 Good afternoon everybody. You're most welcome to this inaugural event of the IIA's new global Europe project, which is supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs. This project aims to address, analyse and communicate to a wider public the debate on the EU's role in the world and Ireland's role in the multilateral order. With a particular focus on Ireland's term as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which begins in January 2021 and ends in December 2022. And we're delighted to be joined today by Federica Mogherini, director of the College of Europe and former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who has been generous enough to take time out of her schedule to speak to us. Director Mogherini, who will address Europe's global role in the future of the multilateral system in the post pandemic world will speak for roughly 10 minutes or so. And then we will go to a question and answer with our audience. We will be able to join the Q&A using the Q&A function on Zoom, which you should see on your screen. And please be free to send your questions in throughout the session as they occur to you. And we will come to them and have a good discussion once Rector Mogherini has finished her presentation. And a reminder that today's presentation and the question and answer are both on the record. And please submit your question and answers via the Q&A function on Zoom. We would be grateful if you could identify yourselves and your affiliation in your question. And please be free to join the discussion on Twitter using the handle at IIA. I'd like now to formally introduce Rector Mogherini prior to handing over to her. Federica Mogherini has been the rector of the College of Europe since September 2020. Prior to this, of course, she served as High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and also as Vice President of the European Commission from 2014 to 2019. And prior to joining the EU, she was Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and a member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, where she had had many delegations in that capacity. Federica Mogherini is a fellow of the Harvard Kennedy School, and she is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the International Crisis Group. And she has co-chaired the United Nations High Level Panel on Internal Displacements since January 2020. In terms of her involvement in disarmament and nuclear test fund, I think it's very interesting that she's a member of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Department Recommission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Fund Treaty Organization, and a member of the European Leadership Network for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation. And also a member of the Board of Directors of the Italian Institute for Foreign Affairs, a sister institute of ours. So, Rector Mogherini, you're most welcome, and we look forward to your address and discussion and the floor, virtually, I'm afraid, but the floor is yours. Thank you very much. Let me first of all thank you for the invitation. For this opportunity to share some thoughts about the role of the European Union in the world. And if you allow me, and as it is indicated also in the short title of my introduction, the role of the European Union in the multilateral system after or during the pandemic times, with a special reference also to the role of islands in this framework, especially in the moment when islands is getting ready to get its seat in the Security Council of the United Nations. So I'll try to be brief because I think interaction with the audience is going to be interesting not only for the audience itself, but also for me. I'll try to be brief and touch upon a few elements of the current landscape. First of all, the role of the European Union in the world. I have to say that out of my experience, we Europeans sometimes tend to underestimate the power and the role and the impact of our actions in the world. My most often, I've heard this expression from my interlocutors, I have to stay far away countries as much as our own neighborhoods both in the south and in the east of Europe. So many interlocutors, different backgrounds have told me you don't realize the power you have you don't realize how important is the European Union in the world. So this would be maybe my first point, sometimes others see our global role and our impact in the world much more than Europeans themselves do. Especially in these times of uncertainties and a more conflictual and contested world order, where indeed the transactional approach to international relations seem to prevail. So the European Union has been and continues to be a thing, a sort of shield, a place where other like-minded partners can find protection is a strong word but I think it is exactly what others felt. The European Union are big enough, both economically and diplomatically and politically, to offer others that might have the same approach to multilateralism and peace building and conflict prevention and diplomacy to face a world that is definitely going in another direction. I think that the power of the European Union in this respect is for sure economic. I think that relations that European Union has built across the world in terms of trade agreements that always imply respect for human rights, environmental standards, sustainable developments, climate change action and so on and so forth, offer an inspiration also to others to support free and fair trade globally. I think that's the power that European Union has diplomatically with a presence in literally all countries in the world is unparalleled and the network of delegations of the European Union in the world coupled with the presence of member states being that 28 during my Mondays 27 today is and offers a unique mix of instruments that can be used in the relationship and in the work with the third countries. And I think that in the purely diplomatic work the European Union does being it's in facilitating negotiations in peace processes in the support to mediation I think of all the support the European Union gives to women in peace processes for instance and mediation for the support to the UN system as such. I think there's no other global actor like the European Union as as powerful and at the same time as humble as the European Union. Maybe we should, maybe we should be even a little bit more self confidence. This is, this is something that I think could be helpful in in this times. I think that the pandemic has offered. Well, first of all, as hits the Europeans, probably more than others, our economies, our social fabric, our way of living for sure. In the lives of so many Europeans in so many European countries, but has also offered the European Union I think a unique opportunity to showcase the cooperative model of the international stage. And I think that most of us in late February beginning of March when the pandemic started to to hit on the global level and more dramatically and more systematically. I think that this would have been maybe a game changer on the word scene, trying to to shift from the bilateral or unilateral transactional approach on to international relations and foreign policy towards a more cooperative multilateral approach, which is normally the European Union way, the cooperative multilateral approach. The question is that in this months we've actually seen more than the same with unilateral temptations being even more rooted in those that were thinking that that was the right way to go. And the need for multilateralism to to be even more even stronger and more rooted in those that were always advocating for this. So I'm afraid that the post pandemic words, hoping will get there at a certain point. The pandemic word and the post pandemic word would not in themselves represent a big paradigm shift in terms of international relations and foreign policy practices. Unless it has a strong impact on the election of the new president of the United States today is too early to say probably next week will have different elements on that. I don't think that the pandemic itself will represent a paradigm shift in the foreign policy framework globally, but it does represent an opportunity for the European Union to act as a global player. Because it gives us the possibility and still say us because I think we are still in this altogether. It gives us the possibility, first of all, to act as a convening power, think of the role that the European Union is playing in, for instance, coordinating work on health support across the European Union and outside of it. We have humanitarian support but also the work on medical research and vaccine and to show the added value of the cooperation elements in international relations. I think this is the trademark of the European Union. The model that we can not export because it's not our way, but offer as an inspiration to the rest of the world, the more cooperative you get, the more successful you are and in real terms, even if sometimes in Europe we don't realize how much we have achieved in this decade of union, we are still the best place to be in the world in terms of economy, in terms of rights, social, working rights, gender, equality, far from perfect, but for sure it's compared to other places in the world is definitely the best place to be. So now coming to the role of the European Union, what I've seen directly in my five years in office as a high representative is, for instance, the key support that the European Union is able to give and is giving to the UN system. So here I would like to spend my last couple of minutes of introduction to highlight how important it is to have, first of all to have member states sitting in the Security Council. That's why I'm so glad to see Ireland taking this responsibility as of January. In particular, Ireland, being Ireland, a country and a member state that has always had, and a very strong, dedicated, multilateral approach focused on peace, non-proliferation and disarmament, I think that the credentials of Ireland in the UN system and the international scene are really impressive, and it's an asset for the European Union. Many identify the UN system as a complicated place for the European Union to play its role, because of the plurality of member states, and when you say, even mention the expression member states in the UN system, it's not the member states of the European Union, but having said that, I have to say that I have seen myself and I have, I think, contributed hopefully a little bit to increase that member states coordinate within the UN system, within the Security Council work, and this has an impact on the way in which the UN system works or not. I will give you just two examples, they're far away, well, two or three, but we can have many others. Think of the role of the European Union in the Sustainable Development Goals negotiations without the European Union and the coordinated work with member states and with third parties. Probably the Sustainable Development Goals would have never been achieved in the UN framework. The same can be considered for the climate change, the Paris Agreement on climate change without the European Union and member states, and the coordinating role of the European Union, that agreement also would have never been achieved, and its implementation would have been even worse than it is now. And if you think of some of the key peace processes that the UN is trying to support or to the conflicts it's trying to solve without the European Union support and contribution, the UN system would have probably not managed to at least maintain a certain common ground on the international level on the parameters on which the conflicts need to be solved. I think, for instance, to the Middle East peace process or how I think it should be rather referred to the lack of Middle East peace process, an issue that I know is very close to the Irish heart. Well, in difficult times, the UN could count always on the European Union. And I have to say on the Arab League, first of all to coordinate, but also to stick to the parameters that were agreed previously, even if and when they were challenged the most. So I would say that the European Union has been and continues to be a sort of life-saving instrument for multilateralism in these difficult times. I think of the peace process negotiations in Afghanistan, the support to the role of women, I think of the peace process in Myanmar, I think of so many dynamics where Syria, Libya, Ukraine, so many dynamics in which without the European Union the situation would be much worse than it is today. Having said that, I perfectly see the challenges, one for all the fact that we moved from 28 to 27. The complicated relations across the Atlantic, that in any case, however, the results of the US elections will need to be, I think, re-looked at. Still, I think that the European Union power and impact on the world stage is much more relevant than perceived by Europeans. And this would be my main message. We have a potential as a union that sometimes we don't fully use. We have a potential that we underestimate. We have a responsibility towards multilateralism, for instance, that sometimes we underestimate. It's far from perfect. We have many shortcomings, but I have not seen a better diplomatic network and system. I have not seen in the world a more functional global actor, even with all our limits. I think that this power of projecting a cooperative model is also a source of inspiration for other regions. I think of, for instance, ASEAN, Southeast Asia, I think of some areas of Latin America or Africa that look at the European Union as not only a partner, a reliable partner, but also as somehow an inspiration for developing their own regional cooperative order beyond the logic of conflict and confrontation that is so much popular at these times. I think I'll finish here because I am sure that questions and comments from the audience will guide us in one direction or another. Many different aspects can be covered. And I am sure that some of the issues I have not mentioned will come up in the Q&A session. So again, I'll stop here and ready to answer questions, enter into conversations with any of the participants to the event. And thank you very much again for this very good initiative. Thank you very much indeed, Rector, and thank you for that introduction because I think you have indicated very clearly the advantages of the European Union in the very broadest sense. And I think this is very timely because coming at us from a number of different directions we have people urging the European Union to become a greater foreign policy player. And the charges that the European Union is only acting as a referee handing out red and yellow cards to felons and not playing any particular role. The different types of role in the different types of instruments and the values that the European Union are promoting tend to be often neglected in the demand for a greater and a stronger role for the European Union. So I think it's very timely that you have reminded us of the values and the actions and what the union stands for, which is, as I say, very often neglected. We do indeed have a number of questions, which will will guide the direction. So the first question I have is from Paula, who is formerly of our department of finance, and he asks, can the EU survive with the global power or at its present stage of integration. Do we need or could we expect any further integration, particularly in the post Brexit scenario. Do you feel we need closer integration politically. Well, first of all, I have to say that I, I witnessed, I, I think I contributed also to go one step further on the current integration that we have 27 but actually we had it. We established it at 28 still when we implemented for the first time ever one of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, the permanent structure cooperation in the security and defense field, for instance, that stack of having somehow two speeds was always present in the treaties but never put in place. And it was just a few months after the results of the Brexit referendum that we went in the direction of implementing that provision of introducing a permanent structure cooperation on security and defense in the European Union. And now many have connected the two as one being the consequence of the other. It was not the case. And I have to say what I experienced at that time was a very constructive UK contribution to the deepening of the European integration on the security and defense cooperation, probably because once the UK felt out or one step out. They weren't noticing any more further steps of integration because they were not touching themselves anymore that is my personal interpretation of this but if you think of it. We adopted all decisions on permanent structure cooperation and all the steps we've taken on an increased integration on security and defense policy in the European Union with the positive participation and vote of the UK still being a member of the European Union. Paradox and not so much because I think that the UK has always had this clear in mind and don't forget in during my mandate Boris Johnson was for a certain period of time before Minister. So he was the one also guiding this. I have the impression that the UK has always had very clear in mind that it was in its own interest to have a strong European Union as a player on foreign and security policy. Because we share and we will continue I think to share the same values and the same viewpoints on on the global geopolitics. Think of the conflict in Ukraine think of peace processes I don't think that's the UK foreign policy position will diverge from the European Union one in relevant terms. What they are missing is the participation to the use of the instruments we have in common, which is the loss for them more than more than for us probably think of the sanctions, think of the yes of the coordination in the UN system and things like that. Do we need as the European Union further step on on integration. I guess that this refers to the possibility of introducing qualified majority voting for instance on decision making. I have a very. A personal opinion about that is differs very much from from that of many friends and colleagues. Personally, I don't think that in foreign policy, for instance, having qualified majority voting would be a good idea. In my experience, but I might be wrong in my experience, unanimity in the decision making has never been a problem in five years we never missed a decision because of lack of unanimity. The problem was more the lack of implementation of the decision that was taken all together. So ministers agreeing on a position. Then you know foreign policy is not a legislation procedure is you don't have a law, you have a diplomatic actions you have the marshes you have positioning. And it requires the day after a position is taken, it requires all the players to play according to the to the scripts that we had written together. I don't think that you increase the level of ownership in the implementation phase of the foreign policy decision, if you introduce a unanimity vote. On the contrary, you might even provide some justifications to those member states that are, let's say less enthusiastically implementing decisions. And if they can say this was not really my decision on top of that, if you introduce qualified majority voting on foreign policy. You offer a very powerful argument to your counterparts to your to the third part is that might accuse you of not being united. That would be on the record. So, a high representative would not be any more in a position of saying, not the European Union is united on this this is the common decision and common position, because divisions would be would be recorded. Somehow will be certified and I think this would weaken the position of the European Union in in its foreign policy and it's, it's global actions. There can be, there can be some issues some topics on which more integration could be beneficial. I, I give you or some changes on an institutional level could be beneficial. I give you an example, I always thought that the double hat that the high representative has that of chairing the council on one side and being the vice president of the European Commission on one side is an incredible asset. It was exactly because of these, this complexity and variety of instruments that we managed to, to realize so much on the security and defend sector for instance, without that provision of of the Lisbon Treaty would have the same capacity to do so. So for instance, having double-hatted roles beyond foreign and security policy could be, I think a good idea I think of the economic of all the economic sector of the European Union activities I think that might make sense. But in terms of further integration, I don't think the problem is the number of all the speeds of the of the groups inside the European Union. I don't think that the problem is that, yeah, 28, 27, 22, 15 or 29. I don't think that is a problem. I think the problem is a problem of ownership and energy that our public opinions and our political leaderships put in in bridging the gap between the member states and the European Union as such. Ministers take decisions together and then when they go to the press room, it's the decision of the European Union. But the European Union doesn't exist without the member states. It's us. The only ones that cannot do this trick are the Belgians because they cannot say Brussels has decided because Brussels is them. But all the others you might have noticed in many, in many cases, if a decision is unpopular or difficult, it immediately becomes Brussels has decided. And bridging this gap, this distance between the national capitals and the European Union as the common house, as us, is I think the real further integration step that we need. But it's a step we take in our minds is not a treaty change. Thank you very much indeed for that elaboration. You make a very powerful argument for maintaining solidarity among all of the new member states. Indeed, I have a question in relation to that from John O'Hagan of Trinity College Dublin, because he had asked and I think you've answered it. And the EU ever have an effective and expedient foreign policy role as long as the national veto power remains in place but he goes on to say that given this. The possibility of a group of EU member states like France, Germany, Italy and Spain combined population 250 million moving ahead to form a subgroup of like minded member states in relation to foreign policy, as for example happened in monetary union. Would you allow that this this may arise there may be a possibility in the future. You know, I have two, two thoughts to share on this. And they might surprise you. One is that this somehow already exists. Not formally, but within the Council within the Foreign Affairs Council. There are already some formats informal formats of groups of member states that come together and act somehow on behalf of the European Union, together with the high representative to bring forward some of the policies that are commonly decided. That was actually for the first time formally introduced with the format of the negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal, where you had the E3. That's, that's where leading the way. But that was somehow a work that was led by the high representative with the active mobilization of a limited number of member states, but always with a connection with the totality of the other member states that were constantly kept informed, and we're able to back the work of this member states this smaller group of member states. And in that case, the legal basis for this was even a Security Council resolution that for the first time recognize the formal role of the high representative of the European Union as as a negotiator facilitator of the negotiations and the role of the three in in this. Other formats where individual member states or some member states groups of member states come together in interaction, or somehow delegated by the secure the Foreign Affairs Council. We established for instance, a few years ago, the contact group to facilitate try to facilitate negotiations on Venezuela. In that case, you have a certain number of member states if I don't remember wrong some five or six member states that participated somehow on behalf of the other member states together with a high representative to a format that included also non European and obviously constantly reported back to the European Union, and the member states count structures being at the ambassadorial level, the permanent representatives or the ministerial level in the council. Why this is there's an attempt to. This is risk, does it this risk to diminish the role of the representative or does it question the Lisbon Treaty provisions. In my experience and this is the second element I would add. We need not only the big member states, but we need all member states when we do forum policy, because it's not so much a matter of size of population even if that counts. So, in many cases, a special, a special connection, special background, special interest, a special mobilization of public opinions that gives the added value to that particular member states in one file. Not necessarily, you need to be one of the big ones to have an impact on a foreign policy file. It might be because of history, it might be because of geography, it might be because of composition of your own population. If I stay on the Venezuela example, Italy was part of the of the contact group, because large number of Italian citizens are also Venezuelan citizens. And the access to large part of the population of Venezuelan population was facilitated by the Italian double nationality they had. This is just an example the Netherlands was part of it because we never think of it, but the Netherlands is a geographical neighbor of Venezuela with the, with the overseas territories. Was that, is that always that the big ones have a bigger role to play not necessarily you can have for instance the Baltic States playing a key role when it comes to, for instance, digital innovation in some countries in Africa. We had a wonderful experience with the Estonian presidency, promoting a digital innovation with the African Union. You need to use the different assets, the different added values that come, not to mention that comes without saying the role that Island for instance, plays when it comes again to the Middle East peace process. Is this linked to size is it linked to, to geography clearly not it is linked to, to history and politics I would say. To me, the use of the specificities of all the 27 member states because more is is a toolbox that we need to use in the European institutions, and they complement each other. Culturally, linguistically, you can have a language link, a cultural link that makes it easier for you to open a door of negotiation, thinking of the peace negotiations in Mozambique Portugal was always extremely helpful when it was a matter of keeping the role of the European Union in that process. Some other in some other cases is the other way around you don't definitely don't want a post colonial approach to your work and then you move as far as way as possible of the former colony let's put it this way. So you need to mix and blend, and you need all this doesn't exclude, I think, the use or the choice to create smaller groups of countries, but not necessarily always the same ones. There are specific issues that can support the work of the high representative on some on some on some specific files. Thank you very much indeed for that I know that you placed heavy reliance on cultural contacts and cultural diplomacy, which I think you felt played a significant role in relations with with other member states with outside the union. I think that has been proven well to be the case. I have a question. We have many questions. I hope we can get through most of them from member of the Institute Dara Moriarty. How do you see us foreign policy towards Europe shifting under a potential Biden administration and likewise how it for more years have influenced the future direction of the foreign policy. I have a crystal ball here. I know the day that's in it. You know, at least it doesn't ask what I think who I think the winner is. That is a question I cannot really answer. But I think actually just need to be patient for a few hopefully days, not more. You know, it's not a mystery that the Trump administration has has introduced. I would say a difficult time in the transatlantic relations, not only with the European Union but also I think the transatlantic alliance has faced some tensions from time to time. I think that in any case, no matter, I mean, if the next president will be one or the other change everything. But I think that in neither one case or another, we will simply go back to 10 years ago, five years ago. I think that in any case, there will be the need to re look at the transatlantic relations and the US European Union relations. And in one case, if Trump is reelected for another term. And I think that we will need to on the two sides of the Atlantic at the administration's level but also at other levels, because we are both complex bodies, we have societies we have economic players we have cities and in that case we have societies and to sit together and define how to do damage control, if it's four more years of this and how to preserve the economic ties, the cultural ties, the, I would say even the family ties I mean your Irish I'm Italian. We know both very well that you take 100 Americans and you for sure find so many Irish and Italian second, third, fourth generation, you take New York and you hardly managed to find a mayor, a governor, a chief of police or fire department that is not Italian in its roots. So, even family wise, it's a community we cannot divide. And I think that if Trump has another term. We will need across the Atlantic to think how to preserve that unity, despite the differences in policies that are evident. There's also the multilateralism climate change approach to negotiations and, and yes the cooperative versus transactional approach. Many, many different things. If it's a, so in one case I think it's how to preserve what can be preserved, and without creating too much damage to the other connections we have society economy and, and the fires on which we still work together. There are many, not always very, very, very visible but are still many. In the case of a Biden administration, I think that we will need to sit down and see well not not me but the Europeans and Americans the administrations, but also I mean, I said not me but also universities and and high education institutions because that is also part of the society society at large sit and how and understand together how to review and refresh somehow revise the paradigm of our relations I don't think it will be back to before, because so many things have changed in the meantime, including maybe a little bit of trust on both sides. I think we lost a bit touch with the common vocabulary on the two sides of the of the Atlantic. And I think that will require a lot of work. Then there are practical files that will need to be looked at. I think of the trade negotiations I think of the of the files of the foreign policy files on which for instance, we might sit together and define, including on an academic level. On which of these files a US European Union cooperation is vital and needs to be re operated somehow revitalized and on which of these files we can do without. And so prioritizing and saying for instance, on the Balkans, we need to work together hand in hand because otherwise, there's no way in which the situation can can get better. And on Syria, or on Libya, there's no way in which we can solve, or on the Middle East, this process, no way Afghanistan, no way in which the US or the European Union alone can solve the solution. There are other files on which we could sit down and see that maybe we have a division of labor and maybe the Europeans do a bit more on one file and the Americans do a little bit more on the file, keeping coordinated but maybe delegating a bit more or getting a bit better. In the previous era, we were used to do everything together. And I think that's this this last four years have made us understand that we do have a space for our own initiatives. And so you, you learn in Italian we have a say I'm not sure it exists in English that you make of an assess virtue out of necessity. If you're forced to face a difficulty you try to turn it into an opportunity. If there has been an opportunity in these last years is that we are we Europeans have realized that there are some issues on which we can disagree with Washington. And this is not the best possible option but it's possible. And we have a role to play in any case as Europeans and sometimes take the Iran deal, a life saving role for some international agreements. We prefer to go together with Washington but if not, we can go alone. Again, I would expect that with a Biden administration that would not happen again, not going alone. But there might be files on which we, we might as Europeans or our American friends on the other side. Keep some more, some more space and prioritizing the common action on the files that absolutely require us to work to hand in hands together because otherwise they don't move forward on a global level. Thank you very much for that assessment. We wait to see who we will be dealing with. I have a question here which brings our discussion to China. And it's from Karen, excuse me, Karen Ferris of her view. And she says there's a growing international concern regarding China's approach to quelling in China descent and dealing with minority groups. And her view is the EU willing to have an honest conversation with China, and how might the EU act as a positive influencer to encourage other countries to take a more critical approach in their engagement with China. This is, thank you for the question I think this is a critical question. The European Union is already having a very candid conversation with the Chinese authorities, not only the authorities also the city society in China. I think this is still the practice. It was in any case during my five years. The European Union has human rights dialogues with China, which are very candid and for what concerns me personally my personal experience every time I visited China, that happened quite often. I also had always meetings with city representatives, obviously very discreetly and pay attention, first and foremost to their security but that always happened. And our conversations and the European Union conversations with the Chinese authorities have always been very candid on this, which is something that the Chinese authorities have, I think, well not always liked, that's clear. I somehow appreciated in this respect that when you when you interact with the European Union, you might have elements that you don't like. For instance, the accent put on human rights and civil society empowerment. But you know what you get. There's no surprise, the European Union values and viewpoints and policies are transparent are solid. Let me add, sometimes need a little bit more of consistency inside the European Union. This helps also projecting them outside of the European Union, the more we are strict on our own standards on human rights, the better we manage to promote them outside. But this is another story. But the conversation is candid and sometimes it's constructive. I would say that I think the Chinese authorities recognize the, the consistency and the transparency and the correct approach of the European Union to this issues, which is never instrumental to other other elements it's always purely and on human rights issues. It's never a transactional approach, such as saying, which other actors sometimes play saying, you know, for us human rights discussions are aimed at creating an environment where inside a bigger negotiations then we can get something else out of you and then we'll forget about human rights. No, the Europeans stick to human rights issues, even when it's only about human rights. I have to say the problem here is that, first, sometimes we are a bit left alone. There's not many others in the world that are so firm and stubborn, I would say, on support of civil society and human rights issues, minority issues, not only with China with with all our interlocutors. We were talking about the United States. I will always remember there was one particular day when the at the time. Secretary of State of the United States had a public statements saying that human rights were not the guiding principle of US foreign policy anymore. In that particular moment, there were two players in the world, three players in the world that felt very lonely, the European Union, the United Nations and Canada. But then we connected among ourselves and we tried to keep up the good causes. Today, we are not, there's not many other international players that puts human rights on top of their foreign policy agenda. We are, I think, still among them, and probably the best champions of human rights in the world. And here, to me, the key is this, to be open and transparent with China, for instance, we have not only different standards on human rights, we have different political systems. We are a democracy based continent and differences can be spelled out very frankly. We are competitors or we are even even we defined even rivals in one of the last policy policies that we issued on on relations with China. And we can have a frank and open and constructive hopefully conversation with the Chinese authorities provided and I will finish with that on this question, provided that we are also open to discuss our own foreign policy, human rights issues. Because the European Union also is not perfect. I mean, we are, as I said, we are probably the best place to be in terms of human rights in the world, human rights, social rights, gender rights, for sure there's no better place than Europe. But we are far, far from from being a perfect place when it comes to human rights respect and promotion. And we have a long way to go. And I think we need to be open to criticism. When it comes to our own human rights policies. I think, for instance, of some elements of how we treated the migration crisis that so called migration crisis during 2015 2016, where some criticism from our interlocutors where I think grounded, or some criticism we might face on some shortcomings we can have on rule of law and and respect of diversity in our societies, or minorities. So we need to be open to criticism and this gives us the credibility to discuss other other countries shortcomings as well. Thank you for that. And thank you for that reminder that we do need, indeed, sometimes to turn the mirror back on ourselves and to assess how we are doing before we go forth with other countries. I'm going to exercise my blogger to this chairman to ask you about an area that you know very well about Iran. I just wanted to ask, what is your view of the Iranian, can you assess the Iranian role in the region as it is now. And also, what is your view of the future of the JCPOA the nuclear agreement and where that that is likely to go. I'll start from the second part of the question because I guess, well, imagine, I find it easier than the previous one. I think that we managed so far to save somehow, far from ideal, but save somehow the deal. It is not completely that. And I have to say, I would say, nobody would have expected that a few years ago. This was because the European Union, first and foremost member states kept a strong position on that. The UK included, let me say so, always at all stages, perfect unity there. The rest of the international community, Russia, China, all the rest of the international community from Africa to Asia to Latin America to the UN system, all behind that agreement. I would say that only a couple of a couple of UN member states were actually not behind the agreement for implementation, but we managed to preserve and keep the unity and I have also to say the Iranian leadership has shown on that particular file. Well, they could have, they could have for sure implemented on their side more, but after the after the decision to the Trump administration to leave the agreement. But they kept implementing the agreement for a long time in difficult circumstances. So I would say that they had shown at that time, resilience and determination on staying on the right track. And they I think they need to be this need to be recognized. So I think that if I've always been convinced of that if the if the deal was not killed in the moment when the Trump administration decided to leave it. Then it is still possible with another administration coming in. Hopefully it's not mystery that I would hope for one result, rather than another. I would expect that one of the first moves would be to restore the full compliance to the GCPOA. Look at ways to do that because it's complicated to go back to the full compliance to the GCPOA. But I would, I would expect and I would advise a new US administration to put that among the first priorities in foreign policy and security policy. Let me stress security policy because this is not a foreign policy deal. This is a no proliferation deal. This is a nuclear no proliferation deal. So for us Europeans are always being clear this is security related need and priority, because we are so far that having a nuclear Iran would be too dangerous for us and for the region. The Middle East just misses a nuclear arm race and then and then we don't miss anything else. The Iranian role in the region has been somehow linked to that. The Iran nuclear deal was never intended to be a regional cooperative tree deal intentionally from the beginning regional dynamics were left outside of the negotiating table. Right or wrong. This was a decision taken back in the beginning of the of the negotiations 2003 long time ago. This was the mandate we had to negotiate only nuclear things not regional dynamics but no mystery in the moment when the nuclear deal was achieved and then implemented and signed and ratified everything. When it entered into force, it was clear that this would have constituted a building block of a different kind of regional dynamic, a more cooperative regional dynamic. In Europe we know very well in Ireland as well. You can, you can be former enemies, you can still not be friends, but you can learn to live next to each other in peace, and in some forms of cooperation. You can turn from being enemies to being in Europe, even part of the same political union, but far from that, you don't need to become friends. You can keep your differences and divergences and even conflicts, but you can learn to be conflict and live together in a sustainable manner because you don't change geography. That's a given. There are a few things you can't change in life you can't change geography you can't change history, and you can't choose your parents. Apart from that probably everything is possible to be changed, but you can't change geography. And Iran is there is not going to disappear. So the, the nuclear deal was also intended to be the beginning of a different kind of process, where the regional powers could come together, possibly together with the European Union with the United States with others at the same scene, and find a way to build a sustainable framework for regional cooperation, non-conflictual living together on the model of the Helsinki process in Europe on the model of even of the reconciliation we faced in Europe after the Second World War. And I am convinced personally that this would have been possible. I'm still convinced that this would be possible. I'm still convinced that there is enough political will for doing that in the region. I'm, because, because the region has everything to lose from a conflict. And it's a rich interconnected region. You look at the economy. You look at the connections, even look at the flights, and you understand that the links are there. So using the economic potential of a living together would be I think an incredible incentive, but you need, you need an international environment to go there and you need the Iran nuclear deal to be fully in place for the going there and we're not there. The conditions I think are still there, but obviously that would require a different kind of approach from, from, let's say from the global scene, but I'm convinced that Europe could play still a role there, because it's a privileged partner for the Gulf countries, and for the Arab League, very strong partner, and it's a trusted interlocutor, I wouldn't say partner, but it's a trusted interlocutor for Iran. Thank you so much for that. Regrettably, I think we only have room for one last question and in doing putting the question I will pass on greetings to you from an old friend from Brussels days who was the British ambassador to Ireland for Johnson. And he has a question which I have also a couple of questions of similar, similar nature, which is, how do you see the internal EU debate by strategic autonomy. Another of our questioners says that Paul Hohner from UCD says that it seems to have different interpretations across different agencies, strategic autonomy. Yes. First of all, great to hear the question Paul and greetings back. Strategic autonomy. I always refer to it as a cooperative autonomy. But this is, this is my trademark. This has been the way in which I presented it. I think that's the European way. You can call it strategic autonomy. The European way is this. To go alone, if needed, but to go together, whatever possible, together with others to look for cooperation on a structural basis systematically within the transatlantic framework with NATO when it comes to security with the UN system. The European DNA is looking for partnerships and going together with others. So strategic autonomy has nothing to do with isolation or the temptation of going alone. If you look at the etymology of autonomy, and you look at the roots of the world, it means, and Paul has listened to me saying this many times in formal meetings autonomy means the capacity to define your own rules by yourself has a lot to do with sovereignty is a lot to do with the capacity to determine your own. Yes, your own norms by yourself to not to be subject to an external decision making body on your own decisions. I think it is only natural for the European Union to have a certain level of strategic autonomy. And that I am 100% sure it's not, it would be contradictory to our history. Otherwise, I'm convinced this would not bring the European Union to being either conflictual or isolated towards others. I think that actually being strategically autonomous would help us building partnerships with others because you, you fear partnerships when you don't feel safe enough secure enough in your own autonomy. And then entering into a partnership with another might put in danger your own, your own capacity to decide for yourself. But I'm pretty sure I don't see it otherwise. The European Union strategic autonomy will always be a cooperative one. No way it can be different and in particular, a very strong transatlantic bonds and I know this is not the case for islands as a member states of the European Union but a very strong tie with NATO when it comes to to security cooperation, talking about the European Union. And regretfully, we have come to the end of our discussion. I have absolutely no doubt that we could go on for another hour, but it has been a wonderfully rich discussion. And I want to thank you so much director for sharing your experience of your time as my representative and also looking forward to future and laying down some paths for us for the European Union. Because as we go forward in this strange time, which hopefully we will not last and that we can have you sometime in the future in actually present in Dublin again, but it has been a wonderful discussion to start off the inauguration of the global Europe program. Thank you most sincerely again and wish you the very best in your new role as rector of the College of Europe, which has given us so many of our diplomats and diplomats around Europe. So thank you most sincerely for that again. Thank you very much and looking forward to being present in person in Dublin or to welcome you all and Bruce in the moment when this will be possible again. And thank you again for the opportunity and looking forward for further cooperation.