 Question 73 of Summa Theologica, Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal of Virtues, the Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica, Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal of Virtues, the Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 73 of Backbiting, or Detraction, in four articles. We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points of inquiry. First, what is backbiting? Second, whether it is a mortal sin. Third, of its comparison with other sins. Fourth, whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting. First article, whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another's character by secret words. Objection one, it would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some. The blackening of another's good name by words uttered in secret. For secretly and openly are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a sin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by few. Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin does not belong to its essence, and should not be included in its definition. Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting that it should be done by secret words. Objection two further, the notion of a good name implies something known to the public. If therefore a person's good name is blackened by backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered openly. Objection three further, to detract is to subtract or diminish something already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is blackened even without subtracting from the truth, for instance when one reveals the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every blackening of a good name is backbiting. On the contrary, it is written in Ecclesiastes 1011, If a serpent bite in silence, he is nothing better than backbiteeth. I answer that, just as one man injures another by deed in two ways, openly as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence, and secretly as by theft or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures another by words in two ways, in one way openly, and this is done by reviling him as stated above, in Question 72 Article 1, and in another way secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think little of him so that for this reason he dishonours him so that reviling is detrimental to the honour of the person reviled. On the other hand, he that speaks against another secretly seems to respect rather than slight him so that he injures directly not his honour but his good name, and so far as by uttering such words secretly. He, for his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the person against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends and aims at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting defers from reviling in two points. First, in the way in which the words are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone and the backbiter secretly. Secondly, as to the end in view, that is, as regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honour, the backbiter injuring his good name. Reply to Objection One. In involuntary commutations to which are reduced all injuries inflicted on our neighbour, whether by word or by deed, the kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances secretly and openly. Because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and by ignorance, as stated above in Question 65, Article 4, as well as in the parts Prima Secunde, Question 6, Articles 5 and 8. Reply to Objection Two. The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said, because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore, if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is case of backbiting if he is absent, but of reviling if he alone be present. Although if a man speaks ill of an absent person to one man alone, he destroys his good name not altogether but partly. Reply to Objection Three. A man is said to backbite, detraere another, not because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly in four ways. First, by saying that which is false about him. Secondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is. Thirdly, by revealing something unknown about him. Fourthly, by ascribing his good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly this is done either by gain-saying his good or by maliciously concealing it or by diminishing it. Second article. Whether backbiting is a mortal sin. Objection One. You would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For no act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin which pertains to backbiting, as stated above in Article One-third reply, is an act of the virtue of charity whereby a man denounces his brother's sin in order that he may amend. Or else it is an act of justice whereby a man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin. Objection Two Further. A Gloss on Proverbs 24-21. Have nothing to do with detractors. Says. The whole human race is in peril from this vice. But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind since many refrain from mortal sin, whereas they are venial sins that are found in all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin. Objection Three Further. Augustine in a homily on the fire of Purgatory reckons it a slight sin to speak ill without hesitation or forethought. But this pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin. On the contrary, it is written in Romans 130, backbiter's hateful to God, which epithet, according to a Gloss, is inserted, lest it be deemed a slight sin because it consists in words. I answer that as stated above in question 72 article 2. Sins of word should be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Therefore, properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to blacken a man's good name because of all temporal things a man's good name seems the most precious. For lack of it, he is hindered from doing many things well. For this reason it is written in Ecclesiasticus 41 15. Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee more than a thousand treasures precious and great. Therefore backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that a man utters words whereby someone's good name is tarnished and yet he does not intend this but something else. This is not backbiting strictly and formally speaking but only materially and accidentally as it were. And if such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some necessary good and with attention to the due circumstances it is not a sin and cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of lightness of heart or for some unnecessary motive it is not a mortal sin unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature as to cause a notable injury to a man's good name especially in matters pertaining to his moral character because from the very nature of the words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man his good name no less than any other thing one has taken from him in the manner stated above. In Question 62 Article 2 when we were treating of restitution Reply to Objection 1 As stated above it is not backbiting to reveal a man's hidden sin in order that he may mend whether one denounce it or accuse him for the good of public justice. Reply to Objection 2 This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to be found throughout the whole of mankind but almost both because the number of fools is infinite Ecclesiastes 115 and few are they that walk in the way of salvation Confirm Matthew 714 and because there are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of heart so as to injure someone's good name at least slightly for it is written in James 3.2 If any man offend not in word the same is a perfect man. Reply to Objection 3 Augustine is referring to the case when a man utters a slight evil about someone not intending to injure him but through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue. 3rd Article whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's neighbor Objection 1 it would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's neighbor because a gloss on Psalm 108 verse 4 instead of making me a return of love they detracted me a gloss says those who detract Christ in his members and slay the souls of future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that was soon to rise again from this it seems to follow that backbiting is by so much a graver sin than murder as it is a graver matter to kill the soul than to kill the body now murder is the gravest of the other sins that are committed against one's neighbor therefore backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all Objection 2 further backbiting is apparently a graver sin than reviling because a man can withstand reviling but not a secret backbiting now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery because adultery unites two persons in one flesh whereas reviling severs utterly those who were united therefore backbiting