 Well, good morning everyone. Welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. My name is Heather Conley. I'm Senior Vice President here at CSIS for Europe and Eurasia, and you're probably scratching your head going, and why are we talking about ASEAN this morning? Well, we have the great privilege of conducting research on how to look at strengthening US-European Union cooperation in the Asia Pacific region and due to a grant from the European Union delegation here in the United States. So this is what brings this fantastic panel together this morning. Not only is it a fantastic panel, I have to say this was pretty good timing, and we didn't plan it because it's very hard to get five very busy people and their busy schedules to be able to converge on a specific day, but it was just yesterday that Vietnam celebrated its 20th anniversary as a member of ASEAN. On August 5th and 6th, there will be the East Asia Summit in the ASEAN Regional Forum, and on August the 8th, it's the 48th anniversary of the creation of ASEAN. So we've got a triple header anniversary that highlights both the prominence of ASEAN, but also the engagement of Europe with this important forum. If you look at the similarities between ASEAN and my hope my statistics are correct, ASEAN, a block of 600 million people representing the seventh largest GDP in the world, the European Union representing 500 million people and the second largest economy in the world. These are two important structures, and it's so interesting as ASEAN is looking towards the formulation of an ASEAN economic community very much along the lines of the predecessor for the European Union, the European economic community. There is much that both of those blocks can learn together, and of course the United States plays an important role in that. So with that, the job of a moderator is to get out of the way and get to our fantastic panel. So I'm going to introduce everyone, moving from my left to my right, everyone's going to provide a few moments of opening remarks, then we're going to get into a conversation here, and then I warn you panelists, CSIS audiences are the best, but they ask the toughest questions, so get ready, we're going to have a great conversation. So immediately to my far left, Ambassador David O'Sullivan, Ambassador of the European Union to the United States. Ambassador O'Sullivan arrived in Washington in November of 2014, and prior to his service, he served as the Chief Operating Officer of the European External Action Service, and Ambassador O'Sullivan was very engaged in the EU's Asia strategy, and prior to that, he was Director General for Trade from 2005 to 2010, so he has definitely a trade perspective that we're looking forward to hearing more about. And then we welcome Michael Fuchs, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Strategy and Multilateral Affairs in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State. Mike served as Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for Strategic Dialogues and served as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. I have to say, we claim you as one of our own because Mike served at the Center for American Progress, so we like our think tank family to come back together, and he served as Associate Managing Director for Energy Environment Policy at CAP. Now turning to my right, we're delighted to welcome Dr. Amy Searight, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia. Dr. Searight has had a distinguished career at the Defense Department. Prior to her service as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, she served as Principal Director for East Asia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and also previously served as a Senior Policy Advisor for Asia at USAID. Our favorite title for Amy is she served as an Adjunct Fellow for the Japan Chair here at CSIS, so again keeping that think tank theme going. But I think Amy, your career is sort of that whole of government approach, AID, DOD, and we welcome you here. Then moving on, we have Ambassador Vinh, Ambassador of Vietnam to the United States who has been here in Washington since July of 2014. Prior to that, Ambassador Vinh served as Deputy Foreign Minister in the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and his connection to ASEAN from 2007 to 2014. Ambassador Vinh served on Vietnam's representation team to ASEAN and was Vietnam's Senior Official to ASEAN. And then last but certainly not least, this is what good luck keeps bringing. Mr. Peter Potman who had been here, is here in Washington for consultations with his colleagues, we happen to be able to work this out that he could join us. Mr. Potman is Director of Asia and OSEAN Affairs at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and previously he served as Dutch General Counsel in Shanghai and has also served here in Washington but began his diplomatic career in Bangkok. So this is a wonderful Asian expert again in Europe. So I told you, fabulous panel, fabulous conversation and I turn to Ambassador Sullivan to start the conversation. Thank you and welcome. Well thank you very much indeed Heather and thank you to CSIS for organizing this event and thank you for assembling such a good panel of very well informed colleagues. I won't mention them individually because I know you want us to keep our remarks very short and I look forward to an interesting discussion. I mean you have emphasized that you want us to keep our remarks short so I'll try to be telegraphic on a subject which frankly you know a lot could be said. I mean the first comment I suppose I would make is contrary to some, the occasional impression that, whoa, whoa, right, okay, okay, yes. You're alive. Right, now I'm, yes, okay, right. It's that voice of God thing. Odd by the sound of my own voice. Europe actually gets Asia and has got Asia for a very long time. I mean I, there was often talk of the US pivot and people said well will the EU have a pivot. I used to say well we don't need to, we pivoted a very long time ago. One of my first jobs in the European commission was in the EU delegation in Tokyo in the early 1980s when we feared that Japan would take over the world. They didn't and now we're disappointed so there may be lessons for other countries, how we see other countries in that but I was able to visit the region a lot and have interacted greatly with Asia down through the years. It's a fantastic continent and I the cliche of will the 21st century be the Asian century I don't know but certainly Asia is destined to play a hugely important role in the coming years and we have a huge stake in that. We have a huge stake in the economics of that, the prosperity of the region. We are actively engaged in trade negotiations with a large number of partners with Japan notably at the moment and Vietnam, China an investment agreement, a free trade agreement with India with most of the Asian countries. We started out trying to have a region to region free trade agreement and frankly it stumbled mainly because of the issue of Myanmar because we were unwilling to conclude with what we then thought was a non-democratic regime and the solidarity of Asia meant that it was not possible to agree a block to block. We then went down the road of bilateral arrangements and that's what we've been negotiating. We're well advanced, we've concluded with Singapore, we're engaged with Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam as I say where I think the negotiations are very well advanced. We're looking to engage with Indonesia and we've made very clear that we are perfectly willing to envisage once we conclude the bilateral deals to have an overarching umbrella agreement with the block as a whole. Of course the nature of ASEAN is that in any event even if you had a block to block agreement you would still need to have bilateral agreements because it is not a fully fledged customs union in the way that other structures can be. So the trade and commercial aspect is hugely important for us obviously but we also have a huge interest in the peace and prosperity of the region. The tensions in Southeast Asia or Asia generally are a source of great concern to us. We want to see this region prosper, we want to see it develop and we want to see it resolve. It's political and territorial dispute issues peacefully and through mechanisms which respect international law and that's been our consistent position. We regard ASEAN as a very important actor in all of this. We think ASEAN is an important point of stability and of Asian unity. We have always supported the ASEAN position on the various territorial disputes in believing that these should be resolved through diplomatic and political means but also that there should be a code of conduct and to try and relieve some of the tensions which we know are there and to avoid that any of this tension by accident could turn into something more serious which would of course be deeply troubling for all of us. And in this regard we've always been hugely supportive of ASEAN as an institution. Heather rightly says there are some parallels between the ASEAN integration process and the European integration process but I wouldn't push that too far. This is an ASEAN project. They will make their own, they will decide what they want to do and we're not selling an off the peg model of integration and saying this is how we've done it, here it is, you know one size fits all. Absolutely not. We have experiences we're willing to share, things we've done well, things we've done not so well, lessons we've learned about how to do it and how not to do it and we're perfectly willing to share that with the ASEAN colleagues and we do so extensively. But this is their project and they have to define how they want to take this process forward and we are very supportive of that. We are one of the, I think after Japan we're the largest contributor to the ASEAN Secretariat and we have just produced a communication from the External Action Service and the Commission on Relations with ASEAN and the future development of our relations, including substantially increased spending in the ASEAN countries of development assistance going from 70 billion currently to about 170 over the next seven years. And this has been approved in Council conclusions of the Foreign Ministers underlining the huge support we have for our relationship and the fact that we would like to take this relationship to another level, to a more strategic level and this is something that we're actively engaged in discussing with the ASEAN colleagues. I will add in this context that we do think we are active participants in the Shangri-La Dialogue, in the ARF, which we are very supportive of. We do think it would be the time has come for the European Union to join the East Asia Summit. We know there are ongoing discussions in that forum about whether new members should be increased and so forth and we're respectful of that of course, but I think we would have a lot to bring to that and frankly it's a little bit paradoxical that we turn up at the ARF meetings and then the EAS meetings take place and we have to leave the room and find something else to do and then come back a couple of hours or sometimes many hours later. So I hope that this will all be bored in mind in terms of the future development of our relations. In terms of the transatlantic dimension, just to finish on that, I was with Kathy Ashton in Nampen when we agreed the transatlantic declaration with Hillary Clinton. I think we have very similar objectives in the region. I mean I sometimes think that you can try to over engineer these things because actually on a day-to-day basis we cooperate very well. If I look at, for example, the transition in Myanmar, if I look at, for example, it's in the region but not directly linked to what we say about the DPOK or even the way in which we've worked together at times, for example, on trade relations with China. When I was Director General of Trade, one of our best relationships we had with the USTO was precisely on issues with China and we took a number of WTO cases jointly, not all the time, but from time to time we shared. And I think this is reflected more generally throughout the region. We share the common values. We're trying to promote the same basic interests. Sometimes we should do this together but I also think that we have a certain complementarity of roles and we should not, you know, from my Geneva days I always remember when the EU and the US couldn't agree we were accused of not demonstrating leadership. When we did agree we were accused of bullying. So I think we have to be careful in the region that we are not appearing to come with well thought out joint positions and saying, well, this is the joint transatlantic position and appearing to sort of not be good interactors with the countries of the region and particularly of ASEAN. So we don't want a transatlantic block in interfacing with ASEAN but I emphasize that we have huge ideas in common. I think we pursue exactly the same objectives. We want the prosperity, the security, the peacefulness and the success of this region and particularly of ASEAN and we're both there to help in whatever way we can with our different perspectives and our different strengths and contributions. So we're very open to working with the US colleagues. I know they work with us. So I think this is an ongoing process which will never be clearly defined in some sort of very mechanical way but I think it's a natural byproduct of our shared interests in the region. Thank you. Ambassador, thank you so much and I absolutely no transatlantic bullying. Absolutely not. Deputy Assistant Secretary Fuchs, please. Well, thank you very much, Heather, and thanks to CSIS for hosting. I think this very interesting and timely event and also thanks to my fellow panelists here. I think I can fully endorse the comments that Ambassador O'Sullivan made. Perhaps I can just stop there and turn it over. But no, no, no, no, no, no bullying, we said. Just very quickly, I think the way that the United States sees this issue is that obviously the United States and this administration has made a decision to rebalance to the Asia Pacific, which of course is building on decades long experience of working with the region to advance our interests along with partners and allies in the region. And it is absolutely fitting, I think, then that the United States and the EU and Europe would work together obviously on issues pertaining to Asia with our partners in Asia on a wide range of issues. The United States and Europe work together on issues around the globe, obviously, and we have for decades. And so again, it is only fitting, I think, that this would apply as well to our policies, our respective policies in the Asia Pacific. Again, as Ambassador mentioned, I think it is obvious that we have shared interests in the region. We have shared interests obviously in peace and stability and the maintenance and upholding of international law. We have strong interests obviously in prosperity and sustainable development. Ambassador obviously again mentioned a lot of the engagement that the EU is involved in in terms of economic engagement in trade discussions, which is obviously at the top of the U.S. agenda right now with TPP. And I think we also have a strong interest in supporting and upholding our values in the region. It is obviously a central part of American foreign policy and something that I think that Europe and the United States see eye to eye on. In the last few years, building on what Ambassador Sullivan was integrally involved in and the communique between Secretary Clinton and Lady Ashton about our transatlantic partnership in the region in the last handful of years, we have embarked in a wide variety of cooperative and coordinated endeavors in the region to advance against shared interests with our partners in Asia. This has included supporting, again, development and sustainable growth in Asia and in particular, I would say, in the lower Mekong subregion. The Friends of the Lower Mekong in particular as a new initiative in the last five years is one of the venues in which the EU and the United States has been able to work together to advance sustainable development in a lower Mekong subregion. We have obviously also, as the Ambassador was mentioning, worked, I think, very closely together in coordination to support, again, the transformation that we have seen in Myanmar over the last few years, which I think is obviously a very important development for the region and for all of us. And then we have been supporting, obviously, regional institutions that contribute to peace and stability. And again, I think the ASEAN Regional Forum is the front and center of that. Obviously, supporting ASEAN and growing ASEAN itself is a vital component of that, a stronger ASEAN, a united ASEAN that is at the center of the region's institutions is vital, I think, for all of our interests. And building up these regional institutions is, again, going to be vital, not just now, but in the coming years, I think, for tackling any of the main security, political, transnational challenges that we're all going to face and that the region is going to face. I think, obviously, the South China Sea, as the Ambassador mentioned, is, I think, one of those main priorities in the security realm for all of us to work together on and be messaging to our partners in the region the importance that we place on this issue and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and across the region. Finally, again, looking forward, I think that, obviously, the EU, I think, as well as the United States, have been stepping up our games, if you will, in the last few years in our engagement with ASEAN, as well as the member countries and the rest of the region. And we need to continue doing that in all three of these areas going forward. I might summarize or close by referencing a comment that High Representative Mogherini made at the Shangri-La Dialogue this year, where she said that the EU's involvement in the region should not be seen as the EU in Asia, but what the EU is doing with Asia. And I think that that is a very appropriate comment. And this is not just about, again, what the United States is doing in Asia, it is not what the United States and the EU are doing in Asia, it is what we are doing with Asia and what we are all doing together. And I think that, again, I just keep referring back to Ambassador Sullivan's comments, because they were so spot on, that I think that, again, this is not about a joined strategy in the region, it is about a complementary approach to the region. I think, again, we have shared interests that guide us, and those are our North Star for our involvement in the region, and I think it is important to keep that in mind as we go forward. Thank you. That was fantastic. Thank you so much, Amy. Thank you. Good morning. It is a pleasure to be here to talk about cooperation in this vitally important region. I feel like all the very strong points have already been made, and my remarks are going to sound very redundant. But I will try to give a DOD perspective to this topic, inevitably overlapping to some degree with my colleague, Mike Fuchs. But those of us who work on the rebalance get very focused on dealing with the particular opportunities and challenges in the region and talking a lot to our partners and allies in the region about those opportunities and challenges. So for people like me, the topic of EU-US or Europe-US cooperation in the Asia Pacific is sometimes a neglected topic, which is unfortunate, because Europe clearly has a very important role to play in this region. It has a very important role to play in Asia's future, and in terms of building the kind of future that we all want to see for the region, one where there are strong rules, norms, strong regional institutions, and a strong commitment to rule of law. From a US perspective and from a DOD perspective, the importance of Southeast Asia and ASEAN in the rebalance really can't be overstated. Sometimes people talk about the rebalance within the rebalance, meaning that we've really rebalanced our focus in the region in many ways, much more centrally on Southeast Asia, and also focus on how we can strengthen regional architecture, which of course is focused on ASEAN. Southeast Asia obviously sits astride the most important trade routes in the world. The countries are dynamic engines of economic growth and innovation, yet the region is still marked by some real security challenges, some of which are quite sensitive and intractable, such as the overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea and the increasingly assertive behavior we see by some countries, particularly China. As we look to the region, we see that ASEAN has emerged as a real driver of regional cooperation and a shaper of regional norms. It's become a key part of our rebalance, and we've sought ways to strengthen our engagement with ASEAN and to try to strengthen further ASEAN centrality. And as we think about all of the benefits, all of the good things that ASEAN does for us, I mean we talk a lot about the habits of cooperation that ASEAN builds, the way that ASEAN can help build trust and confidence amongst each other and with other countries. We, in DOD, we engage most directly with ASEAN through the ADMM Plus, the ASEAN Defense Minister, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus. And we've seen in recent years a real positive trajectory where we are moving towards a lot more action-oriented cooperation through the ADMM Plus. In other words, we are now able to get together, you know, our militaries, our defense professionals are able to get together multilaterally and really do things together, which is very valuable. But I would say that the most important thing that ASEAN does is it helps to build consensus around shared interests and shared challenges and build a consensus around appropriate norms of behavior. And to the degree that ASEAN can really demonstrate a unity of purpose and a unity of voice, it has the most impact in the region and plays the most constructive role. And in my view, you know, key partners to ASEAN like the United States and the EU, as well as Japan, Australia, India, they can play a very helpful role in strengthening this ability to form a regional consensus. And in venues like the Shangri-La Dialogue and of course the East Asia Summit, the ARF, the ADMM Plus, and all of these venues, when we, as key partners, can come to the table and speak up on key issues, I think that helps to build and strengthen regional norms and provide a kind of space for the ASEAN countries to comfortably express their interests and hopefully come together, again with a unity of voice. So specifically, what has the United States done to strengthen our, to strengthen ASEAN and upgrade our relations with ASEAN? A few things just to mention quickly, we make great effort to fully participate at all levels in ASEAN meetings and initiatives. So our Secretary of Defense has participated in every ADMM Plus ministerial and many of the retreats and we fully participated at all other levels as well. We also are looking to create new forums and initiatives to strengthen our cooperation and engagement with ASEAN. And I think most illustrative of that was last spring when Secretary Hagel, then Secretary of Defense Hagel, hosted his 10 ASEAN counterparts in Hawaii for what we called the U.S. ASEAN Defense Forum. But it was a great opportunity to have some informal dialogue on some key issues and talk about some issues like HADR and Maritime Domain Awareness and how we can work more together on that. And another example in this area is that this spring is sort of a follow-on conversation to that conversation with defense ministers. Defense practitioners in all of the ASEAN countries joined us in Paycom for a conference on Maritime Domain Awareness. And then third, we look to build ASEAN capacity in a broad range of ways to tackle some key challenges. So, for example, through the ADMM Plus expert working groups and through other mechanisms, for example, we are, we have proposed to send a new advisor to our U.S. mission in ASEAN to provide some technical advice on issues including HADR and Maritime Domain Awareness to help build some more capacity and coordination, cooperation among the ASEAN countries. And other things that we do such as supporting the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center, the AHA Center, and other regional hubs for coordination. So I think the points have already been made. I won't repeat them about how much interest we share with the EU, with European countries in terms of our approach to Asia. And Europe really can be a very helpful model for ASEAN as it seeks to strengthen its own regional architecture. It's both a model of, you know, practical lessons learned and a real inspiration, I think, in terms of what can be accomplished by having a real political will to build more regional unity and deep cooperation. But I think there are a few things that we can consider in terms of ways that we might be able to work more together effectively. So for example, and DOD would welcome the consideration of these proposals, you know, we could think about initiating regular, high-level U.S.-EU consultations on Asian security. I think Mike Fuchs has already talked about our coordination that has been growing over time in the ASEAN Regional Forum, but perhaps there's more there we could do together. And then we do a variety of things, as I already mentioned, in terms of helping to build capability capacity in areas like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter piracy, human trafficking, and environmental protection. So perhaps we could work together more directly to coordinate those efforts to do, for example, to cosponsor subject matter expert exchanges and those kinds of things. But in short, I think that there's much that the U.S. and the EU can do together to help strengthen the prospects of real success for ASEAN as it seeks to continue to gain momentum and consensus in the region. So I look forward to hearing the views of the rest of the panel and questions from the audience. Thank you. Thanks, and these are some great ideas. Mr. Ambassador. Thank you very much, sir. First of all, I would like to thank the CSIS for organizing these talks on a very relevant and interesting subject. And I do agree also that we can call it the U.S.-EU cooperation or strategy in working with ASEAN rather than transatlantic. But I'm happy also that Vietnam is still now as I may add the country coordinator for EU ASEAN relations until next month, I think. And I've been working with ASEAN until last November, and I'm now the ambassador to the U.S. So maybe in that capacity we have a lot of things to say. But most of the time I agree with the points that have been raised by the three speakers before me. I just want to mention a few points as follows. Number one, both the U.S. and the EU have been important partners, long-time partners of ASEAN. And the EU, for example, has been in partnership with ASEAN in former one since 1977. And we have been working together in many fields, starting from economic, and now we have enlarging our partnership in security and other fields, including in addressing the non-traditional security challenges. The U.S. has been very much enhanced the partnership and relationship with ASEAN, especially together with its pivoting or rebalancing, starting with the time it acceded to the TAC in 2009. And it has been very much involved. And since 2011, it has been part of the East Asia Summit and of the ADMM Plus as well. So it cover the major regional processes initiated by ASEAN. And throughout the years, both the EU and the U.S. have been supported by ASEAN regional integration and regional cooperation for peace, security, and prosperity in the region. In particular, there has been a strong support from the U.S. and the EU for ASEAN centrality in the region, in setting the agenda for dialogue and cooperation in the region, and also for dialogue between ASEAN and its partners. And at the same time, it has been a strong supporter of ASEAN's efforts for ASEAN Community Building. And that will be very much important. So now what we need to think of is there is a shift of geoeconomic and political gravity to Asia. And Asia is now on the rise, but at the same time in transformation. So I think that with the interest that has for the U.S. and the EU to be here will be greater as well. And I do agree with you that the U.S. and the EU may have different approaches and interests in the different issues in the region. They can play their respective individual roles with the region, but at the same time, they can join their work with ASEAN in a way of complementary to their respective roles. And I think that is very, very much important. But the number one thing is that the U.S. and the EU have a lot to share, have a lot of interests to share with ASEAN, including, as I agree with the comments made earlier, on peace and security in the region, on prosperity, on maintenance and upholding the rule of law, and on working together to build trust and confidence building in the region, and also to address the challenges, including in economic integration, in economic prosperity, and in security. So I think for ASEAN, we are ready to continue to play what we call the neutral and honest broker, and we will provide, as we have been doing in the past, a level playing field, neutral playing field to engage all the dialogue partners, including the U.S., the EU, China, India, Japan, and others. So we are here, we have a momentum to work together for the prosperity and peace and stability in the region. And thank you very much for continue to support ASEAN Central role. It is hard to play a central role in a region so dynamic as Asia, but we have been chosen to do so. We need the partnership of the major powers and unity as mentioned is very much important, but at the same time consensus, the spirit of working together, of accommodating the interests of all will be also very much important. Thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador, thank you so much for those comments. And the last speaker always has the most demanding job. So Peter, take it away for providing the last thoughts before we open to questions. Thank you, Heather. And good morning to you all. I'm very happy to be back in Washington and also to be back at CSIS. I worked here from 2004 to 2008, and I spent many, many hours of my working days in the old building. So I have to congratulate you on the new building, and you were making the point about the background, the think tank background of some of the speakers. So I never worked at CSIS, but this is my second day of the program and already my second appearance on one of your events, so I almost qualify. I also would like to thank the EU delegation very much for supporting this series of programs. We believe it's very important that the transatlantic debate is about more than NATO and Europe and perhaps the Middle East, but that in a way we have to rebalance or pivot the transatlantic relationship towards Asia as well. And obviously that is because this is the Asian century. The main part of economic growth in the world will take place in Asia. It's already half the population of the world living there. So it's obvious that the rising middle class is not only in China, but also in Southeast Asian, Asian countries, is going to be leading the way for international companies in doing business. So that is number one. It's the economic rise. Secondly, also because of that I think, the security dimension of Asia becomes more urgent, not only in Asia itself, but also for the United States and Europe. And perhaps the situation in the South China Sea developments there is the one that comes to mind most easily and that hits the front pages. But I think it's much broader because of the rise of Asia and everything that happens in these countries. So it creates opportunities for the countries involved, certainly Asian countries. It creates challenges. And the EU and the US have to deal with that because we have our interests in the region. And since the region is growing, our interests are growing. So that is the second point I would like to make. Third, it's obvious that regardless of all this growth and optimism and issues that are taking place, there are also in Southeast Asia still very pressing what I would call humanitarian developmental issues, not all countries at the same level of development. There are migration issues, refugee issues. There are great disparities between the countries of the region also within ASEAN. And I believe it is the wish also of ASEAN countries to decrease those differences in wealth and to bridge all the gaps that still exist between the countries. So that is a process of integration that is important in and of itself. But I think from a European or an American perspective, it is important that these things are done, that they get them right. And in that sense, I think it is in our interest that we assist and help where we can, not in a bullying way, but in a complementary way, as has been said. And that is important from our perspective. I would add that I believe, and that's the point I think that we're also trying to make, the EU is trying to make in wanting to get a place at the table and also in a way the stretched hand that was extended last month when the European Council adopted their new policy towards ASEAN. That ASEAN countries in a way should repivot as well and rebalance their interest and their attention also to Europe. I have to say that my experience over the last few years is that there's a lot of hesitation in Southeast Asia towards Europe. They say, well, you don't have gunships. What kind of security do you bring? And you're moralizing when you come. The first thing is raise your finger. And you've done that for a long time. We don't want it anymore. So I think modesty should be part of our policy. And at the same time, I think it is important that ASEAN sort of re-invites and reopens up to the EU and European countries. A good thing of the EU is you get 28 for the price of one. And that is helpful because it brings about a lot of human resources from all our countries with different experiences and different qualities that can be brought about. So I think it is good to sum up the rebalancing of the transatlantic relationship because of the importance of Asia, because of the challenges. And secondly, I would hope that ASEAN countries in particular would also welcome that and see the advantage because we all need each other. Thank you. Well, thank you all so much. And thank you for your discipline. Sometimes panelists don't always respect that narrow window of conversation. So thank you so much. My takeaway, I have to say, obviously the theme of for the US and the EU not joint but complementary. And all I have to say is we have a lot of rebalancing going on. I have heard rebalance in the rebalance, so the centrality of ASEAN. Peter just suggested that ASEAN rebalance towards Europe. So we have got a lot of balancing to think about. The only problem I have with our panelists is that they are in way too much agreement. So my job as moderator is to stir that pot and make sure that we find where the disagreement may be. So let me begin on the subject of security. In fact, as I checked the news before coming down the panel, we are reminded of the dynamism of the security situation in the South China Sea with the conduct of live ammunition exercises in the South China Sea by China. We are reminded that this is continuing to be a very dynamic situation, not only with island reclamation but some fairly provocative moves. So we do have to focus on the security. I often hear criticism that Europe's strategy is economic in its pursuit and that there is not that great of a role that Europe will play largely in the security zone. Although we had, and Amy correct me, six European countries involved in the last year's specific room exercises. So we are seeing a Europe that is engaging more in the security area. But I just like to ask our panelists to just briefly reflect, and Peter, I may start with you and we'll reverse order back down. Is there a meaningful role for Europe to play in the security dynamic? Obviously support of the code of conduct, support of peaceful resolution of conduct, we all share that goal. But Peter, as you said, you know, where are your gunships? When things are getting very dynamic, where is the specific role for Europe in the security arena? I'll start with you. Let's see. There we are. Well, thank you for starting with me. Yeah, no, that is true. And from a Dutch perspective, I mean, let's say the gunships were there 400 years ago. But seriously, I think, first of all, let's say the security dimension of the region is much broader than just the South China Sea. And as I said, that's the one that hits the front pages. And it's a serious issue that is reason for concern for the EU, for the Netherlands as well, because of the trade flows and because of the principles involved. So we, I mean, the Dutch support the EU policy. We're part of that, that these issues should be resolved peacefully in accordance with international law. And that is something that holds particular importance for the Netherlands. So does it mean that we are going to send gunships? No, I don't think so. But we believe that this is an issue that should be raised in various fora because of its importance. It should be resolved diplomatically. It should be primarily resolved by the countries of the region. It's a regional issue with global implications. That's why we have an interest. But it's not something that we should solve. The parties involved should solve it. But we follow this closely. As I said, human security is another issue. It's broader. Humanitarian crises, they also affect security. And I think the EU and the United States should help out there as well. Just one example, because there was a Dutchman involved a couple of years ago, there had been a long-standing insurgency in Aceh, part of Indonesia. And the European Union brokered a peace deal. One of my former colleagues was involved, and that worked. So there's a lot of experience, I think, also in the part of Europe, in conflict resolution that can be brought to bear. So I think that's my remarks on that. Thank you. I will agree totally on the first assessment that we look at security in Aceh, in particular in Southeast Asia in a broader sense, not just South China Sea issue. And ASEAN is very much one environment of peace and stability for its economic world, especially for its ASEAN economic community to be coming. With regard to the question of South China Sea, certainly we are greatly concerned also about the development, the complications that have been made now. And ASEAN has been working hard on that. But I think we should look into the issue of South China Sea into the different elements of that question. Point number one, we acknowledge that there are territorial disputes over there. Certainly the dispute should be settled among the parties concerned. But the region and other countries can also have to create a conducive environment for the parties to sit down together and settle their disputes in accordance with international law. And point number two, this is very much important, the question of freedom of navigation and maritime security. It's not just for the region, the EU, the US, and other countries, China, Japan, Australia, all will have great interest in securing the freedom of navigation and ensuring maritime security in the region. And point number three, I would like to stress again, certainly we are very much see the importance of regional cooperation, building trust, enhancing confidence in the region and promoting dialogues. But at the same time, we never forget that the role to be played by international law, especially on close and other related piece of international in this one. So ASEAN is very much at the heart of all these efforts and activities, and ASEAN is not part of the territorial dispute. So why it is involved? It is involved because of peace and stability in the region and in the South China Sea. At the same time, it works for trust and confidence, and it ensure framework that everybody is following the rules of law. And so I think that we need partnership with other countries in this exercise. Thank you very much. Yes, I very much agree with all of the comments that were just made. And I also agree that there are a broad range of security issues, many of which I touched upon in the region that we should be working on a variety of transnational threats from counter piracy to trafficking in people, to HADR, to a whole range of things. But I will say that from the Defense Department's perspective, the South China Sea has emerged as a really critically important issue in the region for several reasons that have already been mentioned. I mean, first, you have the very important principles at stake of freedom of navigation and the very important trade flows that go through the region. Secondly, there's a large number of claimants that are directly impacted by the ratcheting up of disputes and some coercive behavior, many of whom are great friends and allies. But I think most importantly, most broadly, when we look at the South China Sea and developments there, we get very concerned not only about the potential for a near term conflict based on an inadvertent or miscalculation at sea or some unintended incident. But much more broadly, it has real implications for the future of the region. Is the region going to be based on one that ASEAN has long championed where disputes are resolved peacefully through dialogue and through international law and other kinds of peaceful means of solution? Or is it going to be a region where a very large rising country like China can settle the disputes in a de facto way through the use of power and coercion? When we look at the future of the region, we have some real concerns. Now to be clear, and my State Department colleague will back me up on this with more detail, the United States does not take a position on the disputes themselves. We do not take a position on the sovereignty of any of the claims of the claimant states. We do, however, take a position that these disputes should be resolved peacefully and through international norms and international legal standards. And we have taken a position at Shangri-La Dialogue. Secretary Carter was quite clear that the United States takes a strong position that a very helpful step in this direction would be to have the claimants agree to have no further land reclamation, no further militarization of their outposts. And so this is where I think there is somewhat of a difference of approach that you are trying to draw out, so I will be very clear about it. I think from our perspective it would be helpful if the EU would be a little more clear in terms of backing up these principles. Now I think there have been some very helpful comments made, including at Shangri-La Dialogue, by the high representative, Mo Greeny, who called for a maritime order based on international law, including the UN Convention of Law of the Sea. That was in her speech. Those kinds of comments are very welcome from us. But I think a little bit more forward-leaning approach that would support, for example, the idea of a halt to further reclamation, further militarization would be very useful. Amy, thank goodness. I was getting worried there. All right. You just were given a task, so please. I can't help it. I have to agree with everything that everyone said. But no, I think to build on what Amy and our other panelists were saying, I think obviously the United States is quite concerned about the situation in the South China Sea. And I think that I would say, I agree with Amy's comments, and I would say that there is always more that we can be doing. There is more, I think, that the EU can be doing. There is more that others can be doing as well. And I think that, again, as Amy pointed out, the United States does not take a position on the claims, sovereignty claims of land features in the South China Sea, but we do believe very strongly that there is a right way to approach resolving these disputes. And we have an interest in that, as does the EU, as do many other countries around the world, because not because of which country will end up getting which of these rocks, but because of what a potential conflict over these overlapping disputes could lead to, as Amy mentioned, either an inadvertent miscalculation leading to conflict or longer-term steps that would by any country that might impact the broader regional security environment in the South China Sea. And so I think that this is about, yes, it is about public comments. It is about speaking up when we see activity that is concerning in the South China Sea. It is about interventions made at speeches and events and ministerial meetings elsewhere. But I would also say that that is really not, I think, the most important borrow, though it is very important. I would say also that this is a security problem. And first and foremost, we rely on diplomacy to be addressing security problems. And so diplomacy, combination of public and private diplomacy, I think, is absolutely essential. And I think it is essential that the countries of the region hear from the EU, they hear from the United States, they hear from many other countries around the region who rely on peace and stability in the South China Sea, that it is, again, coming upon us to express, again, all the countries, there are concerns over what is happening and over what could happen in the South China Sea. And to work creatively and innovatively, again, with the combination of public and private diplomacy with the countries involved, try to help those countries figure out a peaceful way to resolve these disputes. And I think that what Amy outlined here in terms of a first step is exactly what we have been advocating for, which is that it seems eminently reasonable to us that all of the claimants, since there is such difficulty right now in getting to a place where the claimants in all the countries involved are able to actually negotiate a code of conduct in a substantive way and lay out a longer-term solution to this problem that they agree for the time being to halt reclamation, to halt further militarization of outposts in the construction of new major facilities out there. This seems like a very, very reasonable confidence-building measure I think that countries could take. Well, I think it's all been said, really. Firstly, I mean, you know, I think the last thing the region needs is more gunboats. So I don't think that's going to be our future contribution to the security of the region. The EU, of course, is not always seen as a security actor, though if anyone wants to, you know, understand how far we've come, just look at the Iran deal and the role which the EU has played in that process. And in, you know, our engagement elsewhere in the world, it's perhaps not very well known, but we have nearly 7,000 military and civilian people operating in emissions across the world, from Africa through to Eastern Europe to we were, as Peter rightly pointed out, we played a very important role in ACHE at the time. So I mean, we are developing a security dimension to our work, which is, you know, in its beginnings, but which is very clear. And I think we have a very clear message for the security of that region. I agree with Michael and with Amy that, you know, it's a question, you have to make the judgment about what statements you make where and when. I think our position is extremely clear. But on the other hand, I've assisted at a number of difficult discussions in the ARF and elsewhere, trying to draft statements on these issues where even within the ASEAN partners, it was sometimes not easy to find the precise language. So diplomacy, as Michael pointed out, is the art perhaps of people saying the same thing, but in slightly different ways. And completely joining up language is sometimes useful and sometimes counterproductive. So I think we say what we have to say in the way that we say it. I think nobody doubts what we stand for or what we believe in in terms of the need to resolve these disputes through peaceful and diplomatic means. We have also done quite a lot with ASEAN, but I won't go into the details now of helping ASEAN develop maritime capacity. We've also, as Amy mentioned, the humanitarian side of the AHA, we've been actively involved. And we will continue to be a voice for the putting in place of a security architecture in Asia, which eliminates the need for dealing with these things through any kind of confrontational means. I mean, I think that is the, if there's one lesson Europe can bring to this particular discussion through the Helsinki process and elsewhere, it is that you need a structure where you can have confidence-building measures, where you can talk about conflicts or potential distrust or potential suspicion of people's motives and do that in a peaceful way around conference tables rather than out on the high seas or through actions. Now, of course, you will then, I mean, I used to give this speech a lot when I was traveling around Asia. I have to admit events in Ukraine have complicated slightly this discourse. What do you do when someone pulls a gun at the conference table? I agree. Then you have to deal with that situation. But I nonetheless think that the stability, which our security architecture in Europe delivered over many, many years, does show that there is much to be gained for that. And if that is a model, I would suggest, and I think that's what the ASEAN colleagues are actually talking about through the Code of Conduct and through other means, maybe even through further developments of the East Asia Summit, to try and put in place a structure and a system of discussions, of early warning systems, of confidence-building measures which would enable all of these disputes to be managed in a peaceful and diplomatic way. I agree with both Amy and Michael. We also, frankly, take no position on the respective claims. There's a field day for lawyers going forward for probably 20 years on these issues. But the important thing is that all of this is managed peacefully and without provocation and in a way that tends to deflate rather than inflate the tension. Thank you. I point to my next question. Then I want to turn this over to the audience. Ambassador Vinn has to leave in a few moments. He has to attend a meeting at the State Department. So I want to start, Ambassador Vinn, with you for this particular set of questions. First of all, I think Ambassador Sullivan put out a challenge that I'm going to ask all of our panelists that how can the EU be brought closer and as an observer state or a participant state to the East Asia summit. But there's been one area of disagreement that has been outside of ASEAN. So I'm going to expand the conversation a little bit. And that's the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank. Here you did not have a transatlantic unity on participating in that. And I'm wondering, Ambassador, your reflections on the emergence of the AIIB and how you see this fitting into a broader regional context. And then I just want to make sure I understood from your comments, would you support the EU becoming more engaged at the East Asia summit? And then I'll then say our goodbyes to you, and then I'll let the other panelists weigh in. Thank you very much. Then first on the EU's engagement with ASEAN, and in particular with the EES. Actually, there has been a lot of declassances, including my trip to the Brussels working with your colleagues and Brussels when we talked about this one. Number one, the AES has just been established in 2005, and this is the 10th anniversary of this forum, and it has been expanded for four years now. And people think that there are two parallel efforts here. ASEAN will want very much to engage its dialogue partners now within the EES at the same time how to strengthen ASEAN centrality that it has been playing for so far within the EES and within the region as well. And number two, how to fit the EES in the evolving regional architecture is also a question of discussion within ASEAN and within ASEAN and among its dialogue partners. So all these discussions are going on, why the challenges for peace and stability and also prosperity are still there at the region in the outside world. So there are a lot of things. For example, people think that maybe we need to strengthen the institutional mechanisms of the EES and better, but some others argue that because the EES is a leader's lead forum, so let the leaders create environment for the leaders to talk freely and to decide on strategic thinking and on strategic issues. So we are strengthening that one. Now with engagement of the EU with the region, I think a lot we can do together, not necessary now to be involved in one form or the other on a formal basis with the EES. The EU has been doing so far in working with ASEAN in setting the regional agenda and working with ASEAN in setting the regional agenda including, for example, maritime security, for example, regional economic integration, disaster management, for example, that has been through ASEAN-EU collaboration and the agenda can be fit in the different processes in the region, including the EES. And supporting the ASEAN central role and sharing information and sharing interests in the region will also be part of that. Certainly, Ambassador Suryavan already knows that everything here, he mentioned at the beginning, everything here will depend on the central role to play ASEAN, but this is what we have been doing so far. Engagement of the EU as the longest partner of ASEAN will be very much important for peace stability in the region and for ASEAN community buildings as well. That's what I have to say. On AIIB, I think we need to look into a bigger picture of regional integration and connectivity. And there is a great need for resources to further enhance connectivity in the region, especially in terms of infrastructure upgrading and building. So ASEAN community is also dependent on the ASEAN connectivity as well. And I think the video shows that within the next few years we will need about $800 billion for upgrading and building connectivity within ASEAN. So different resources will be very much important for the region, for ASEAN. And I think all ASEAN countries have been part of the AIIB at the beginning. We are working on the establishment and that has been already the establishment of AIIB. And I think many people have concerns how this AIIB will be working, whether it will be up to the regional and international standards or not. I think 57 or something original members of AIIB will ensure that it will be working in a transparent and accountable manner. And that's how we view it. And Vietnam has been one of that. Mr. Ambassador, thank you so much for being with us. And I hope we haven't made you late for your next busy appointment, but we really appreciate your insights. Thank you so much. Mike, if I can turn to you, because I'm going to put you on the spot and you are welcome to make some news today. Let me preface that. What is the U.S. position on the EU, on the East Asia Summit perspective? And you're also your perspective now that the dust has settled a little bit. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. On healing a bit, the transatlantic rift, if you will, over AIIB. Easy questions. Well, I'm sorry. I'm going to disappoint. I'm going to not give you a yes or no answer on EU and the EAS. I'm going to reserve a judgment for the moment on that. We've been talking with our EU colleagues about this for quite some time, as well as with our ASEAN colleagues about it. And I think the points that Ambassador Vinn made about this actually are, I think, quite appropriate. What I would say about this is that without a doubt, as we've been talking about here for over an hour, more EU engagement, more European engagement in Asia is without a doubt an unquestioned positive for all of us. I think this is actually more about the EAS than it is about the EU and what its role is right now. I think that there is, as Ambassador Vinn alluded to, a quite vigorous debate going on right now within the East Asia summit. Again, it's only 10 years old. It is relatively new. I think ASEAN is undergoing a, again, quite vigorous debate internally about where the EAS should go in the coming years. And so I would say two things. One, I would say that I think what ASEAN's position is, we heard a little bit about from Ambassador Vinn about, I think, what Vietnam's position perhaps is on EU and the EAS. But I think one important factor for us is going to be where ASEAN is on it. Again, we do not just pay lip service to the mantra that we prize ASEAN centrality when it comes to the regional architecture. And they're setting the agenda. And so I think that it is very important to know where ASEAN is on this. And again, I know that they're discussing the issue actively. And then the second thing is, I think, where the EAS will go in the future. And again, the United States has made it very clear, President Obama has made it very clear since joining the East Asia summit that we believe that this is the region's premier forum for political and strategic and security issues. And it should be, but it's going to take a lot of work to turn it into that in the coming years. And again, I think there's a lot of discussion about how to do that. And so I think that those will be two big factors, I think, in determining the answer to your question. On the AAIB, again, I think that perhaps a little bit too much hype has been made of this in recent months. I think President Obama actually made pretty clear the United States view on this a few months ago when asked about it. I guess what I could say to your question, Heather, is just reiterating the point I made at the beginning, which is that I think when it comes to U.S.-EU approaches to the region, we're talking complimentary, not joint. We don't have to do absolutely every last thing together in the region. But that does not mean that there is discord or disagreement between us over this. I think, again, in our position on the AAIB has been very clear. I think Ambassador Vin is absolutely right. There is a tremendous need for infrastructure investment across the Asia Pacific. And we very much support growing investments and focus on meeting those goals. Our interests are in however the money is being invested in those projects that the investments, the projects meet certain standards, standards that we all with I think the EU, the United States, and many other countries on the world have worked over decades to develop the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and others. And we hope that the AAIB will live up to those standards as well when it starts operating. Thank you so much. Let's open it up for some questions. If you could please identify yourself and keep your questions short. We're going to wrap this up in about 10 minutes. We have colleagues with microphones. So it looks like that group over there has got lots of questions. So let's begin over there. And if it's all right with the panelists, we'll bundle some questions and then I'll allow you to wrap up and answer. Yes, sir, please. My name is Eric Rose. I'm with Hertzfeld, Rubenmann, and Rose in Yangon. My question have to do specifically with financing for Myanmar. In part due to the fact that the US is the only country left with substantial sanctions against a number of entities in Myanmar, there is a chilling effect on financing of transactions with Myanmar, either from the US or from Europe, the result of which has been that there are no American or European banks present with branches in Myanmar. And financing of transactions has been done offshore and not onshore. So my question is twofold. One, it has to do with the public financing. EBRD has not done any transactions, to my knowledge, in Myanmar at this point. Will EBRD be joining now defunct and soon to come back? Ex-Im Bank in financing transactions in Myanmar for European companies. And number two is considering the enormous number of sanctions that have been imposed by FinCEN and a whole bunch of courts on European banks, specifically BNP Paribas, more than $8.9 billion, Commerzbank, $1.4 billion, Standard Chartered, over $300 million. What is the position of the EU in dealing with these remaining sanctions, which are causing these banks not to engage in Myanmar? Thank you. I think we had another question over there. Yes, sir. Right there. Hi, Lauren Hershey, retired attorney, but I'm a generalist on Asia Affairs for about 50 years. Point blank question, should the U.S. have naval bases in Vietnam and in the Philippines? And should those naval bases be shared by other countries in the region? And should there be an ASEAN type, if you will, compact on the use of their own naval forces? Second question relates to the Joint Development Project with India of an aircraft carrier. What does it mean? What does it signify? What is the implication, if any, for Southeast Asia? And third question relates to the Exclusive Economic Zones under UNCLOS. Should the European Union, the United States, any of the global powers be supporting hydrocarbon exploration, I didn't say production, in the South China Sea? Three questions. And easy ones at that. Thank you, Lauren. Let's see, we can move over here. There's a colleague right there. Thank you. Hi, I'm Nora from the foreign policy initiative. Thank you for being here today. My question is, considering the U.S. rebalance to Asia, does the EU see Asia and Southeast Asia as a competition for U.S. strategic commitments? Yeah. Thank you. Wonderful. Thank you. I'm just moving along to make sure I saw the hand in the back. Yes, right there, ma'am. Thank you. Hi, Susanna Seltzer from Carnegie Mellon University. Considering the U.S. and garment manufacturing businesses within the ASEAN countries, what are thoughts on maybe strategies for ensuring prosperity and safety of citizens within those countries while maintaining trade relations on garment manufacturing? Thank you. Do you say that we have a diverse set of questions? Maybe. An understatement here, but wonderful questions. Thank you so much. I think what we'll do with the remaining time and Ambassador O'Sullivan, I'm going to start with you and we'll work down. The beauty of this is you can answer the questions that you feel motivated to answer, or if you really want to stretch yourselves, answer them all. So, Ambassador O'Sullivan. Well, yeah, very, as you say, diverse selection of questions. Very quickly. On Myanmar and the sanctions, you're right that there is an issue there, particularly about what we would see as the extraterritoriality of some U.S. sanctions. We're in constant discussion with the United States about this. I mean, we're certainly not going to, it's for the U.S. to decide what it does with its sanctions on Myanmar and how and when it wishes to move on those. One of the things I think we are trying to do, and by the way, this is going to arise also in the Iran context, because we will probably have differential sanctioned lifting between the EU and the United States. We're in a constant dialogue with the U.S. colleagues about how to be more clear, how to avoid gray zones of, so that companies know what they can and cannot do. And I think this is the important point. I mean, companies have to respect their legal obligations, and if that includes by virtue of using the dollar or using U.S. banks, then of course, they have to respect U.S. law. On the other hand, I agree that there is a certain gray zone of potential confusion where you have differential sanctions, or in our case, no more sanctions with Myanmar. And then this is something where we try to provide maximum clarity to companies, try to navigate their way through it. But of course, the question of when the United States chooses to lift its sanctions is entirely a decision for the U.S. I've never heard the idea of supporting hydrocarbon exploration. I don't think that's something we do as EU. I mean, EU companies may wish to do it. But I take your point that this is part of the complex of the issues in some of these disputes. On the issue of the rebalance, do we see any competition? Absolutely not. I mean, this is a country with two coasts, an Atlantic coast and a Pacific coast. It can only have a huge stake in the Asia-Pacific region. We do not have a coastal connection with the region directly, though through the maritime routes we have a huge connection with the region. But there's no competition here. We're also heavily engaged. That's the point I tried to make today. We're just as heavily engaged and have been just as heavily engaged, and will continue to be just as heavily engaged. Asia-Pacific region is of crucial importance both to the EU and the U.S. We wish the TPP well. I hope they come back from Maui with a deal. It's not competition with us because we're also opening up trade exchanges there, too. On the issue of garment manufacturing, I'm afraid a bit of a loss because I mean, where I know we were active, for example, was in Bangladesh when there was the tragedies there. We took a slightly different approach to the U.S. because we went with the companies who are using these textile companies. We established a code of conduct with the Bangladeshi producers on how they needed to improve the working conditions and provide greater guarantees. That is always our approach. We actually offer duty-free quotas. By the way, Heather, I think you were wrong, but I'd have to go back and check. I think we're still the largest economy in the world, the best of my knowledge. But it may be that the depreciation of the euro has slightly changed the balance. I'll check my numbers. But we are the only major trading bloc to offer duty-free, quota-free access on all products to the least developed countries. This is obviously hugely important for Bangladesh, but also for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, potentially. This is a big issue for us while we offer this access. It is also conditioned on working conditions, employment conditions, respect of international labor organization conventions. But we try to do this in an incentivizing way rather than in a sense of threatening, because we also realize that for most of these countries textile production is actually a first foot on the ladder towards prosperity for many, many poor families. So you have to get the balance right between trying to insist on high standards and on the other hand not appearing to want to put these people at such a disadvantage that they can't actually produce competitively in order to provide a first rung on that ladder of international trading prosperity. Yeah, just to pick up on a couple of questions. The question about garment manufacturing, I think the issue of broader, the broader issue of labor rights, and I think obviously in South East Asia is a big one. It's an important one. I think similarly the United States in the way we engage, whether it's through trade negotiations or in other ways, without it out prioritizes this issue in treatment, I think obviously, as Ambassador just mentioned, this is a difficult issue, I think, a lot of the time. But we definitely prioritize it. We also do a lot of work with individual ASEAN countries as well as ASEAN as a whole on capacity building when it comes to being able to put in force the right regulatory structures that are necessary to implement legal regimes, whether it's on labor rights or it's other issues. And I think that as we move forward and you look towards ASEAN fulfilling its ASEAN economic community at the end of this year, and that won't be the end obviously moving forward in coming years, I think this is one of the main issues, not just labor rights, but broader rights, human rights and others within Southeast Asia and ASEAN and how the ASEAN economic community and the ASEAN community as a whole is going to align its regulatory structures, its laws, and others to support not just labor rights, but I think broader human rights is going to be an important thing for all of us to watch and to support in the coming years. And again, on the oil exploration question, I think I agree with Ambassador O'Sullivan. I don't think that this is something that we are actively promoting and supporting. Well, what I would say is that I think that for a long time there has been economic activities that have been engaged in by many of these countries in areas where they have done it peacefully, not disputed areas, and that has been ongoing. And I think that those activities are important to the economic lifeblood of many of these countries, including fishing, I think as well. And I think that whether it is oil exploration, it is fishing, whatever else it may be, I think the things that we don't want to see are countries actively engaging in these sorts of activities in openly disputed areas in ways that may raise tensions. I think that that is something that is very important. I think that, again, this is something that we have been encouraging all of the claimants to refrain from, because, again, we want to support the countries in trying to create an environment that is conducive to a peaceful resolution of these disputes. And I know lots of the time these are some of the activities that actually are at the heart of potential conflict. Amy, naval bases. Yes, I think that question was directed at me. Well, you know, the way that we are thinking about our naval forces in the Pacific, our posture and presence is really, you know, we have really moved away from the idea of bases to places as the saying goes. So as we are working with our allies and partners in the region, as our interests, we have a lot of shared interests and a lot of shared activities, a lot of things we want to do together. And as those interests in doing more things together grows, we are making some very interesting agreements and practices where we are rotating more of our presence through particular countries. So to take specific examples with Australia, we have negotiated a force posture agreement to institutionalize what is normally known as our marine Darwin initiative so that our marines as well as Air Force can rotate through Australia's northern territories on a regular basis and work together with the Australians and with other regional partners to strengthen jointly all of our capabilities. Similarly, with the Philippines, last year we signed the Advanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, which will not be about creating bases. It is not about bases. It is about having an agreement where we will agree upon joint activities and places where our forces can rotate in, work with the Philippines, work on key issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities, and other types of activities. That is currently being reviewed by the Philippines Supreme Court, so we are sort of on a pause waiting for them to work it through their domestic processes. But we are optimistic that once the Supreme Court makes its ruling, we will be able to move forward very quickly and do some very interesting things with the Philippines. We also have, we work closely with Singapore. Singapore hosts our littoral combat ship. Our second ship has arrived there. By 2018, we plan to have four based out of Singapore, which will not just be sitting in the port in Singapore, but will be traveling throughout the region doing all kinds of very interesting and productive engagements. So that is the way we are approaching our presence, our naval presence, and other kinds of presence in the region. And we are doing it because we have a lot of very strong demand signals from our partners and allies that they want to do more with us, they want us there. And so we are not having those kinds of conversations about any kind of basing conversations with the Vietnamese. Ambassador Vinh is not here to give his perspective. I will say that I think we have tremendous momentum right now in our relationship with Vietnam, given the historic visit of the party secretary last month, and a number of high-level engagements and a number of very productive discussions. So we're very happy about where we're headed with Vietnam, but we're a long way off from doing something that would be that close. And then just briefly, on the India question, gives me an excuse to bring India into the conversation, which also is in my AOR. And we really are very excited about where we are with our relationship with India and the discussions that we're having with India. As India looks east and is now talking more about acting east, the Modi government has been very forthcoming with us about wanting to deepen our defense cooperation across the board. And in particular, wanting to do more with us in East Asia, in large part because India will point out that we really share the same kind of approach and the same kind of norms and vision for the future of the region. So it's an alignment of use that allows us to build a lot of cooperative activities. Just like our conversation here today about how the U.S. and the EU can work together in a complementary fashion. It doesn't have to be joint activities, but we can coordinate, we can cooperate, we can complement each other. Those are the kinds of discussions we're having with India. Now, within the broad range of cooperation that we're doing, we're seeing a special degree of momentum in our defense technology and trade initiative. And some announcements have come out of that initiative in terms of areas that we've agreed to collaborate on technology and trade. And the president and the prime minister made a series of announcements, one of which was that we were going to launch a joint working group on aircraft carrier technology collaboration. So to clarify, because there hasn't a lot of confusion about this in the press, we have not committed to jointly develop an aircraft carrier with India. We have committed to sit down in a working group and look at the vast array of technologies that comes with an aircraft carrier, which is basically a floating city on the ocean. It's got a whole range of technologies. And so we want to sit down with the Indians and identify areas where it would be useful to collaborate on development or on technological trade or other kinds of things. That working group is just kind of getting set up and hasn't met yet, so we don't know where it's going to go yet. So I don't want to prejudge its outcomes. But it is a very exciting area of collaboration for us and for the Indians for obvious reasons. India is a net security provider, especially in the Indian Ocean region. But I think its interests are increasingly being directed towards East Asia. And so the more that we can work together so that we're building up our joint capabilities, we don't like to use the word interoperability with the Indians, but our ability to operate together in crisis situations such as the 2004 tsunami when we worked well together on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, that's really going to be very much for the benefit of the whole region. Amy, that was great information. Thank you so much. Peter, I'm going to be unfair and give you 30 seconds to wrap it up. It's always good to have the last word. You have the last word, exactly. I'm so thankful that you took the aircraft carrier question because we don't build them. No, so just two remarks. I mean, basically everything has been said on the point of competition. Again, let me stress, no, there is no competition as the others have said. If you boil down ASEAN's need to discuss with the U.S. and the European Union, I mean, it's all about the economy. It's about security and it's about institution building. And you can see the complementarity if you don't look at the EU and you look at the U.S. So again, this underlines the, I think, the need for a pivot of ASEAN towards the EU. And I hope that in time leads to a request to the European Union to join the EAS. Finally, on the point of the government industry, just let me point out that the Netherlands government, particularly our Minister for Development Corporation, this is one of our focus areas. Most of our activities and money go to Bangladesh and to Pakistan. But since we are on the verge of increasing our engagement also with Myanmar, that is a country that we're also specifically looking at also working more with the government industry and with the producers in those countries. Thank you. Well, on behalf of Ernie Bauer, who directs our Southeast Asia program and couldn't be with us today, I thank you for joining us. There's two things, precious things that people can give us, their time and their insights. And our panelists were very generous in both of those gifts and we thank them. And I'm changing the title of this panel to Developing a Complimentary Transatlantic Strategy with Asia. So please join me in thanking our panelists for a terrific discussion.