 Question 116 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde – Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues – The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde – Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues – The Virtue of Justice by Saint Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 116 of Quoraling in two articles. We must now consider quaraling, concerning which there are two points of inquiry. First, whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship. Second, of its comparison with flattery. First, article. Whether quaraling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability. Objection 1. It seems that quaraling is not opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability. For quaraling seems to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated above in Question 37, Article 1. Therefore quaraling is also. Objection 2 further. It is written in Proverbs 26, verse 21. An angry man stirs up strife. Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife or quaraling is also. Objection 3 further. It is written in James 4, 1. From whence are wars and quarrels among you? Are they not hints from your concupiscences which war in your members? Now it would seem contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it seems that quaraling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance. On the contrary, the philosopher opposes quaraling to friendship in Ethics 4, 6. I answer that quaraling consists properly in words, when namely one person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be observed in this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him from lack of that love which unites minds together and this seems to pertain to discord which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagreeable. Whence arises quarreling which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 4, 6 that those who are opposed to everything with the intent of being disagreeable and care for nobody are said to be peevish and quarrelsome. Reply to Objection 1. Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of discord while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the intention of displeasing. Reply to Objection 2. The direct opposition of virtuous devices depends not on their causes since one vice may arise from many causes but on the species of their acts and although quarreling arises at times from anger it may arise from many other causes. Hence it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness. Reply to Objection 3. It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the contrary vice, notably adulation or flattery. The law is good since by forbidding concupiscence it forbids all evil. Second article. Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery. Objection 1. It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the contrary vice, adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than quarreling for it is written in Isaiah 3.12, O my people, that they call thee blessed, the same deceive thee and destroy the way of thy steps. Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling. Objection 2. There appears to be a certain amount of deceit in flattery since the flatterer says one thing and thinks another, whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit for he contradicts openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a vile man according to the philosopher in Ethics 7.6. Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling. Objection 3. Shame is fear of what is vile according to the philosopher in Ethics 4.9. But a man is more ashamed to be a flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous sin than flattery. On the contrary, the more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be more inconsistent with the spiritual state for it is written in 1 Timothy 3 verses 2 and 3 that it behooveth a bishop to be not quarrelsome and in 2 Timothy 3.24 the servant of the Lord must not wrangle. Therefore quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery. I answer that we can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In one way we may consider the species of either sin and thus the more a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to displease and so the quarrelsome man who exceeds in giving displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer who exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as regards certain external motives and thus flattery is sometimes more grievous for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue honor or gain. While sometimes quarreling is more grievous for instance when one intends either to deny the truth or to hold up the speaker to contempt. Reply to Objection 1 Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving secretly so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly. Now other things being equal it is more grievous to harm a person openly by violence as it were than secretly where for robbery is a more grievous sin than theft as stated above in Question 66 Article 9. Reply to Objection 2 In human acts the more grievous is not always the more vile for the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason where for the sins of the flesh whereby the flesh enslaves the reason are vile although spiritual sins are more grievous since they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner sins that are committed through deceit are vile insofar as they seem to arise from a certain wickedness and from a certain falseness of the reason although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a greater contempt. Hence flattery through being accompanied by deceit seems to be a vileer sin while quarreling through proceeding from greater contempt is apparently more grievous. Reply to Objection 3 As stated in the Objection shame regards the vileness of a sin where for a man is not always more ashamed of a more grievous sin but of a vileer sin. Hence it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery than of quarreling although quarreling is more grievous. End of Question 116 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 117 Of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Justice This is the LibriVox Recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 117 Of Liberality in Six Articles We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices namely covetousness and prodigality. Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry. First, whether liberality is a virtue. Second, what is its matter? Third, of its act. Fourth, whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take. Fifth, whether liberality is a part of justice. Sixth, of its comparison with other virtues. First article, whether liberality is a virtue. Objection 1 It seems that liberality is not a virtue for no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more than for others and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary since according to the philosopher in Ethics 4.1 It is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself so that he leaves for himself the lesser things. Therefore, liberality is not a virtue. Objection 2 Further, man sustains life by means of riches and wealth contributes to happiness instrumentally as stated in Ethics 1.8. Since then every virtue is directed to happiness it seems that the liberal man is not virtuous for the philosopher says of him in Ethics 4.1 He is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money but to give it away. Objection 3 Further The virtues are connected with one another but liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal for they have nothing to give and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise. Therefore, liberality is not a virtue. On the contrary, Ambrose says in On the duties of the clergy one that the gospel contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated. Now in the gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore, liberality is a virtue. I answer that as Augustine says in On Free Will 1.19 It belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill. Now we may use both well and ill not only the things that are within us such as the powers and passions of the soul but also those that are without such as the things of this world that are granted us for our livelihood. Therefore, since it belongs to liberality to use these things well it follows that liberality is a virtue. Reply to Objection 1. According to the preaching of Ambrose and Basil excess of riches is granted by God to some in order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship but it suffices for one man to have few things. Therefore, the liberal man commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless, we are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods in which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore, Ambrose says on the duties of the clergy one it is a commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them to be in want. Reply to Objection 2. It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support nor the wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 4.1 that the liberal man does not neglect his own wishing thus to be of help to certain people. And Ambrose says again that our Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches all at once but to dispense them unless he do as Elias did who slew his oxen and fed the poor that he might not be bound by any household cares. For this belongs to the state of perfection of which we shall speak further on in Question 184 as well as in Question 186 Article 3. It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's possessions liberally insofar as it is an act of virtue is directed to happiness. Reply to Objection 3. As the philosopher says in Ethics 4.1 those who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal and likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of others' sins. Hence Ambrose says in On the Duties of the Clergy 1 if you assist to rob others of their possessions your honesty is not to be commended nor is your liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than of pity. Wherefore, those who lack other virtues though they spend much on certain evil works are not liberal. Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses without having the habit of liberality even as men perform works of other virtues before having the habit of virtue though not in the same way as virtuous people as stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde Question 65 Article 1. In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal although he is poor. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 4.1 Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance that is his means for it consists not in the quantity given but in the habit of the giver and Ambrose says that it is the heart that makes a gift rich or poor and gives things their value. Second article whether liberality is about money Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not about money for every moral virtue is about operations and passions Now it is proper to justice to be about operations as stated in Ethics 5.1 Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue it seems that it is about passions and not about money. Objection 2. It belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind of wealth Now natural riches are more real than artificial riches according to the philosopher in Politics 1.5 and 6. Therefore, liberality is not chiefly about money Objection 3. Different virtues have different matter since habits are distinguished by their objects but external things are the matter of distributive and communicative justice therefore they are not the matter of liberality On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 4.1 that liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money I answer that according to the philosopher in Ethics 4.1 it belongs to the liberal man to part with things hence liberality is also called open-handedness Largitas because that which is open does not withhold things but parts with them The term liberality seems also to allude to this since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it liberate so to speak from his keeping and ownership and shows his mind to be free of attachment there too Now those things which are the subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are the goods he possesses which are denoted by the term money therefore the proper matter of liberality is money Reply to Objection 1 As stated above in Article 1, Third Reply Liberality depends not on the quantity given but on the heart of the giver Now the heart of the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow towards the things given Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of liberality while exterior money is the object of those same passions Reply to Objection 2 As Augustine says in his book De disciplina cristi Everything whatsoever man has on earth and whatsoever he owns goes by the name of Pecunia Money Because in olden times possessions consisted entirely of Pecura Flocks And the philosopher says in Ethics 4.1 We give the name of money to anything that can be valued in currency Reply to Objection 3 Justice establishes equality in external things but has nothing to do properly speaking with the regulation of internal passions where for money is in one way the matter of liberality and in another way of justice Third article Whether using money is the act of liberality Objection 1 It seems that using money is not the act of liberality For different virtues have different acts but using money is becoming to other virtues such as justice and magnificence Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality Objection 2 further It belongs to a liberal man not only to give but also to receive and keep but receiving and keeping do not seem to be connected with the use of money Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality Objection 3 further The use of money consists not only in giving but also in spending it But the spending of money refers to the spender and consequently is not an act of liberality For Seneca says in On Benefits 5 A man is not liberal by giving to himself Therefore not every use of money belongs to liberality On the contrary the philosopher says in Ethics 4.1 In whatever matter a man is virtuous he will make the best use of that matter for he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the best use of riches Now such is the liberal man Therefore the good use of money is the act of liberality I answer that the species of an act is taken from its object as stated above in the Paras Primasakunde question 18 article 2 Now the object or matter of liberality is money and whatever has a money value as stated in the foregoing article 2nd reply And since every virtue is consistent with its object it follows that since liberality is a virtue its act is consistent with money Now money comes under the head of useful goods since all external goods are directed to man's use Hence the proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches Reply to Objection 1 It belongs to liberality to make good use of riches as such because riches are the proper matter of liberality On the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under another aspect namely that of debt insofar as an external thing is due to another And it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a special aspect insofar to wit as they are employed for the fulfillment of some great deed Hence magnificence stands in relation to liberality as something in addition there too as we shall explain further on in question 134 Reply to Objection 2 It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make good use of his matter or instrument but also to provide opportunities for that good use Thus it belongs to a soldier's fortitude not only to wield his sword against the foe but also to sharpen his sword and keep it in its sheath Thus too it belongs to liberality not only to use money but also to keep it in preparation and safety in order to make fitting use of it Reply to Objection 3 As stated in Article 2, first reply The internal passions whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of liberality Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man should not be prevented from making any due use of money through an inordinate affection for it Now there is a twofold use of money One consists in applying it to one's own use and would seem to come under the designation of costs or expenditure whereas the other consists in devoting it to the use of others and comes under the head of gifts Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an immoderate love of money either from spending it becomingly or from making suitable gifts Therefore liberality is concerned with giving and spending according to the philosopher in Ethics 4.1 The saying of Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving for a man is not said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself Fourth article Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give Objection one it seems that it does not belong to a liberal man chiefly to give for liberality like all other moral virtues is regulated by prudence Now it seems to belong very much to prudence that a man should keep his riches where for the philosopher says in Ethics 4.1 Those who have not earned money but have received the money earned by others spend it more liberally because they have not experienced the want of it Therefore it seems that giving does not chiefly belong to the liberal man Objection two further No man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do nor does he cease from doing it But a liberal man is sometimes sorry for what he has given nor does he give to all as stated in Ethics 4.1 Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give Objection three further In order to accomplish what he intends chiefly a man employs all the ways he can Now a liberal man is not a beggar as the philosopher observes in Ethics 4.1 and yet by begging he might provide himself with the means of giving to others Therefore it seems that he does not chiefly aim at giving Objection four further Man is bound to look after himself rather than others But by spending he looks after himself whereas by giving he looks after others Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend rather than to give On the contrary the philosopher says in Ethics 4.1 that it belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving I answer that it is proper to a liberal man to use money Now the use of money consists in parting with it For the acquisition of money is like generation rather than use While the keeping of money in so far as it is directed to facilitate the use of money is like a habit Now in parting with a thing, for instance when we throw something the farther we put it away the greater force Virtus is employed Hence parting with money by giving it to others proceeds from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect since virtue is a kind of perfection according to Physics 7, 17 and 18 Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving Reply to Objection 1 It belongs to prudence to keep money lest it be stolen or spent uselessly But to spend it usefully is not less but more prudent than to keep it usefully Since more things have to be considered in money's use which is likened to movement than in its keeping which is likened to rest As to those who, having received money that others have earned spend it more liberally though not having experienced the want of it If their inexperience is the sole cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of liberality Sometimes however this inexperience merely removes the impediment to liberality so that it makes them all the more ready to act liberally because not unfrequently the fear of want that results from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired money from using it up by acting with liberality As does likewise the love they have for it as being their own effect according to the philosopher in Ethics 4.1 Reply to Objection 2 As stated in this and the preceding article it belongs to liberality to make fitting use of money and consequently to give it in a fitting manner since this is the use of money Again, every virtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act and avoids whatever hinders that act Now two things are opposed to suitably giving namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given and giving something unsuitably Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at both but especially at the former since it is more opposed to his proper act For this reason too he does not give to all since his act would be hindered were he to give to everyone for he would not have the means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him to give Reply to Objection 3 Giving and receiving are related to one another as act and passion Now the same thing is not the principle of both action and passion Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving it does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive and still less to beg Hence the verse In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many should give often, take seldom, ask never But he makes provision in order to give certain things according as liberality requires Such are the fruits of his own possessions for he is careful about realizing them that he may make a liberal use thereof Fifth article Whether liberality is a part of justice Objection 1 It seems that liberality is not a part of justice For justice regards that which is due Now the more a thing is due the less liberally it is given Therefore liberality is not a part of justice but is incompatible with it Objection 2 further Justice is about operation as stated above in question 58 article 9 Whereas liberality is chiefly about the love and desire of money which are passions Therefore liberality seems to belong to temperance rather than to justice Objection 3 further It belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly as stated in article 4 But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and mercy which pertain to charity as stated above in questions 30 and 31 Therefore liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice On the contrary, Ambrosez in On the Duties of the Clergy 1 Justice has to do with the fellowship of mankind For the notion of fellowship is divided into two parts Justice and beneficence also called liberality or kind-heartedness Therefore liberality pertains to justice I answer that liberality is not a species of justice Since justice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another what is one's own There are however two points in which it agrees with justice First, that it is directed chiefly to another as justice is Secondly, that it is concerned with external things and so is justice albeit under a different aspect as stated in this article and above in article 2 Third reply Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to be a part of justice being annexed there too as to a principal virtue Reply to Objection 1 Although liberality does not consider the legal due that justice considers it considers a certain moral due This due is based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation so that it answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree Reply to Objection 2 Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the body but the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to the body but rather to the soul Hence liberality does not properly pertain to temperance Reply to Objection 3 The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he gives wherefor this giving belongs to charity or friendship but the giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a certain way towards money and that he desires it not or loves it so that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also to those whom he knows not Hence it belongs not to charity but to justice which is about external things 6th Article Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues Objection 1 It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues for every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness Now man is likened chiefly by liberality to God who giveth to all men abundantly an up-braideth knot according to James 1.5 Therefore liberality is the greatest of the virtues Objection 2 further According to Augustine and on the Trinity 6.8 In things that are great but not in bulk to be greatest is to be the best Now the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality since the good is self-communicative according to Dionysius in On the Divine Names 4 Hence Ambrose says in On the duties of the clergy one that justice reclines to severity liberality to goodness Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues Objection 3 further Men are honored and loved on account of virtue Now Boethius says in On the Consolation of Philosophy 2 that bounty above all makes a man famous and the philosopher says in Ethics 4 one that among the virtuous the liberal are the most beloved Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues On the contrary Ambrose says in On the duties of the clergy one that justice seems to be more excellent than liberality although liberality is more pleasing The philosopher also says in Rhetoric 1 9 that brave and just men are honored chiefly and after them those who are liberal I answer that every virtue tends towards a good where for the greater virtue is that which tends toward the greater good Now liberality tends towards a good in two ways In one way primarily and of its own nature In another way consequently Primarily and of its very nature it tends to set in order one's affection towards the possession and use of money In this way temperance which moderates desires and pleasures relating to one's own body takes precedence of liberality And so do fortitude and justice which in a manner are directed to the common good one in time of peace the other in time of war While all these are preceded by those virtues which are directed to the divine good For the divine good surpasses all manner of human good And among human goods the public good surpasses the good of the individual And of the last named the good of the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things Again liberality is ordained to a good consequently and in this way it is directed to all the aforesaid goods For by reason of his not being a lover of money it follows that a man readily makes use of it himself or for the good of others or for God's glory Thus it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many ways Since however we should judge of things according to that which is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature rather than according to that which pertains to them Consequently it remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues God's giving proceeds from his love for those to whom he gives not from his affection towards the thing he gives Therefore it seems to pertain to charity the greatest of virtues rather than to liberality Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving forth its own act and the acts of certain other virtues are better than money which liberality gives forth Reply to Objection 3 The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not that which is based on virtue as though he were better than others but that which is based on utility because he is more useful in external goods which as a rule men desire above all others For the same reason he becomes famous Question 118 This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org By St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 118 Of the vices opposed to liberality and in the first place of covetousness in eight articles We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality and one covetousness two prodigality Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry First, whether covetousness is a sin Second, whether it is a special sin Third, to which virtue is it opposed Fourth, whether it is a mortal sin Fifth, whether it is the most grievous of sins Sixth, whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin Seventh, whether it is a capital vice Eighth, of its daughters First article Whether covetousness is a sin Objection one It seems that covetousness is not a sin For covetousness, avaricea denotes a certain greed for gold Ayaris aviditas Because to which it consists in a desire for money Under which all external goods may be comprised Translators note The Latin for covetousness, avaricea Is derived from aveo to desire But the Greek philageria signifies literally Love of money And it is to this that St. Thomas is alluding Confer article two, objection two End of note Now it is not a sin to desire external goods Since a man desires them naturally Both because they are naturally subject to man And because by their means man's life is sustained For which reason they are spoken of as his substance Therefore covetousness is not a sin Objection two further Every sin is either against God Or one's neighbor or one's self As stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde Question 72, article four But covetousness is not, properly speaking, A sin against God Since it is opposed neither to religion Nor to the theological virtues By which man is directed to God Nor again is it a sin against oneself For this pertains properly to gluttony And lust, of which the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 618 He that commiteth fornication Sineth against his own body Unlike manor, neither is it apparently A sin against one's neighbor Since a man harms no one by keeping What is his own Therefore covetousness is not a sin Objection three further Now covetousness comes naturally to old age And every kind of defect according to the philosopher In Ethics 4.1 Therefore covetousness is not a sin On the contrary it is written in Hebrews 13.5 Let your manors be without covetousness Contented with such things as you have I answer that in whatever things Good consists in a due measure Evil must of necessity ensue Through excess or deficiency of that measure Now in all things that are for an end The good consists in a certain measure Since whatever is directed to an end Must needs be commensurate with that end As for instance medicine is commensurate With health as the philosopher observes In politics 1.6 External goods come under the head of things Useful for an end as stated above In question 117 article 3 As well as in the Parse Prima Secunde Question 2 article 1 Hence it must needs be that man's good In their respect consists in a certain measure In other words that man seeks According to a certain measure to have external riches Insofar as they are necessary for him to live In keeping with his condition of life Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed this measure By wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately This is what is meant by covetousness Which is defined as immoderate love of possessing It is therefore evident that covetousness is a sin Reply to Objection 1 It is natural to man to desire external things As means to an end Wherefore this desire is devoid of sin Insofar as it is held in check by the rule Taken from the nature of the end But covetousness exceeds this rule And therefore is a sin Reply to Objection 2 Covetousness may signify immoderation About external things in two ways First, so as to regard immediately the acquisition And keeping of such things When to which man acquires or keeps them more than is due In this way it is a sin directly against one's neighbor Since one man cannot over abound in external riches Without another man lacking them For temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time Secondly, it may signify immoderation in the internal affection Which a man has for riches when, for instance A man loves them, desires them, or delights on them Immoderately In this way by covetousness a man sins against himself Because it causes disorder in his affections Though not in his body as do the sins of the flesh As a consequence however It is a sin against God just as all mortal sins In as much as man contends things eternal For the sake of temporal things Reply to Objection 3 Natural inclinations should be regulated according to reason Which is the governing power in human nature Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid of external things Just as everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied They are not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with regard to riches Second article Whether covetousness is a special sin Objection 1 It seems that covetousness is not a special sin For Augustine says in On Free Will 2 Covetousness which in Greek is called philargaria Applies not only to silver or money But also to anything that is desired immoderately Now in every sin there is immoderate desire of something Because sin consists in turning away from the immutable good And adhering to mutable goods as stated above In the Parse Primesakunde question 71 article 6 Objection 3 Therefore covetousness is a general sin Objection 2 further According to Isidore in his etymologies 10 The covetous avarus man is so called because he is greedy For brass avidus aeris that is money Wherefore in Greek covetousness is called philargaria That is love of silver Now silver which stands for money Signifies all external goods the value of which can be measured by money As stated above in question 117 article 2 second reply Therefore covetousness is a desire for any external thing And consequently seems to be a general sin Objection 3 further A gloss on Romans 7 7 For I had not known concupiscence Says the law is good since by forbidding concupiscence It forbids all evil Now the law seems to forbid especially the concupiscence of covetousness Hence it is written in Exodus 20 17 Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil And so covetousness is a general sin On the contrary covetousness is numbered together with other special sins In Romans 129 where it is written Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness etc I answer that sins take their species from their objects As stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde Question 71 article 1 Now the object of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appetite tends Hence where there is a special aspect of good inordinately desired There is a special kind of sin Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good And riches as such come under the head of useful good Since they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man Consequently covetousness is a special sin For as much as it is an immoderate love of having possessions Which are comprised under the name of money Whence covetousness avarizia is denominated Since however the verb to have Which seems to have been originally employed in connection with possessions Whereof we are absolute masters Is applied to many other things Thus a man is said to have health, a wife, clothes and so forth As stated in De Predicamentis Consequently the term covetousness has been amplified To denote all immoderate desire for having anything whatever Thus Gregory says in a homily that Covetousness is a desire not only for money But also for knowledge and high places Whence prominence is immoderately sought after In this way covetousness is not a special sin And in this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness In the passage quoted in the first objection Wherefore this services for the reply to the first objection Reply to objection too All those external things that are subject to the uses of human life Are comprised under the term money In as much as they have the aspect of useful good But there are certain external goods that can be obtained by money Such as pleasures, honors and so forth Which are desirable under another aspect Wherefore the desire for such things is not properly called covetousness Insofar as it is a special vice Reply to objection three This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for anything whatever For it is easy to understand that if it is forbidden to covet another's possessions It is also forbidden to covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions Third article Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality Objection one It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality For Corsostom commenting on the Gospel of Matthew chapter 5 verse 6 Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice Says that there are two kinds of justice One general and the other special to which covetousness is opposed And the philosopher says the same in Ethics 5 too Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality Objection two further The sin of covetousness consists in a man's exceeding the measure in the things he possesses But this measure is appointed by justice Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to liberality Objection three further Liberality is a virtue that observes the means between two contrary vices As the philosopher states in Ethics 1, 7 and in Ethics 4, 1 But covetousness has no contrary and opposites in according to the philosopher in Ethics 5, 1 and 2 Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality On the contrary it is written in Ecclesiastes 5, 9 A covetous man shall not be satisfied with money And he that loveth riches shall have no fruits from them Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it inordinately Are opposed to liberality which observes the mean in the desire of riches Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality I answer that covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches in two ways First immediately in respect of the acquisition and keeping of riches In this way a man obtains money beyond his due by stealing or retaining another's property This is opposed to justice and in this sense covetousness is mentioned in Ezekiel 2227 Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood And to run after gains through covetousness Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches, for instance When a man loves or desires riches too much Or takes too much pleasure in them even if he be unwilling to steal In this way covetousness is opposed to liberality which moderates these affections as stated above In question 117, article 2, third reply In article 3, third reply and in article 6 In this sense covetousness is spoken of in 2 Corinthians 9, 5 They that would prepare this blessing before promised to be ready So as a blessing not as covetousness Where a gloss observes, lest they should regret what they had given and give but little Reply to Objection 1 Chrysostom and the philosopher are speaking of covetousness in the first sense Covetousness in the second sense is called illiberality Analo Theria by the philosopher Reply to Objection 2 It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of legal due So that a man should neither take nor retain another's property But liberality appoints the measure of reason principally in the interior affections And consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of money and in the spending of the same Insofar as these proceed from the interior affection looking at the matter from the point of view Not of the legal but of the moral debt which latter depends on the rule of reason Reply to Objection 3 Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite vice Since it consists in having more than one ought according to justice The contrary of which is to have less than one ought and this is not a sin but a punishment But covetousness as opposed to liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it Fourth article Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin Objection 1 It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin For no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin But men are worthy of death on account of covetousness For the apostle after saying in Romans 1.29 Being filled with all iniquity fornication covetousness etc. adds at verse 32 They who do such things are worthy of death Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin Objection 2 further The least degree of covetousness is to hold to one's own inordinately But this seemingly is a mortal sin For Basil says in a homily on the Gospel of Luke It is the hungry man's bread that thou keepest back The naked man's cloak that thou hoardest The needy man's money that thou possessest Hence thou despoilest as many as thou mightest succour Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another Since it is contrary to the love of our neighbour Much more therefore is all covetousness a mortal sin Objection 3 further No one is struck with spiritual blindness save through a mortal sin For this deprives a man of the light of grace But according to Chrysostom lust for money brings darkness on the soul Therefore covetousness which is lust for money is a mortal sin On the contrary a gloss on 1 Corinthians 3.12 If any man build upon this foundation says that He builds wood, hay, stubble who thinks in the things of the world How he may please the world Which pertains to the sin of covetousness Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble sins not mortally but venally For it is said of him that he shall be saved yet so as by fire Therefore covetousness is sometimes a venial sin I answer that as stated above in Article 3 Covetousness is twofold In one way it is opposed to justice and thus it is a mortal sin in respect of its genus For in this sense covetousness consists in the unjust taking or retaining of another's property And this belongs to theft or robbery which are mortal sins as stated above Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness By reason of imperfection of the act as stated above in Article 6 When we were treating of theft In another way covetousness may be taken as opposed to liberality In which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches Accordingly if the love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity In such wise that a man through love of riches fear not to act counter to the love of God and his neighbor Covetousness will then be a mortal sin If on the other hand the inordinate nature of his love stops short of this So that although he love riches too much yet he does not prefer the love of them to the love of God And is unwilling for the sake of riches to do anything in opposition to God or his neighbor Then covetousness is a venial sin Reply to Objection 1 Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins by reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin Reply to Objection 2 Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor Either through fear of their want or on account of his having too much Reply to Objection 3 Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on the soul When it puts out the light of charity by preferring the love of riches to the love of God Fifth Article Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins Objection 1 It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins For it is written in Ecclesiasticist 10.9 Nothing is more wicked than a covetous man And the text continues There is not a more wicked thing than to love money For such a one saideth even his own soul to sail Tully also says under the heading True magnanimity is based chiefly on two things Nothing is so narrow or little-minded as to love money But this pertains to covetousness Therefore, covetousness is the most grievous of sins Objection 2 further The more a sin is opposed to charity, the more grievous it is Now covetousness is most opposed to charity For Augustine says in his 83 questions, question 36 That greed is the bane of charity Therefore, covetousness is the greatest of sins Objection 3 further The gravity of a sin is indicated by its being incurable Therefore, the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be most grievous Because it is irremissable But covetousness is an incurable sin Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 4 One that old age and helplessness of any kind make men illiberal Therefore, covetousness is the most grievous of sins Objection 4 further The apostle says in Ephesians 5.5 That covetousness is a serving of idols Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous sins Therefore, covetousness is also On the contrary, adultery is a more grievous sin than theft According to Proverbs 6.30 But theft pertains to covetousness Therefore, covetousness is not the most grievous of sins I answer that every sin from the very fact that it is an evil Consists in the corruption or privation of some good While insofar as it is voluntary It consists in the desire of some good Consequently, the order of sins may be considered in two ways First, on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin And then the greater the good, the graver the sin From this point of view, a sin that is against God is most grievous After this comes a sin that is committed against a man's person And after this comes a sin against external things Which are deputed to man's use and this seems to belong to covetousness Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good To which the human appetite is inordinately subjected And then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin For it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods Since it is less than the good of the body And this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the divine good From this point of view, the sin of covetousness Whereby the human appetite is subjected even to external things Has in a way a greater deformity Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin While conversion to a mutable good is the material element The gravity of this sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted Rather than from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins Reply to Objection 1 These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of the good to which the appetite is subjected Hence in Ecclesiasticus 1010 it is given as a reason that the covetous man Saddeth his own soul to sail Because to wit he exposes his soul, that is his life, to danger for the sake of money Hence the text continues, because while he liveth he hath cast away, that is despised, his bowels In order to make money, Tully also adds that it is the mark of a narrow mind, namely, that one be willing to be subject to money Reply to Objection 2 Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness Because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, in as much as a man turns away from the divine good through cleaving to a temporal good Reply to Objection 3 The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way, covetousness in another For the sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable by reason of contempt For instance, because a man condemns God's mercy or his justice or some one of those things whereby man's sins are healed Wherefore, incurability of this kind points to the greater gravity of the sin On the other hand, covetousness is incurable on the part of a human defect A thing which human nature ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is, the more one seeks relief from external things And consequently, the more one gives way to covetousness Hence, incurability of this kind is an indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more dangerous Reply to Objection 4 Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a certain likeness that it bears to it Because the covetous man, like the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in the same way For the idolater subjects himself to an external creature by paying it divine honor Whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use, not for worship Hence, it does not follow that covetousness is as grievous a sin as idolatry 6th Article Whether Covetousness is a spiritual sin Objection 1 It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin For spiritual sin seem to regard spiritual goods But the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely external riches Therefore, covetousness is not a spiritual sin Objection 2 further Spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from the corruption of the flesh as instanced in old people who, through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness Therefore, covetousness is not a spiritual sin Objection 3 further A sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle and 1 Corinthians 6-18 He that committed fornication, sineth against his own body Now covetousness disturbs man even in his body, wherefore Chrysostom, in a homily on the Gospel of Matthew, compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil Confirm Mark 5 and was troubled in body Therefore, covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin On the contrary, Gregory, in his commentary on Job 31, numbers covetousness among spiritual vices I answer that sins are seeded chiefly in the affections And all the affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and sorrow, according to the philosopher in Ethics 2-5 Now some pleasures are carnal and some spiritual Carnal pleasures are those which are consummated in the carnal senses, for instance the pleasures of the table and sexual pleasures While spiritual pleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures While spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without pleasures of the flesh Such is covetousness For the covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches Therefore, covetousness is a spiritual sin Reply to Objection 1 Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the pleasure not of the body but only of the soul For as much as a man takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches Therefore, it is not a sin of the flesh Nevertheless, by reason of its object it is a mean between purely spiritual sins which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of spiritual objects Thus pride is about excellence and purely carnal sins which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a bodily object Reply to Objection 2 Movement takes its species from the term where to and not from the term where from Hence a vice of the flesh is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh and not from its originating in some defect of the flesh Reply to Objection 3 Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who is possessed by the devil not that the former is troubled in the flesh in the same way as the latter but by way of contrast since while the possessed man of whom we read in Mark 5 stripped himself the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches 7th Article Whether covetousness is a capital vice Objection 1 It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice for covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean and to prodigality as extreme but neither is liberality a principal virtue nor prodigality a capital vice therefore covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital vice Objection 2 further as stated above in the Parsprima Secundae Question 84 Articles 3 and 4 Those vices are called capital which have principal ends to which the ends of other vices are directed but this does not apply to covetousness since riches have the aspect not of an end but rather of something directed to an end as stated in Ethics 1.5 Therefore covetousness is not a capital vice Objection 3 further Gregory says in his commentary on Job 15 that covetousness arises sometimes from pride sometimes from fear but there are those who when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses allow the mind to give way to covetousness and there are others who wishing to be thought more of are incited to greed for other people's property Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices On the contrary, Gregory in his commentary on Job 31 reckons covetousness among the capital vices I answer that as stated in the second objection a capital vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices because when an end is very desirable the result is that through desire thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil Now the most desirable end is happiness or felicity which is the last end of human life as stated above in the Paris-Premier-Sequinte Question 1 articles 4, 7 and 8 Wherefore the more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness the more desirable it is Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficing Else it would not set man's appetite at rest as the last end does Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency as Boethius says in On the Consolation of Philosophy 3 The reason of which according to the philosopher in Ethics 5.5 is that we use money in token of taking possession of something and again it is written in Ecclesiastes 10.19 all things obey money therefore covetousness which is desire for money is a capital vice Reply to Objection 1 Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive appetite Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to the same genus and consequently it does not follow that principal vice is opposed to principal virtue Wherefore although liberality is not a principal virtue since it does not regard the principal good of the reason yet covetousness is a principal vice because it regards money which occupies a principal place among sensible goods for the reason given in the article On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is desirable principally indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of reason Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 4.1 that a prodigal man is a fool rather than a nave Reply to Objection 2 It is true that money is directed to something else as its end yet insofar as it is useful for obtaining all sensible things it contains in a way all things virtually Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness as stated in the article Reply to Objection 3 Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising sometimes out of other vices as stated above in question 36 article 4 first reply as well as in the Pars Prima Secundae question 84 article 4 provided that itself be frequently the source of others 8th article Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness Objection 1 It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as commonly stated namely treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy for covetousness is opposed to liberality as stated above in article 3 Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object violence to justice, insensibility to mercy therefore these vices have no connection with covetousness Objection 2 further treachery, fraud, and falsehood seem to pertain to the same thing namely the deceiving of one's neighbor therefore they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness Objection 3 further Isidore in his commentary on Deuteronomy enumerates nine daughters of covetousness which are lying, fraud, theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity, rapacity therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient Objection 4 further The philosopher in Ethics 4-1 mentions many kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality for he speaks of those who are sparing, tight-fisted, skin-flints, misers, who do illiberal deeds and of those who baton on hordom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead and robbers therefore it seems that the aforesaid enumeration is insufficient Objection 5 further Tyrants use much violence against their subjects but the philosopher says in Ethics 4-1 that Tyrants who destroy cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal that is, covetous therefore violence should not be reckoned as a daughter of covetousness On the contrary, Gregory in his commentary on Job 31 assigns to covetousness the daughters mentioned above I answer that the daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise therefrom especially in respect of the desire of an end now since covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two things for in the first place it exceeds in retaining and in this respect covetousness gives rise to insensibility to mercy because to wit a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with his riches Confer question 30 article 1 in the second place it belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving and in this respect covetousness may be considered in two ways first as in the thought, affectu in this way it gives rise to restlessness by hindering man with excessive anxiety and care for a covetous man shall not be satisfied with money as is stated in Ecclesiastes 5.9 secondly it may be considered in the execution affectu in this way the covetous man in acquiring other people's goods sometimes employs force which pertains to violence sometimes deceit and then if he has recourse to words it is falsehood if it be mere words perjury if he confirms his statement by oath if he has recourse to deeds and the deceit affects things we have fraud if persons then we have treachery as in the case of Judas who betrayed Christ through covetousness reply to Objection 1 there is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice because a sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters and another for it to have species reply to Objection 2 these three are distinguished as stated in the article reply to Objection 3 these nine are reducible to the 704 said for lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood since false witnessing is a special kind of lie just as theft is a special kind of fraud wherefor it is comprised under fraud and greed of filthy lucre belongs to restlessness rapacity is comprised under violence since it is a species thereof and inhumanity is the same as insensibility to mercy reply to Objection 4 the vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness for a man may be said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving if he gives but little he is said to be sparing if nothing he is tightfisted if he gives with great reluctance he is said to be skinflint chimino priestess a cumin seller as it were because he makes a great fuss about things of little value sometimes a man is said to be illiberal or covetous through an excess in receiving and this in two ways in one way through making money by disgraceful means whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of illiberal practices or by acquiring more through sinful deeds such as whoredom or the like or by making profit where one ought to have given gratis as in the case of usury or by laboring much to make little profit in another way in making money by unjust means whether by using violence on the living as robbers do or by despoiling the dead or by praying on one's friends as gamblers do reply to objection five just as liberality is about moderate sums of money so is illiberality where for tyrants who take great things by violence are said to be not illiberal but unjust End of question 118 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 119 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Treaties on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Justice This is the LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Treaties on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas Read by the Fathers of the English Dominican province Question 119 of Prodigality in three articles We must now consider prodigality under which head there are three points of inquiry First whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness Second whether prodigality is a sin Third whether it is a graver sin than covetousness First article whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness Objection 1 It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness for opposites cannot be together in the same subject but some are at the same time prodigal and covetous Therefore, prodigality is not opposite to covetousness Objection 2 further opposites relate to one same thing but covetousness as opposed to liberality relates to certain passions whereby man is affected towards money whereas prodigality does not seem to relate to any passions of the soul since it is not affected towards money or to anything else of the kind Therefore, prodigality is not opposite to covetousness Objection 3 further Sin takes its species chiefly from its end as stated above in the Pars Prima Secunde question 62 article 3 Now prodigality seems always to be directed to some unlawful end for the sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods especially is it directed to pleasures wherefore it is stated in Luke 1513 of the prodigal son that he wasted his substance living riotously Therefore, it seems that prodigality is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and liberality On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 2.7 and again in Ethics 4.1 that prodigality is opposed to liberality and illiberality to which we give here the name of covetousness I answer that in morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency Now covetousness and prodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency Thus, as regards affection for riches the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than he ought while the prodigal is deficient by being less careful of them than he ought And as regards external action prodigality implies excess in giving but deficiency in retaining and acquiring while covetousness on the contrary denotes deficiency in giving but excess in acquiring and retaining Hence, it is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness Reply to Objection 1 Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same subject in different respects For a thing is denominated more from what is in it principally Now just as in liberality which observes the mean the principal thing is giving to which receiving and retaining are subordinate So true covetousness and prodigality regard principally giving wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be prodigal while he who is deficient in giving is said to be covetous Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving without exceeding in receiving as the philosopher observes in Ethics 4.1 And unlike Manor it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in giving and therefore is prodigal and yet at the same time exceeds in receiving This may be due either to some kind of necessity since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own so that he is driven to acquire unduly and this pertains to covetousness Or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind for he gives not for a good purpose but as though despising virtue cares not wence or how he receives wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects Reply to Objection 2 Prodigality regards passions in respect of money not as exceeding but as deficient in them Reply to Objection 3 The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance but sometimes through being so disposed as to not care about riches and sometimes on account of something else More frequently however he inclines to intemperance both because through spending too much on other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure to which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone and because through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods he seeks for himself pleasures of the body Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 4-1 that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate Second article Whether prodigality is a sin Objection 1 It seems that prodigality is not a sin For the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 6-10 Covetousness is the root of all evils But it is not the root of prodigality since this is opposed to it Therefore prodigality is not a sin Objection 2 further The Apostle says in 1 Timothy 6-17-18 Charge the rich of this world to give easily to communicate to others Now this is especially what prodigal persons do Therefore prodigality is not a sin Objection 3 further It belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving to be deficient in solicitude about riches But this is most becoming to the perfect who fulfilled the words of our Lord in Matthew 6-34 Be not solicitous for tomorrow and in Matthew 19-21 Sell all thou hast and give to the poor Therefore prodigality is not a sin On the contrary the prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality I answer that as stated above in Article 1 The opposition between prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency either of which destroys the mean of virtue Now a thing is vicious and sinful through corrupting the good of virtue Hence it follows that prodigality is a sin Reply to Objection 1 Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring not to actual covetousness but to a kind of habitual covetousness which is the concupiscence of the fomez Confirm the verse Prima Sukunde Question 81, Article 3, second reply Whence all sins arise Others say that he is speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good And in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from covetousness since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inordinately, namely to give pleasure to others or at least to satisfy his own will in giving But to one that receives the passage correctly it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of riches for he had said previously in 1 Timothy 6-9 They that will become rich, etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be the root of all evils Not that all evils arise from covetousness but because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from covetousness Wherefore prodigality is sometimes born of covetousness as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in order to curry favor with certain persons from whom he may receive riches Reply to Objection 2 The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and communicate their riches according as they ought The prodigal does not do this since as the philosopher remarks in Ethics 4-1 His giving is neither good nor for a good end nor according as it ought to be for sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor namely to buffoons and flatterers whereas to the good they give nothing Reply to Objection 3 The excess in prodigality consists chiefly not in the total amount given but in the amount over and above what ought to be given and sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal man if it be necessary Accordingly, we must reply that those who give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things are not prodigal but perfectly liberal Third Article Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness Objection 1 It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness for by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not communicating his goods to him whereas by prodigality a man injures himself because the philosopher says in Ethics 4 1 that the wasting of riches which are the means whereby a man lives is an undoing of his very being Now he that injures himself sins more grievously according to Ecclesiasticus 14 5 he that is evil to himself to whom will he be good Therefore, prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness Objection 2 further A disorder that is accompanied by a laudable circumstance is less sinful Now the disorder of covetousness is sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance as in the case of those who are unwilling to spend their own lest they be driven to accept from others whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame in as much as we ascribe to prodigality to those who are intemperate as the philosopher observes in Ethics 4 1 Therefore, prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness Objection 3 further Prudence is chief among the moral virtues as stated above in question 56 article 1 first reply as well as in the Parsprima Sokunde question 61 article 2 first reply Now prodigality is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is for it is written in Proverbs 21 20 There is a treasure to be desired and oil in the dwelling of the just and the foolish man shall spend it and the philosopher says in Ethics 4 6 that it is the mark of a fool to give much and to receive nothing Therefore, prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 4 6 that the prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man I answer that prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous sin than covetousness and this for three reasons First, because covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue Since giving, wherein the prodigal exceeds belongs to liberality more than receiving or retaining wherein the covetous man exceeds Secondly, because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives while the covetous man is of use to no one not even to himself as stated in Ethics 4 6 Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured for not only is the prodigal on the way to old age he is opposed to prodigality but he is easily reduced to a state of want since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in giving Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness there too On the other hand, the covetous man is not easily cured for the reason given above in Question 118 Article 5 Third Reply Reply to Objection 1 The difference between the prodigal and the covetous man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter against another for the prodigal sins against himself by spending that which is his and his means of support and against others by spending the wherewithal to help others This applies chiefly to the clergy who are the dispensers of the church's goods that belong to the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure In like manner, the covetous man sins against others by being deficient in giving and he sins against himself through deficiency in spending Wherefore it is written in Ecclesiastes 6-2 A man to whom God hath given riches yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof Nevertheless, the prodigal man exceeds in this that he injures both himself and others yet so as to profit some whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor himself since he does not even use his own goods for his own profit Reply to Objection 2 In speaking of vices in general we judge of them according to their respective natures Thus with regard to prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess and with regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess that one spend too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional sins wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse as stated in Ethics 4-1 that an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs to others although this appears in itself to call for praise yet on account of the motive for which he does so it calls for blame since he is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others Reply to Objection 3 All vices are opposed to prudence even as all virtues are directed by prudence wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence alone for this very reason it is deemed less grievous End of question 119 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC