 Mr. President, and for many of you dear friends, good friends by the way, it is my pleasure to be here and I would like to start by thanking Mario, another good friend, for inviting me here this morning. I am told that this is rare for a politician like me to be invited to speak to these prestigious forum. I have to say I understand and I respect this policy. It's so unfair to attack central banks when it comes to their independence. One of the great powers and responsibilities of being a central banker is that you can move markets with a single line in speech. Every word counts a billion and this is why I always admire Mario's speeches with priceless pieces of art. It is fair to say that I am better suited to being a politician. I can't say what I think from time to time. I can't say what I think, which is what I plan to do today. So allow me to tell you the story of the year, my story, which is a little bit different from yours. I am privileged to have been part of this adventure from the very start and it is my personal experience and vision that I would like to share with you today. As someone who has witnessed every twist and turn of the last 30 years of European politics, I can confirm that the road has not been easy but I remain astonished by the strength and the relevance of the project. As every European success story is full of crisis and lessons learned, too often we lose sight of how far we have come and the true value of that success. Today I want to stop the clock on six moments in time, six lessons in history that have shaped your and European Union as we know it. Question number one, the euro is a political project for our grandchildren. The first moment in time goes back to the crisis of the European exchange rate mechanism in 1992. This story starts one year earlier when as a finance minister during the Luxembourg Expresidency of the Council, I was in charge of the economic and monetary aspects of the Intergovernmental Conference. This led to the Maastricht Treaty of December 91, which paved the way for the single camps. This is a time from which there are only two survivors, the euro and myself. And only one of us is here to stay. Two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty was a proud European moment. Together with the launch of the European single currency and to recently publish the law report of 1989, the Maastricht Treaty was about creating a new future for Europe. It was about Europe taking its destiny into its own hands. But as often in Europe, our collective will was soon put to the test. Under the pressure of the markets, the United Kingdom chose to leave the European exchange rate mechanism in September 1992 to make the deal at Maastricht possible. I had already proposed that was in May 91, Jean-Claude was there and others. I had already proposed the British opt out from the single currency the year before. And now the United Kingdom was leaving the exchange rate mechanism. In some ways, I believe this parting of ways was perhaps the start of the journey that led to Brexit. Other countries also faced increased market pressure. In 1993, the finance ministers of Germany and the Netherlands also wanted to leave. Because they believed their economic fundamentals were by far much stronger than those of France and of others. For me, as a then young finance minister of Luxembourg, a country with even better fundamentals, this put me in a very uncomfortable situation. Our currency at that time was the Belgium franc. And if those countries left, Luxembourg would be under pressure to follow, putting Belgium in great difficulties. In these long negotiations, it was, this may surprise you, it was the British Chancellor of Aixaca, Kenneth Clark, who woke us up. He said out loud in the room, if you let Germany and the Netherlands go, you will never have a single currency. And personally, did he say, I would like my grandchildren to be able to pay in Euro one day. The British Chancellor, Kenneth Clark, a real statesman. He was right. We had to find a solution and look at the bigger picture. And this is what we did by widening the intervention bands of the exchange rate mechanism from 2.25 to 15 percent to make the system less vulnerable to speculation. It was a difficult moment. Jean-Claude was there, he's here. You are, yeah, you like Jean-Claude, director of Treasury. I remember that because I had to convince the finance minister of the merits of the independence of the Central Bank. Jean-Claude, whenever he was saying we are fiercely independent, I remember the moments we spent in Luxembourg during that period of time. The next day after this decision, all the newspapers and leading academies wrote that it was the end of the single currency, when in reality it was the rescue of the single currency. But at this point I have to make a solemn confession to a room full of central bankers. While we were working to find a solution, the Luxembourgish government secretly printed 50 billion in a new and secret currency, the Luxembourgish Frank. We even put the image of Grand Duchess Charlotte who died in 85 on the face of the bank notes in order to hide our intentions as much as possible. Because we said to ourselves that nobody will believe that with the image of the old Grand Duchess that we are launching a new currency in Europe. Such action would be totally unthinkable, irresponsible, reckless in our currency union. Back then, relying on the