 International organizations endowed with a separate international legal personality generally enjoy immunity from jurisdiction. However, unlike states, international organizations are not sovereign entities. Therefore, the idea that states must refrain from passing judgment on the acts of international organizations out of respect for their sovereignty, that idea cannot be transposed to international organizations. Par in param non abet juridictionem, does not apply in respect of international organizations. In contrast to what happens with states whose immunities exist as a matter of custom international law, as we sow, immunities of international organizations are established under treaties. And such treaty can be the instrument under which the organization has been established, or it can be a separate convention, or both. And for instance, under article 105 of the UN Charter, the UN, I quote, shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes, end of quote. And pursuant to that provision, the member states of the UN have adopted in 1946 a convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Many organizations are granted immunity from jurisdiction and also immunity from measures of constraint in order to protect their property and assets. Some have argued that the multiplication of those treaties have created a practice resulting in the emergence of a customary rule of international law under which international organizations would automatically enjoy immunities. However, this is much doubtful and it has been rejected by some domestic courts. Therefore, it is rather safe to say that in the absence of a treaty granting immunity to the organization and a treaty which is binding on the forum state, the state of the church ceased of the matter, the courts of that state have no obligation to grant any immunity from jurisdiction to the respondent organization. When granted under a treaty, the immunity enjoyed by the organization usually relates to any of its acts. Every act of the organization is indeed presumed to pursue the purposes of the organization. In other words, the distinction between Acta jure imperii and Acta jure gestionis, that distinction cannot be meaningfully transposed to the situation of international organizations. Like foreign state immunity from jurisdiction, the immunity enjoyed by an international organization is a limitation to the right to a church as protected under human rights instruments. However, the difference between states and international organizations in that regard is that granting immunity to a foreign state does not amount to radically depriving the individual of the possibility to claim, as he or she could, at least in theory, always sue the foreign state in its own domestic courts. Well, the same possibility does not exist when it comes to international organizations. Very often, organizations do not have courts and tribunals of their own, so that granting them immunity results in the absence of any means of redress for the individuals complaining of their acts. Such result has been considered by the European Court of Human Rights as constituting a disproportionate restriction to the right of a judge protected under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The landmark judgments in that regard are Wait and Kennedy v Germany and Beer and Reagan v Germany dating back from 18 February 1999, both cases related to labour law disputes concerning the European Space Agency. The European Court of Human Rights admitted that granting privileges and immunities to international organizations was a legitimate objective. In particular, the Court said that, and I quote, the attribution of privileges and immunities to international organizations is an essential means of ensuring the proper functioning of such organizations free from unilateral interference by individual governments. The immunity from jurisdiction, commonly accorded by states to international organizations under the organization's constituent instruments or supplementary agreements, is a long-standing practice established in the interest of the good working of these organizations. The importance of this practice, said the Court, is enhanced by a trend towards extending and strengthening international cooperation in all domains of modern society, end of quote. But in order to be permissible under the Convention, the restriction to the right to a judge resulting from the immunity of the organization depends on whether individuals benefit from available reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention. And because the European Space Agency had an internal justice system to which labour law disputes could be submitted, the Court ruled that its immunity was permissible under the Convention. In other words, in the absence of any means of redress instituted within the organization and offering a reasonable alternative to domestic courts, the immunity from jurisdiction of the organization must be set aside by the foreign judge whose state is a member of the Council of Europe. And this is a typical example of a conflict between two treaties, the treaty by which immunity is granted to the organization and the European Convention on Human Rights. And such conflict being solved by a balancing of interest tests by the European Court of Human Rights. On the basis of the legitimate character of the restriction to the fundamental right and the proportional character of such restriction. The weight in Kennedy and Beer and Reagan judgments have been followed in many domestic courts of the member states of the Council of Europe and as a result, many international organizations having offices in some of the 47 states of the Council have established internal justice systems in order to keep their immunities. Sometimes the weight in Kennedy and Beer and Reagan judgments have been interpreted as requiring that in the absence of any means of redress instituted within the organization, its immunity must automatically be set aside. However, such radical interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the express requirement under those judgments to assess proportionality on a case by case basis in light of all the circumstances of the case. And furthermore, in a case concerning the immunity of the United Nations in Dutch courts for its alleged responsibility in the genocide at Zebrénica, the European Court of Human Rights has rejected what it called any absolute interpretation of its previous judgments and has refused to consider that, I quote, that in the absence of an alternative remedy the recognition of the immunity is ipso facto constitutive of a violation of the right of access to a court. Therefore, it is possible that the immunity of the organization be appealed even in the absence of any alternative means of redress depending on the specific circumstances of the case. And this is what the Dutch courts did in the Zebrénica case to the benefit of the UN, while they recognized the responsibility of the Dutch state in the events.