 This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer Please visit LibriVox.org The anti-Federalist Papers section 35 Brutus letter 15 Read by ML Cohen Cleveland, Ohio May 2007 I said in my last number that the Supreme Court under this Constitution would be exalted above all other power in the government and subject to no control The business of this paper will be to illustrate this and to show the danger that will result from it. I Question whether the world ever saw in any period of it a court of justice Invested with such immense powers and yet placed in a situation so little responsible Certain it is that in England and in the several states where we have been taught to believe The courts of law are put upon the most prudent establishment They are on a very different footing The judges in England it is true hold their offices during their good behavior But then their determinations are subject to correction by the House of Lords and Their power is by no means so extensive as that of the proposed Supreme Court of the Union I believe they in no instance assume the authority to set aside an act of Parliament under the idea that it is inconsistent with their Constitution They consider themselves bound to decide according to the existing laws of the land and Never undertake to control them by a judging that they are inconsistent with the Constitution Much less are they vested with the power of giving an equitable construction to the Constitution? The judges in England are under the control of the legislature for they are bound to determine according to the laws passed by them But the judges under this Constitution will control the legislature For the Supreme Court are authorized in the last resort to determine. What is the extent of the powers of the Congress? They are to give the Constitution an explanation and there is no power above them to set aside their judgment The framers of this Constitution appear to have followed that of the British in rendering the judges Independent by granting them their offices during good behavior Without following the Constitution of England and instituting a tribunal in which their errors may be corrected and Without adverting to this that the judicial under this system have a power which is above the legislative and Which indeed transcends any power before given to a judicial by any free government under heaven I do not object to the judges holding their commissions during good behavior. I suppose it is a proper provision provided They were made properly responsible But I say this system has followed the English government in this While it has departed from almost every other principle of their jurisprudence under the idea of rendering the judges independent Which in the British Constitution means no more than they hold their places during good behavior and have fixed salaries They have made the judges independent in the fullest sense of the world There is no power above them to control any of their decisions There is no authority that can remove them and they cannot be controlled by the laws of the legislature In short, they are independent of the people of the legislature and of every power under heaven Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself Before I proceed to illustrate the truth of these assertions. I beg liberty to make one remark Though in my opinion the judges ought to hold their offices during good behavior Yet I think it is clear that the reasons in favor of this establishment of the judges of England Do by no means apply to this country The great reason assigned why the judges in Britain ought to be commissioned during good behavior is this that they may be placed in a situation not to be influenced by the crown to give such decisions as would tend to increase its powers and prerogatives While the judges held their place at the will and pleasure of the king on whom they depended not only for their offices But also for their salaries. They were subject to every undue influence If the crown wished to carry a favorite point to accomplish which the aid of the courts of law was necessary the pleasure of the king would be signified to the judges and It required the spirit of a martyr for the judges to determine contrary to the king's will They were absolutely depended upon him both for their offices and livings the king Holding his office during life and transmitting it to his posterity as an inheritance Has much stronger inducements to increase the prerogatives of his office than those who all their offices for stated periods or even for life Hence the English nation gained a great point in favor of liberty When they obtained the appointment of judges during good behavior They got from the crown to concession Which deprived it of one of the most powerful engines with which it might enlarge the boundaries of the royal prerogative and encroach on the liberties of the people But these reasons do not apply to this country. We have no hereditary monarch Those who appoint the judges do not hold their offices for life nor do they descend to their children The same arguments therefore which will conclude in favor of the tenor of the judges offices for good behavior Lose a considerable part of their weight when applied to the state and condition of America But much less can it be shown that to nature of our government requires that the court should be placed beyond all account more Independent so much so as to be above control I have said that the judges under this system will be independent in a strict sense of the word to prove this I will show that there is no power above them that can control their decisions or correct their errors There is no authority that can remove them from office for any errors or want of capacity or lower their salaries and In many cases their power is superior to that of the legislature First There is no power above them that can correct their errors or control their decisions The adjudications of this court are final and irreversible For there is no court above them to which appeals can lie either in error or on the merits in This respect it differs from the courts in England For there the house of lords is the highest court to whom appeals in error are carried from the highest of the courts of law second They cannot be removed from office or suffer a diminution in their salaries for any error in judgment or want of capacity It is expressly declared by the Constitution quote That they shall at stated times receive a compensation for their services Which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office end quote The only clause in the Constitution which provides for the removal of the judges from office is that which declares that quote The president vice president and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for and convictions of treason bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors end quote By this paragraph Civil officers in which the judges are included are removable only for crimes treason and bribery are named and The rest are included under the general terms of high crimes and misdemeanors Errors and judgment or Want of capacity to discharge duties of the office can never be supposed to be included in the words high crimes and misdemeanors a Man may mistake a case in giving judgment or manifest that he is incompetent to the discharge of the duties of a judge and Yet give no evidence of corruption or want of integrity To support the charge it will be necessary to give an evidence some facts that will show That the judges committed the error from wicked and corrupt motives third The power of this court is in many cases superior to that of the legislature. I Have showed in a former paper that this court will be authorized to decide upon the meaning of the Constitution and That not only according to the natural and obvious meaning of the words but also according to the spirit and intention of it in The exercise of this power they will not be subordinate to but above the legislature For all the departments of this government will receive their powers so far as they are expressed in the Constitution From the people immediately who are the source of power The legislature can only exercise such powers as are given them by the Constitution They cannot assume any of the rights annexed to the judicial for this plain reason that the same authority which vested the legislature with their powers Vested the judicial with theirs Both are derived from the same source Both therefore are equally valid and the judicial hold their powers independently of the legislature as the legislature do of the judicial The Supreme Court then have a right independent of the legislature to give a construction to the Constitution and every part of it And there is no power provided in this system to correct their construction or do it away If therefore the legislature pass any laws Inconsistent with this sense the judges put upon the Constitution They will declare it void and therefore in this respect their power is superior to that of the legislature In England the judges are not only subject to have their decisions set aside by the House of Lords for error But in cases where they give an explanation to the laws or Constitution of the country contrary to the sense of Parliament Though the Parliament will not set aside the judgment of the court yet They have authority by a new law to explain a former one and by this means to prevent a reception of such decisions But no such power is in the legislature the judges are supreme and no law Explanatory of the Constitution will be binding on them from the preceding remarks which have been made on the judicial powers proposed in this system The policy of it may be fully developed. I Have in the course of my observations on this Constitution Affirmed an endeavor to show that it was calculated to abolish entirely the state governments and to melt down the states into one entire government For every purpose as well internal and local as external and national In this opinion the opposers of the system have generally agreed and this has been uniformly denied by its advocates in public Some individuals indeed among them will confess that it has this tendency and scruple not to say it is what they wish and I will venture to predict without the spirit of prophecy that if it is adopted without amendments or Some such precautions as will ensure amendments immediately after its adoption That the same gentlemen who have employed their talents and ability with such success to influence the public mind to adopt this plan Will employ the same to persuade the people that it will be for their good to abolish the state governments as useless and burdensome Perhaps nothing could be better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the state governments than the Constitution of the Judicial They will be able to extend the limits of the general government gradually and by insensible degrees and to accommodate themselves to the temper of the people Their decisions on the meaning of the Constitution will commonly take place in cases which arise between individuals With which the public will not be generally acquainted One adjudication will form a precedent to the next and this to a following one These cases will immediately affect individuals only so that a series of determinations will probably take place Before even the people will be informed of them In the meantime all the art and address of those who wish for a change will be employed to make converts to their opinion The people will be told that their state officers and state legislatures are a burden and expense without affording any solid advantage For that all the laws passed by them might be equally well made by the general legislature If to those will be interested in the change be added Those will be under the influence and such who will submit to almost any change of government Which they can be persuaded to believe will ease them of taxes It is easy to see the part of will favor the abolition of the state governments will be far from being inconsiderable In this situation the general legislature might pass one law after another Extending the general and abridging the state jurisdictions and to sanction their proceedings would have a course of decisions of the judicial To whom the Constitution has committed the power of explaining the Constitution If the states remonstrated The constitutional mode of citing upon the validity of the law is with the Supreme Court and Neither people nor state legislatures nor the general legislature can remove them or reverse their decrees Had the construction of the Constitution been left with the legislature they would have explained it at their peril if they exceed their powers or sought to find in the spirit of the Constitution more than was expressed in the letter the People from whom they derive their power could remove them and do themselves right and