currency of another country in the case of Luxembourg Belgium and exposed to the risks of the markets, we had to hatch ourselves against all eventualities. Luckily the Luxembourgish Frank never had to be used. And standing here today, decades later, I strongly reject this sort of behavior. The little story states a well-kept secret between the Grand Duke, the Prime Minister, Jacques Santa and myself, until we burned all the notes on the day Europe was introduced on the 1st of January, 1999. That was a major performance by the Luxembourgish government. For once, they had a job to do and they were burning our money. We never used. There was a second lesson. The rules do not need to be stupid. Because the second moment stems from what I call the stability and growth crisis of 2003. France and Germany contravened the rule that the deficit should not go beyond 3% of GDP. Under the pressure of these two countries, the Council of Ministers decided not to adopt the formal corrective remedies proposed by the Commission. The Commission took the decision of the Council to court. And both Council and Commission partly lost a very European story. These were early dates, more than 15 years ago, but it clearly showed the risk of the rules being banned for some member states for political risks. The legislative framework has been strengthened in the meantime. By interestingly, the court already confirmed at the time that rules should be applied with some discretion, taking all circumstances in account. And this is the approach I have taken since I took office as President of the Commission. Yes, the fiscal rules are here to be respected by everyone, however complex they have become. But at that time, the rules must make both practical and economic sense. This is also what the rule foresees. This is why faced with the risk of a sluggish recovery, the European Commission, which I have the privilege to preside, has made use of the flexibility that exists within the fiscal rules to allow European economies the time and space they needed to recover and reform. And when the risks of slippage appeared, we took the time to negotiate hard to put the countries back on the sustainable path. Just think of Spain and Portugal. Three years ago, have we been rigid in our approach to the fiscal rules and prematurely applied financial sanctions, these countries would not have had such a robust growth and been able to correct their public finances. The credit also goes to the government of these countries, which choose a credible and cooperative path for the benefit of their citizens. I'm saying this because we often get a lot of criticism for our job of fiscal surveillance from both sides of the spectrum, which is a good sign. By the way, it is the Council of Ministers which ultimately decided on fiscal surveillance in the European Union, not the Commission. And I'm pleased to report that the Council has followed all the recommendations of the Commission in recent years. Frankly, when one looks back, the facts speak for themselves. Over the last four years, this flexible approach is estimated to have boosted the European economy by 0.8% and help create 1.5 million jobs, while allowing government debt and deficit to fall significantly, in particular within the U.S. I'm confident that history will prove our side. There is a third lesson that this lesson has a title, and the title is that Europe is a matter of common interest. The third moment in time, the third lesson comes from Greece, where in October 2009, the government admitted that official statistics had misrepresented the real debt and deficit figures for years. The weak government revised the 2009 deficit forecast from 3.7% to 12.7% of GDP. The final figure was about 15%. Similarly, the figure for weak government debt at the end of 2009 increased from 272 billion euros to 300 billion euros, with the highest ratio of debt to GDP for any European country. This fueled mistrust and uncertainty at all levels, and it revealed one of the biggest contradictions and absurdities of Europe's economic and monetary union. The truth is that Europe's debt has sent 10 delegations to Athens with a view to improving the reliability of Greek statistics from 2004 to 2010. However, member states had been resisting tighter euros on statistics for years. Prime Ministers, Finance Ministers, Governments, arguing that national sovereignty was more important than trustworthy and comparable data. I have to accept my part of responsibility, because I was amongst those who asked the Commission not to pursue in that way. Yeah. I voted against the proposal of the Commission to give more power and to give more independence to Europe's debt. That was a major mistake. Would we have done the right thing? We would never have experienced the Greek crisis as we did. The actions of these institutions, Eurostat and others, should be accountable and transparent, which also means that they should be anchored in the European decision-making process. This is why I push for intergovernment solutions inherited from the crisis years to be incorporated into the institutional framework of the European Union over time. The fourth moment in time relates to the summer of 2012, and your words, Mario, announcing that the European Central Bank was ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. You had taken office less than a year before, coming after my good friend, Jean Clout. At the time, the euro area was at the brink of falling back into recession. Greece, Ireland, Portugal were under enormous stress and under financial problems. The fragmentation of financial markets threatened the integrity of the euro area and the survival of the euro was at risk. Your calm and confidence not only pacified the markets, it saved me, the president of the euro group, at that time for many more sleepless nights. I know I'm not supposed to comment on the policy of the European Central Bank, but allow me to say how glad I am that you were there. And I can only commend the bold action of the ECP and our close relationship in recent years. In that same speech, July 2012, you were also right to point out that many market actors and commentators underestimated the political capital invested in the euro project. The euro requires resolve and it deserves determined leaders. These are stronger than markets. The fifth moment, the fifth lesson, is the fight to keep Greece in the euro in 2015. Many leaders have now taken credit for saving Greece on one night in July of that year. I believe there is some artistic license in some of these memoirs. Success has many parents, but failure is always and often. But just as quickly as politicians appear to claim success, so disappear the many pundits, often from across the pond, who predicted Brexit and the end of the euro. Where are they now? For those of us who were at the center of the storm for months, the negotiations were long and tense, but we knew the importance of the fight. A fight to overcome years of prejudices, ideologies, mismanagement, a fight to strike the right balance between solidarity and responsibility and safeguard the future of the European Union as a whole. A fight to make sure that the efforts required made sense, not in an economic textbook, but in the lives of the real people. A fight to find European solutions to European problems. Of course, the real efforts and the real courage were shown by the people of Greece. Our job was to support them. This is why the Commission mobilized up to 35 billion euros for Greece from variable EU funds for investment, which triggered an estimated 2% GDP increase in that country. It is also why I personally insisted that the program goes through a social impact assessment and contains a strong social dimension. This, for instance, helped us cut the price of medicines and roll out a guaranteed minimum income scheme for the most vulnerable. The issue was not solved overnight, despite what some think. The solution struck in the early hours of the 13th of July by leaders because they were trying to avoid new problems. Most people have forgotten about the fact that even after the so-called deal, Greece was actually about to default on its debt to the European Central Bank. Once again, we did what it took, and the Commission mobilized a short-term loan worth 7 billion euros in which financing under the European financial stabilization mechanism to prevent Greece from crashing out of the euro by accident. Today, it is with pride that I can say that Greece is in its rightful place at the beating heart of Europe and the euro. Together, we showed that the euro is irreversible, and we all knew it had to be. Greece, a final moment, a kind of sixth lesson, and we are still living in that moment. It started back on the 18th of May last year when the US announced its decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement and to reinstate sanctions. The decision caused far-reaching problems for European companies to continue trading and doing business. For many Europeans, this was a kind of wake-up call. It showed how isolated and fragile we can be, how reliant we still remain on others. And it showed that it was time for the euro to strengthen its global role. Time will tell, but I believe this could prove to be what we could call our Nixon moment. We can indeed draw many parallels to 1971 when President Nixon took the US dollar of the gold standard and ended a fixed exchange rate system that had existed since World War II. This was the moment when Europe decided to move towards its own European monetary system, the first step towards the single currency, which would see the light 30 years later. Europeans were lucky that they could fall back on the report drawn up by Pia Verna in 1970, setting out the plan towards the Economic and Monetary Union. His plan was already there, but it took the global crisis for it to be used and for Europe to take a leap forward. We should not wait for the next crisis to do what we know we have to do. For our own sovereignty, we need to think afresh the strategic role of currencies, that currencies play in today's world. And this is why the Commission has set out the new agenda to strengthen the international role of the EU. These six moments, these six examples are all examples of crises. But every time we have been challenged, we have found solutions and even surprised ourselves with what we can achieve. This is a fitting way to tell the story of European construction. These moments also have one lesson in common. They show that the EU has never been a purely technical or economic matter. It is first and foremost a political project about people, about history, about unity. It is about lessons learned and the collective ambition for the future. This is why when I took office as president of the Commission five years ago, I had three priorities in mind. First, to make sure the EU delivers for Europeans and to boost jobs, wealth and investment. This came at the time when Europe was struggling to emerge from its worst crisis since World War II and when populists used the EU as the symbol of austerity. Since then, we have come a long way together. 13.4 million jobs have been created in the European Union since this commission took office in November 2014. 9.5 million of those in the U.I.R. Employment is now at the record high and unemployment at the record low since the turn of the century. If these jobs had been destroyed, 40 million there, 9 million here, it would be the fault of the Commission and ECB. So let us take our part of the credit for once. Think of the impact of the monetary policies adopted by our central bank. Think of the flexibility used within the rules of stability and gold-packed. Think of the impact of the European plan for investment, the so-called Junker plan, which has unlocked 400 billion of additional investment across Europe. But this plan is no longer called Junker plan. They decided to call the plan Junker plan because they wanted to pre-identify the one who would be responsible for the failure. Now it's a success and now it's no longer the Junker plan. It's the European plan for strategic investment. And think of the deepening of the single market in all its form and the positive impact of trade policy with unprecedented deals made with Canada and Japan against the opinion of the general public because people don't like trade deeds. We have concluded under my mandate, 15 trade agreements with other parts of the world. And I think that this effort has to be pursued. There's still work to do. But our European economies are growing and people across our union are feeling the difference. I know we need to complete the Economic and Monetary Union to support our single currency and deliver better for the real economy. The European sample bank cannot do it alone. We have made big strides forward, notably on the European banking union, which has helped to reduce non-performing loans back to pre-crisis levels and strengthen the capital buffers of euro area banks by more than 234 billion since 2014. Through the launch of the Capital Markets Union, we are also making it easier for businesses to access the financing they need. We are also making progress towards dedicated budget lines for the euro area. This would come in the form of an instrument of convergence and competitiveness helping to steer reform and investment. I have been calling for this for a long time. And the Commission put the proposal on the table more than one year ago. I expect, and Mario will attend, I expect Friday's Euro Summit to take this forward and call for a swift conclusion of the legislative work. All in all, I believe we can now say that Europe's Economic and Monetary Union is more robust than ever before. But there is still a lot more to do. We need a common deposit guarantees to complete our banking union. We need simpler fiscal rules and a stabilization function for the euro area. And we need to build a common treasury and develop a euro safe asset over time. With the help of Mario, we have charted the way forward through what is known as the Five Presidents Report of June 2015. We have come a long way, but there should be no complacency. And lastly, I wanted to put more heart and soul back in the European project, more politics, more humanity. I want people to see the euro not just as a currency, but as a way to deliver a fairer society in line with the values of our social market economy. This is why I prioritized a strong social agenda, the proclamation of a European pillar of social rights and relaunch of the social dialogue at all levels. This is why I pushed for fair taxation in the European Union and to combat against tax evasion. This is why we are engaging in a strong fight against money laundering. All of this has contributed to a changing tone and a changing narrative on the euro to reconciling the citizens of Europe with their currency. The talk of Brexit implosion and contagion of the euro as a threat to cohesion has rightly been replaced by a better understanding of the single currency as a source of protection and empowerment and as a strategic asset for Europeans in this unsettled world. And the support for the euro has reached an all-time high. 75% of our citizens are now in favor of the single currency. Looking back to where we come from, I'm prouder of this than money, other statistic or figure. Dear friends, the euro is now the second currency in the world. It is the single currency of the European Union. Without the UK, the economies of the euro era represent 85% of the GDP of the European Union. More member states will join the euro area in the coming years. Standing on the shoulders of many European statesmen, we have turned an improbable aspiration into a daily reality for hundreds of millions of Europeans. The coins and banknotes in our pockets are worth far more than the numbers written on them. They are the tangible symbol of a united euro that promises peace, protection, and prosperity. The only way to honor the legacy of all those who made our Swiss as possible is to continue delivering on these promises of our single currency. It has been my life's work and my great pride to have played a small part in a journey that has a long way to go. And I have been very privileged to travel along with all of you. Thank you.