limitation for the prosecution to file the charge sheet. No. See this period of 90 days and 60 days provided by 167. Is to see that the accused is not detained in the study for a long time. If beyond 90 days and 60 days also the final report is not fine. As a matter of right, the accused is entitled to bail. That 90 days and 60 days is not the limitation for filing the charge sheet. In fact, if we carefully read the provisions of CRPC related to limitation. Strictly doesn't say limitation for filing the charge sheet. It says limitation for the court to take that distance of the efforts that is provided in a separate chapter. Limitation for taking part distance of certain offenses under chapter 36. I am not on that limitation aspect, but I want to clarify it here because there is some notion that charge sheet is not filed in 90 days. The charge sheet is not filed in 60 days. Failure of the prosecuting investigating agency to file the charge sheet with the 90 days or 60 days. Only entitles the accused to bail. That does not deprive the court of its power to take court distance. The power of the court to take court distance is limited. Not by 167, but by a separate provision in that product as I said that relevant chapter. Chapter 36 limitation for taking court distance. Well, for offenses punishable up to a particular thing, this is the limitation. Six months in the offense, this is 468. As I said, it is not limitation for filing charge sheet as we say limitation for filing a suit in a civil case. It is a bar to the magistrate to take court distance. After the bar to the magistrate or the court consent to take court distance after the lapse of the period of limitation. Period of limitation shall be six months in the offense is punishable if fine. One year if it is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. Three years if it is. It is not exceeding three years. Subsection clarifies if it is beyond three years, there is no period of limitation at all. So therefore, let us not confuse this concept of limitation for taking court distance with this 90 days and 60 days through. Then, as I told you in the beginning, there are some inroads into this 167 insert the two special enactments. I have not gone through all these special enactments where there are similar provisions. Immediately I was able to lay my hand on two enactments. One is the popular NDPS act. Just as those narcotic drugs are popular, the act has also become popular. So this is section 36 capital A subsection for section 36 capital A subsection for I am referring to this provision of the NDPS act with a writer and a request. I have no questions regarding NDPS because my knowledge of the NDPS act for that matter, my knowledge with the familiarity with narcotic drugs itself is I don't have any knowledge of the narcotic drugs or cytotropic substances. And my knowledge of the NDPS act is not all that vast or good to tell you anything. But in the context of because I said NDPS act somebody may ask some questions without to certain other things. I am not prepared for that. I really have not all that accomplished to speak to you about that. Please don't ask medicine without to NDPS. Section 36 capital A4 in respect of persons accused of a reference punishable under 1924 or 27A or for the offenses involving commercial quantity. The reference in subsection 2 of 167 CRPC thereof to 90 days where the act shall be construed as reference to 180 days. Because these are some special enactments dealing with heinous offenses. The parliament in its wisdom thought that 90 days may be insufficient. Let us make it 180 days even thereafter what happens. Provided that if it is not possible to complete the investigation in the set period of 180 days. The special court may extend the set period up to one year on the report of the public prosecutor. Not on the report of the police on the report of the public prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the set period of 180 days. Notwithstanding anything contained in the report of the criminal prosecutor. So therefore under NDPS act that 90 days will have to be read as 180 days. Then we have another act. 2 AP act that is this unlawful activities prevention act 1967. Section 43 capital D. Section 43 capital D of this act. It has this marginal note as this. Modified application of certain provisions of the court that is CRPC. Subsection 1 notwithstanding anything contained in the court or any other law. Every offense punishable under this act shall be deemed to be a cognizable offense in the meaning of class C or section 2. And cognizable case are defined in that class shall be construed accordingly. Because in CRPC we have a schedule which says which are the offenses which are cognizable and non-cognizable. So cognizable are those in respect of which the police can investigate without a direction from the magistrate. Police can arrest an accused without an warrant from him. Non-cognizable is one where the police cannot investigate without a direction from the magistrate. They cannot arrest the accused without a warrant from him. So whatever might have been stated in CRPC. Here the offenses under the NDPS have been under this UAP act or cognizable. Then subsection 2. Section 167 of the court shall apply in relation to a case involving an offense punishable under this act. Subject to the modification that in subsection 2. They reference to 15 days, 90 days and 60 days. The police custody of 15 days are remanded from time to time for 50 days. Then 90 days and 60 days wherever they occur shall be construed as references to 30 days, 90 days and 90 days respectively. So this is the change made under this act. Now 167 as we have presumed it to be is not just for granting bail to the accused on the failure of the investigating agency to submit the charges to the 90 days and 60 days. Neither it is confined to police custody or judicial custody. It has something more than what we have presumed it to be. It is that something more which you no need to know that takes me to the last link of my presentation. We will go to subsection 5 and subsection 6 of 167. And judicial officers from whichever state have who have died will give special attention to this. It is not that the lawyers need not know it but it is more for the judicial officers and the police. One more small point I forgot to mention that whenever a magistrate gives the accused to police custody, he is required to intimate the chief judicial magistrate under subsection 4. Under subsection 4 of 167 CRPC, whenever an accused is given to police custody, a copy of that order will have to be sent to the chief judicial magistrate number one. One more thing is this physical production is required for giving the accused to police custody. As far as judicial custody is concerned, there is no one amendment to CRPC which says through video conference also, the production can be made. Now, there may be an allegation at one point of time that the accused was not produced at all. Yet he was given to custody. For that explanation 2 to section 167 CRPC says, if the signature of the accused is taken to the proceeding sheet or the order sheet, then that is sufficient proof that the accused was physically produced before the magistrate. Therefore, the magistrate will take care to see that the signature of the accused is taken to the order sheet when remained is sought. And then a copy of the order given the accused to police custody will have to be given to the chief judicial magistrate. Now, let us have a look at subsections 5 and 6, subsection 5. If in any case tribal by a magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from which, from the date on which the accused was arrested, the magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offense, unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the magistrate, that for special reasons and in the interest of justice, the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary. So, subsection 5 relates to a summons case. Yes, the summons case as all of you know is one for which the term of imprisonment which the court can impose shall not exceed two years. If it is more than two years, it is fabled as a warrant case. So, if it is a summons case, if within six months of the date on which the accused was arrested, investigation is not completed, then it is the duty of the magistrate to, I do not call it as a power, it is the duty of the magistrate to stop further investigation. If police will have to make a request to him, they have some reason, they are not able to complete the investigation within a period of six months and therefore, time may be extended. Subsection 6, where any order stopping further investigation into the offense has been made under subsection 5, that is, the magistrate passes an order under subsection 5 stopping further investigation. The session stage may, if he is satisfied on an application made to him or otherwise, it is not an appeal against the order of the magistrate stopping further proceedings. It is an application to the session stage on an application made to him or otherwise, that further investigation into the offense ought to be made, vacate the order made under subsection 5 and direct further investigation to be made into the offense subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters has been specified. Therefore, if the police seek extension for further investigation before the magistrate, it will be a problem that is provided by subsection 5. If the police do not seek further extension and the magistrate stops further proceedings after completion of six months from the date of arrest, then what is the remedy available to the police to make an application to the session stage. As I said, it is not an appeal against the order of the magistrate, it is an application under subsection 6 to the session stage. Now, the next question here is, police have not sought the permission of the magistrate to continue the investigation after a period of six months or after the magistrate stops further investigation, they don't approach the session state with an application under subsection 6. They neither invoke subsection 5 before the magistrate nor subsection 6 before the session stage. They continue the investigation. What is the effect of that investigation, which is continued beyond that period of six months? Of course, the Karnataka High Court has a few decisions that I will tell at the end because I see a few advocates from Karnataka and a few magistrates from Karnataka. But first, let me cite the decision in the Supreme Court in that regard. This is state of Karnataka versus Raju. It is a decision in the Supreme Court, state of Karnataka versus Raju. AER Online 1994 SC 438 AER Online 1994 SC 438 Those who are familiar with the reporting and other things in Karnataka They read its equivalent that is ILR 1994 Karnataka 3244 Perhaps many may be knowing that some decisions to the Supreme Court arising from the state of Karnataka are also reported in the total ILR. So ILR 1994 Karnataka 3444, state of Karnataka versus Yamaraju is a decision of the Supreme Court. In fact, I searched for its equivalent, one of my good friends whom I see here, I told him and he has made available to me. I asked him whether AER citation or SCC citation is available. He searched and I thank him. He has given me AER online equivalent, AER Online 1994 SC 438. What the Supreme Court has held in this decision meeting is merely because the charge sheet is filed. Even after the period of six months contemplated by 1675, the magistrate cannot refuse to take part in this. What best that can be done is yet stood that part of the evidence collected after the period of six months. 1675 does not come in the way of the magistrate taking cognizance even after the expiry of six months. But that part of the material collected by the investigating agency after the period of six months needs to be instituted. I find in this decision, a reference to an earlier decision in state of West Bengal versus Falbuni Datta, FALGUNI, state of West Bengal versus Falbuni Datta. Unfortunately, in this ILR 1994 Karnataka 3444, the citation of the state of West Bengal versus Falbuni Datta was not available. Again, my good friend whom I refer to has made available to me the citation also. It is in 1993, Volume 3 SCC 288. I must frankly tell you I am not ready because we have sent it on WhatsApp appears to be a fairly long decision. I will have to read it. Anyway, since the Supreme Court has made reference to this, I can take it that the magistrate cannot say that he cannot refuse to take cognizance on the chart sheet nearly because it is after a period of six months. At best he can yet stood that part of the material collected by the police after the period of six months. To the same effect, we have a few decisions in the Karnataka High Court, which may be of relevance to the judicial officers working in the state of Karnataka. ILR 1980 Karnataka 1450, ILR 1985 Karnataka 1450, Kumar versus state of Karnataka. Then 1991, Criminal Law Journal 2126, 1991 Criminal Law Journal 2126. It is also reported in 1991, one Karnataka Law Journal 257, 1991 one Karnataka Law Journal 257, state of Karnataka versus Lachmi Narayan. But I request all the judicial magistrates to read this. It's a very evident jet, please read it. These two decisions and then this the state of Karnataka versus Raju has also been followed by our High Court in ILR 1996 Karnataka, ILR 1996 Karnataka 1611, ILR 1996 Karnataka 1611, state versus Nagaraj, state versus Nagaraj. Well, this is in brief or in its time so as you think it is section 157 CRPG. I must make it clear that I have not referred to the provisions regarding regular bail under 437 or 439 when it can be granted or when it can be refused have not gone into those aspects. I have strictly confined myself to the scope of section 167. To sum it up, the maximum period for which the accused can be given to police custody is 15 days. Even if on the first day he is not given to police custody, during the first period of 15 days, he can be taken back from judicial custody and given to police custody. But if he is required for police custody, in some other case, the 15 day rule will not apply. For judicial custody, if he is prepared to grant bail and the court grants bail, he will come out. Otherwise, on the expiry of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be, he is entitled to be released on bail if the final report is multiplied. After the final report is filed, police as a matter of fright cannot arrest him only because the charge sheet is filed. If there are other contingencies, the police can re-arrest him that is on the grounds specified in 437 or 439. Then this NDPSAT and other special enactments have given special periods in this regard. And then the 60 days or 90 days will have to be calculated from the rate of remand. It is to be exercised immediately after that 90 days or 60 days has completed. If it is not immediately exercised and the police file the charge sheet, he cannot be later climate. On the other hand, if he has made the application before the charge sheet is filed, he is bound to be released on bail. So, I have told you about the stopping of further investigation. One clarification needs to be made here for the benefit of the junior members. We have a provision for stopping of further proceedings under 258 CRPC. 258 CRPC finds its place in a different chapter relating to trial. Trial of someone's cases by magistrates chapter 20. Obviously that is a situation after the charge sheet is filed. So, 258 CRPC after the charge sheet is filed during the course of trial, the magistrate can stop proceedings in a someone's case. Let there be no confusion between 258 CRPC and 167.5. 167.5 is prior to the filing of the charge sheet. So, the power is to stop investigation in case of a someone's case under 258 power to stop further proceedings. So, let us not confuse one thing with the other. Yes, any questions? We have a lot of questions sir. Thank you so much in your usual erudite tone and tenor you have presented sir. We are very thankful to you for that. Vikas sir, you are not unmuted. Vikas sir? Yes sir. Like what? I thought that at least by default today I will be completing within one hour. So, I have not committed default as usual it has gone beyond one hour. No. It is always a pleasure. You never realize how the time went on. I will just ask the persons if the program somehow the chat is not being visible on my chat. If you can take the question. I am just scrolling down sir. I am just scrolling down. Meanwhile, if we can take one or two audience who want to pose their question. Meanwhile, I will also pick up these questions from this. I will take it from the YouTube. Yes, please. It says who has the right to file application in the section 1676. Does the victim and be entitled for the same? No. No. It is for the police. It is for the police. See now after CRPC came to be amended in 2009 or so, the team has a right of appeal in case the prosecution does not file an appeal. State does not file an appeal in the event of acquittal or inadequate compensation or submission for a lesser offense. On that throne, the provisional to 372 enables the victim. This 1676. I don't think that the victim has a right for that to my knowledge. It is the police. All right. Let me check up instead of on an application made to him or otherwise. Maybe otherwise. We'll see whether the Supreme Court may interpret a claim that the victim also has a right to my knowledge. Usually it is the police who do it. I'm yet to see a case where the police have inverted subsection six. I worked as a session state for nearly 13 years. No occasion. Any application was filed under the subsection six of 467. This is by professor. Our provisions of section 167 applicable when they accuse himself surrenders before the court. Are the provisions of section 167 applicable. We'll examine this. Well, it appears to be a good question. You'll see. My first impression is whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody. So if you go by the plain language of the statute, he must have been arrested. It is a case where the accused voluntarily surrenders. My one doubts about the applicability of 167 in such a situation. Anyway, let us examine that. He has posed a question. Let me examine it. What the case law that point is section doesn't give any indication section gives an indication to the contrary. Sometimes case law will guide us. Let me see it right now. I am not able to give him an offer and answer this way. But reading of the section gives an indication that it cannot. But maybe there may be some case law. You will get different. I think we'll take up this question, sir. By Mr. This question is, sir. My doubt here is if the accused was initially demanded to the judicial custody, say for 12 days. Will he be able to do that? My doubt here is if the accused was initially demanded to judicial custody, say for 12 days. Will he be again demanded to 15 days or only for the remaining five days to the police custody if police comes up with the requirement. So in total it should be only 15 days. So maximum the study police is only 15 days for the first 12 days is not taken to police custody at all for that remaining three days only he can be given to police custody. Because no police custody after the first 15 days. Maximum is also 15 days and first 15 days only. There's a very relevant question by Mr. If default bail application is filed and prior to pronouncement of bail, bail order perhaps that is what he means. The target is filed. So what would be the status of the default? That is why the Supreme Court has said. The magistrate should not postpone considering that application at all. Maybe to ascertain from the office because we know in reality what happens is the office person is identified by the office. The office would not have made a note in the order sheet that the charge sheet is filed. Only to satisfy himself that charge sheet is not filed prior to the filing of the application. He may just pass over the matter for a few minutes or a half an hour, ascertaining and then pass an order. So therefore that will not come in the way. That is why such orders should not be reserved at all. Order should not be reserved. File should not be reserved. In regard to the objections to be filed by the prosecution sir, how should that be done? He has no right to oppose. The only thing is, he may say, well, this is not a situation. The punishment provided is not less than 10 years. It is something else maximum. There are provisions in the Indian penal code. It may fall for some interpretation, not less than 10 years, not more than 10 years. It will be there. Maybe in such a gray area, see, we have to convince the court only to that extent. There is no question of him writing an application saying that the accused will tamper. The evidence he will try to give it necessary will expand. No. All those considerations are totally out of place. That is why I gave that decision of justice. Deepak Mishra, the, the, the one in union of India versus nearly other in terms of honorable Supreme Court said that the new taken in earlier decisions with the Supreme Court is also wrong. So the magistrate should not postpone that at all. Yes. So in case the prosecution wants to take an adjournment, then they will file a written, written objections. The learned judge should not ideally. Should not at all. Should not at all. Should not at all. Because the right would be defeated. Because anything beyond 90 days or 60 days, it will be illegal custody. This is the cap of 15 days in section 167-2. As I understand does not pertain to the first 15 days. In other words, the tension of not exceeding 15 days is not confined to first 15 days. That is, but can be granted beyond the first 15 days. But the police custody not beyond the first 15 days. Say maximum is also 15 days during the first 15 days only police custody. If within first 15 days, the police do not seek him to custody thereafter. It cannot be given. Only during the first 15 days. Sir, any other question? I'm just checking. I think we have one more question. 60 days and 90 days are given. I think this is something related to the state amendment. If I'm not wrong, Mr. Sharma has a question. If 60 days and 90 days are given in the act for filing of tar sheet. Why some states such as Odisha have been granted 120 day for a murder case? I think this should be very case specific or some... The answer is this. See the parliament in its wisdom has thought that in respect of some special enactments like this UPR, NDPS. Instead of that 90 days and 60 days, it should be 180 days and other things. The parliament has also provided for extension of this type. Maybe the legislator of Orissa thought in respect of some offenses. Instead of 90 days or 60 days has provided in 160 days. It's a legislative policy. That's all. Because I think we are done with this. It is not questioned. We have to accept it. That's all. Because sir, I think we are done with the questions from my entity. Only one question on the YouTube, what you had already told us. What is the subtle difference between a police custody and a judicial custody? Very clear distinction. Not subtle distinction. So now police custody is the accused is physically handed over to the police for further investigation. In the case of judicial custody, the accused is not given to the hands of the police. The accused will be sent to the prison. That is the jail. Judicial custody does not, as I jokingly said, keep in the accused to the judges' house or judges' chambers or the court premises. So judicial custody is taking the accused to a prison. The last question is, is there any relevance in the further investigation laid down under section 173-8 to that of the concept of stopping further investigation as laid down under section 167-5? Yes, yes. While reading today afternoon, somehow I expected this question. I had expected this question because there is some further investigation under section 167-6. Well, whatever it is, I have a duty to answer. I don't think 167 is at a stage before the investigation is completed. Investigation is not completed at all. Char sheet is not filed or final report is not filed within that maximum period of 90 days or 60 days. Therefore, the accused gets a right of being. In the case of a summons trial, if investigation is not completed within six months, further investigation shall be stopped. Thereafter, the police can make a request for extension of time and the magistrate can do it. Or the application to the session state, he can make it. That is for further investigation after the period of six months before the charge sheet is filed. But further investigation referred to in 173-8 is investigation is complete. Final report is filed under 173-1. Thereafter, the police still have something to do. In fact, the leading decision on the fine is Ramlal Naran. AER 1979 Supreme Court, I am not able to give the page number immediately. It is Ramlal Naran. It is a leading decision on the fine. A request will concern the participant to go through it. You see, it is worth reading. Now that the question is asked, I will tell you. What the Supreme Court has said in the decision is, rather the Supreme Court has extracted the 42nd or 44th law-submission report. The law-submission report says, police had always the power to make a further investigation even after submission of the final report. The law-submission report reads like this. Though the police had that power, police took a narrow view in telling that once the police filed the final report, they can't touch the case. This narrow view came in the way of the police making a further investigation. Therefore, it has now become necessary for us to clarify by inserting subsection 8 in section 173. They have also gone to the extent of saying the law-submission report has said it is not for collecting by placing some additional material against the accused or implicating an additional accused. It is also for absolving the accused who is already shown. I have given this example to the judicial officers in the academy and also to the advocates who may have addressed in bar association and other things. Now, let us take a case where a vehicle is parked. We are somewhere in a hotel or attending a function or attending a class or something. Our vehicle is parked outside. Somebody by some means is able to start the vehicle and takes the vehicle and turns it and accident is caused. He is afraid, leaves the vehicle at the spot and expands. Seeing the number played, the police will go to the RTO and find out who the registered owner is. They naturally presume that it is the registered owner who is responsible for the accident. They file a charge sheet against him for 279, 337, 338, and 348. The accused, of course, during the course of trial, he can establish that Ali be true. But even then, if he has the strong material to show that he could not have been present at all at the time when he said to have caused that accident, he can produce that material before the police and get himself absolved. Therefore, the Law Commission report says sometimes to establish the innocence of the accused also this further investigation may be required. Many times on suspicion, the police would have proceeded to help somebody. Later, it might turn out that he was not the real culprit. This is one such situation. Therefore, further investigation and the Supreme Court judgment says, in fact, no permission of the court is also required. The police have got a right to make a further investigation. But the Supreme Court has said the majesty of the magistracy requires the majesty of the magistracy requires that the police should formally inform the magistrate, because the charge sheet is already filed, should formally inform the magistrate and take his permission. We have a series of decisions on this point, 173-8, and now the law is the court also can direct for further investigation. Just this Katie Thomas in his inimitable style one side inimitable style one side that further investigation can also be triggered at the instance of the magistrate. The latest decision says, true magistrate can do it before taking before the case has written a particular state, not after the commencement of trial and other things, in which even the request should come from the investigating agency. If the investigating agency seats a direction for further investigation, the magistrate can do it after the case has written a particular stage. Of course, there were some earlier decisions. I think Justice Nariman took a different view in that regard in his exhaustive judgment. Well, it's a very interesting subject 173-8. Yeah, so the last question. Stop investigation. Stop the investigation. The magistrate can stop investigation only if it is a someone's case and the investigation is not completed. He cannot stop investigation. He is bound to stop investigation. It is not a question of Ken or me. He is bound to stop further investigation. After the period of, in fact, the magistrates are also required to send a statement to the high court. Indicating how many FIRs are pending. And if it is a case, it's a someone's trial. And if the investigation is not completed within six months, he has to stop further investigation. There may formally close the FIR at the court level. And the police make a request, even before that is done, seeking extension of time the magistrate can do it. The police do not seek an extension before the magistrate and give the magistrate stops further investigation. As I already said, they can approach the session state with an application under subsection six, not an appeal. As I said, I never saw any police making that application before me. Probably no magistrate in my unit had stopped further investigation. Or the police were happy about it. Either way. Sir, one question from Maya. Can contrast be drawn with section 436A? Is there a contrast between these two sections? 436A, to my knowledge, speeds up a different situation. Let me refresh my memory. Maximum period for which an under-trail prisoner can be detained. A person has during the period of investigation into a trial under this code of offense under any law not being in offense for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under law. Undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offense under that law. He shall be released by the court on his personal point with the rhetorical duties. If as an under-trail prisoner, he is in custody for a period more than 50% of the term of imprisonment which can be imposed, then as a matter of fact he is entitled to bail under 436A. That has nothing to do with the bail under 167 operates prior to the filing of the charge. Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir. It was a session. As Thurikram had said, in as usual your stereotype manner it could be explained in such a manner that everybody would cherish it for all times to come. Thank you, everyone. Stay safe. I think because we should thank you others. Thank you, Mr. Justice Jay Malik, who is a former judge of the Delhi High Court, had joined us. He should be thanking his lordship for joining us on this webinar. And we would be fairly if we do not thank all the judicial officers who have logged in. And of course the learned members of the Bar, a lot of arcade admissions whom I can see participating. And of course the students of law. We should be thanking all of them. Thank you so much for your participation. Thank you, one and all. Please accept my respects to his lordship also. Yes, sir. Please. Thank you, sir.