Indeed I can see no other remedy that the people can have against their rulers for encroachments of this nature a Constitution is a compact of a people with their rulers if the rulers break the compact The people have a right and ought to remove them and do themselves justice But in order to enable them to do this with the greater facility Those whom the people choose at stated periods should have the power in the last resort to determine the sense of the compact If they determine contrary to the understanding of the people an appeal will lie to the people at the period when the rulers are to be elected And they will have it in their power to remedy the evil But when this power is lodged in the hands of men independent of the people and of their representatives and who are not constitutionally accountable for their opinions No way is left to control them, but with a high hand and an outstretched arm Brutus end of anti-Federalist papers section 35 Brutus letter 15. This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Anti-Federalist papers section 36 Brutus letter 16 10 April 1788 When great and extraordinary powers are vested in any man or body of men Which in their exercise may operate to the oppression of the people It is of high importance that powerful checks should be formed to prevent the abuse of it Perhaps no restraints are more forcible than such as a rise from responsibility to some superior power Hence it is that the true policy of a Republican government is Deframing in such a manner that all persons who are concerned in the government are made accountable to some superior for their conduct in office This responsibility should ultimately rest with the people To have a government well administered in all its parts It is requisite the different departments of it should be separated and lodged as much as they may be in different hands The legislative power should be in one body The executive in another and judicial in one different from either But still each of these bodies should be accountable for their conduct Hence it is impracticable perhaps to maintain a perfect distinction between these several departments For it is difficult if not impossible to call to account the several officers in government Without in some degree mixing the legislative and judicial The legislature in a free republic are chosen by the people at stated periods and their responsibility Consist in there being amenable to the people When the term for which they are chosen shall expire Who will then have the opportunity to displace them if they disapprove of their conduct? But it would be improper that your judicial should be elective because their business requires that they should possess a degree of law knowledge Which is acquired only by a regular education and Besides it is fit that they should be placed in a certain degree in an independent situation that they may maintain firmness and steadiness in their decisions As the people therefore ought not to elect the judges they cannot be amenable to them immediately Some other mode of amenability should be devised for these as well as for all other officers Which do not spring from the immediate choice of the people This is to be affected by making one court subordinate to another and by giving them cognizance of the behavior of all officers But on this plan we at last arrive at some supreme over whom there is no power to control, but the people themselves This supreme controlling power should be in the choice of the people or else you establish an authority Independent and not amenable at all, which is repugnant to the principles of a free government Agreeable to these principles I suppose the supreme judicial ought to be liable to be called to account for any misconduct by somebody of men who depend upon the people for their Places and so also should all other great officers of the state who are not made amenable to some superior officers This policy seems in some measure to have been in view of the framers of the new system and to have given rise to the Institution of a court of impeachments How far this court will be properly qualified to execute the trust Which will be reposed in them will be the business of a future paper to investigate To prepare the way to do this it shall be the business of this to make some remarks upon the Constitution and powers of the Senate with whom the power of trying impeachments is lodged The following things may be observed with respect to the Constitution of the Senate First they are to be elected by the legislatures of the states and not by the people And each state is to be represented by an equal number Second they are to serve for six years Except that one third of those first chosen are to go out of office at the expiration of two years one third at the expiration of four years and one third at the expiration of six years After which this rotation is to be preserved, but still every member will serve for the term of six years Third if vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise during the recess of the legislator of any state The executive is authorized to make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature four No person can be a senator who has not arrived to the age of 30 years Been nine years a citizen of the United States and who is not at the time He is elected an inhabitant of the state for which he is elected The appointment of members of Senate among the states is not according to numbers or importance of the states, but is equal this on the plan of a consolidated government is Unequal and improper, but is proper on the system of confederation on this principle. I approve of it It is indeed the only feature of any importance in the Constitution of a confederate government It was obtained after a vigorous struggle of that part of the convention who were in favor of preserving the state governments It is to be regretted that they were not able to have infused other principles into that plan To have secured the government of the respective states and to have marked with sufficient precision the line between them and the general government The term for which the Senate are to be chosen isn't my judgment too long and no provision being made for a rotation Will I conceive be of dangerous consequence. It is difficult to fix the precise period for which the Senate should be chosen It is a matter of opinion and our sentiments on the matter must be formed by attending to certain principles Some of the duties which are to be performed by the Senate seemed evidently to point out the propriety of their term of service Being extended beyond the period of that of the assembly Besides as they are designed to represent the aristocracy of the country It seems fit that they should possess more stability and so continue a longer period than that branch who represent the democracy The business of making treaties and some other which it will be proper to commit by the Senate Requires that they should have experience and therefore that they should remain some time in office to acquire it But still it is of equal importance That they should not be so long in office has to be likely to forget the hand that formed them or be insensible of their interests Men long in office are very apt to feel themselves independent and to form and pursue interests separate from those who appointed them and This is more likely to be the case with the Senate as they will for the most part of the time be absent from the state They represent and associate with such companies will possess very little of the feelings of the middling class of people For it is to be remembered that there is to be a federal city and the inhabitants of it will be the great and the mighty of the earth For these reasons I would shorten a term of their service to four years Six years is a long period for a man to be absent from his home. It would have a tendency to wean him from his constituents a Rotation in the Senate will also in my opinion be of great use It is probable that senators once chosen for a state will as the system now stands Continue an office for life The office will be honorable if not lucrative the persons who occupy it will probably wish to continue in it and therefore use all their Influence in that of their friends to continue an office Their friends will be numerous and powerful for they will have it in their power to confer great favors Besides it will before long be considered as disgraceful not to be re-elected It will therefore be considered as a matter of delicacy to the character of the senator not to return him again Everybody acquainted with public affairs knows how difficult it is to remove from office a person who has long been in it It is seldom done except in cases of gross misconduct. It is rare that want of Compatibility procures it To prevent this inconvenience I can see if it would be wise to determine that a senator should not be eligible after he had served for the period Assigned by the Constitution for a certain number of years Perhaps three would be sufficient a Farther benefit would be derived from such an arrangement It would give opportunity to bring forward a greater number of men to serve their country and would return those who had served to their state and Afford them the advantage of becoming better acquainted with the condition and politics of their constituents It farther appears to me proper that the legislature should retain the right which they now hold under the confederation of recalling their members It seems an evident dictative reason that when a person authorizes another to do a piece of business for him He should retain the power to displace him when he does not conduct according to his pleasure The power in the state legislature is under confederation has not been exercised to the injury of the government Nor do I see any danger. It's being so exercised under the new system. It may operate much to the public benefit These brief remarks are all I shall make on the organization of the Senate The powers with which they are invested will require more in minute investigation This body will possess a strange mixture of legislative Executive and judicial powers which in my opinion will in some cases class with each other One They are one branch of the legislature and in this respect will possess equal powers in all cases with the House of Representatives For I consider the clause which gives the House of Representatives the right of originating bills for raising revenue as merely nominal Seeing the Senate be authorized to propose or concur with amendments to They are a branch of the executive in the appointment of ambassadors and public ministers and in the appointment of all other officers Not otherwise provided for whether the forming of treaties in which they are joined with the president Apportains to the legislature or the executive part of government or to neither is not material Third they are part of the judicial for they form the court of impeachments It has been a long established maxim that the legislative executive and judicial departments and government should be kept distinct It is said I know that this cannot be done and Therefore that this maximum is not just or at least that it should only extend to certain leading features in the government I admit that this distinction cannot be perfectly preserved In a do-balanced government It is perhaps absolutely necessary to give the executive qualified legislative powers and the legislative or a branch of them Judicial powers in the last resort It may possibly also in some special cases be advisable to associate the legislature or a branch of it with the executive in The exercise of acts of great national importance But still the maximum is a good one and a separation of these powers should be sought as far as is practicable. I Can scarcely imagine that any of the advocates of the system will pretend that it was necessary to accumulate all these powers in the Senate There is a propriety in the Senate's possessing legislative powers This is the principal end which should be held in view of their appointment. I Need not hear repeat what has so often and ably been advanced on the subject of a division of the legislative power into two branches The arguments in favor of it. I think conclusive But I think it equally evident that a branch of the legislature should not be invested with the power of appointing officers This power in the Senate is very improperly lodged for a number of reasons He shall be detailed in a future number Brutus and Anti-federalist papers section 36 Brutus letter 16 the anti-federalist papers chapter 37 This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org the anti-federalist papers John DeWitt letter 1 Massachusetts October 22nd 1787 to the free citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Whoever attentively Exams the history of America and compares it with that of others. It will find its commencement its growth and its present situation without a precedent It must ever prove a source of pleasure to the philosopher Who ranges the explored parts of this inhabitable globe and takes a comparative view As well of the rise and fall of those nations Which have been and are gone As of the growth and present existence of those which are now in being To close his project with this Western world in Proportion as he loves his fellow creatures He must here admire and approve for a while They have Severely laid their foundations in the blood and slaughter of three four and sometimes ten successive generations from their passions have experienced every misery to which human nature is subject and At this day present striking features of usurped power unequal justice and despotic tyranny America stands completely Systematized without any of these misfortunes on the contrary from the first settlement of the country the Necessity of civil associations founded upon equality Consent and proportionate justice have ever been universally acknowledged The means of education always attended to and the foundations of science brought within the reach of poverty hitherto we have commenced society and advanced in all respects resembling a family without Partial affections or even a domestic bickering and if we consider her as an individual Instead of an undue proportion of violent passions and bad habits We must set her down possessive reason genius and virtue. I Presume these few observations because there are too many among us of narrow minds Who live in the balance of blasting the reputation of their own country? They hold it as a maxim that virtues cannot grow in their own soil They will appreciate those of a man. They know nothing about Because he is an exotic while they are sure to depreciate those much more brilliant In their neighbors because they are really acquainted with and know them Our society is a blessing. It is here universally known as such the education of every child in this country tends to promote it There is scarcely a citizen in America who does not wish to bring it Consistent with our situation and circumstances to its highest state of improvement Nay I may say further that the people in general aim to affect this point in a peaceable laudable and rational way These assertions are proved by stubborn facts and I need only resort to that moment when in Contest with a powerful enemy they paid such an unprecedented attention to civilization as to select from among themselves Their different conventions and form their several constitutions Which for their beautiful theoretical structure caught the admiration of our enemies and secured to us the applause of the world We at this day feel the effects of this disposition and now live under a government of our own choice constructed by ourselves upon unequivocable principles and Requires but to be well administered to make us happy under it as generally falls to the lot of Humanity the disturbances in the course of the year past cannot be placed as an objection to this principle I advance They took their true rise in idleness extravagance and misfortune a want of knowledge of our several finances a Universal delusion at the close of the war and in consequence thereof a pressure of embarrassments Which checked and in many cases destroyed that disposition of forbearance, which ought to be exercised Toward each other These were added to the accursed practice of letting money at usury and some few real Difficulties and grievances which our late situation unavoidably brought upon us the issue of them however rather proves the position for a very few Inclaimables accepted we find even an anxiety to hearken to reason pervading all classes Industry and frugality increasing and the advantages arising from good wholesome laws Confessed by everyone let who will gain say it I am confident we are in a much better situation in all respects Then we were at this period the same last year and as fact as can be expected consistent with the passions and habits of a free people of Men who will think for themselves Coalescing as a correspondent observes in a late paper under a firm wise and efficient government The powers vested in Congress have hitherto been found inadequate Who are those that have been against investing them the people of this Commonwealth have very generally supposed it expedient and the farmer equally with the merchant have taken steps to affect it a Convention from the different states for that sole purpose Have been appointed of their most respectable citizens Respectable indeed. I may say for their equity for their literature and for their love of their country Their proceedings are now before us for our approbation the eagerness with which they have been received by certain classes of our fellow citizens Naturally forces upon us this question. Are we to adopt this government without an examination? Some here are who literally speaking are for pressing it upon us at all events the name of the man who but Lists a sentiment and an objection to it is to be handed to the printer By the printer to the public and by the public. He is to be led to execution They are themselves stabbing its reputation for my part I am a stranger to the necessity for all this haste. Is it not a subject of some small importance? certainly it is are not your lives your liberties and Properties intimately involved in it. Certainly. They are is it a government for a moment a day or a year? By no means but for ages altered It may possibly be but it is easier to correct before it is adopted Is it for a family a state or a small number of people? It is for a number no less respectable than three million are the enemy at our gates And have we not time to consider it certainly we have it is so simple in its form as to be Comprehended instantly every letter if I may be allowed the expression is an idea Does it consist of but few additions to our present confederation and those which have been from time to time Described among us and known to be necessary Far otherwise it is a complete system of government and armed with every power that a people in any Circumstance ought to bestow it it is a path newly struck out and a new set of ideas are introduced that have never occurred Or been digested a government for national purposes Preserving our constitution entire has been the only plan hitherto agitated. I do not pretend to say But it is in theory the most Unexceptionable and in practice will be the most conductive to our happiness of any possible to be adopted But it ought to undergo a candid and strict examination It is the duty of everyone in the Commonwealth to communicate his sentiments to his neighbor divested of passion and equally so of prejudices if they are honest And he is a real friend to his country He will do it and embrace every opportunity to do it if thoroughly looked into before it is adopted the people will be more apt to approve of it in practice and Every man is a traitor to himself and his posterity who shall ratify it with his signature Without first endeavoring to understand it We are but yet in infancy and we had better proceed slow than to fast It is much easier to dispense powers than recall them the present generation will not be drawn into any system They are too enlightened They have not forfeited their right to share in a government and they ought to enjoy it Some are heard to say when we consider them in who made it We ought to take it for sterling and without hesitation that they were the collected wisdom of the states and had no object But the general good I do not doubt all this but facts ought not to be winked out of sight They were delegated from different states and nearly equally represented though vastly Disportionate both in wealth and numbers. They had local prejudices to combat and in many instances Totally opposite interests to consult The situations their habits their extent and their particular interest Varied each from the other the gentlemen themselves acknowledged that they have been less rigid upon some points in Consequence of those difficulties than they otherwise should have been Others again tell you that the convention is or will be dissolved that we must take their Proceedings in whole or reject them, but this surely cannot be a reason for their speedy adoption It rather works the other way if evils are acknowledged in the composition We ought at least to see whose shoulders are to bear the most to compare ours with those of other states and Take care that we are not saddled with more than our proportion that the citizens of Philadelphia are running mad after it Can be no argument for us to do the like their situation is almost Contrasted with ours. They suppose themselves a central state They expect the perpetual residence of Congress which of itself alone will ensure their aggrandizement We on the contrary are sure to be near one of the extremes neither the loaves nor fishes will be so plenty with us Or shall we be so handy to procure them? We are told by some people that upon the adoption of this new government We are to become everything in a moment our foreign and domestic debts will be as a feather Our ports will be crowded with ships of all over the world Soliciting our commerce and our produce our manufacturers will increase and multiply and in short If we stand still our country not withstanding will be like the blessed Canaan a land flowing with milk and honey Let us not deceive ourselves The only excellency of any government is in exact proportion to the administration of it Idleness and luxury will be as much a bane as ever our passions will be equally at war with us Then as now and if we have men among us trying with all their ability to undermine our present Constitution these very persons will direct their force to sap their vitals of the new one upon the whole My fellow countrymen I am as much a federal man as any person in a federal union lies our political Salvation to preserve that union and make it respectable to foreign optics the national government ought to be armed with all Necessary powers, but the subject I conceive of infinite delicacy and requires both ability and reflection In discussing points of such moment America has nothing to do with passions or hard words Every citizen has an undoubted right to examine for himself neither ought He to be ill treated and abused because he does not think at the same moment exactly as we do It is true that many of us have but our liberties to lose But they are dearly bought and are not the least precious in estimation in the meantime Is it not of infinite consequence that we pursue inflexibly that path which I feel persuaded We are now approaching wherein we shall discourage all foreign importations Shall see the necessity of greater economy and industry shall smile upon the husband man and Reward the industrious mechanic shall promote the growth of our own country and where the produce of our own farms and Finally shall support measures in proportion to their honesty and wisdom without any respect to men Nothing more is wanted to make us happy at home and respectable abroad signed John DeWitt End of chapter 37 Anti-Federalist Papers chapter 38 This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer Please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Federalist Papers John DeWitt letter number two Massachusetts October 27 1787 to the free citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in my last address upon the proceedings of the federal convention I endeavored to convince you of the importance of the subject that it required a cool Dispassionate examination and a thorough investigation Previous to its adoption that it was not a mere revision and amendment of our first Constitution but a complete system for the future government of the United States and I may now add in preference to and in Exclusion of all others here to adopted. It is not temporary But in its nature perpetual it is not designed that you shall be annually called either to revise Correct or renew it, but that your posterity shall grow up under and be governed by it as well as Ourselves it is not so capable of alterations as you would at the first reading Suppose and I venture to assert it never can be unless by force of arms The fifth article in the proceedings. It is true expressly provides for an alteration under certain conditions Whenever it shall be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states or by conventions in three-fourths thereof as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress not withstanding Which such are the heterogeneous materials from which this system was formed Such is the difference of interest different manners and different local prejudices in the different parts of the United States That to obtain the majority of three-fourths to any one single alteration Essentially affecting this or any other state amounts to an absolute impossibility the conduct of the delegates in dissolving the convention Plainly speaks this language and no other their sentiments in their letter to his Excellency the president of Congress are that this Constitution was the result of a spirit of amnesty that the parties came together Disposed to concede as much as possible each to the other that mutual concessions and compromises Did in fact take place and all those which could consistent with the peculiarity of their political situation their disillusion Enforces the same sentiment by confining you to the alternative of taking or refusing their doings in the gross in this view Who is there to be found among us who can seriously assert that this? Constitution after ratification and being practiced upon will be so easy of Alteration where is the probability that a future convention in any day will be found possessed of a greater spirit of Amity and mutual concession than the present Where is the possibility that three-fourths of the states in that convention or three-fourths of the Legislatures of the different states whose interests differ Scarcely in nothing short of everything will be so very ready or willing and materially to change any part of this system Which shall be to the emollient of an individual state only Know my fellow citizens as you are now obliged to take it in the hole You must hereafter administer it in the hole without the prospect of change unless by reverting to a State of nature which will be ever opposed with success by those who approve the government in being That the Bill of Rights to accompany this proposed system is a solid objection to it Provided there is nothing exceptional in the system itself. I do not assert However, there is at any time a propriety in having one it would not have been amiss here a People entering into society Surrender such a part of their natural rights as shall be necessary for the existence of that society They are so precious in themselves that they would never be parted with Did not the preservation of the remainder require it They are entrusted in the hands of those who are very willing to receive them who are naturally fond of Exercising them and whose passions are always striving to make a bad use of them They are conveyed by a written compact expressing those which are given up and the mode in which those Reserved shall be secured language is so easy of Explanation and so difficult is it by words to convey exact ideas that the party to be governed cannot be too explicit the line cannot be drawn with too much precision and accuracy the necessity of this Accuracy and this precision Increases in proportion to the greatness of the sacrifice and the numbers who make it that a constitution for the United States Does not require a bill of rights when it is considered that a constitution for an individual state would I cannot conceive The difference between them is only in the numbers of the parties concerned They are both a compact between the governors and governed the letter of which must be adhered to By discussing their powers that which is not expressly granted is of course Retained the compact itself is a recital upon paper of that proportion of the subjects natural rights Intended to be parted with for the benefit of averting to it in case of dispute miserable indeed would be the situation of those individual states who have not prefixed to their Constitutions a bill of rights if as a very respectable learned gentleman at the southward Observes the people when they established the power of legislators under their separate governments Invested their representatives with every right and authority which they did not in explicit terms Reserve and therefore upon every question respecting the jurisdiction of the House of Assembly if the frame of Constitution is silent the jurisdiction of the House of Assembly if The frame of government is silent the jurisdiction is efficient and complete In other words those powers which the people by their Constitutions expressly give them they enjoy by positive grant and those remaining ones Which they never meant to give them and which the constitutions say nothing about they enjoy by tacit implication So that by one means and by the other they become possessed of the whole the doctrine is But poorly calculated for the meridian of America where the nature of compact the mode of constructing them And the principles upon which society is founded are so accurately known and universally diffused The insatiable thirst for unconditional control over our fellow creatures and the facility of Sounds to convey essentially different ideas Produce the first bill of rights ever prefixed to a frame of government the people although fully sensible that they receive Every title of power they did not expressly grant away Yet afraid that the words made use of to express those rights So granted might convey more than they originally intended They chose at the same moment to express in different language those rights Which the agreement did not include and which they never designed to part with endeavoring thereby to prevent any cause for future altercation and The intrusion into society of that doctrine of tacit implication Which has been the favorite theme of every tyrant from the origin of all governments to the present day the proceedings of the convention are now handed to you by your legislature and The second Wednesday in January is appointed for your final answer To enable you to give that with propriety that your future reflections may produce peace However opposed the present issue of your present conduct may be to your present expectations You must determine that in order to support with dignity the federal union It is proper and fit that the present confederation shall be annihilated that the future Congress of the United States Shall be armed with the powers of legislation Judgment and execution the annual elections in this Congress shall not be known and the most powerful body the Senate in which a Due proportion of representation is not preserved and in which the smallest state has equal weight with the largest Be the longest in duration That it is not necessary for the public good that persons habituated to the exercise of power Should ever be reminded from whence they derive it by a return to the station of private citizens But that they shall at times at the expiration of their term for which they were elected to an office Be capable of immediate reelection to that same office that you will hear after risk The probability of having the chief executive branch chosen from among you and that it is wholly indifferent both to you And your children after you whether this future government shall be administered within the territories of your own state Or at the distance of 4,000 miles from them You must also determine that they shall have the exclusive power of Imposts and the duties on imports and exports the power of laying excises and other duties and the additional power of laying Internal taxes upon your lands your goods your chattels as well as your persons at their sovereign pleasure That the produce of these several funds shall be appropriated to the use of the United States and Collected by their own officers armed with a military force if a civil aid should not prove sufficient that the power of organizing arming and Disciplining the militia shall be lodged in them and this Through fear that they shall not be sufficiently attentive to keeping so respectable a body of men as Yeomanry of this Commonwealth completely armed organized and disciplined They shall have also the power of raising supporting and Establishing a standing army in time of peace in your several towns and I see not why in your several houses That should an insurrection or an invasion, however small take place in Georgia the extremity of the continent It is highly expedient They should have the power of suspending the writ of habeas corpus in Massachusetts as long as they shall judge the public safety Requires it you must also say that your present supreme judicial court shall be an inferior court to a continental court Which is to be inferior to the supreme court of the United States That from an undue bias which they are supposed to have for the citizens of their own states They shall not be competent to determine title to your real estate disputes which may arise upon the protested bill of exchange a Simple note of hand or book debit wherein your citizens shall be Unfortunately involved with disputes of such of any other kind with citizens either of other states or foreign states In all such cases they shall have a right to carry their causes to the Supreme Court of the United States Whether for delay only or vexation however Distant from the place of your abode or inconsistent with your circumstances That such appeals shall be extended to matters of fact as well as law and a trial of the cause by jury You shall not have a right to insist upon in short my fellow citizens Previous to a capacity of giving complete answer to these proceedings You must determine that the Constitution of your Commonwealth which is instructive beautiful and consistent in practice Which has been justly admired in Europe as a model of perfection and which the present convention have affected to imitate a Constitution which is especially calculated for your territory and is made Comfortable to your genius your habits the mode of holding your estates and your particular interests Shall be reduced in its powers to those of a city corporation the skeleton of it may remain But its vital principle shall be transferred to the new government Nay, you must go still further and agree to invest the new government with powers Which you have yet thought proper to withhold from your own present government All these and more are contained in the proceedings of the federal Constitution may be highly proper and necessary It is this overturn of all individual governments in a new-fashioned set of ideas and In this total dereliction of those sentiments which animated us in 1775 the political salvation of the United States may be very deeply interested, but be cautious signed John DeWitt End of chapter 38 the anti-federalist papers chapter 39 This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox org The anti-federalist papers John DeWitt letter number three Massachusetts November 5th 1787 to the free citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Civil liberty in all countries has promoted by a free discussion of public measures and conduct of public men the freedom of the press Hash in consequence thereof been esteemed one of its safeguards The freedom gives the right at all times to every citizen to lay his sentiments in a decent manner Before the people if he will take that trouble upon himself Whether they are in point or not his countrymen are obliged to him for so doing For at least they lead to an examination of the subject upon which he writes If any possible situation makes it a duty It is our present important one for in the course of 60 or 90 days You are to approve of or reject the present proceedings of your constitution Which if established will certainly affect in a greater or less degree During the remainder of your lives those privileges which you esteem dear to you and not Improbably those of your children for succeeding ages now therefore is Unquestionably the proper time to examine it and see if it really is what upon paper It appears to be if with your eyes open you deliberately accept it However different it may prove in practice from what it appears in theory you will have nobody to blame but yourselves and What is infinitely worse as I have before endeavored to observe to you you will be wholly without remedy It has many zealous advocates and they have attempted at least as far as their modesty would permit lies our gazettes with their Cummins upon it with the people they have to manage I would hint to them their zeal is not their best weapon the exertions of such a kind Artful attempts to seize the moment do seldom tend either to elucidate and explain principles or ensure Successes such conduct ought to be an additional stimulus for those persons who are not its professed admirers To speak their sentiments with freedom however unpopular such conduct ought to inspire caution For as a man is invariably known by his company so is the tendency of principles known by their advocates Nay, it ought to lead you to inquire who are its advocates whether ambitious men throughout America Waiting with impatience to make it a stepping stone to posts of honor and emilient are not of this class whether men who openly profess to be tired of Republican governments and Sick to the heart of Republican measures who daily ridicule a government of choice and pray ardently for one of force are Not of the same class and whether there are not men among us who disapprove of it only because it is not an absolute Monarchy, but who upon the whole are among its advocates in such examinations as these you cannot Misspend a proportion of the sixty days All contracts are to be construed according to the meaning of the parties at the time of making them By which is meant that mutual communications shall take place and each shall explain to the other Their ideas of the contract before them if any unfair practices are made use of if it's real Tendency is concealed by either party or any advantage taken in the execution of it It is itself fraudulent and may be avoided. There is no difference in the Constitution of government Consent it is allowed is the spring the form is the mode in which the people choose to direct their efforts and The magistrates are but trustees to put that mode in force It will not be denied that this people of any under heaven have a right of living under a government of their own choosing That government originally consented to which is in practice what it purports to be in theory is a government of choice On the contrary that which is essentially different in practice from its appearance in theory However, it may be in a letter a government of choice. It never can be so in spirit Of this latter kind appear to me to be the proceedings of the federal convention They are presented as a frame of government purely Republican and Perfectly consistent with the individual governments in the Union It is declared to be constructed for national purposes only and not calculated to interfere with domestic concerns You are told that the rights of the people are very aptly secured and when the wheels of it are put in motion It will wear a milder aspect than its present one Whereas the very contrary of all this doctrine appears to be true upon an attentive examination You can pronounce it nothing less than a government which in a few years will degenerate to a complete aristocracy Armed with the powers Unnecessary in any case to bestow and which in its vortex swallow up every other government upon the continent in short My fellow citizens it can be said to be nothing less than a hasty stride to universal empire in this Western world Flattering very flattering to young ambitious minds, but fatal to the liberties of the people The cord is strained to the very utmost there is every spice of the sick jubio Possible in the composition your consent is requested because it is essential to the introduction of it After having received confirmation your complaints may increase the whistling of the wind and they will be equally Regarded it cannot be doubted at this day by any means of common sense that there is a charm in politics That persons who enter reluctantly into office become habituated grow fond of it and are loath to resign it They feel themselves flattered and elevated and are apt to forget their constituents Until the time returns that they again feel the want of them. They unfortunately exercise all the powers granted to them and 99 in a hundred are for grasping at more it is this passionate thirst for power Which has produced different branches to exercise different departments and mutual checks upon those branches the aristocratical Hath ever been found to have the most influence and the people in most countries have been particularly Attentive in providing checks against it. Let us see if it is the case here a President a Senate and a House of Representatives are proposed The judicial department is at present out of the question being separated Accepting in impeachments the legislature is divided between the people who are the Democratical in the Senate who are the aristocratical part and the executive between the same Senate and the President Who represents the monarchical part in the construction of this system their interests are put in opposite scales If they are exactly balanced the government will remain perfect if there is a Proponency it will firmly prevail After the first four years each senator will hold his seat for the term of six years This length of time will be amply sufficient of itself to remove any checks that he may have upon his Independency from the fear of a future election He will consider that it is a serious portion of his life After the age of 30 that places an honor and trust are not generally obtained Unsolicited the same means that placed him there may be again made use of His influence and his abilities rising from his opportunities will during this whole term Increase those means he will have a complete negative upon all Laws that shall be general or that shall favor individuals and a voice in the appointment of all officers in the United States Thus habituated to power and living in the daily practice of granting favors and receiving Solicitations he may hold himself completely independent of the people and at the same time ensure his election if there remains even a risque The blessed assistance of a little well distributed money will remove it with respect to the executive the Senate Accepting in nomination have a negative upon the president and if we but a moment attend to their Situation and to his and to the power of persuasion over the human mind Especially when employed in behalf of friends and favorites We cannot hesitate to say that he will be infinitely less apt to dislodge them than they to refuse him It is far easier for 20 to gain over one than 120 besides in the one case we can ascertain where the denial comes from and The other we cannot it is also highly improbable But some of the members perhaps a majority part will hold their seats during their lives We see this daily in our own government and we see it in every government We are acquainted with however many the cautions and however frequent the elections these considerations added to their share Above mentioned in the executive department must give them a decided superiority over the House of Representatives But that superiority is greatly enhanced when we consider the difference of time for which they are chosen They will have become adepts in the mystery of administration while the House of Representatives may be composed Perhaps two-thirds of members just entering into office little used to the course of business and totally unacquainted with the means made use of to accomplish it Very possible also in a country where there are total strangers But my fellow citizens the important question here arises who are this House of Representative a Representative assembly says the celebrated Mr. Adams in the sense of the people and the perfection of the portrait Consists in the likeness can this assembly be said to contain the sense of the people? Do they resemble the people in any one feature do you represent your wants your grievances your wishes in person? If that is impractical have you a right to send one of your townsmen for that purpose? Have you a right to send one from your country? Have you a right to send more than one for every 30,000 of you? Can he be presumed knowing to your different peculiar situations your abilities to pay? Public taxes when they ought to be abated and when increased or is there any possibility of giving him information? All these questions must be answered in the negative, but how are these men to be chosen? Is there any other way than by dividing the Senate into districts? May not you as well at once invest your annual assemblies with the power of choosing them? Where is the essential difference the nature of the thing will admit of none? Nay, you may give them the power to prescribe the mode They may invest it in themselves if you choose them yourself You must take them upon credit and elect those persons, you know only by common frame Even this privilege is denied you annually through fear that you might withhold the shadow of control over them In this view of the Senate, let me sincerely ask you where is the people of this House of Representatives? Where is the boasted popular part of this much-admired system? Are they not cousins, germane in every sense to the Senate? May they not with propriety be termed an assistant aristocratical branch? Who will be infinitely more inclined to cooperate and compromise with each other than to be the careful guardians of the rights of their constituents? Who is there among you would not start at being told that instead of your present House of Representatives Consisting of members chosen from every town your future houses are to consist of a ten in number and These to be chosen by districts What man among you should betray his country and approve of it and yet? How infinitely preferable to the plan proposed in the one case the elections would be annual The persons elected would reside in the center of you their interests would be yours They would be subject to your immediate control and nobody to consult in their Deliberations, but in the other they are chosen for double the time during which however well-disposed They become strangers to the very people choosing them. They reside at a distance from you You have no control over them You cannot observe their conduct and they have to consult and finally be guided by 12 other states Whose interests are in all material points directly opposed to yours. Let me again ask you What citizen is there in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that would deliberately consent laying aside the mode? proposed that the several sentence of the several states should be the popular branch and Together from one national House of Representatives and yet one moment's attention Will a vice to you that this blessed proposed representation of the people this apparent faithful mirror this striking likeness is To be still further refined and more aristocratical four times told where now is the exact balance Which has been so diligently attended to where lies the security of the people what? Assurances have they that either their taxes will not be extracted But in the greatest emergencies and then sparingly or that standing armies will be raised and supported for the very plausible Purpose only of cantoning them upon their frontiers. There is but one answer to these questions They have none nor was it intended by the makers. They should have for meaning to make a different use of the ladder They never will be at a loss for ways and means to expend the former They do not design to beg a second time knowing the danger of frequent applications to the people They ask for the whole at once and are now by their conduct tearing and absolutely haunting of you into a compliance If you choose all these things should take place by all means gratify them go and establish this government Which is unanimously confessed imperfect yet incapable of alteration entrusted to men subject to the same unbounded passions and infirmities as yourselves possessed with an insatiable thirst for power and Many of them carrying in their vices though tinseled and concealed yet in themselves Not less dangerous than those more naked and exposed But in the meantime add the additional weight to the stone that now covers the remains of the great Warren and Montgomery prepare an apology for the blood and treasure Profusely spent to obtain those rights which you now so timely part with Conceal yourselves from the ridicule of your enemies and bring your new England spirits to a level with the contempt of mankind Henceforth you may sit yourselves down with propriety and say Blessed are they that never expect for they shall not be Disappointed signed John DeWitt End of chapter 39 This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org the anti-federalist papers section 40 Cato letter 3 from the New York Journal October 25th 1787 The recital or premises on which the new form of government is erected Declare as a consolidation or union of all the 13 parts or states into one great whole Under the form of the United States for all the various and important purposes therein set forth But whoever seriously considers the immense extent of territory Comprehended within the limits of the United States Together with the variety of its climates productions and commerce The difference of extent and number of inhabitants in all The dissimilitude of interest morals and politics in almost every one We'll receive it as an intuitive truth that a consolidated Republican form of government therein Can never form a perfect union Establish justice ensure domestic tranquility Promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to you and your posterity For to these objects it must be directed This unkindred legislature therefore composed of interests opposite and dissimilar in their nature Will in its exercise emphatically be like a house divided against itself The governments of Europe have taken their limits in form from Adventious circumstances and nothing can be argued on the motive of agreement from them But these Adventious political principles have nevertheless produced effects that have attracted the attention of philosophy Which have established axioms in the science of politics therefrom as Irrefragable as any in Euclid. It is natural says Montesquieu to a republic to have only a small territory Otherwise it cannot long subsist in a large one. There are men of large fortunes and consequently of less moderation There are two great deposits to trust in the hands of a single subject an Ambitious person soon becomes sensible that he may be happy great and glorious by oppressing his fellow citizens And that he might raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country in large republics The public good is sacrificed to a thousand views in a small one the interest of the public is easily perceived Better understood and more within the reach of every citizen Abuses have a less extent and of course are less protected He also shows you that the duration of the Republic of Sparta was owing to its having continued with the same extent of territory after all its wars and That the ambition of Athens and Lacodemans to command and direct the Union lost them their liberties and gave them a monarchy From this picture. What can you promise yourselves on the score of consolidation of the United States into one government in? practicability in the just exercise of it your freedom insecure even this form of government limited its Continuance the employments of your country disposed of to the opulent to whose contumely you will continually be an object You must risk much by Indispensibly placing trusts of the greatest magnitude into the hands of individuals whose ambition for power and a grand Dismantle will oppress and grind you Where from the vast extent of your territory and the complication of interests the science of government will become intricate and Perplexed and too mysterious for you to understand and observe and by which you are to be conducted into a monarchy Either limited or despotic the latter. Mr. Locke remarks is a government derived from neither nature nor compact Political liberty the great Montesquieu again observes Consistent security or at least in the opinion we have of security and this security Therefore or the opinion is best obtained in moderate governments Where the mildness of the laws and the equality of the manners beget a confidence in the people Which produces this security or the opinion this moderation in governments? Depends in a great measure on their limits connected with their political distribution The extent of many of the states of the union is at this time almost too great for the Superintendents of a Republican form of government and must one day or other revolve into more vigorous ones or by Separation be reduced into smaller and more useful as well as moderate ones You've already observed the feeble efforts of Massachusetts against their insurgents with what difficulty did they quell that insurrection and Is not the province of Maine at this moment on the eve of separation from her? The reason of these things is that for the security of the property of the community in which Expressive term Mr. Locke makes life liberty and estate to consist the wheels of a republic are necessarily slow in their operation Hence enlarge free republics the evil sometimes is not only begun But almost complete before they are in a situation to turn the current into a contrary progression The extremes are also too remote from the usual seat of government and the laws therefore to feeble to afford protection to all its parts and Ensure domestic tranquility without the aid of another principle if Therefore this state and that of North Carolina had an army under their control They never would have lost Vermont and Franklin nor the state of Massachusetts suffered an insurrection or the dismemberment of her Ferris district But the exercise of a principle which would have prevented these things if we may believe the experience of ages would have ended in the destruction of their liberties Will this consolidated republic if established in its exercise beget such confidence and compliance among the citizens of these states as To do without the aid of a standing army. I deny that it will the male contents in each state Who will not be a few nor the least important will be exciting factions against it The fear of a dismemberment of some of its parts and the necessity to enforce the execution of revenue laws a fruitful source of oppression on the extremes and in the other districts of the government will Incidentally and necessarily require a permanent force to be kept on foot Will not political security and even the opinion of it be extinguished Can mildness and moderation exist in a government where the primary incident in its exercise must be force Will not violence destroy confidence and can equality Subsist where the extent policy and practice of it will naturally lead to make odious distinctions among citizens The people who may compose this national Legislature from the southern states in which from the mildness of the climate the fertility of the soil and the value of its productions Wealth is rapidly acquired and where the same causes naturally lead to luxury dissipation and a passion for aristocratic Distinction where slavery is encouraged and liberty of course less respected and protected Who know not what it is to acquire property by their own toil nor to economize with the savings of industry Will these men therefore be as tenacious of the liberty and interests of the more northern states where freedom Independence industry equality and frugality are natural to the climate and soil as men who are your own citizens Legislating in your own state under your inspection and whose manners and fortunes bear a more equal resemblance to your own It may be suggested in answer to this that whoever is a citizen of one state is a citizen of each and that therefore He will be as interested in the happiness and interests of all as the one he is delegated from But the argument is fallacious and whoever has attended to the history of mankind and the principles which bind them together as parents Citizens or men will readily perceive it These principles are in their exercise like a pebble cast on the calm service of a river The circles begin in the center and are small active and forcible But as they depart from that point they lose their force and vanish into calmness The strongest principle of union resides within our domestic walls The ties of the parent exceed that of any other as we depart from home The next general principle of union is amongst citizens of the same state Where acquaintance habits and fortunes nourish affection and attachment Enlarge the circle still further and as citizens of different states that we acknowledge the same national denomination We lose in the ties of acquaintance habits and fortunes and thus by degrees we lessen in our attachments Till at length we know more than acknowledge a sameness of species Is it therefore from certainty like this reasonable to believe that inhabitants of Georgia or New Hampshire Will have the same obligations toward you as your own and preside over your lives Liberties and property with the same care and attachment intuitive reason answers in the negative end of section 40 This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org the anti-federalist papers to papers section 41 Cato letter 4 from the New York Journal November 8 1787 I Shall begin with observations on the executive branch of this new system and though it is not the first in order As arranged therein yet being the chief is perhaps entitled by the rules of rank to the first consideration The executive power as described in the second article Consists of a president and vice president who are to hold their offices during the term of four years The same article has marked the manner and time of their election and established the qualifications of the president It also provides against the removal death or inability of the president and vice president regulates the salary of the president delineates his duties and powers and Lastly declares the causes for which the president and vice president shall be removed from office Notwithstanding the great learning and abilities of the gentleman who composed the convention It may be here remarked with defense that the construction of the first paragraph of the first section of the second article is vague and Inexplicit and leaves the mind in doubt as to the election of a president and vice president After the expiration of the election for the first term of four years In every other case the election of these great officers is expressly provided for But there is no explicit provision for their election, which is to set this political machine in motion No certain and express terms as in your state Constitution That's statedly once in every four years and as often as these offices shall become vacant by expiration or otherwise As is there in expressed an election shall be held as follows, etc This inexplicitness may perhaps lead to an establishment for life It is remarked by Montesquieu in treating of republics that in all Magistracies the greatness of the power must be compensated by the brevity of the duration and That a longer time than a year would be dangerous It is therefore obvious to the least intelligent mind to account wide great power in the hands of a magistrate And that power connected with considerable duration may be dangerous to the liberties of a republic The deposit of vast trust in the hands of a single magistrate Enables him in their exercise to create a numerous train of dependence This tempts his ambition which in a republican magistrate is also remarked to be pernicious And the duration of his office for any considerable time favors his views Gives him the means and time to perfect and execute his designs He therefore fancies that he may be great and glorious by oppressing his fellow citizens And raising himself to permanent grandeur on the ruins of his country And here it may be necessary to compare the vast and important powers of the president Together with his continuance in office with the foregoing doctrine his eminent Magisterial situation will attach many adherents to him and he will be surrounded by expectance and courtiers His power of nomination and influence on all appointments The strong posts in each state compromised within his superintendents And garrisoned by troops under his direction His control over the army militia and navy the unrestrained power of granting pardons for treason Which may be used to screen from punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime And thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt His duration in office for four years these and various other principles evidently prove the truth of the position That if the president is possessed of ambition he has the power and time sufficient to ruin his country Though the president during the sitting of the legislature is assisted by the senate Yet he is without a constitutional counsel in their recess He will therefore be unsupported by proper information and advice And will generally be directed by minions and favorites or a council of state will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments The most dangerous counsel in a free country The language and the manners of this court will be what distinguishes them from the rest of the community Not what assimilates them to it and in being remarked for a behavior that shows they are not meanly born In an adulation to people of fortune and power The establishment of a vice president is as unnecessary as it is dangerous This officer for want of other employment is made president of the senate thereby blending the executive and legislative powers Besides always giving to some one state from which he is to come and unjust preeminence It is a maxim in republics that the representative of the people should be of their immediate choice But by the manner in which the president is chosen he arrives to this office at the fourth or fifth hand Nor does the highest vote in the way that he is elected determine the choice For it is only necessary that he should be taken from the highest five Who may have a plurality of votes And wherein does this president invested with his powers and prerogatives essentially differ from the king of great britain Save as to name the creation of nobility and some immaterial incidents the offspring of absurdity and locality The direct prerogatives of the president as springing from his political character are among the following It is necessary in order to distinguish him from the rest of the community and enable him to keep and maintain his court That the compensation for his services or in other words his revenue Should be such as to enable him to appear with the splendor of a prince He has the power of receiving ambassadors from and a great influence on their appointments to foreign courts As also to make treaties leagues and alliances with foreign states Assisted by the senate which when made becomes the supreme law of land He is a constituent part of the legislative power for every bill Which shall pass the house of representatives and senate is to be presented to him for approbation If he approves of it. He is to sign it if he disapproves He is to return it with objections Which in many cases will amount to a complete negative And in this view he will have a great share in the power of making peace Coining money etc and all the various objects of legislation Expressed or implied in this constitution For though it may be asserted that the king of great britain has the express power of making peace or war Yet he never thinks it prudent to do so without the advice of his parliament From whom he is to derive his support and therefore these powers in both president and king are substantially the same He is the generalissimo of the nation and of course has the command and control of the army navy and militia He is the general conservator of the peace of the union He may pardon all offenses except in cases of impeachment and the principal fountain of all offices and employment Will not the exercise of these powers therefore tend either to the establishment of a vile and arbitrary aristocracy or monarchy The safety of the people in a republic depends on the share or proportion they have in the government But experience ought to teach you that when a man is at the head of an elective government invested with great powers And interested in his reelection in what circle appointments will be made By which means an imperfect aristocracy bordering on monarchy may be established You must however my countrymen be aware that the advocates of this new system do not deceive you by a fallacious resemblance between it and your own state government Which use so much prize And if you examine you will perceive that the chief magistrate of this state is your immediate choice Controlled and checked by a just and full representation of the people Devested of the prerogatives of influencing war and peace Making treaties receiving and sending embassies and commanding standing armies and navies which belong to the power of the confederation And which will be convinced that this government is no more like a true picture of your own Than an angel of darkness resembles an angel of light end of section 41 This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Anti-Federalist Papers section 42 Cato letter 5 The new york journal november 22nd 1787 to the citizens of the state of new york In my last number i endeavored to prove that the language of the article relative to the establishment of the executive of this new government Was vague and inexplicit That the great powers of the president connected with his duration in office would lead to oppression and ruin That he would be governed by favorites and flatterers or that a dangerous council would be collected from the great officers of state That the 10 mile square if the remarks of one of the wisest men drawn from the experience of mankind may be credited Would the asylum of the base idol and avaricious and ambitious And that the court would possess a language and manners different from yours That a vice president is as unnecessary as he is dangerous in his influence That the president cannot represent you because he is not of your own immediate choice Differs that if you adopt this government you will incline to an arbitrary and odious aristocracy or monarchy the president That the president possessed of the power given him by this frame of government differs But very immaterially from the establishment of monarchy in great britain And i warned you to be aware of the fallacious resemblance that is held out to you by the advocates of this new system between it and your own state governments And here i cannot help remarking that inexplicitness seems to pervade this whole political fabric Certainly in political compacts, which mr. Coke tells the mother and nurse of repose and quietness The want of which induced men to engage in political society has ever been held by a wise and free people as essential to their security As on the one hand it fixes barriers which the ambitious and tyrannically disposed magistrate dare not overleap And on the other becomes a wall of safety to the community Otherwise stipulations between the governors and governed are Nugatory and you might as well deposit the important powers of legislation and Execution in one or a few and permit them to govern according to their disposition and will But the world is too full of examples which prove that to live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery Before the existence of express political compacts It was reasonably implied that the magistrate should govern with wisdom and justice But mere implication was too feeble to restrain the unbridled ambition of a bad man Or to afford security against negligence cruelty or any other defective mind It is alleged that the opinions and manners of the people of america are capable to resist and prevent an extension of prerogative or oppression But you must recollect that opinion and manners are mutable and may not always be a permanent obstruction against the encroachments of government That the progress of a commercial society begets luxury the parent of inequality the photo virtue and the enemy to restraint And that ambition and voluptuousness aided by flattery will teach magistrates where limits are not explicitly fixed to have separate and distinct Interests from the people besides it will not be denied that government assimilates the manners and opinions of the community to it Therefore a general presumption that rulers will govern well is not a sufficient security You are then under a sacred obligation to provide for the safety of your posterity And would you now basically desert their interests when by a small share of prudence you may transmit to them a beautiful Political patrony that will prevent the necessity of their traveling through seas of blood to obtain that which your wisdom might have secured It is a duty you owe likewise to your own reputation for you have a great name to lose You are characterized as cautious prudent and jealous in politics Once it is therefore that you are about to precipitate yourselves into a sea of uncertainty and adopt a system so vague And which has discarded so many of your valuable rights Is it because you do not believe that an american can be a tyrant? If this be the case you rest on a weak basis Americans are like other men in similar situations when the manners and opinions of the community are changed by the causes I mentioned before and your political compact inexplicit your posterity will find that great power connected with ambition Luxury and flattery will as readily produce a caesar caligula Nero and emission in america as the same causes did in the roman empire But the next thing to be considered in conformity to my plan is the first article of this new government Which comprises the erection of the house of representatives in senate and prescribed their various powers and objects of legislation The most general objections to the first article are that biennial elections for representatives are a departure from the safe democratic principles of annual ones That the number of representatives are too few that the apportionment and principles of increase are unjust That no attention has been paid to either the numbers or property in each state informing the senate That the mode in which they are appointed and their duration will lead to the establishment of an aristocracy That the senate and president are improperly connected both as to appointments and the making of treaties Which are to become the supreme law of the land That the judicial in some measure too wit as to the trial of impeachments is placed in the senate a branch of the Legislative and sometimes a branch of the executive That congress have the improper power of making or altering the regulations prescribed by the different legislatures Respecting the time place and manner of holding elections for representatives And the time and manner of choosing senators that standing armies may be established an appropriation of money made for their support For two years that the militia of the most remote state may be marched into those states situated at the opposite extreme of this continent That the slave trade is to all intends and purposes permanently established and a slavish Capitation or poll tax may at any time be levied These are some of the many evils that will attend the adoption of this government But with respect to the first objection it may be remarked that a well-digested democracy has this advantage over all others to wit That it affords to many the opportunity to be advanced to the supreme command And the honors they thereby enjoy fill them with the desire of rendering themselves worthy of them Hence this desire becomes part of their education is matured in manhood and produces an ardent affection for their country And it is the opinion of the great sydney and montesquieu that this is in a great measure produced by annual election of magistrates If annual elections were to exist in this government and learning and information to become more prevalent You never will want men to execute whatever you could design sydney observes quote that a well-governed state is as fruitful to all good purposes as the seven headed serpent is said to Have been in evil when one head is cut off Many rise up in the place of it end quote he remarks further that quote It was also thought that free cities by frequent elections of magistrates became nurseries of great and able men Every man endeavoring to excel others that he might be advanced to the honor He had no other title to then what might arise from his merit or reputation End quote But the framers of this perfect government as it is called have departed from this Democratical principle and established by any all elections where the house of representatives Who are to be chosen by the people and sextennial for the senate who are to be chosen by the Legislatures of the different states and have given to the executive the unprecedented power of making temporary senators in case of vacancies By resignation or otherwise and so far forth establishing a precedent for virtual representation Though in fact their original appointment is virtual Thereby influencing the choice of legislatures or if they should not be so complacent as to conform to his appointment Offense will be given to the executive and the temporary members will appear ridiculous by rejection This temporary member during his time of appointment will of course act by a power derived from the executive and for and under his immediate influence It is a very important objection to this government that the representation consists of so few Too few to resist the influence of corruption and the temptation to treachery against which all governments ought to take precautions How guarded you have been on this head in your own state constitution And yet the number of senators and representatives proposed for this vast continent does not equal those of your own state How great the disparity if you compare them with the aggregate numbers in the united states The history of representation in england from which we have taken our model of legislation is briefly this Before the institution of legislating by deputies the whole free part of the community usually met for that purpose When this became impossible by the increase of numbers the community was divided into districts From each of which was sent such a number of deputies as was a complete representation of the various numbers and orders of citizens within them But can it be asserted with truth that six men can be a complete and full representation of the numbers and various orders of the people in this state Another thing that may be suggested against the small number of representatives is That but few of you will have the chance of sharing even in this branch of the legislature And the choice will be confined to a very few the more completed is the better will your interests be preserved And the greater the opportunity you will have to participate in government one of the principal securities of a free people But this subject has been so ably and fully treated by a writer under the signature of brutus That I shall content myself with referring you to him there on Reserving further observations on the other objections. I have mentioned for my future numbers Signed kato end of anti federalist papers section 42 This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org The Anti Federalist Papers Anti Federalist Papers section 43 kato letter 7 The new york journal january 3rd 1788 To the citizens of the state of new york That the senate and president are further improperly connected will appear if it is considered that their dependence on each other will prevent either from being a check upon the other They must act in concert and whether the power and influence of the one or the other is to prevail Will depend on the character and abilities of the men who hold those offices at the time The senate is vested with such a proportion of the executive that it would be found necessary that they should be constantly sitting This circumstance did not escape the convention And they have provided for the event in the second article Which declares that the executive may on extraordinary occasions convene both houses or either of them No occasion can exist for calling the assembly without the senate The words or either of them must have been intended to apply only to the senate Their wages are already provided for and it will be therefore readily observed that the partition between a Perpetuation of their sessions and a perpetuation of their offices in the progress of the government will be found to be but thin and feeble Besides the senate who will have sole power to try all impeachments in case of the impeachment of the president Are to determine as judges the propriety of the advice they gave him as senators Can the senate in this therefore be an impartial judicator and will they not rather serve as a screen to great public defaulters? Among the many evils that are incorporated in this new system of government is that of congress having the power of making or altering The regulations prescribed by the different legislatures Respecting the time place and manner of holding elections for representatives And the time and manner of choosing senators If it is inquired in what manner this regulation may be exercised to your injury the answer is easy By the first article the house of representatives shall consist of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states Who are qualified to vote for members of their several state assemblies It can therefore readily be believed that the different state legislatures provided such exist after the adoption of this government Will continue those easy and convenient models for the election of representatives for the national legislature That are in use for the election of members of assembly for their own states But the congress have by the constitution a power to make other regulations Or alter those in practice prescribed by your own state legislature Hence instead of having the places of elections in the precincts and brought home almost to your own doors Congress may establish a place or places at either the extremes center or outer parts of the states At a time and season two when it may be very inconvenient to attend And by these means destroy the rights of election But in opposition to this reasoning it is asserted that it is a necessary power because the states might omit making rules for the purpose And thereby defeat the existence of that branch of the government This is what logicians call argumentum absurdum for the different states If they will have any security at all in this government will find it in the house of representatives And they therefore would not be very ready to eradicate a principle in which it dwells or involve their country in an instantaneous revolution Besides if this was the apprehension of the framers and the ground of that provision Why did they not extend this controlling power to the other duties of the several state legislatures? To exemplify this the states are to appoint senators and electors for choosing of a president But the time is to be under the direction of congress now Suppose they were to omit the appointment of senators and electors though congress was to appoint the time Which might as well be apprehended as the omission of regulations for the election of members of the house of representatives Provided they had that power or suppose they were not to meet at all Of course the government cannot proceed in its exercise And from this motive or apprehension congress ought to have taken these duties entirely in their own hands And by a decisive declaration Annihilated them which they in fact have done by leaving them without the means of support Or at least resting on their bounty To this the advocates for this system oppose the common empty Declamation that there is no danger that congress will abuse this power But such language as relative to so important a subject is mere vapor and sound without sense Is it not in their power however to make such regulations as may be inconvenient to you It must be admitted because the words are unlimited in their sense It is a good rule in the construction of a contract to support that what may be done will be Therefore in considering this subject You are to suppose that in the exercise of this government a regulation of congress will be made For holding an election for the whole state at poughkepsie at new york or perhaps at fort stanwicks Who will then be the actual electors for the house of representatives very few more than those people who may live in the vicinity of these places Could any others afford the expense and time of attending and would not the government by this means having it their power to Put whom they pleased in the house of representatives You want certainly to have as much or more distressed with respect to the exercise of those duties Which ought to be entrusted to the several states because over them congress can have a legislative controlling power Hitherto we have tied up our rulers in the exercise of their duties by positive restrictions If the court has been drawn too tight loosen it to the necessary extent, but do not entirely unbind them I am no enemy to placing a reasonable confidence in them But such an unbounded one as the advocates and framers of this new system advise you to would be dangerous to your liberties It has been the ruin of other governments and will be yours if you adopt with all its latitudinal powers Unlimited confidence and governors as well as individuals is frequently the parent of despotism What facilitated the corrupt designs of philip of mastodon and caused the ruin of Athens But the unbounded confidence in their statesmen and rulers Such improper confidence dimosthenes was so well convinced had ruined his country that in his second Philippic oration he remarks that quote There is one common bulwark with which men of prudence are naturally provided the guard and security of all people Particularly of free states against the assaults of tyrants. What is this distrust of this be mindful to this adhere Preserve this carefully and no calamity can affect you end quote Montesquieu observes that quote the course of government is attended with an insensible descent to evil and there is no Reascending to good without very great efforts end quote The plain inference from this doctrine is that rulers in all governments will erect an interest separate from the ruled Which will have a tendency to enslave them There is therefore no other way of interrupting this insensible descent and warding off the evil as long as possible Then by establishing principles of distrust in your constituents and cultivating the sentiment among yourselves But let me inquire of you my countrymen Whether the freedom and independence of election is a point of magnitude If it is what kind of a spirit of amity? Deference and concession is that which has put in the power of congress at one stroke to prevent your interference in government And do away your liberties forever Does either the situation or circumstances of things warrant it? signed cato End of anti federalist papers section 43 This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer Please visit LibriVox.org The anti federalist papers Anti federalist number 44 letters of a grippa to the massachusetts gazette letter number six 14th of december 1787 to the people To prevent any mistakes or misapprehensions of the argument stated in my last paper to prove that the proposed constitution Is an actual consolidation of the separate states into one extensive commonwealth The reader is desired to observe that in the course of the argument the new plan is considered as an entire system It is not dependent on any other book for an explanation and contains no references to any other book All the defenses of it therefore so far as they are drawn from the state constitutions or from maxims of the common law Are foreign to the purpose It is only by comparing the different parts of it together That the meaning of the whole is to be understood For instance, we find in it that there is to be a legislative assembly with authority to constitute courts for the trial of all kinds of civil causes between citizens of different states The right to appoint such courts necessarily involves it in the right of defining their powers And determining the rules by which their judgment shall be regulated And the grant of the former of those rights is negatory without the latter It is vain to tell us that a maxim of common law requires contracts to be determined by the law existing Where the contract was made For it is also a maxim that the legislature has a right to alter the common law Such a power forms an essential part of legislation Here then a declaration of rights is of inestimable value It contains those principles which the government never can invade without an open violation of the compact between them and the citizens Such a declaration ought to have come to the new constitution in favor of the legislative rights of the several states By which their sovereignty over their own citizens within the state should be secured Without such an express declaration the states are annihilated in reality upon receiving this constitution The forms will be preserved only during the pleasure of congress The idea of consolidation is further kept up in the right given to regulate trade Though this power under certain limitations would be a proper one for the department of congress It is in this system carried much too far and much farther than is necessary This is without exception the most commercial state upon the continent Our extensive coasts cold climate small estates and equality of rights With a variety of subordinate and concurring circumstances place us in this respect at the head of the union We must therefore be indulged if a point which so nearly relates to our welfare be rigidly examined The new constitution not only prohibits vessels bound from one state to another from paying any duties But even from entering and clearing The only use of such a regulation is to keep each state in complete ignorance of its own resources It certainly is no hardship to enter and clear at the custom house and the expense is too small to be an object The unlimited right to regulate trade includes the right of granting exclusive charters This in all old countries is considered as one principal branch of prerogative We find hardly a country in europe which has not felt the ill effects of such a power Holland has carried the exercise of it farther than any other state And the reason why that country has felt less evil from it is That the territory is very small and they have drawn large revenues from their colonies in the east and west indies In this respect the whole country is to be considered as a trading company Having exclusive privileges The colonies are large in proportion to the parent state So that upon the whole the latter may gain by such a system We are also to take into consideration the industry which the genius of a free government inspires But in the british islands all these circumstances together have not prevented them from being injured by the monopolies created there Individuals have been enriched but the country at large has been hurt Some valuable branches of trade being granted to companies who transact their business in london That city is perhaps the place of the greatest trade in the world But ireland under such influence suffers exceedingly and is impoverished and scotland is a mere byword Bristol the second city in england ranks not much above this town in population These things must be accounted for by the incorporation of trading companies And if they are felt so severely in countries of small extent They will operate with tenfold severity upon us who inhabit an immense tract And living towards one extreme of an extensive empire Shall feel the evil without retaining that influence in government which may enable us to procure redress There ought then to have been inserted a restraining clause which might prevent the congress from making any such grant Because they consequentially defeat the trade of the outports and are also injurious to the general commerce By enhancing prices and destroying that rival ship, which is the great stimulus to industry Signed a grippa end of anti federalist paper number 44