 SECTION 22 OF THE GREAT EVENTS BY FAMOUS HISTORIANS, VOLUME 2. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Mike Botez. The Great Events by Famous Historians, Volume 2. Recorded by Charles F. Horn, Roseter Johnson and John Rudd. The Battle of Metaurus, B.C. 207 by Sir Edward S. Creasy, Part 3. Meanwhile at Rome, the news of Nero's expedition had caused the greatest excitement and alarm. All men felt the full audacity of the Enterprise, but hesitated what epithet to apply to it. It was evident that Nero's conduct would be judged off by the event that most unfair criterion, as the Roman historian truly terms it. People reasoned on the perilous state in which Nero had left the rest of his army, without a general and deprived of the core of its strength, in the vicinity of the terrible Hannibal. They speculated on how long it would take Hannibal to pursue and overtake Nero himself and his expeditionary force. They talked over the former disasters of the war, and the fall of both the consuls of the last year. All these calamities had come on them, while they had only one Carthaginian general and army to deal with in Italy. Now they had two Punic Wars at a time. They had two Carthaginian armies, they had almost two Hannibals in Italy. Hasdrubal was sprung from the same father, trained up in the same hostility to Rome. They practiced in the battle against their legions, and if the comparative speed and success with which he had crossed the Alps were a fair test, he was even a better general than his brother. With fear for their interpreter of every rumor, they exaggerated the strength of their enemy's forces in every quarter and criticized and distrusted their own. Only for Rome, while she was thus a prey to terror and anxiety, her consuls' nerves were stout and strong, and he resolutely urged on his march toward Senna, where his colleague Lepheus and the Pretor-Portus were encamped, Hasdrubal's army being in position about half a mile to their north. Nero had sent couriers forward to uprise his colleague of his project and of his approach, and by the advice of Lepheus, Nero so timed his final march, as to reach the camp at Senna by night. According to previous arrangement, Nero's men were received silently into the tents of their comrades, each according to his rank. By these means there was no enlargement of the camp that could betray to Hasdrubal the accession of force which the Romans had received. This was considerable, as Nero's numbers had been increased on the march by the volunteers, who offered themselves in crowds, and from whom he selected the most promising men, and especially the veterans of former campaigns. A council of war was held on the morning after his arrival, in which some advised that time should be given for Nero's men to refresh themselves after the fatigue of such a march. But Nero vehemently opposed all delay. The officer said he, who is for giving time to my men here to rest themselves, is for giving time to Hannibal to attack my men, whom I have left in the camp in Apolia. He is for giving time to Hannibal and Hasdrubal to discover my march, and to maneuver for a junction with each other in Cisalpine Gaul at their leisure. We must fight instantly, while both, the foe here and the foe in the south, are ignorant of our movements. We must destroy this Hasdrubal, and I must be back in Apolia, before Hannibal awakes from his torpor. Nero's advice prevailed. It was resolved to fight directly, and before the consuls and Preter left the tent of Livius, the red n-sign, which was the signal to prepare for immediate action, was hoisted, and the Romans, forthwith, drew up in battle a ray outside the camp. Hasdrubal had been anxious to bring Livius and Portius to battle, though he had not judged it expedient to attack them in their lines. And now on hearing that the Romans offered battle, he also drew up his men and advanced toward them. No spy or deserter had informed him of Nero's arrival, nor had he received any direct information that he had more than his old enemies to deal with. But as he rode forward to reconnoiter the Roman line, he thought that their numbers seemed to have increased, and that the armor of them was unusually dull and stained. He noticed also that the horses of some of the cavalry appeared to be rough and out of condition, as if they had just come from a succession of forced marches. So also, though owing to the precaution of Livius, the Roman camp showed no change in size, it had not escaped the quick year of the Carthaginian general, that the trumpet which gave the signal to the Roman legions sounded that morning once oftener than usual, as if directing the troops of some additional superior officer. Hasdrubal from his Spanish campaigns was well acquainted with all the sounds and signals of Roman war, and from all that he heard and saw, he felt convinced that both the Roman consuls were before him. In doubt and difficulty as to what might have taken place between the armies of the south, and probably hoping that Hannibal also was approaching, Hasdrubal determined to avoid an encounter with the combined Roman forces, and to endeavor to retreat upon Insubrian Gaul, where he would be in a friendly country, and could endeavor to reopen his communication with his brother. He therefore led his troops back into their camp, and as the Romans did not venture on an assault upon his entrenchments, and Hasdrubal did not choose to commence his retreat in their sight, the day passed away in inaction. But the first watch of the night, Hasdrubal led his men silently out of their camp, and moved northward toward the Metaurus, in the hope of placing that river between himself and the Romans, before his retreat was discovered. His guides betrayed him, and having purposely led him away from the part of the river that was fordable, they made their escape in the dark, and left Hasdrubal and his army wandering in confusion along the steep bank, and seeking in vain for a spot where the stream could be safely crossed. But last they halted, and when they donned on them, Hasdrubal found that a great number of his men, in their fatigue and impatience, had lost all discipline and subordination, and that many of his gaelic auxiliaries had got drunk and were lying helpless in their quarters. The Roman cavalry was soon seen coming up in pursuit, followed at no great distance by the legions, which marched in readiness for an instant engagement. It was hopeless for Hasdrubal to think of continuing his retreat before them. The prospect of immediate battle might recall the disordered part of his troops to a sense of duty, and revive the instinct of discipline. He therefore ordered his men to prepare for action instantly, and made the best arrangement of them that the nature of the ground would permit. Heron has well described the general appearance of a Carthaginian army. He says, It was an assemblage of the most opposite races of the human species, from the farthest parts of the globe. Hordes of half-naked Gauls were ranged next to companies of white clothed Iberians, and savage Ligurians next to the far-traveled Nassimons and Latofagi. Carthaginians and Phoenician Africans formed the center, while innumerable troops of Numidian horsemen taken from all the tribes of the desert, swarmed about on unsaddled horses, and formed the wings. The van was composed of Balearic slingers, and a line of colossal elephants with their Ethiopian guides formed as it were, a chain of moving fortresses before the whole army. Such were the usual materials and arrangements of hosts that fought for Carthage, but the troops under Hasdrubal were not in all respects thus constituted or thus stationed. He seems to have been especially deficient in cavalry, and he had few African troops, though some Carthaginians of high rank were with him. His veteran Spanish infantry armed with helmets and shields, and short cotton thrust swords were the best part of his army. These and his few Africans he drew up on his right wing under his own personal command. In the center he placed his Ligurian infantry, and on his left wing he placed or retained the Gauls who were armed with long javelins and with huge broadswords and targets. The rugged nature of the ground in front and on the flank of this part of his line made him hope that the Roman right wing would be unable to come to close quarters with these unserviceable barbarians before he could make some impression with his Spanish veterans on the Roman left. This was the only chance that he had of victory or safety, and he seems to have done everything that good generalship could do to secure it. He placed his elephants in advance of his center and right wing. He had caused the driver of each of them to be provided with a sharp iron spike and a mallet, and had given orders that every beast that became unmanageable and run back up on his own ranks should be instantly killed by driving the spike into the vertebra of the junction of the head and the spine. Hasdrubal's elephants were ten in number. We have no trustworthy information as to the amount of his infantry, but it is quite clear that he was greatly outnumbered by the combined Roman forces. The tactics of the Roman legions had not yet acquired that perfection which they received from the military genius of Marius and which we read of in the first chapter of Gibbon. We possess in that great work an account of the Roman legions at the end of the Commonwealth, and during the early ages of the Empire which those alone can adequately admire who have attempted a similar description. We have also in the 6th and 17th books of Polybius an elaborate discussion on the military system of the Romans in his time, which was not far distant from the time of the Battle of the Metaurus, but the subject is beset with difficulties, and instead of entering into minute but inconclusive details, I would refer to Gibbon's first chapter, a serving for a general description of the Roman army in its period of perfection, and remark that the training and armor which the whole legion received in the time of Augustus were two centuries earlier only partially introduced. Two divisions of troops called Hastati and Principis formed the bulk of each Roman legion in the Second Punic War. Each of these divisions was 1200 strong. The Hastatus and the Principis, legionary, bore a breastplate or coat of mail, brazen greaves, and a brazen helmet with a lofty upright crest of scarlet or black feathers. He had a large oblong shield and as weapons of offense, two javelins, one of which was light and slender, but the other was a strong and massive weapon, with a shaft about four feet long and an iron head of equal length. The sword was carried on the right thigh and was a short cut and thrust weapon, like that which was used by the Spaniards. Thus armed, the Hastati formed the front division of the legion, and the Principis the Second. Each division was drawn up about ten deep, a space of three feet being allowed between the files as well as the ranks, so as to give each legionary ample room for the use of his javelins and of his sword and shield. The men in the Second rank did not stand immediately behind those in the First rank, but the files were alternate, like the position of the men on a draft board. This was turned the Quincunx Order. Naboor considers that this arrangement enabled the legion to keep up a shower of javelins on the enemy for some considerable time, he says. When the First line had hurled its pillar, it probably stepped back between those who stood behind it, and two steps forward restored the front nearly to its first position. A movement which, on account of the arrangement of the Quincunx, could be executed without losing a moment. Thus one line succeeded the other in the front, till it was time to draw the swords. Nay, when it was found expedient, the lines which had already been in the front might repeat this change, since the stores of Pila were surely not confined to the two which each soldier took with him into battle. The same charge must have taken place in fighting with the sword, which, when the same tactics were adopted on both sides, was anything but a confused melee. On the contrary, it was a series of single combats. He adds that a military man of experience had been consulted by him on the subject, and had given it as his opinion, that the change of lines as described above was by no means impracticable. But in the absence of the deafening noise of gunpowder, it cannot have had even any difficulty with well-trained troops. The third division of the Legion was 600 strong and acted as a reserve. It was always composed of veteran soldiers who were called the triari. Their arms were the same as these of the Principis and Hastati, except that each triarian carried a spear instead of javelins. The rest of the Legion consisted of light-armed troops who acted as skirmishers. The cavalry of each Legion was at this period about 300 strong. The Italian allies who were attached to the Legion seemed to have been similarly armed and equipped, but their numerical proportion of cavalry was much larger. Such was the nature of the forces that advanced on the Roman side to the Battle of the Metaurus. Nero commanded the right wing, Livius the left, and the Pretor Portius had the command of the center. Both Romans and Carthaginians well understood how much depended upon the fortune of this day and how little hope of safety there was for the vanquished. Only the Romans herein seemed to have had the better inconsit and opinion that they were to fight with men desirous to have fled from them. And according to this presumption, Cain Livius the consul, with a proud bravery to give charge to the Spaniards and Africans, by whom he was so sharply entertained that the victory seemed very doubtful. The Africans and Spaniards were stout soldiers and well acquainted with the manner of the Roman fight. The Ligurians also were a hard nation and not accustomed to give ground, which they needed the less or were able now to do, being placed in the midst. Livius, therefore, and Portius found great opposition, and with great slaughter on both sides prevailed little or nothing. Besides other difficulties they were exceedingly troubled by the elephants, that break their first ranks and put them in such disorder as the Roman ensigns were driven to fall back. All this while Claudius Nero, laboring in vain against the steep hill, was unable to come to blows with the goals that stood opposite him but out of danger. This made Hasdrubald the more confident who, seeing his own left wing safe, did the more boldly and fiercely make impression on the other side, upon the left wing of the Romans. But at last Nero, who found that Hasdrubald refused his left wing, and who could not overcome the difficulties of the ground, in the quarter assigned to him, decided the battle by another stroke of that military genius which had inspired his march. Wheeling a brigade of his best men around the rear of the rest of the Roman army, Nero fiercely charged the flank of the Spaniards and Africans. The charge was as successful as it was sudden. Rolled back in disorder upon each other and overwhelmed by numbers, the Spaniards and Ligurians died, fighting gallantly to the last. The goals who had taken little or no part in the strife of the day, were then surrounded and butchered almost without resistance. Hasdrubald, after having, by the confession of his enemies, done all that a general could do, when he saw that the victory was irreparably lost, scorning to survive the gallant host which he had led, and to gratify as a captive Roman cruelty and pride, spurred his horse into the midst of a Roman cohort, and sword in hand met the death that was worthy of the son of Hamilcar and the brother of Hannibal. Success the most complete had crowned Nero's enterprise. Returning as rapidly as he had advanced, he was again facing the inactive enemies in the south, before they even knew of his march. But he brought with him a ghastly trophy of what he had done. In the true spirit of that savage brutality, which deformed the Roman national character, Nero ordered Hasdrubald's head to be flung into his brother's camp. Ten years had passed since Hannibal had last gazed on those features. The sons of Hamilcar had then planned their system of warfare against Rome, which they had so nearly brought to successful accomplishment. Year after year had Hannibal been struggling in Italy, in the hope of one day hailing the arrival of him, whom he had left in Spain, and of seeing his brother's eye flush with affection and pride, at the junction of their irresistible hosts. He now saw that eye glazed in death, and in the agony of his heart the great Carthaginian groaned aloud that he recognized his country's destiny. Meanwhile at the tidings of the great battle, Rome at once rose from the thrill of anxiety and terror to the full confidence of triumph. Hannibal might retain his hold on southern Italy for a few years longer, but the imperial city and her allies were no longer in danger from his arms. And after Hannibal's downfall, the great military republic of the ancient world met in her career of conquest no other worthy competitor. Byron had termed Nero's march unequaled, and in the magnitude of its consequences it is so. Viewed only as a military exploit, it remains unparalleled, saved by Malboru's bold march from Flanders to the Danube in the campaign of Blenheim, and perhaps also by the Archduke Charles's lateral march in 1796, by which he overwhelmed the French under Jourdan, and then driving Morro through the Black Forest and across the Rhine for a while freed Germany from her invaders. End of Section 22. Section 23 of The Great Events by Famous Historians, Volume 2. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Ryan Fahey, Fairfield, Connecticut. The Great Events by Famous Historians, edited by Charles F. Horn, Rossiter Johnson, and John Rudd. Section 23. Scipio Africanus crushes Hannibal at Zama and subjugates Carthage, BC 202 by Libri Part 1. Sprung from a colony of tear, Carthage, founded about BC 800, rapidly developed through a wonderful system of colonization into a dominating power, her rule extending through northwestern Africa and western Europe. In BC 509, Carthage made her first treaty with Rome, but the rivalry which grew up between the two powers developed into a stubborn contest for the Empire of the World, culminating in the three Punic Wars. The first of these lasted from BC 264 to 241, the second from BC 218 to 201. In the interval between these two wars, Rome acquired the northern part of Italy, whence she sent victorious armies against the barbarians in Gaul. Meanwhile, under Hamelkar Barker, the Carthaginians had affected the conquest of southern Spain, which they reduced to the condition of a dependency. Hamelkar's greater son, Hannibal, was compelled by his father to swear eternal enmity to Rome. Having established the Carthaginian Empire in Spain, at the age of 26 he took the Spanish city of Saguntum, an ally of Rome, and this was the immediate cause of the Second Punic War, which the Romans declared. The passage of the Alps by Hannibal is regarded as one of the greatest military performances in history. He was welcomed by the Gauls as a deliverer and was soon operating in northern Italy, his appearance there being a complete surprise to the Romans. He won victories over them at the rivers Techinus and Trebia, B.C. 218, another in 217 at Lake Trasimines, a great triumph at Cannae in 216, took Capua in the same year and wintered there. In 212 captured Tarentum, marched against Rome in 211 and in 203 was recalled to Africa. In the meantime the Romans had decided to carry the war into Africa, although in 215 they had beaten Hannibal and in 211 had retaken Capua. Publius Cornelius Scipio, Scipio-Africanus major, in BC 210-206 drove the Carthaginians out of Spain. In 205 he was made consul and the next year invaded Africa. Landing on the coast he was met by the forces of the Numidian king who became his allies against Carthage. In 203 he defeated Syphax and Hasjubal. Hannibal, now having returned to Carthage, he took command of the forces which she opposed to the Roman invaders, but in BC 202 suffered final overthrow at Zama in the battle that ended the Second Punic War. Livy's account of the closing scenes of that war, which here follows, gives the reader a clear understanding of the sequence and conclusion of the events related. Marcus Servilius and Tiberius Claudius, having assembled the Senate, consulted them respecting the provinces. As both were desirous of having Africa, they wished Italy and Africa to be disposed of by lots, but principally in consequence of the exertions of Quintus Metilus, Africa was neither assigned to anyone nor withheld. The consuls were ordered to make application to the tribunes of the people. To the effect that, if they thought proper, they should put it to the people to decide who they wished to conduct the war in Africa. All the tribes nominated Publius Scipio. Nevertheless, the consuls put the province of Africa to the lot, for so the Senate had decreed. Africa fell to the lot of Tiberius Claudius, who was to cross over into Africa with a fleet of 50 ships, all Quinkarines, and have an equal command with Scipio. Marcus Servilius obtained Etruria. Caes Servilius was continued in command in the same province, in case the Senate resolved that the consul should remain at the city. Of the Prytors, Marcus Sextus obtained Gaul, which province together with two legions, Publius Quintilius Varus, was to deliver to him. Caes Livius obtained Bruteum, with the two legions which Publius Simpronius, the procuncle, had commanded the former year. Naus Tremelius had Sicily, and was to receive the province and two legions from Publius Vilius Tapulus, a Prytor of the former year. Vilius, as pro-Prytor, was to protect the coast of Sicily with 20 men of war and 1,000 soldiers, and Marcus Pomponius was to convey thence to Rome 1,500 soldiers with the remaining 20 ships. The city jurisdiction fell to Caes Aurelius Cota, and the rest of the Prytors were continued in command of the respective provinces and armies, which they then had. Not more than 16 legions were employed this year in the defense of the empire, and that they might have the gods favorably disposed toward them in all their undertakings and proceedings, it was ordered that the consuls, before they set out to the war, should celebrate those games and sacrifice those victims of the larger sort, which, in the consulate of Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Titus Quintius, Titus Manlius the dictator had vowed, provided the Commonwealth should continue in the same state for the next five years. The games were exhibited in the circus during four days, and the victims sacrificed to those deities to whom they had been vowed. Meanwhile, hope and anxiety daily and simultaneously increased, nor could the minds of men be brought to any fixed conclusion, whether it was a fit subject for rejoicing that Hannibal had now at length after the 16th year departed from Italy and left the Romans in the unmalested possession of it, or whether they had not greater cause to fear from his having transported his army in safety into Africa. They said that the scene of action certainly was changed, but not the danger. That Quintus Fabius, lately deceased, who had foretold how arduous the contest would be, was used to predict, not without good reason, that Hannibal would prove a more formidable enemy in his own country than he had been in a foreign one, and that Scipio would have to encounter, not Syphax, a king of undisciplined barbarians whose armies statorious, a man little better than a soldier's drudge, was used to lead, nor his father-in-law Hasdrubal, that most fugacious general, nor tumultuary armies hastily collected out of a crowd of half-armed rustics, but Hannibal, born in a manner in the pavilion of his father, that bravest of generals nurtured and educated in the midst of arms, who served as a soldier formerly when a boy, and became a general when he had scarcely attained the age of manhood, who, having grown old in victory, had filled Spain, Gaul, and Italy from the Elbs to the Strait with monuments of his vast achievements, who commanded troops who had served as long as he had himself, troops hardened by the endurance of every species of suffering, such as it is scarcely credible that men could have supported, stained a thousand times with Roman blood, and bearing with them the spoils not only of soldiers, but of generals, that many would meet the eyes of Scipio in battle, who had with their own hands slain Roman praetors, generals, and consuls, many decorated with crowns in reward for having scaled walls and crossed ramparts, many who had traversed the captured camps and cities of the Romans, that the magistrates of the Roman people had not then so many fascades as Hannibal could have carried before him, having taken them from generals whom he had slain. While their minds were harassed by these apprehensions, their anxiety and fears were further increased from the circumstance that, whereas they had been accustomed to carry on war for several years in different parts of Italy, and within their view, with languid hopes and without the prospect of bringing it to a speedy termination, Scipio and Hannibal had stimulated the minds of all, as generals prepared for a final contest. Even those persons whose confidence in Scipio, and hopes of victory were great, were affected with anxiety, increasing in proportion as they saw their completion approaching. The state of feeling among the Carthaginians was much the same, for when they turned their eyes on Hannibal, and the greatness of his achievements, they repented having solicited peace, but when again they reflected that they had been twice defeated in a pitched battle, that Syphax had been made prisoner, that they had been driven out of Spain in Italy, and that all this had been affected by the valor and conduct of Scipio alone, they regarded him with horror, as a general marked out by destiny and born for their destruction. Hannibal had by this time arrived at Adrementum, from which place, after employing a few days there in refreshing his soldiers, who had suffered from the motion by sea, he proceeded by force marches to Zama, roused by the alarming statements of messengers who brought word that all the country around Carthage was filled with armed troops. Zama is distant from Carthage a five days journey, some spies who he sent out from this place, being intercepted by the Roman guard and brought before Scipio, he directed that they should be handed over to the military tribunes, and after having been desired fearlessly to survey everything, to be conducted through the camp wherever they chose, then asking them whether they had examined everything to their satisfaction, he assigned them an escort and sent them back to Hannibal. Hannibal received none of the circumstances which were reported to him with feelings of joy, for they brought word that, as it happened, Massinissa had joined the enemy that very day with six thousand infantry and four thousand horse, but he was principally dispirited by the confidence of his enemy, which doubtless was not conceived without some ground. Accordingly, though he himself was the originator of the war, and by his coming had upset the truce which had been entered into and cut off all hopes of a treaty, yet concluding that more favorable terms might be obtained if he solicited peace while his strength was unimpaired than when vanquished, he sent a message to Scipio, requesting permission to confer with him. Scipio took up his position not far from the city of Naragara, in a situation convenient not only for other purposes, but also because there was a watering place within a dart's throw. Hannibal took possession of an eminence four miles dense, safe and convenient in every respect, except that he had a long way to go for water. Here in the intermediate space, a place was chosen open to view from all sides, that there might be no opportunity for treachery. Their armed attendants having retired to an equal distance, they met, each attended by one interpreter, being the greatest generals not only of their own times, but of any to be found in the records of the times preceding them, and equal to any of the kings or generals of any nation whatever. When they came within sight of each other, they remained silent for a short time, thunder struck, as it were, with mutual admiration. At length Hannibal thus began, Since fate hath so ordained it that I, who was the first to wage war upon the Romans, and who have so often had victory almost within my reach, should voluntarily come to sue for peace, I rejoice that it is you above all others, from whom it is my lot to solicit it. To you also, amid the many distinguished events of your life, it will not be esteemed one of the least glorious that Hannibal, to whom the gods had so often granted victory over the Roman generals, should have yielded to you, and that you should have put an end to this war, which has been rendered remarkable by your calamities, before it was by ours. Peace is proposed at a time when you have the advantage. We who negotiate it are the persons whom it most concerns to obtain it, and we are persons whose arrangements, be they what they will, our states will ratify. You have recovered Spain, which had been lost, after driving thence forth Carthaginian armies. When elected consul, though all others wanted courage to defend Italy, you crossed over into Africa, were having cut to pieces two armies, having at once captured and burnt two camps in the same hour, having made prisoner Syphax a most powerful king, and seized so many towns of his dominions and so many of ours. You have dragged me from Italy, the possession of which I had firmly held for now sixteen years. While your affairs are in a favorable and ours in adubious state, you would derive order and splendor from granting peace, while to us, who solicited it, it would be considered as necessary rather than honorable. It is indeed the right of him who grants, and not of him who solicits it, to dictate the terms of peace, but perhaps we may not be unworthy to impose upon ourselves the fine. We do not refuse that all those possessions, on account of which the war was begun, should be yours. Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, with all the islands lying in any part of the sea, between Africa and Italy. Let us Carthaginians, confined within the shores of Africa, behold you, since such is the pleasure of the gods, extending your empire over foreign nations both by sea and land. I cannot deny that you have reason to suspect the Carthaginian faith, in consequence of their insincerity, lately in soliciting a peace and while awaiting the decision. The sincerity with which a peace will be observed depends much, Scipio, on the person by whom it is sought. Your Senate, as I hear, refused to grant a peace in some measure because the deputies were deficient in respectability. It is I, Hannibal, who now solicit peace, who would neither ask for it unless I believed it expedient, nor will I fail to observe it for the same reason of expedience, on account of which I have solicited it. And in the same manner as I, because the war was commenced by me, brought it to pass that no one regretted it till the gods began to regard me with displeasure, so will I also exert myself that no one may regret the peace procured by my means. In answer to these things, the Roman general spoke nearly to the following effect. I was aware that it was in consequence of the expectation of your arrival that the Carthaginians violated the existing faith of the truce and broke off all hope of a peace. Nor indeed do you conceal the fact. In as much as you artfully withdraw from the former conditions of peace, every concession except what relates to those things which have for a long time been in our own power. But as it is your object that your countrymen should be sensible how great a burden they are relieved from by your means, so it is incumbent upon me to endeavor that they may not receive as the reward for their perfidy, the concessions which they formerly stipulated, by expunging them now from the conditions of the peace. Though you do not deserve to be allowed the same conditions as before, you now request even to be benefited by your treachery. Neither did our fathers first make war respecting Sicily, nor did we respect Spain. In the former case, the danger which threatened our allies, the Mamertines, and in the present the destruction of Sagunto, girded us with just and pious arms. That you were the aggressors, both you yourselves confess, and the gods are witnesses, who determined the issue of the former war, and who are now determining and will determine the issue of the present, according to right and justice. As to myself, I am not forgetful of the instability of human affairs, but consider the influence of fortune, and I am well aware that all our measures are liable to a thousand casualties. But as I should acknowledge that my conduct would savor of insolence and oppression if I rejected you on your coming in person to solicit peace, before I crossed over into Africa, you voluntarily retiring from Italy, and after you embarked your troops, so now, when I have dragged you into Africa almost by manual force, notwithstanding your resistance and evasions, I am not bound to treat you with any respect. Wherefore, if in addition to those stipulations on which it was considered that a peace would at that time have been agreed upon, and what they are you are informed, a compensation is proposed for having seized our ships together with their stores during a truce, and for the violence offered to our ambassadors. I shall then have matter to lay before my counsel, but if these things also appear oppressive, prepare for war, since you could not broke the conditions of peace. Thus, without affecting an accommodation, when they had returned from the conference to their armies, they informed them that warrants had been bandied to no purpose, that the question must be decided by arms, and that they must accept that fortune which the gods assigned to them. When they had arrived at their camps, they both issued orders that their soldiers should get their arms in readiness and prepare their minds for the final contest, in which if fortune should favor them, they would continue victorious, not for a single day, but forever. Before tomorrow night, they said, they would know whether Rome or Carthage should give laws to the world, and that neither Africa nor Italy, but the whole world, would be the prize of victory, that the dangers which threatened those who had the misfortune to be defeated, were proportioned to the rewards of the victors. For the Romans had not any place of refuge in an unknown and foreign land, and immediate destruction seemed to await Carthage if the troops which formed her last reliance were defeated. To this important contest, the day following, two generals, by far the most renowned of any, and belonging to two of the most powerful nations in the world, advanced either to crown or overthrow on that day the many otters they had previously acquired. Scipio drew up his troops, posting the Hestati in front, the Principais behind them, and closing his rear line with the triarii. He did not draw up his cohorts in close order, but each before their respective standards, placing the companies at some distance from each other, so as to leave a space through which the elephants of the enemy passing might not at all break their ranks. Leilius, whom he had employed before as Lieutenant General, but this year as Quistor, by special appointment, according to a decree of the Senate, he posted with the Italian cavalry in the left wing, Massonisa and the Numidians in the right. The open spaces between the companies of those in the van he filled with velites, which then formed the Roman light-armed troops, with an injunction that on the charge of the elephants they should either retire behind the files, which extended in a right line, or, running to the right and left and placing themselves by the side of those in the van, afford a passage by which the elephants might rush in between weapons on both sides. Hannibal, in order to terrify the enemy, drew up his elephants in front, and he had 80 of them, being more than he had ever had in any battle. Behind these, his Ligurian and Gallic auxiliaries, with Bolarians and Moors intermixed. In the second line, he placed the Carthaginians, Africans, and a legion of Macedonians. Then, leaving a moderate interval, he formed a reserve of Italian troops, consisting principally of Brutians, more of whom had followed him on his departure from Italy by compulsion and necessity than by choice. His cavalry also he placed in the wings, the Carthaginian occupying the right, the Numidian the left. Various were the means of exhortation employed in an army consisting of a mixture of so many different kinds of men, men differing in language, customs, laws, arms, dress, and appearance, and in the motives for serving. To the auxiliaries, the prospect both of their present pay, and many times more from the spoils, was held out. The Gauls were stimulated by their peculiar and inherent animosity against the Romans. To the Ligurians, the hope was held out of enjoying the fertile plains of Italy, and quitting their rugged mountains, if victorious. The Moors and Numidians were terrified with subjection to the government of Massonisa, which he would exercise with despotic severity. Different grounds of hope and fear were represented to different persons. The view of the Carthaginians was directed to the walls of their city, their household gods, the sepulchres of their ancestors, their children and parents, and their trembling wives. They were told that either the destruction of their city and slavery or the empire of the world awaited them, that there was nothing intermediate which they could hope for or fear. While the general was thus busily employed among the Carthaginians and the captains of the respective nations among their countrymen, most of them employing interpreters among troops intermixed with those of different nations. The trumpets and cornets of the Romans sounded, and such a clamor arose that the elephants, especially those in the left wing, turned round upon their own party, the Moors and Numidians. Massonisa had no difficulty in increasing the alarm of the terrified enemy, and deprived them of the aid of their cavalry in that wing. A few, however, of the beasts which were driven against the enemy and were not turned back through fear, made great havoc among the ranks of the Velites, though not without receiving many wounds themselves. For when the Velites, retiring to the companies, had made way for the elephants, that they might not be trampled down, they discharged their darts at them. Exposed as they were to wounds on both sides, those in the van also keeping up a continual discharge of javelins, until driven out of the Roman line by the weapons, which fell upon them from all quarters. These elephants also put to flight even the cavalry of the Carthaginians, posted in their right wing. Leilius, when he saw the enemy in disorder, struck additional terror into them in their confusion. The Carthaginian line was deprived of the cavalry on both sides, when the infantry, who are now not a match for the Romans in confidence or strength, engaged. In addition to this, there was one circumstance, trifling it itself, but at the same time producing important consequences in the action. On the part of the Romans the shout was uniform, and on that account louder and more terrific, while the voices of the enemy, consisting as they did of many nations of different languages, were dissonant. The Romans used the stationary kind of fight, pressing upon the enemy with their own weight in that of their arms, but on the other side there was more of skirmishing and rapid movement than force. Accordingly, on the first charge, the Romans immediately drove back the line of their opponents, then pushing them with their elbows and the bosses of their shields, and pressing forward into the places from which they had pushed them. They advanced a considerable space, as though there had been no one to resist them. Those who formed the rear are urging forward those in front, when they perceived the line of the enemy giving way, which circumstance itself gave great additional force in repelling them. On the side of the enemy, the second line, consisting of the Africans and Carthaginians, were so far from supporting the first line when giving ground that on the contrary they even retired, lest their enemy, by slaying those who made a firm resistance, should penetrate to themselves also. Accordingly the auxiliaries suddenly turned their backs, and facing about upon their own party, fled some of them into the second line, while others slew those who did not receive them into their ranks, since before they did not support them, and now refused to receive them. And now there were, in a manner, two contests going on together, the Carthaginians being compelled to fight at once with the enemy and with their own party. Not even then, however, did they receive into their line the terrified and exasperated troops. But, closing their ranks, drove them out of the scene of action to the wings and the surrounding plain, lest they should mingle these soldiers, terrified with defeat and wounds, with that part of their line which was firm and fresh. But such a heap of man in arms had filled the space in which the auxiliaries a little while ago had stood, that it was almost more difficult to pass through it than through a close line of troops. The spearmen, therefore, who formed the front line, pursuing the enemy, as each could find a way through the heap of arms and men and streams of blood, threw into complete disorder the battalions and companies. The standards also of the Principais had begun to waver when they saw the line before them driven from their ground. Scipio, perceiving this, promptly ordered the signal to be given for the spearmen to retreat, and having taken his wounded into the rear, brought the Principais and Triarii to the wings, in order that the line of spearmen in the center might be more strong and secure. Thus a fresh and renewed battle commenced, in as much as they had penetrated to their real antagonists, men equal to them in the nature of their arms, in their experience in war, in the fame of their achievements, and the greatness of their hopes and fears. But the Romans were superior both in numbers and courage, for they had now routed both the cavalry and the elephants, and, having already defeated the front line, were fighting against the second. Lelius and Bassanisa, who had pursued the routed cavalry through a considerable space, returning very opportunity, charged the rear of the enemy's line. This attack of the cavalry at length routed them. Many of them, being surrounded, were slain in the field, and many dispersed in flight through the open plain around, were slain on all hands, as the cavalry were in possession of every part. Of the Carthaginians and their allies, above 20,000 were slain on that day. About an equal number were captured, with 133 military standards and 11 elephants, of the victors as many as 2,000 fell. End of section 23. Section 24 of the Great Events by Famous Historians, Volume 2. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Ryan Fahey, Fairfield, Connecticut. The Great Events by Famous Historians, edited by Charles F. Horn, Rossiter Johnson, and John Rudd. Section 24. Scipio Africanus crushes Hannibal Edzama and subjugates Carthage, B.C. 202, by Livy, Part II. Hannibal, slipping off during the confusion with a few horsemen, came to adrimet him, not quitting the field till he had tried every expedient both in the battle and before the engagement, having, according to the admission of Scipio and everyone skilled in military science, acquired the fame of having marshaled his troops on that day with singular judgment. He placed his elephants in the front in order that their desultory attack and insupportable violence might prevent the Romans from following their standards and preserving their ranks, on which they placed their principal dependents. Then he posted his auxiliaries before the line of Carthaginians, in order that men who were made up of the refuse of all nations, and who were not bound by honor but by gain, might not have any retreat open to them in case they fled, at the same time that the first ardor and impetuosity might be exhausted upon them, and if they could render no other service that the weapons of the enemy might be blunted in wounding them. Next he placed the Carthaginian and African soldiers, on whom he placed all his hopes, in order that, being equal to the enemy in every other respect, they might have the advantage of them in as much as, being fresh and unimpaired in strength themselves, they would fight with those who were fatigued and wounded. The Italians, he removed into the rear, separating them also by an intervening space, as he knew not with certainty whether they were friends or enemies. Hannibal, after performing this as it were his last work of valor, fled to Adrimetum, whence, having been summoned to Carthage, he returned thither in the sixth and thirtieth year after he had left it when a boy, and confessed in the Senate House that he was defeated, not only in the battle but in the war, and that there was no hope of safety in anything but in obtaining peace. Immediately after the battle, Scipio, having taken and plundered the enemy's camp, returned to the sea and his ships with an immense booty, news having reached him that Publius lentilus had arrived at Utica with 50 men of war, and 100 transports laden with every kind of stores, concluding that he ought to bring before Carthage everything which could increase the consternation already existing there. After sending Leilius to Rome to report his victory, he ordered Neus Octavius to conduct the legions thither by land, and setting out himself from Utica with the fresh fleet of lentilus added to his former one, made for the harbor of Carthage. When he had arrived within a short distance, he was met by a Carthaginian ship decked with fillets and branches of olive. There were ten deputies, the leading men in the state, sent at the instance of Hannibal to solicit peace, to whom, when they had come up to the stern of the general's ship, holding out the badges of suppliance, in treating and imploring the protection and compassion of Scipio, the only answer given was that they must come to Tunis, to which place he would move his camp. After taking a view of the sight of Carthage, not so much for the sake of acquainting himself with it for any present object as to despair at the enemy, he returned to Utica having recalled Octavius to the same place. As they were proceeding thence to Tunis, they received intelligence that Vermina, the son of Syphax, with a greater number of horse than foot, was coming to the assistance of the Carthaginians, a part of his infantry with all the cavalry having attacked them on their march on the first day of the Saturnalia, routed the Numidians with little opposition, and as every way by which they could escape in flight was blocked up, for the cavalry surrounded them on all sides, fifteen thousand men were slain, twelve hundred were taken alive, with fifteen hundred Numidian horses and seventy-two military standards. The Prince himself fled from the field with a few attendants during the confusion. The camp was then pitched near Tunis in the same place as before, and thirty ambassadors came to Scipio from Carthage. These behaved in a manner even more calculated to excite compassion than the former, in proportion as their situation was more pressing, but from the recollection of their recent perfidy, they were heard with considerably pity. In the council, though all were impelled by just resentment to demolish Carthage, yet, when they reflected upon the magnitude of the undertaking, and the length of time which would be consumed in the siege of so well fortified and strongest city, while Scipio himself was uneasy in consequence of the expectation of a successor, who would come in for the glory of having terminated the war, though it was accomplished already by the exertions and danger of another, the minds of all were inclined to peace. The next day the ambassadors being called in again, and with many rebukes of their perfidy, warned that instructed by so many disasters they would at length believe in the existence of the gods and the obligation of an oath, these conditions of the peace were stated to them, that they should enjoy their liberty and live under their own laws, that they should possess such cities and territories as they had enjoyed before the war and with the same boundaries, and that the Romans should on that day desist from devastation, that they should restore to the Romans all deserters and fugitives, giving up all their ships of war except ten triremes, with such tamed elephants as they had, and that they should not tame any more, that they should not carry on war in or out of Africa without the permission of the Roman people, that they should make restitution to Massenisa and form a league with him, that they should furnish corn and pay for the auxiliaries until the ambassadors had returned from Rome, that they should pay ten thousand talents of silver in equal annual installments distributed over fifty years, that they should give a hundred hostages according to the pleasure of Scipio, not younger than fourteen nor older than thirty, that he would grant them a truce on condition that the transports, together with their cargos, which had been seized during the former truce, were restored. Otherwise they would have no truce nor any hope of a peace. When the ambassadors who were ordered to bear these conditions home reported them in an assembly, and Gisco had stood forth to dissuade them from the terms and was being listened to by the multitude, who were at once indisposed for peace and unfit for war, Hannibal, indignant that such language should be held and listened to at such a juncture, laid hold of Gisco with his own hand and dragged him from his elevated position. This unusual sight in a free state having raised a murmur among the people, the soldier disconcerted at the liberties which the citizens took, thus addressed them. Having left you at nine years old, I have returned after a lapse of thirty six years. I flatter myself, I am well acquainted with the qualifications of a soldier, having been instructed in them from my childhood, sometimes by my own situation and sometimes by that of my country. The privileges, the laws, and customs of the city and the forum you ought to teach me. Having thus apologized for his indiscretion, he discoursed largely concerning the peace, showing how inoppressive the terms were and how necessary it was. The greatest difficulty was that of the ships which had been seized during the truce, nothing was to be found except the ships themselves, nor was it easy to collect the property, because those who were charged with having it were opposed to the peace. It was resolved that the ships should be restored and that the men at least should be looked up, and as to whatever else was missing, that it should be left to Scipio to put a value upon it, and that the Carthaginians should make compensation accordingly in money. There are those who say that Hannibal went from the field of battle to the sea coast, whence he immediately sailed in a ship which he had ready for the purpose to King Antiochus, and that when Scipio demanded above everything that Hannibal should be given up to him, answer was made that Hannibal was not in Africa. After the ambassadors returned to Scipio, the Quaesters were ordered to give in an account made out from the public registers of the public property which had been in the ships, and the owners to make a return of the private property. For the amount of the value, 25,000 pounds of silver were required to be paid down, and a truce for three months was granted to the Carthaginians. It was added that during the time of the truce, they should not send ambassadors anywhere else than to Rome, and that whatever ambassadors came to Carthage, they should not dismiss them before informing the Roman general who they were and what they sought. With the Carthaginian ambassadors Lucius Vitorius Filo, Marcus Martius Ralla, and Lucius Scipio, brother of the general, were sent to Rome. The Roman, together with the Carthaginian ambassadors having arrived at Rome from Africa, the senate was assembled at the temple of Bologna, when Lucius Vitorius Filo stated to the great joy of the senate that a battle had been fought with Hannibal, which was decisive of the fate of the Carthaginians, and that a period was at length put to that calamitous war. He added what formed a small accession to their successes, that Vermina, the son of Syphax, had been vanquished. He was then ordered to go forth to the public assembly and impart the joyful tidings to the people. Then, a Thanksgiving having been appointed, all the temples in the city were thrown open and supplications for three days were decreed. Publius Scipio was continued in command in the province of Africa with the armies which he then had. The Carthaginian ambassadors were called before the senate. On observing their ages and dignified appearance, for they were by far the first men of the state, all promptly declared their conviction that now they were sincere in their desire to effect a peace. Hasdrubal, however, surnamed by his countrymen, Hyedus, who had invariably recommended peace and was opposed to the Barcene faction, was regarded with greater interest than the rest. On these accounts, the greater weight was attached to him when transferring the blame of the war from the state at large to the cupidity of a few. After his speech of varied character in which he sometimes refuted the charges which had been brought, at other times admitted some, lest by imprudently denying what was manifestly true, their forgiveness might be the more difficult. And then, even in monishing the conscript fathers to be guided by the rules of decorum and moderation in their prosperity, he said that if the Carthaginians had listened to himself and Hanno, and had been disposed to make a proper use of circumstances, they would themselves have dictated the terms of peace, instead of begging it, as they now did. That it rarely happened that good fortune and a sound judgment were bestowed upon men at the same time. That the Roman people were therefore invincible, because when successful they forgot not the maxims of wisdom and prudence, and indeed it would have been a matter of astonishment did they act otherwise. That those persons to whom success was a new and uncommon thing proceeded to a pitch of madness in their ungoverned transports, in consequence of their not being accustomed to it. That to the Roman people the joy arising from victory was a matter of common occurrence, and was now almost become old-fashioned. That they had extended their empire more by sparing the vanquished than by conquering. The language employed by the others was of a nature more calculated to excite compassion. They represented from what a height of power the Carthaginian affairs had fallen. That nothing besides the walls of Carthage remained to those who a little time ago held almost the whole world in subjection by their arms. That shut up within these they could see nothing anywhere on sea or land which owned their authority. That they would retain possession of their city itself and their household gods only in case the Roman people should refrain from venting their indignation upon these, which is all that remains for them to do. When it was manifest that the fathers were moved by compassion, it is said that one of the senators, violently incensed at the perfidy of the Carthaginians, immediately asked with a loud voice by what gods they would swear in striking the league, since they had broken their faith with those by whom they swore in striking the former one. By those same, replied Hasdrubal, who have shown such determined hostility to the violators of treaties. The minds of all being disposed to peace, Naus Lentulus, whose province the fleet was, protested against the decree of the senate. Upon this, Manius Achilius and Quintus Menuchius, tribunes of the people, put the question to the people whether they willed and ordered that the senate should decree that peace should be made with the Carthaginians, whom they ordered to grant that peace and whom to conduct the army out of Africa. All the tribes ordered respecting the peace according as the question had been put, that Publius Scipio should grant the peace and that he also should conduct the army home. Agreeably to this order, the senate decreed that Publius Scipio, acting according to the opinion of the ten deputies, should make peace with the Carthaginian people on what terms he pleased. The Carthaginians then returned thanks to the senate and requested that they might be allowed to enter the city and converse with their countrymen who had been made prisoners and were in custody of the state, observing that some of them were their relations and friends and met of rank and some persons to whom they were charged with messages from their relations. Having obtained these requests, they again asked permission to ransom such of them as they pleased when they were desired to give in their names. Having given in a list of about 200, a decree of the senate was passed to the effect that the Carthaginian ambassadors should be allowed to take away into Africa to Publius Cornelius Scipio, 200 of the Carthaginian prisoners, selecting whom they pleased, and that they should convey to him a message that if the peace were concluded he should restore them to the Carthaginians without ransom. The heralds being ordered to go into Africa to strike the league, at their own desire the senate passed a decree that they should take with them flint stones of their own and vervein of their own, that the Roman praetor should command them to strike the league and that they should demand of him herbs. The description of herb usually given to the heralds is taken from the capital. Thus the Carthaginians being allowed to depart from Rome when they had gone into Africa to Scipio concluded the peace on the terms before mentioned. They delivered up their men of war, their elephants, deserters, fugitives, and 4,000 prisoners, among whom was Quintus Tarentius Cullio, a senator. The ships he ordered to be taken out into the main and burned. Some say there were 500 of every description of those which are worked with oars, and that the sun's sight of these wind-burning occasioned as deep a sensation of grief to the Carthaginians as if Carthage had been in flames. The measures adopted respecting the deserters were more severe than those respecting the fugitives. Those who were of the Latin Confederacy were decapitated. The Romans were crucified. The last piece with the Carthaginians was made 40 years before this in the consulate of Quintus Lutetius and Aeolus Manlius. The war commenced 23 years afterward in the consulate of Publius Cornelius and Tiberius Simpronius. It was concluded in the 17th year in the consulate of Neus Cornelius and Publius Aeolius Paetus. It is related that Scipio frequently said afterward that first the ambition of Tiberius Claudius and afterward of Neus Cornelius were the causes which prevented his terminating the war by the destruction of Carthage. The Carthaginians finding difficulty in raising the first sum of money to be paid as their finances were exhausted by a protracted war and in consequence great lamentation and grief arising in the senate house. It is said that Hannibal was observed laughing and when Hasdrubal Haedus rebuked him for laughing amid the public grief, when he himself was the occasion of the tears which were shed, he said, If, as the expression of the countenance is discerned by the sight, so the inward feelings of the mind could be distinguished, it would clearly appear to you that that laughter which you censure came from a heart not elated with joy but frantic with misfortunes, and yet it is not so ill-timed as those absurd and inconsistent tears of yours. Then you ought to have wept when our arms were taken from us, our ships burned, and we were forbidden to engage in foreign wars. For that was the wound by which we fell. Nor is it just that you should suppose that the measures which the Romans have adopted toward you have been dictated by animosity. No great state can remain at rest long together. If it has no enemy abroad it finds one at home in the same manner as over robust bodies seem secure from external causes but are encumbered with their own strength. So far for sooth we are affected with the public calamities as they reach our private affairs. Nor is there any circumstance attending them which is felt more acutely than the loss of money. Accordingly when the spoils were torn down from vanquished Carthage, when you beheld her left unarmed and defenseless amid so many armed nations of Africa, none heaved a sigh. Now because a tribute is to be levied from private property you lay meant with one accord as though at the funeral of the state. How much do I dread lest you should soon be made sensible that you have shed tears this day for the lightest of your misfortunes? Such were the sentiments which Hannibal delivered to the Carthaginians. Scipio, having summoned an assembly, presented Massinissa in addition to his paternal dominions with the town of Surta and the other cities and territories which had passed from the Kingdom of Syphax into the possession of the Romans. He ordered Neus Octavius to conduct the fleet to Sicily and deliver it to Neus Cornelius the consul and directed the Carthaginian ambassadors to go to Rome that the arrangements he had made with the advice of the 10 deputies might be ratified by the sanction of the fathers and the order of the people. Peace having been established by sea and land, he embarked his troops and crossed over to Lily Bayam in Sicily. Wents, having sent a great part of his soldiers by ships, he himself proceeded through Italy which was rejoicing not less on account of the peace than the victory. While not only the inhabitants of the cities poured out to show him honor, but crowds of rustics thronged the roads. He arrived at Rome and entered the city in a triumph of unparalleled splendor. He brought into the treasury 123,000 pounds of silver. He distributed to each of his soldiers 400 asses out of the spoils. By the death of Syphax which took place but a short time before at Tiber, wither he had been removed from Alba, a diminution was occasioned in the interest of the pageant rather than in the glory of him who triumphed. His death, however, was attended with circumstances which produced a strong sensation, for he was buried at the public expense. Polybius, an author by no means to be despised, asserts that this king was led in the triumph. Quintus Torentius Culeo followed Scipio in his triumph with a cap of liberty on his head, and during the remainder of his life, treated him with the respect due to him as the author of his freedom. I have not been able to ascertain whether the partiality of the soldiers or the favor of the people fixed upon him the surname of Africatus, or whether in the same manner as Felix was applied to Sulla and Magnus to Pompey, in the memory of our fathers, it originated in the flattery of his friends. He was doubtless the first general who was distinguished by a name derived from the nation which he had conquered. Afterward, in imitation of his example, some, by no means his equals and his victories, affixed splendid inscriptions on their statues and gave honorable surnames to their families. End of section 24.