 Think of individual people as nodes in a directed network, where each node refers to a single individual and each directed edge indicates that that person communicates with whoever the edge points to. We can then describe a dyad like the one pictured here as one where person A talks to person B. So person A is the one doing the telling and person B is the one doing the listening. If we think of communication in this way, we might start to think that there are specific traits or dispositions that make someone very good at communicating what they already know, and then there might be other dispositions that make someone very good at hearing what someone else knows. Now, of course, somebody might be good at both of these, in which case we could enhance our network by having them both communicate and be communicated with. But the point is that we can understand individuals in terms of their roles in a communications network. But, of course, telling and listening aren't the only things that can happen in communication. We can also overhear other people. We can remember what they said. We can forget what they said. We can retell what someone said back to them saying something like, so what you're telling me is blah, blah, blah. And we can also retell what they said to some third party who might tell it to some fourth party who might tell it to some other party further down the line. This sort of communications network, the one pictured here, is going to be useful for us because it helps us define the four types of virtues that I mentioned in the outline. Source virtues are the dispositions that make someone an excellent source of knowledge for other individuals. So that doesn't mean that they're necessarily good at looking around in the world and seeing what's going on. It means that they're good at communicating what they happen to know, no matter how they came to know it. These are the best-studied virtues in virtue epistemology, and there are many examples of them. Some of them involve moral character as well as epistemic character. So they include virtues like honesty, sincerity, trustworthiness, and intellectual generosity. If you're going to receive testimony from someone, if someone is going to tell you what they know, it's much better for you if you know that that person is honest. You can trust them more easily. Similarly, if someone is sincere, then what they have to say is probably going to reflect their knowledge. Similarly, if someone is trustworthy, they can be trusted, and someone who's intellectually generous isn't stingy with what they know. They tell you all that you need to hear, not just some bits of it. Source virtues have also been studied in the philosophy of language, including by H. Paul Greist, who in a 1975 paper argued that there is a duty to be cooperative in a communicative exchange. When he talks about cooperation, he specifically is thinking about the cooperativeness of a speaker, rather than the cooperativeness of a hearer. He said that there are four main ways that someone can manifest this cooperativeness. He called these the maxims of quantity, quality, relation, and manner. Quantity has to do with saying all that someone needs to hear and no more. Quality has to do with saying what you know and indicating that you know it, saying what you guess and indicating that you merely guess it, and saying what you doubt and indicating that you doubt it. Relation has to do with saying things that are relevant to what's gone before in the talk exchange, so not just randomly asserting things that you happen to think are true, but asserting things that are relevant to what's been said before. And manner has to do with the rudeness or propriety in the way in which someone speaks, for instance, not talking over someone, listening to their whole sentence before responding, and so on. The source virtue related to the maxim of quantity can be thought of in terms of the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. According to this theory, many, if not all, virtues are a mean or an average between two vices, two bad ways of being. An example that Aristotle often uses is courage. He says that a courageous person is neither too confident nor not confident enough, that a courageous person fears neither too much nor too little. In terms of the maxim of quantity, we can think of the mean in terms of neither providing too much information nor providing too little information. Someone who says too much, who says things that they do happen to know to be true, but which are more than this hearer needs to know, might engage in things like mansplaining or what is sometimes called conversational terrorism, whereas someone who gives too little might be described as intellectually stingy or even as lying by omission. The disposition to adhere to the maxim of quality can also be thought of in terms of the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. So someone can go too far in one direction or the other, so in the direction of excess, someone might be pathologically lacking in confidence. So even though they know something, they might be disposed never to say so because they just might be wrong or they might be reluctant to speculate because they think that that would be a violation of saying only what you have evidence for. In the other direction, someone might violate the maxim of quality by passing off their opinions as knowledge or by passing off their speculation as their opinions. In terms of the maxim of relation, someone who is too keen to stick to only what's relevant might lack creativity. They don't think of things that are somewhat relevant but only indirectly so, whereas someone who goes too far in the other direction could be accused of engaging in evasion, deflection, and non-sequitur. So if this is right, it suggests that there are source virtues related to not just honesty and sincerity and trustworthiness as we saw before, but also to these topics that are discussed in the philosophy of language, namely the maxims of quantity, quality, and relation. It's less clear to me that the maxim of manner fits this kind of analysis, so I'll turn now to receiver virtues. These are the virtues that make someone an excellent receiver of communication from another rather than an excellent source of information for another person. They relate to testimonial knowledge, so someone who is an excellent receiver who has virtues related to receiving communication is more likely to acquire knowledge from others and less likely to be deceived by others who are lying or speaking over confidently and so on. Such dispositions have been studied in virtue epistemology and social epistemology by people like John Greco and Ernie Sosa. A second type of receiver virtue that has gotten some interest recently is epistemic justice. This is a concept that Miranda Fricker introduced in 2007. Her basic idea is this, sometimes we're subtly biased against other people. We think that, well, this sort of person doesn't tend to have knowledge about this topic. And so when someone tells us the truth, even if they're expressing their knowledge, we might not take them as seriously as they deserve. She calls that a credibility deficit. There are also credibility excesses. These occur when someone belongs to some kind of group that we take more seriously than they deserve. Perhaps people who have an accent that we find charming. Fricker says that epistemic justice is the virtue of, according exactly the right amount of credibility to the statements and assertions of other people and not applying either credibility excesses or the one that she's more interested in credibility deficits to what they have to say in a systematic way. Even more recently, there's been some work on the virtue of intellectual humility, which is an interesting disposition because unlike many virtues, it's one where having it might be inconsistent with knowing that you have it. There's no problem with an honest person thinking that they're honest. And there's no problem with a courageous person thinking that they're courageous. But a person who goes around bragging about how humble they are probably isn't really humble. So this is an interesting virtue that I and some others have started to investigate recently. And it's easily thought of as a receiver virtue because if someone tells you something that you didn't know or if somebody tells you something that you disagree with, then humility is required in order to investigate their claims and take them seriously. There is perhaps also a disposition not to make assertions or take the assertions of others on board with the right amount of credibility, but also to ask questions, to use interrogative statements rather than assertions. And these would be the interrogative analogues of the Gracian maxims that we discussed just before in the section on source virtues, and they would have to do with asking the right questions of the right people at the right time for the right reasons and so on. Christopher Hookway published a paper in 2010 in the journal Episteme that had to do with such receiver virtues. Two other kinds of virtues that have not been discussed as much are conduit virtues and echo virtues, where a source virtue makes someone an excellent original source of communication and a receiver virtue makes someone an excellent recipient of information from someone else. A conduit virtue makes someone an excellent conduit through which knowledge or information can pass. They might do this by believing what they've been told and reporting it as their own knowledge to someone else, or they might express such a conduit virtue by quoting or paraphrasing what someone else has said. Conduit virtues have been almost entirely neglected by philosophers, including people who work on virtue epistemology. Two recent exceptions to this trend are papers that I co-authored in the first instance with Brian Robinson, a paper on the virtue of gossiping well, and a paper that I co-authored with Gus Skorberg on journalistic virtues, which have to do, we argue, with taking the words of people from various groups seriously and reporting them on even if one is not likely to make a lot of money off of such reporting. Much contemporary non-academic attention, however, has been paid to conduit virtues. So, for instance, there was an article recently in the news about a strategy that some women used in the first term of the Obama White House that they called amplification. What this meant was whenever a woman made a point in an important meeting, another woman would repeat it and refer it back to the first person who spoke. They did this because they found that unless they amplified, they would be spoken over by the men at the meetings, and sometimes the men would even take credit for the women's contributions claiming them as their own. So, conduit virtues have to do not just with repeating what someone said, but also with giving them credit for it when one does repeat what they said. Another example of non-academic attention to conduit virtues is the say-her-name hashtag, which was started by Kimberly Crenshaw very recently in response to the Black Lives Matter movement. She doesn't disagree with the Black Lives Matter movement, but she found that they paid disproportionate attention to police violence against black men, and she wanted to raise awareness about police brutality towards black women as well. The say-her-name hashtag insists on not just reporting statistics about women who've been harmed by the police, but individualizing them and humanizing them by insisting on saying their names. Another example of a conduit vice in this case was recent outrage over Donald Trump retweeting anti-Semitic memes that he got from alt-right accounts on Twitter. Another thing that Trump is often accused of doing, in fact, which he often does do, is say things like, a lot of people are saying and then reporting a conspiracy theory or an innuendo. In fact, this has been responded to also on Twitter by people who started using the hashtag Many People Are Saying and mocking Donald Trump with it. Echo virtues are the fourth type of virtues we're going to think about in this discussion, and they might seem a bit unnecessary. After all, if I tell you something and then you just repeat it back to me, that seems sort of useless, and if I tell you something and you repeat it to yourself, again, that might seem kind of useless. So, echo virtues, maybe rightly, have been ignored by most philosophers. There are three exceptions that I can think of, however. David Wong, a philosopher at Duke University, has written about character echoes. He has the idea that when I tell you what I think and what I care about and what I value, you might echo that back to me in a slightly distorted and perhaps even idealized way in order to help me crystallize what I really care about in order to help me find out what sort of person I really am. And he thinks of this as a process that mostly is just true to what the source originally reports, to what A says to B, but which might involve a certain amount of benevolent or charitable distortion. Two other examples are the philosophers Bluestine and Margulet, who've written about ritual echoing specifically of people who've died. Bluestine speaks about the dear departed, so family and friends who've died, and Margulet specifically focuses on the Holocaust and the duty to remember this atrocity and others like it. Both of them point out that memory is fragile and that one way to strengthen memories, one way to ensure that we don't forget is to repeat either to ourselves or to each other, sometimes in ritualized ways. An echo virtue that's been investigated to some extent in clinical practice is the find methodology, which I'll mention just in a second. First, I want to show you an example of an echo virtue related to the Holocaust. This is a picture that I took in the town of Khauda in the Netherlands this year. These are Stolperstein, which means stumbling blocks or stumbling stones. And there are thousands of these now throughout Europe that have been placed in the ground in front of the houses where Jews were last living before they were taking to concentration camps and death camps. And the point with these is that they're very simple, they're easy to miss and that's what makes them stumbling blocks in a way. But they ensure that we don't forget these people who were killed during the Holocaust. The find methodology, which stands for filming interactions to nurture development is being developed at Phil Fisher's lab at the University of Oregon. And what he basically does is he films parents interacting with high risk children and he edits the videos of these interactions to ensure that only the very best interactions are shown back to the parents when they watch them. And then these are used as a kind of role model for the parents where they themselves become their own role models because they get back an echo that shows only the best of them.