 Our next speaker is Lily Morse, whose presentation will address the title, Exposing Fraud Vulnerabilities in Client Auditor Relationships. Okay, so I'd like to begin by asking everybody to take a look at the picture frame on the left. And in this empty picture frame, I'd like you to imagine the face of somebody that you know well. This could be the face of a friend, maybe not a best friend, but somebody that you're familiar with, that you trust, and that you know for a period of time. And while you're thinking about this person, I want you to think about what you'd be willing to do for this person. Would you be willing to engage in bad behavior, potentially illegal behavior, in order to help this person out? Do you think that this person would be willing to do the same for you? And while we're asking ourselves these questions, I'd like to apply them to a context in which they're particularly relevant, accounting. So I'd like to direct your attention to the picture on the right. On the right you see Ken Hanna, who was chair of the Audit Committee at Tesco. For those of you who are unaware, Tesco was a multinational grocery chain based in England. And what's interesting about Ken Hanna and Tesco is that last fall, they were involved in an accounting scandal. And the accounting scandal was that they found that they had Tesco over-reported their financial income for the year by $391 million. And so when we hear about accounting scandals like these in the media, we might ask ourselves what leads these companies and people like Ken Hanna to engage in this sort of behavior known as financial statement fraud. And what my research does is it attempts to answer this question by looking at the relationships that these companies, people like Ken Hanna have with the people who review their income statements known as independent auditors. And so what I do is I bring participants into the lab and I assign them to the role of either a company manager or a reviewer, an auditor. And what the company manager does is he or she prepares a financial statement and auditors review these financial statements for accuracy. And so what I do is I have the managers complete this task across two conditions. The first, they're interacting with an auditor who is a friend. And in the second, they're interacting with an auditor who is a stranger. And what I find is that managers when interacting with an auditor, managers are much more likely to cheat or over-report their financial statements when they're interacting with an auditor who is a friend compared to interacting with an auditor who is a stranger. And likewise, reviewers are more likely to allow over-reporting to occur. They fail to catch a report over-reporting when the manager is a friend compared to a stranger. And what's more interesting than that is that managers use different tactics and different strategies to over-report depending on the type of relationship they have with an auditor. So managers are much more likely to try to use deceptive tactics trying to shrink the auditor when the auditor is a stranger, whereas with managers when they're not going to be with a friend they're much more likely to attempt to collude with them and try to share profits. And so what this shows us is not only that the interpersonal one-on-one relationship between managers and auditors not only does that matter because it can tell us when these parties are likely to over-report or commit illegal behavior, but also it influences the strategies that they use to try to accomplish this sort of behavior.