is more grievous than adultery and yet of all other sins a man commits against his neighbor adultery is most grave Objection 3 further reviling arises from anger while backbiting arises from envy according to Gregory in his commentary on Job 3145 but envy is a greater sin than anger therefore backbiting is a graver sin than reviling and so the same conclusion follows as before Objection 4 further the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity of the defect that it causes now backbiting causes a most gravest defect notably blindness of mind for Gregory says what else do backbiter's but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into their eyes so that the more they breathe of detraction the less they see of the truth therefore backbiting is the most grievous sin committed against one's neighbor on the contrary it is more grievous to sin by deed than by word but backbiting is a sin of word while adultery, murder and theft are sins of deed therefore backbiting is not graver than the other sins committed against one's neighbor I answer that the essential gravity of sins committed against one's neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him since it is dense that they derive their sinful nature now the greater the good taken away the greater the injury and while man's good is threefold namely the good of his soul the good of his body and the good of external things the good of the soul which is the greatest of all cannot be taken from him by another save as an occasional cause for instance by an evil persuasion which does not induce necessity on the other hand the two latter goods notably of the body and of external things can be taken away by violence since however the goods of the body excel the goods of external things those sins which injure a man's body are more grievous than those which injure his external things consequently among other sins committed against one's neighbor murder is the most grievous since it deprives a man of the life which he already possesses after this comes adultery which is contrary to the right order of human generation whereby man enters upon life in the last place come external goods among which a man's good name takes precedence of wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods where for it is written in Proverbs 221 a good name is better than great riches therefore backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin than theft but is less grievous than murder or adultery nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or extenuating circumstances the accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to the sinner who sins more grievously if he sins deliberately then if he sends through weakness or carelessness in this respect sins of word have a certain levity insofar as they are apt to occur through a slip of the tongue and without much forethought reply to Objection 1 those who detract Christ by hindering the faith of his members disparage his Godhead which is the foundation of our faith wherefor this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy reply to Objection 2 reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting in as much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor even as robbery is a greater sin than theft as stated above in Question 66 Article 9 yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery for the gravity of adultery is measured not from its being a union of bodies but from being a disorder in human generation moreover the reviler is not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man but is only the occasional cause of division among those who were united insofar to wit as by declaring the evils of another he for his own part severs that man from the friendship of other men though they are not forced by his words to do so accordingly a backbiter is a murderer occasionally since by his words he gives another man an occasion for hating or despising his neighbor for this reason it is stated in the Epistle of Clement that backbiter's are murderers that is occasionally because he that hateeth his brother is a murderer as stated in 1st John 315 reply to Objection 3 Anger seeks openly to be avenged as the philosopher states in Rhetoric 2 wherefor backbiting which takes place in secret is not the daughter of anger as reviling is but rather of envy which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's glory nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than reviling since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin just as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy for the origin of a sin depends on its inclination to an end that is on the thing to which the sin turns whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away from reply to Objection 4 since a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his mouth according to Proverbs 1523 it follows that a backbiter more and more loves and believes what he says and consequently more and more hates his neighbor and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less this effect, however, may also result from other sins pertaining to hate of one's neighbor 4th article whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter Objection 1 it would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter does not sin grievously for a man is not under greater obligations to others than to himself but it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his own backbiter for Gregory says in his ninth homily on Ezekiel just as we ought not to incite the tongue of backbiter lest they perish so ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited by their own wickedness in order that our merit may be the greater therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who backbite others Objection 2 further it is written in Ecclesiasticus 430 in no wise speak against the truth now sometimes a person tells the truth while backbiting is stated above in article 1 third reply therefore it seems that one is not always bound to withstand a backbiter Objection 3 further no man should hinder what is profitable to others now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten for Pope Pius says not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good persons with the result that those who have been unduly exalted through the flattery of their kindred or the favour of others are humbled by backbiting therefore one ought not to withstand backbiter on the contrary Jerome says take care not to have an itching tongue nor tingling ears that is neither detract others nor listen to backbiter I answer that according to the apostle in Romans 132 they are worthy of death not only they that commit sins but they also that consent to them that do them now this happens in two ways first directly when to wit one man induces another to sin or when the sin is pleasing to him secondly indirectly that is if he does not withstand him when he might do so and this happens sometimes not because the sin is pleasing to him but on account of some human fear accordingly we must say that if a man listens to backbiting without resisting it he seems to consent to the backbiter so that he becomes a participator in his sin and if he induces him to backbite or at least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his hatred of the person detracted he sins no less than the detractor and sometimes more therefore Bernard says it is difficult to say which is the more to be condemned the backbiter or he that listens to backbiting if however the sin is not pleasing to him and he fails to withstand the backbiter through fear, negligence or even shame he sins indeed but much less than the backbiter and as a rule veneally sometimes too this may be a mortal sin either because it is his official duty to correct the backbiter or by reason of some consequent danger or on account of the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be a mortal sin as stated above in question 19 article 3 reply to objection one no man hears himself backbitten because when a man is spoken evil of in his hearing it is not backbiting properly speaking but reviling as stated above in article 1 second reply yet it is possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his knowledge through others telling him and then it is left to his discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name unless this endanger the good of others as stated above in question 72 article 3 where for his patience may deserve commendation for as much as he suffers patiently being detracted himself but it is not left to his discretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name hence he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can for the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's donkey lying underneath his burden as commanded in Deuteronomy 21.4 reply to objection two one ought not always to withstand a backbiter by endeavouring to convince him of falsehood especially if one knows that he is speaking the truth rather ought one to reprove him with words for he that sins in backbiting his brother or at least by our pained demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting because according to Proverbs 25 23 the north wind driveeth away rain as doth Assad countenance a backbiting tongue reply to objection three the prophet one derives from being backbitten is due not to the intention of the backbiter but to the ordinance of God who produces good out of every evil hence we should nonetheless withstand backbiter's just as those who rob or oppress others even though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience End of question 73 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert L.C. Question 74 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triates on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Justice This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triates on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 74 of Tail-Bearing Translators note Susurratio that is whispering in two articles We must now consider tail-bearing for which head there are two points of inquiry First, whether tail-bearing is a sin distinct from back-biting Second, which of the two is the more grievous? First article Whether tail-bearing is a sin distinct from back-biting Objection one You would seem that tail-bearing is not a distinct sin from back-biting Isidore says in Etymology 10 The Susuro Tail-bearer takes his name from the sound of his speech for he speaks disparagingly not to the face but into the ear But to speak of another disparagingly belongs to back-biting Therefore tail-bearing is not a distinct sin from back-biting Objection two further It is written in Leviticus 1916 Thou shalt not be an informer nor a tail-bearer among the people But an informer is apparently the same as a back-biter Therefore neither does tail-bearing differ from back-biting Objection three Further it is written in Ecclesiasticus 2815 The tail-bearer and the double-tongued is a cursed But a double-tongued man is apparently the same as a back-biter because a back-biter speaks with a double-tongued with one in your absence, with another in your presence Therefore a tail-bearer is the same as a back-biter On the contrary A gloss on Romans 1, 29 and 30 Tail-bearers, back-biter, says Tail-bearers so discord among friends Back-biter's deny or disparage others' good points I answer that The tail-bearer and the back-biter agree in matter and also inform or mode of speaking since they both speak evil secretly of their neighbor and for this reason these terms are sometimes used for one another Hence a gloss on Ecclesiasticus 516 Be not called a tail-bearer, says That is a back-biter They differ, however, in end because the back-biter intends to blacken his neighbor's good name wherefore he brings forward those evils especially about his neighbor which are likely to defame him or at least to depreciate his good name whereas a tail-bearer intends to sever friendship as appears from the gloss quoted above and from the saying of Proverbs 2620 Where the tail-bearer is taken away contensions shall cease Hence it is that a tail-bearer speaks such ill about his neighbors as may stir his hearer's mind against them according to Ecclesiasticus 2811 A sinful man will trouble his friends and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace Reply to Objection 1 A tail-bearer is called a back-biter insofar as he speaks ill of another yet he differs from a back-biter since he intends not to speak ill as such but to say anything that may stir one man against another though it be good simply and yet has a somblance of evil through being unpleasant to the hearer Reply to Objection 2 An informer differs from a tail-bearer and a back-biter for an informer is one who charges others publicly with crimes either by accusing or by railing them which does not apply to a back-biter or tail-bearer Reply to Objection 3 A double-tongued person is properly speaking a tail-bearer for since friendship is between two the tail-bearer strives to sever friendship on both sides hence he employs a double-tongued towards two persons by speaking ill of one to the other wherefore it is written in Ecclesiasticus 2815 the tail-bearer and the double-tongued is accursed and then it is added for he hath troubled many that were at peace 2nd Article Whether back-biting is a graver sin than tail-bearing Objection 1 it would seem that back-biting is a graver sin than tail-bearing for sins of word consist in speaking evil now a back-biter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply for such things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name whereas a tail-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently evil because to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer therefore back-biting is a graver sin than tail-bearing Objection 2 further he that deprives a man of his good name deprives him not merely of one friend but of many because everyone is minded to score in the friendship of a person with a bad name hence it is reproached against a certain individual thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord as was said of King Joseph at but tail-bearing deprives one of only one friend therefore back-biting is a graver sin than tail-bearing Objection 3 further it is written in James 4.11 he that back-biteeth his brother detracteth the law and consequently God the giver of the law wherefore the sin of back-biting seems to be a sin against God which is most grievous as stated above in Question 20, Article 3 as well as in the Parse Primus Acundae, Question 73, Article 3 on the other hand the sin of tail-bearing is against one's neighbor therefore the sin of back-biting is graver than the sin of tail-bearing on the contrary it is written in Ecclesiasticus 5.17 an evil mark of disgrace is upon the double-tongued but to the tail-bearer hatred and enmity and reproach I answer that as stated above in Question 73, Article 3 as well as in the Parse Primus Acundae, Question 73, Article 8 sins against one's neighbor are the more grievous according as they inflict a greater injury on him and an injury is so much the greater according to the greatness of the good which it takes away now of all one's external goods a friend takes the first place since no man can live without friends as the philosopher declares in Ethics 8.1 hence it is written in Ecclesiasticus 6.15 nothing can be compared to a faithful friend again a man's good name whereof back-biting deprives him is most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship therefore tail-bearing is a greater sin than back-biting or even reviling because a friend is better than honor and to be loved is better than to be honored according to the philosopher in Ethics 8 reply to Objection 1 the species and gravity of a sin depend on the end rather than on the material object wherefor by reason of its end tail-bearing is worse than back-biting although sometimes the back-biter says worse things reply to Objection 2 a good name is a disposition for friendship and a bad name is a disposition for enmity but a disposition falls short of a thing for which it disposes hence to do anything that leads to a disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what conduces directly to enmity reply to Objection 3 he that back-bites his brother seems to detract the law insofar as he despises the precept of love for one's neighbor while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more directly against this precept hence the latter sin is more specially against God because God is charity according to first John 4.16 and for this reason it is written in Proverbs 6.16 six things there are which the Lord hadeth and the seventh his soul detesteth and the seventh is he that soweth discord among brethren End of Question 74 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 75 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triities on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice This is the LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triities on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 75 of Derision or Mockery in two articles We must now speak of Derision under which head there are two points of inquiry First, whether Derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins whereby one's neighbor is injured by words Second, whether Derision is a mortal sin First article Whether Derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned Objection 1 It would seem that Derision is not a special sin distinct from those mentioned above For laughing to scorn is apparently the same as Derision But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling Therefore, Derision would seem not to differ from reviling Objection 2 further No man is derided except for something reprehensible which puts him to shame Now such are sins and if they be imputed to a person publicly it is a case of reviling if privately it amounts to backbiting or tail-bearing Therefore, Derision is not distinct from the foregoing vices Objection 3 further Sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury they inflict on one's neighbor Now the injury inflicted on a man by Derision affects either his honor or his good name or is detrimental to his friendship Therefore, Derision is not a sin distinct from the foregoing On the contrary Derision is done in jest Therefore it is described as making fun Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in jest Therefore, Derision differs from all of them I answer that as stated above in question 72 article 2 Sins of word should be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker Therefore these sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those who speak against another Now just as the railer intends to injure the honor of the person he rails the backbiter to depreciate a good name and the tail-bearer to destroy friendship So too the derider intends to shame the person he derides and since this end is distinct from the others it follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the foregoing sins Reply to objection one Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but differ in mode because derision is done with the mouth that is by words and laughter while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the nose as a glass says on Psalm 24 He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them and such a distinction does not differentiate the species yet they both differ from reviling as being shamed differs from being dishonored for to be ashamed is to fear dishonor as Damascene states in On the True Faith 215 Reply to objection two For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect and a good name in the eyes of others and in his own eyes the glory of a good conscience according to 2 Corinthians 112 Our glory is this the testimony of our conscience Hence on the other hand for doing a reprehensible that is a vicious action a man forfeits his honor and good name in the eyes of others and for this purpose the reviler and the backbiter speak of another person while in his own eyes he loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at reprehensible deeds being imputed to him and for this purpose the derider speaks ill of him it is accordingly evident that derision agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to the end Reply to objection three A secure and calm conscience is a great good according to Proverbs 1515 A secure mind is like a continual feast wherefore he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him inflicts a special injury on him hence derision is a special kind of sin Second article Whether derision can be a mortal sin Objection one it would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin every mortal sin is contrary to charity but derision does not seem contrary to charity for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends wherefore it is known as making fun therefore derision cannot be a mortal sin Objection two further the greatest derision would appear to be that which is done as an injury to God but derision is not always a mortal sin when it tends to the injury of God else it would be a mortal sin to relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented for Isidore says in On the highest good to sixteen that he who continues to do what he has repented of is a derider and not a penitent it would likewise follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin because according to Gregory in his commentary on Job 3115 the ostrich signifies the hypocrite who derides the horse that is the just man and his rider that is God therefore derision is not a mortal sin Objection three further reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than derision because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest but not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin much less therefore is derision a mortal sin on the contrary it is written in Proverbs 334 he derideth the scorners but God's derision is eternal punishment for mortal sin as appears from the words of Psalm 24 he that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them therefore derision is a mortal sin I answer that the object of derision is always some evil or defect now when an evil is great it is taken not in jest but seriously consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule whence the terms derision and jesting this is because it is considered to be slight now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways first in itself secondly in relation to the person when anyone makes game or fun of another's evil or defect because it is a slight evil in itself this is a venial sin by reason of its genus on the other hand this defect may be considered as a slight evil in relation to the person just as we are want to think little of the defects of children and imbeciles and then to make game or fun of a person is to scorn him altogether and to think him so despicable that his misfortune troubles us not one wit but is held as an object of derision in this way derision is a mortal sin and more grievous than reviling which is also done openly because the reviler would seem to take another's evil seriously whereas the derider does so in fun and so would seem the more to despise and dishonor the other man where for in this sense derision is a grievous sin and all the more grievous according as a greater respect is due to the person derided consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the things of God according to Isaiah 37 23 whom hast thou reproached and whom hast thou blasphemed and against whom hast thou exalted thy voice and he replies against the holy one of Israel in the second place comes derision of one's parents where for it is written in Proverbs 30 17 the eye that mocketh at his father and that despyeth the labour of his mother in bearing him let the ravens of the brooks pick it out and the young eagles eat it further the derision of good persons is grievous because honour is the reward of virtue and against this it is written in Job 12 4 the simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn such like derision does very much harm because it turns men away from good deeds according to Gregory in his same commentary on Job 2014 who when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts of others directly pluck them up with the hand of mischievous reviling reply to Objection 1 jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation to the person with whom one jests but it may imply something against charity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest on account of contempt as stated above reply to Objection 2 neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has repented nor a hypocrite derides God explicitly but implicitly and so far as either's behaviour is like a derider's nor is it true that to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether but only dispositively and imperfectly reply to Objection 3 derision considered in itself is less grievous than backbiting or reviling because it does not imply contempt but jest sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does as stated above and then it is a grave sin End of Question 75 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 76 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Justice This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 76 of Cursing in four articles We must now consider Cursing Under this head there are four points of inquiry First, whether one may lawfully curse another Second, whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature Third, whether cursing is a mortal sin Fourth, of its comparison with other sins First article Whether it is lawful to curse anyone Objection one It would seem unlawful to curse anyone For it is unlawful to disregard the command of the apostle in whom Christ spoke according to 2 Corinthians 13.3 Now he commanded also in Romans 12.14 Bless and curse not Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone Objection two further All are bound to bless God Oh ye sons of men bless the Lord Now the same mouth cannot both bless God and curse man as proved in the third chapter of James Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man Objection three further He that curses another would seem to wish him some evil either a fault or of punishment Since a curse appears to be a kind of imprecation But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone Indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse Objection four further The devil exceeds all in malice on account of his obstinacy But it is not lawful to curse the devil as neither is it lawful to curse oneself for it is written in Ecclesiasticus 21.30 While the ungodly curseth the devil he curseth his own soul Much less therefore is it lawful to curse a man Objection five further A gloss on Numbers 23.8 How shall I curse whom God hath not cursed Says There cannot be a just cause for cursing a sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments Now one man cannot know another man's sentiments nor whether he is cursed by God Therefore no man may lawfully curse another On the contrary it is written in Deuteronomy 27.26 Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law Moreover Elicias cursed the little boys who mocked him in 4th Kings 224 I answer that To curse Maledicere is the same as to speak ill Malum dicere Now speaking has a threefold relation to the thing spoken First by way of assertion as when a thing is expressed in the indicative mood In this way Maledicere signifies simply to tell someone of another's evil and this pertains to backbiting where for tellers of evil Maledici are sometimes called backbiter's Secondly speaking is related to the thing spoken by way of cause and this belongs to God first and foremost since he made all things by his word according to Psalm 32 verse 9 he spoke and they were made while secondarily it belongs to man who by his word commands others and thus moves them to do something it is for this purpose that we employ verbs in the imperative mood Thirdly speaking is related to the thing spoken by expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in words and for this purpose we employ the verb in the optative mood Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way of simple assertion of evil and consider the other two kinds and here we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness as shown above in the parts Prima Secunde question 20 article 3 Hence in these two ways of evil speaking by way of command and by way of desire there is the same aspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness for if a man commands or desires another's evil as evil being intent on the evil itself then evil speaking will be unlawful in both ways and this is what is meant by cursing On the other hand if a man commands or desires another's evil under the aspect of good it is lawful and it may be called cursing not strictly speaking but accidentally because the chief intention of the speaker is directed not to evil but to good Now evil may be spoken by commanding or desiring it under the aspect of a twofold good sometimes under the aspect of just and thus a judge lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty thus too the church curses by pronouncing anathema in the same way the prophets in the scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners as though conforming their will to divine justice although such like imprecation may be taken by way of foretelling sometimes evil is spoken under the aspect of useful as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of some kind either that he may himself reform or at least that he may cease from harming others Reply to Objection 1 the apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an evil intent and the same answer applies to the second objection Reply to Objection 3 to wish another man evil under the aspect of good is not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply in fact rather is it in conformity therewith Reply to Objection 4 in the devil both nature and guilt must be considered his nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful to curse it on the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed according to Job 3.8 let them curse it who cursed the day yet when a sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt for the same reason he judges himself worthy of being cursed and in this sense he is said to curse his own soul Reply to Objection 5 although the sinner's sentiments cannot be perceived in themselves they can be perceived through some manifest sin which has to be punished likewise although it is not possible to know whom God curses in respect of final reprobation it is possible to know who is a cursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin second article whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature Objection 1 it would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational creature cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to punishment now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either of guilt or of punishment therefore it is unlawful to curse them Objection 2 further in an irrational creature there is nothing but the nature which God made but it is unlawful to curse this even in the devil as stated above in article 1 therefore it is no wise lawful to curse an irrational creature Objection 3 further irrational creatures are either stable as bodies or transient as the seasons now according to Gregory in his commentary on Job 4-2 it is useless to curse what does not exist and wicked to curse what exists therefore it is no wise lawful to curse an irrational creature on the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree as related in Matthew 21 verse 19 and Job cursed his day according to Job 3-1 I answer that benediction and malediction properly speaking regard things to which good or evil may happen notably rational creatures while good and evil are said to happen to irrational creatures in relation to the rational creature for whose sake they are now they are related to the rational creature in several ways first by way of ministration insofar as irrational creatures minister to the needs of man in this sense the Lord said to man in Genesis 3-17 cursed is the earth in thy work so that its barrenness would be a punishment to man thus also David cursed the mountains of Gilboi according to Gregory's expounding in the commentary on Job 4-3 again the irrational creature is related to the rational creature by way of signification and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of Judea thirdly the irrational creature is related to rational creatures as something containing them namely by way of time or place and thus Job cursed the day of his birth on account of the original sin which he contracted in birth and on account of the consequent penalties in this sense also we may understand David to have cursed the mountains of Gilboi as we read in 2 Kings 121 namely on account of the people slaughtered there but to curse irrational beings considered as creatures of God is a sin of blasphemy while to curse them considered in themselves is idle and vain and consequently unlawful from this the replies to the objections may easily be gathered third article whether cursing is a mortal sin objection one it would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin for Augustine in a homily on the fire of purgatory reckons cursing among slight sins but such sins are venial therefore cursing is not a mortal but a venial sin objection to further that which proceeds from a slight movement of the mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin but cursing sometimes arises from a slight movement therefore cursing is not a mortal sin objection three further evil deeds are worse than evil words but evil deeds are not always mortal sins much less therefore is cursing a mortal sin on the contrary nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom of God but cursing excludes from the kingdom of God according to 1 Corinthians 6 10 nor cursors nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God therefore cursing is a mortal sin I answer that the evil words of which we are speaking now are those whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or desire now to wish evil to another man or to conduce to that evil by commanding it is of its very nature contrary to charity whereby we love our neighbor by desiring his good consequently it is a mortal sin according to its genus and so much the graver as the person whom we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect hence it is written in Leviticus 20 verse 9 he that curseth his father or mother dying let him die it may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial sin either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in cursing him or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters the curse because he may say such words through some slight movement or ingest or without deliberation and sins of word should be weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker's intention as stated above in question 72 article 2 from this the replies to the objections may be easily gathered fourth article whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting objection one it would seem that cursing is a graver sin than backbiting cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy as implied in the canonical epistle of Jude in verse 9 where it is said that when Michael the archangel disputing with the devil contended about the body of Moses he durst not bring against him the judgment of blasphemy where blasphemy stands for cursing according to a gloss now blasphemy is a graver sin than backbiting therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting objection two further murder is more grievous than backbiting as stated above in question 73 article 3 but cursing is on a par with the sin of murder for Chrysostom says in his homily 19 on the gospel of Matthew when thou sayest curse him down with his house away with everything you are no better than a murderer therefore cursing is graver than backbiting objection three further to cause a thing is more than to signify it but the cursor causes evil by commanding it whereas the backbiter merely signifies an evil already existing therefore the cursor sins more grievously than the backbiter on the contrary it is impossible to do well in backbiting whereas cursing may be either a good or an evil deed as appears from what has been said in article 1 therefore backbiting is graver than cursing I answer that as stated in the first part in question 48 article 5 evil is twofold evil of faults and evil of punishment and of the two evil of fault is the worse confer pars prima question 48 article 6 hence to speak evil of faults is worse than to speak evil of punishment provided the mode of speaking be the same accordingly it belongs to the reviler the tail bearer the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of faults whereas it belongs to the evil speaker as we understand it here to speak evil of punishment and not evil of fault except under the aspect of punishment but the mode of speaking is not the same for in the case of the four vices mentioned above evil of fault is spoken by way of assertion whereas in the case of cursing evil of punishment is spoken either by causing it in the form of a command or by wishing it now the utterance itself of a person's fault is a sin in as much as it inflicts an injury on one's neighbor and it is more grievous to inflict an injury than to wish to inflict it other things being equal hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin than the cursing which expresses a mere desire while the cursing which is expressed by way of command since it has the aspect of a cause will be more or less grievous than backbiting according as it inflicts an injury more or less grave than the blackening of man's good name moreover this must be taken as applying to these vices considered in their essential aspects for other accidental points might be taken into consideration which would aggravate or extenuate the aforesaid vices reply to objection one to curse a creature as such reflects on God and thus accidentally it has the character of blasphemy not so if one curse a creature on account of its fault and the same applies to backbiting reply to objection two as stated above in article three cursing in one way includes the desire for evil where if the cursor desire the evil of another's violent death he does not differ in desire from a murderer but he differs from him in so far as the external act adds something to the act of the will reply to objection three this argument considers cursing by way of command this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 77 of cheating which is committed in buying and selling in four articles we must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary commutations first we shall consider cheating which is committed in buying and selling secondly we shall consider usury which occurs in loans in connection with the other voluntary commutations no special kind of sin is to be found distinct from rapine and theft under the first head there are four points of inquiry first of unjust sales as regards the price namely whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than it's worth second of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold third whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold fourth whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price than was paid for it first article whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than it's worth objection one you would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more than it's worth in the commutations of human life civil laws determined that which is just now according to these laws it is just for buyer and seller to deceive one another and this occurs by the seller selling a thing for more than it's worth the buyer buying a thing for less than it's worth therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than it's worth objection two further that which is common to all would seem to be natural and not sinful now Augustine relates that the saying of a certain jester was accepted by all you wish to buy for a song and to sell at a premium which agrees with the saying of Proverbs 20 verse 14 it is not it is not sayeth every buyer and when he has gone away then he will boast therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than it's worth objection three further it does not seem unlawful if that which honestly demands to be done by mutual agreement now according to the philosopher in ethics 813 in the friendship which is based on utility the amount of the recompense for a favor received should depend on the utility accruing to the receiver and this utility is sometimes worth more than the thing given for instance if the receiver be in great need of that thing whether for the purpose of avoiding a danger or of deriving some particular benefit therefore in contracts of buying and selling it is lawful to give a thing in return for more than it's worth on the contrary it is written in Matthew 7 12 all things whatsoever you would that men should do to you do you also to them but no man wishes to buy a thing for more than it's worth therefore no man should sell a thing to another man for more than it's worth I answer that it is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit in order to sell a thing for more than it's just price because this is to deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him hence Tully says contracts should be entirely free from double dealing the seller must not impose upon the bidder nor the buyer upon one that bids against him but apart from fraud we may speak of buying and selling in two ways first as considered in themselves and from this point of view buying and selling seem to be established for the common advantage of both parties one of whom requires that which belongs to the other and vice versa as the philosopher states in politics 13 now whatever is established for the common advantage should not be more of a burden to one party than to another and consequently all contracts between them should observe equality of thing and thing again the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured by the price given for it for which purpose money was invented as stated in ethics 55 therefore if either the price exceed the quantity of the thing's worth or conversely the thing exceed the price there is no longer the equality of justice and consequently to sell a thing for more than it's worth or to buy it for less than it's worth is in itself unjust and unlawful secondly we may speak of buying and selling considered as accidentally tending to the advantage of one party and to the disadvantage of the other for instance when a man has great need of a certain thing while another man will suffer if he be without it in such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing sold but on the loss which the sale brings on the seller and thus it will be lawful to sell a thing for more than it's worth in itself though the price paid be not more than it is worth to the owner yet if the one man derive a great advantage by becoming possessed of the other man's property and the seller be not at a loss through being without that thing the latter ought not to raise the price because the advantage accruing to the buyer is not due to the seller but to a circumstance affecting the buyer now no man should sell what is not his though he may charge for the loss he suffers on the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from something he has bought he may of his own accord pay the seller something over and above and this pertains to his honesty reply to objection one as stated above in the Paris Prima Secunde question 96 article 2 human law is given to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue and it is not given to the virtuous alone hence human law was unable to forbid all that is contrary to virtue and it suffices for it to prohibit whatever is destructive of human intercourse while it treats other matters as though they were lawful not by approving of them but by not punishing them accordingly if without employing deceit the seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth or the buyer obtain them for less than their worth the law looks upon this as licit and provides no punishment for so doing unless the excess be too great because then even human law demands restitution to be made for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half the amount of the just price of a thing on the other hand the divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary to virtue hence according to the divine law it is reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in buying and selling and he who has received more than he ought make compensation to him that has suffered loss if the loss be considerable I add this condition because the just price of things is not fixed with mathematical precision but depends on a kind of estimate so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality of justice reply to objection 2 as Augustine says this gesture either by looking into himself or by his experience of others thought that all men are inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium but since in reality this is wicked it is in every man's power to acquire that justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination and then he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book to a man who through ignorance asked a low price for it hence it is evident that this common desire is not from nature but from vice where for it is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin reply to objection 3 in commutative justice we consider chiefly real equality on the other hand in friendship based on utility we consider equality of usefulness so that the recompense should depend on the usefulness accruing whereas in buying it should be equal to the thing bought second article whether a sale is rendered unlawful through a fault in the thing sold objection 1 it would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and unlawful through a fault in the thing sold for less account should be taken of the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its substance yet the sale of a thing does not seem to be rendered unlawful through a fault in its substance for instance if a man sell instead of the real metal silver or gold produced by some chemical process which is adapted to the human uses for which silver and gold are necessary for instance in the making of vessels and the like much less therefore will it be an unlawful sale if the thing be defective in other ways objection 2 further any fault in the thing affecting the quantity would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in equality now quantity is known by being measured and the measures of things that come into human use are not fixed but in some places are greater and others less as the philosopher states in ethics five seven therefore just as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of the thing sold it seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful through the thing sold being defective objection 3 further the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a fitting quality but in order to know the quality of a thing much knowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers therefore a sale is not rendered unlawful by a fault in the thing sold on the contrary Ambrose says in on the duties of the clergy 311 it is manifestly a rule of justice the good man should not depart from the truth nor inflict an unjust injury on anyone nor have any connection with fraud I answer that a three-fold fault may be found pertaining to the thing which is sold one in respect of the thing substance and if the seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling he is guilty of a fraudulent sale so that the sale is rendered unlawful hence we find it written against certain people in Isaiah 122 thy silver is turned into dross thy wine is mingled with water because that which is mixed is defective in its substance another defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being measured wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty measure in selling he is guilty of fraud and the sale is illicit hence it is written in Deuteronomy 25 verses 13 and 14 thou shalt not have diverse weights in thy bag a greater and a less neither shall there be in thy house a greater bushel and a less and further on in verse 16 for the Lord abhoreth him that doth these things and he hateeth all injustice a third defect is on the part of the quality for instance if a man sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one and if anyone do this knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale and the sale in consequence is illicit in all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale but he is also bound to restitution but if any of the foregoing defects be in the things sold and he knows nothing about this the seller does not sin because he does that which is unjust materially nor is his deed unjust as was shown above in question 59 article 2 nevertheless he is bound to compensate the buyer when the defect comes to his knowledge moreover what has been said of the seller applies equally to the buyer for sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his goods to be specifically of lower value as when a man sells gold instead of copper and then if the buyer be aware of this he buys it unjustly and is bound to restitution and applies to a defect in quantity as to a defect in quality reply to objection one gold and silver are costly not only on account of the usefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them but also on account of the excellence and purity of their substance hence if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the true specific nature of gold and silver the sale thereof is fraudulent and unjust especially as real gold and silver can produce certain results by their natural action which the counterfeit gold and silver of alchemists cannot produce thus the true metal has the property of making people joyful and is helpful medicinally against certain maladies moreover real gold can be employed more frequently and lasts longer in its condition of purity than counterfeit gold if however real gold were to be produced by alchemy it would not be unlawful to sell it for the genuine article for nothing prevents art from employing certain natural causes for the production of natural and true effects as Augustine says in on the Trinity three eight of things produced by the art of the demons reply to objection two the measures of saleable commodities must needs be different in different places on account of the difference of supply because where there is greater abundance the measures are want to be larger however in each place those who govern the state must determine the just measures of things saleable with due consideration for the conditions of place and time hence it is not lawful to disregard such measures as are established by public authority or custom reply to objection three as Augustine says in on the city of God eleven sixteen the price of things saleable does not depend on their degree of nature since at times of horse fetches a higher price than a slave but it depends on their usefulness to man hence it is not necessary for the seller or buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold but only of such as render the thing adapted to man's use for instance that the horse be strong run well and so forth such qualities the seller and buyer easily can discover third article whether the seller is bound to state the defects of the thing sold objection one you would seem that the seller is not bound to state the defects of the thing sold since the seller does not bind the buyer to buy you would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods offered for sale now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that thing belong to the same person therefore it does not seem imputable to the seller the buyer be deceived in his judgment and be hurried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its condition objection two further it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents him carrying out his work but if a man states the defects of the goods he has for sale he prevents their sale where for tally pictures a man as saying could anything be more absurd than for a public crier instructed by the owner to cry I offer this unhealthy horse for sale therefore the seller is not bound to state the defects of the thing sold objection three further man needs more to know the road of virtue than to know the faults of the things offered for sale now one is not bound to offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters pertaining to virtue the one should not tell anyone what is false much less therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of what he offers for sale as though he were counseling the buyer objection four further if one were bound to tell the faults of what one offers for sale this would be in order to lower the price now sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason without any defect in the things sold for instance if the seller carry wheat to a place where wheat fetches a high price knowing that many will come after him carrying wheat because if the buyers knew this they would give a lower price but apparently the seller need not give the buyer this information therefore in like manner neither need he tell him the faults of the goods he is selling on the contrary Ambrose says in On the duties of the clergy 310 in all contracts the defects of the saleable commodity must be stated and unless the seller make them known although the buyer has already acquired a right to them the contract is voided on account of the fraudulent action I answer that it is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of danger or loss although a man need not always give another the help or counsel which would be for his advantage in any way but only in certain fixed cases for instance when someone is subject to him or when he is the only one who can assist him now the seller who offers goods for sale gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger by the very fact that he offers him defective goods if such defect may occasion loss or danger to the buyer loss if by reason of this defect the goods are of less value and he takes nothing off the price on that account danger if this defect either hinder the use of the goods or render it hurtful for instance if a man sells a lame for a fleet horse or a tottering house for a safe one or rotten or poisonous food for wholesome wherefore if such like defects be hidden and the seller does not make them known the sale will be illicit and fraudulent and the seller will be bound to compensation for the loss incurred on the other hand if the defect be manifest for instance if a horse have but one eye or if the goods though useless to the buyer be useful to someone else provided the seller take as much as he ought from the price he is not bound to state the defect of the goods since perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to allow a greater rebate than he need wherefore the seller may look to his own indemnity by withholding the defect of the goods reply to objection one judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is manifest for a man judges of what he knows according to ethics one three hence if the defects of the goods offered for sale be hidden judgment of them is not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be known to him the case would be different if the defects were manifest reply to objection two there is no need to publish beforehand by the public crier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale because if he were to begin by announcing its defects the bidders would be frightened to buy through ignorance of other qualities that might render the thing good and serviceable such defect ought to be stated to each individual that offers to buy and then he will be able to compare the various points one with the other the good with the bad for nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being useful in many others reply to objection three although a man is not bound strictly speaking to tell everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue yet he is so bound in a case when unless he tells the truth his conduct would endanger another man in detriment to virtue and so it is in this case reply to objection four the defect in a thing makes it of less value now than it seems to be but in the case cited the goods are expected to be of less value at a future time on account of the arrival of other merchants which was not foreseen by the buyers where for the seller since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him does not seem to act contrary to justice though not stating what is going to happen if however he were to do so or if he lowered his price it would be exceedingly virtuous on his part although he does not seem to be bound to do this as a debt of justice fourth article whether in trading it is lawful to sell a thing at a higher price than what was paid for it objection one it would seem that is not unlawful in trading to sell a thing for a higher price than we paid for it for Chrysostom says on Matthew twenty one twelve he that buys a thing in order that he may sell it and tire and unchanged at a profit is the trader who has cast out of God's temple Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in his commentary on Psalm seventy verse fifteen because I have not known learning or trading according to another version what is trade says he but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of retailing at a higher price and he adds such were the tradesmen whom our Lord cast out of the temple now no man is cast out of the temple except for a sin therefore such like trading is sinful objection two further it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a higher price than their worth or to buy them for less than their value is shown above an article one now if you sell a thing for a higher price than you paid for it you must either have bought it for less than its value or sell it for more than its value therefore this cannot be done without sin objection three further Jerome says in a letter Sean as you would the plague a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy or who from being a nobody has become a celebrity now trading would not seem to be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness therefore it is a sin in trading to buy at a low price and to sell at a higher price on the contrary Augustine commenting on Psalm seventy verse fifteen because I have not known learning says the greedy tradesmen blasphemes over his losses he lies and purges himself over the price of his wares but these are vices of the man not of the craft which can be exercised without these vices therefore trading is not in itself unlawful I answer that a tradesman is one whose business consists in the exchange of things according to the philosopher in politics one three exchange of things is twofold one natural as it were and necessary whereby one commodity is exchanged for another or money taken in exchange for a commodity in order to satisfy the needs of life such like trading properly speaking does not belong to tradesmen but rather to housekeepers or civil servants who have to provide the household or the state with the necessaries of life the other kind of exchange is either that of money for money or of any commodity for money not on account of the necessities of life but for profit and this kind of exchange properly speaking regards tradesmen according to the philosopher again in politics one three the former kind of exchange is commendable because it supplies a natural need but the latter is justly deserving of blame because considered in itself it satisfies the greed for gain which knows no limit and tends to infinity hence trading considered in itself has a certain debasement attaching there too in so far as by its very nature it does not imply a virtuous or necessary end nevertheless gain which is the end of trading though not implying by its nature anything virtuous or necessary does not in itself denote anything sinful or contrary to virtue where for nothing prevents gain from being directed to some necessary or even virtuous end and thus trading becomes lawful thus for instance a man may intend the moderate gain which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his household or for the assistance of the needy or again a man may take to trade for some public advantage for instance lest his country lack the necessaries of life and seek gain not as an end but as a payment for his labor reply to objection one the saying of Chrysostom refers to the trading which seeks gain as a last end this is especially the case where a man sells something at a higher price without its undergoing any change for if he sells at a higher price something that has changed for the better he would seem to receive the reward of his labor nevertheless the gain itself may be lawfully intended not as a last end but for the sake of some other end as necessary or virtuous as stated above reply to objection two not everyone that sells at a higher price than he bought it is a tradesman but only he who buys that he may sell at a profit if on the contrary he buys not for sale but for possession and afterwards for some reason wishes to sell it is not a trade transaction even if he sell at a profit he may lawfully do this either because he has bettered the thing or because the value of the thing has changed with the change of place or time or on account of the danger he incurs in transferring the thing from one place to another or again in having it carried by another in this sense neither buying nor selling is unjust reply to objection three clerics should abstain not only from things that are evil in themselves but even from those that have an appearance of evil this happens in trading both because it is directed to worldly gain which clerics should despise and because trading is open to so many vices since a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips according to Ecclesiasticus 2628 there is also another reason because trading engages the mind too much with worldly cares and consequently withdraws it from spiritual cares where for the apostle says in 2 Timothy 2.4 no man being a soldier to God entanglet himself with secular businesses nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in the first mentioned kind of exchange which is directed to supply the necessaries of life either by buying or by selling End of question 77 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC