 Chapter 3, Part 2 of Principia Ethica, this LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by Fredrik Carlson, Principia Ethicae by G.E. Moore. 43. But now let us return to consider another of Mill's arguments for his position that happiness is the sole end of human action. Mill admits, as I have said, that pleasure is not the only thing we actually desire. The desire of virtue, he says, is not as universal, but is as authentic a fact as the desire of happiness. And again, money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself. These admissions are, of course, in naked and glaring contradiction with this argument that pleasure is the only thing desirable, because it is the only thing desired. How then does Mill even attempt to avoid this contradiction? His chief argument seems to be that virtue, money, and other such objects, when they are thus desired in and for themselves, are desired only as a part of happiness. Now, what does this mean? Happiness, as we saw, has been defined by Mill as pleasure and the absence of pain. Does Mill mean to say that money, these actual coins which he admits to be desired in and for themselves, are a part either of pleasure or of the absence of pain? Will he maintain that those coins themselves are in my mind and actually a part of my pleasant feelings? If this is to be said, all words are useless. Nothing can possibly be distinguished from anything else. If these two things are not distinct, what on earth is? We shall hear next that this table is really and truly the same thing as this room, that a cab horse is in fact indistinguishable from St. Paul's Cathedral, that this book of mills which I hold in my hand, because it was his pleasure to produce it, is now and at this moment a part of the happiness which he felt many years ago and which has so long ceased to be. Pray consider a moment what this contemptible nonsense really means. Money, says Mill, is only desirable as a means to happiness. Perhaps so, but what then? Why, says Mill, money is undoubtedly desired for its own sake. Yes, go on, say we. Well, says Mill, if money is desired for its own sake it must be desirable as an end in itself. I have said so myself. Oh, say we, but you have also said just now that it was only desirable as a means. I own I did, says Mill, but I will try to patch up matters by saying that what is only a means to an end is the same thing as a part of that end. I dare say the public won't notice. And the public haven't noticed. Yet this is certainly what Mill has done. He has broken down the distinction between means and ends upon the precise observance of which his hedonism rests. And he has been compelled to do this because he failed to distinguish end in the sense of what is desirable from end in the sense of what is desired. A distinction which nevertheless both the present argument and his whole book presupposes. This is a consequence of the naturalistic fallacy. 44. Mill then has nothing better to say for himself than this. His two fundamental propositions are in his own words. That to think of an object as desirable unless for the sake of its consequences and to think of it as pleasant are one and the same thing. And that desire anything except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant is a physical and metaphysical impossibility. Both of these statements are we have seen merely supported by fallacies. The first seems to rest on the naturalistic fallacy. The second rests partly on this, partly on the fallacy of confusing ends and means. And partly on the fallacy of confusing a pleasant thought with a thought of a pleasure. His very language shows this. For that the idea of a thing is pleasant in his second clause is obviously meant to be the same fact which he denotes by thinking of it as pleasant in his first. Accordingly Mill's argument for the proposition that pleasure is so good and our refutation of those arguments may be summed up as follows. First of all he takes the desirable which he uses as a synonym for the good to mean what can be desired. The test again of what can be desired is according to him what actually is desired. If therefore he says we can find some one thing which is always and alone desired, that thing will necessarily be the only thing that is desirable, the only thing that is good as an end. In this argument the naturalistic fallacy is plainly involved. That fallacy I explained consists in the contention that good means nothing but some simple or complex notion that can be defined in terms of natural qualities. In Mill's case good is thus opposed to mean simply what is desired and what is desired is something which can thus be defined in natural terms. Mill tells us that we ought to desire something, an ethical proposition, because we actually do desire it. But if his contention that I ought to desire means nothing but I do desire were true, then he is only entitled to say we do desire so and so because we do desire it. And that is not an ethical proposition at all, it is a mere tautology. The whole object of Mill's book is to help us to discover what we ought to do. But in fact by attempting to define the meaning of this ought he has completely debarred himself from ever fulfilling that object. He has confined himself to telling us what we do do. Mill's first argument then is that because good means desired, therefore the desired is good. But having thus arrived at an ethical conclusion by denying that any ethical conclusion is possible, he still needs another argument to make his conclusion a basis for hedonism. He has to prove that we always do desire pleasure or freedom from pain and that we never desire anything else whatever. The second doctrine which Professor Sitchwick has called psychological hedonism I accordingly discussed. I pointed out how obviously untrue it is that we never desire anything but pleasure and how there is not a shadow of ground for saying even that whenever we desire anything we always desire pleasure as well as that thing. I attributed the obstinate belief in these untruths partly to a confusion between the cause of desire and the object of desire. It may I said be true that desire can never occur unless it be preceded by some actual pleasure. But even if this is true it obviously gives no ground for saying that the object of desire is always some future pleasure. By the object of desire it's meant that of which the idea causes desire in us it is some pleasure which we anticipate, some pleasure which we have not got which is the object of desire whenever we do desire pleasure and any actual pleasure which may be excited by the idea of this anticipated pleasure is obviously not the same pleasure as that anticipated pleasure of which only the idea is actual. This actual pleasure is not what we want, what we want is always something which we have not got and to say that pleasure always causes us to want is quite a different thing from saying that what we want is always pleasure. Finally we saw Mill admits all this. He insists that we do actually desire other things than pleasure and yet he says we do really desire nothing else. He tries to explain away this contradiction by confusing together two notions which he has before carefully distinguished the notions of means and of end. He now says that a means to an end is the same thing as part of that end. To this last fallacy special attention should be given as our ultimate decision with regard to hedonism will largely turn upon it. 45 It is this ultimate decision with regard to hedonism at which we must now try to arrive. So far I have been only occupied with refuting Mill's naturalistic arguments for hedonism but the doctrine that pleasure alone is desirable may still be true although Mill's fallacies cannot prove it so. This is the question which we now have to face. This proposition, pleasure alone is good or desirable, belongs undoubtedly to that class of propositions to which Mill at first rightly pretended it belonged, the class of first principles which are not amendable to direct proof. But in this case as he also rightly says consideration may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine. It is such considerations that Professor Sitchwick presents and such also that I shall try to present for the opposite view. This proposition that pleasure alone is good as an end, the fundamental proposition of ethical hedonism will then appear in Professor Sitchwick's language as an object of intuition. I shall try to show you why my intuition denies it just as his intuition affirms it. It may always be true notwithstanding neither intuition can prove whether it is true or not. I am bound to be satisfied if I can present considerations capable of determining the intellect to reject it. Now it may be said that this is a very unsatisfactory state of things. It is indeed, but it is important to make a distinction between two different reasons which may be given for calling it unsatisfactory. Is it unsatisfactory because our principle cannot be proved? Or is it unsatisfactory merely because we do not agree with one another about it? I am inclined to think that the latter is the chief reason. For the mere fact that in certain cases proof is impossible does not usually give us the least uneasiness. For instance, nobody can prove that there is a chair beside me. Yet I do not suppose that anyone is much dissatisfied for that reason. We all agree that it is a chair and that is enough to content us, although it is quite possible we may be wrong. A mad man, of course, might come in and say that it is not a chair but an elephant. We could not prove that he was wrong and the fact that he did not agree with us might then begin to make us uneasy. Much more, then, shall we be uneasy if someone whom we do not think to be mad disagrees with us. We shall try to argue with him and we shall probably be content if we lead him to agree with us, although we shall not have proved our point. We can only persuade him by showing him that our view is consistent with something else which holds to be true, whereas his original view is contradictory to it. But it will be impossible to prove that that something else, which we both agree to be true, is really so. We shall be satisfied to have settled the matter in dispute by means of it, merely because we are agreed on it. In short, our dissatisfaction in these cases is almost always of the type felt by the poor lunatic in the story. I said the world was mad, says he, and the world said I was mad and, confounded, they outvoted me. It is, I say, almost always such a disagreement and not the impossibility of proof which makes us call the state of things unsatisfactory. For indeed, who can prove that proof itself is a warrant of truth? We are all agreed that the laws of logic are true and therefore we accept a result which is proved by their means. But such a proof is satisfactory to us only because we are also fully agreed that it is a warrant of truth. And yet we cannot, by the nature of the case, prove that we are right in being so agreed. Accordingly, I do not think we need be much distressed by our admission that we cannot prove whether pleasure alone is good or not. We may be able to arrive at an agreement notwithstanding, and if so, I think it will be satisfactory. And yet I am not very sanguine about our prospects of such satisfaction. Ethics and philosophy in general have always been in a peculiarly unsatisfactory state. There has been no agreement about them as there is about the existence of chairs and lights and benches. I should therefore be a fool if I hope to settle one great point of controversy now and once for all. It is extremely improbable, I shall convince. It would be highly presumptuous even to hope that in the end, say, two or three centuries hence, it will be agreed that pleasure is not the sole good. Philosophical questions are so difficult, the problems they arise are so complex that no one can fairly expect now any more than in the past to win more than a very limited ascent. And yet I confess that the considerations which I am about to present appear to me to be absolutely convincing. I do think that they ought to convince, if only I can put them well. In any case, I can but try. I shall try now to put an end to that unsatisfactory state of things of which I have been speaking. I shall try to produce an agreement that the fundamental principle of hedonism is very like an absurdity by shooing what it must mean if it is clearly thought out and how that clear meaning is in conflict with other beliefs which will, I hope, not be so easily given up. 46. Well then, we now proceed to discuss intuitionistic hedonism. And the beginning of this discussion marks, it is to be observed, a turning point in my ethical method. The point I have been laboring his hair to, the point that good is indefinable and that to deny this involves a fallacy, is a point capable of strict proof, for to deny it involves contradictions. But now we are coming to the question for the sake of answering which ethics exists, the question what things or qualities are good. Of any answer to this question, no direct proof is possible and that, just because of our former answer as to the meaning of good, direct proof was possible. We are now confined to the hope of what Mills calls indirect proof, the hope of determining one another's intellect. And we are now so confined just because in the matter of the former question we are not so confined. Here, then, is an intuition to be submitted to our verdict. The intuition that pleasure alone is good as an end, good in and for itself. 47. Well, in this connection, it seems first desirable to touch on another doctrine on Mills, another doctrine which, in the interest of hedonism, Professor Sitchwick has done very wisely to reject. This is the doctrine of difference of quality in pleasures. If I am asked, says Mills, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasure, what makes one pleasure more valuable than another merely as a pleasure, except it's being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both have a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it in comparison a small amount. Now it is well known that Bentham rested his case for hedonism on quantity of pleasure alone. It was his maxim that quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry. And Mills apparently considers Bentham to have proved that nevertheless poetry is better than pushpin, that poetry does produce a greater quantity of pleasure. But yet, says Mills, the utilitarians might have taken the other and as it may be called, higher ground with entire consistency. Now we see from this that Mills acknowledges quality of pleasure to be another or different ground for estimating pleasures than Bentham's quantity. And moreover, by that question begging higher, which afterwards translates into superior, he seems to betray an uncomfortable feeling that after all if you take quantity of pleasure for your only standard something may be wrong and you may be deserved to be called a pig and it may presently appear that you very likely would deserve this name. But meanwhile I only wish to shoe that Mills' admissions as to the quality of pleasure are either inconsistent with the hedonism or else afford no other ground for it than would be given by mere quantity of pleasure. It will be seen that Mills' test for one's pleasure superiority and quality over another is the preference of most people who have experienced both. A pleasure so preferred, he holds, is more desirable. But then, as we have seen, he holds that to think of an object as desirable and to think of it as pleasant are one and the same thing. He holds therefore that the preference of experts merely proves that one pleasure is pleasanter than another. But if that is so, how can he distinguish this standard from the standard of quantity of pleasure? Can one pleasure be pleasanter than another, except in the sense that it gives more pleasure? Pleasant must, if words are to have any meaning at all, denote some one quality common to all things that are pleasant. And if so, then one thing can only be more pleasant than another, according as it has more or less of this one quality. But then, let us try the other alternative and suppose that Mills does not seriously mean that this pleasure of experts merely proves one pleasure to be pleasanter than another. Well, in this case, what does preferred mean? It cannot mean more desired since, as we know, the degree of desire is always according to Mills in exact proportion to the degree of pleasantness. But in that case, the basis of Mills' hedonism collapses, for he is admitting that one thing may be preferred over another and thus proved more desirable although it is not more desired. In this case, Mills' judgment of preference is just a judgment of that intuitional kind which I have been contending to be necessary to establish the hedonistic or any other principle. It is a direct judgment that one thing is more desirable or better than another, a judgment utterly independent of all considerations as to whether one thing is more desired or pleasanter than another. This is to admit that good is good and indefinable. 48. And note another point that is brought out by this discussion. Mills' judgment of preference so far from establishing the principle that pleasure alone is good is obviously inconsistent with it. He admits that experts can judge whether one pleasure is more desirable than another because pleasures differ in quality. But what does this mean? If one pleasure can differ from another in quality, that means that a pleasure is something complex, something composed. In fact, a pleasure in addition to that which produces pleasure. For instance, Mills speaks of sensual indulgences as lower pleasures. But what is a sensual indulgence? It is surely a certain excitement of some sense together with the pleasure caused by such excitement. Mills, therefore, in admitting that a sensual indulgence can be directly judged to be lower than another pleasure in which the degree of pleasure involved may be the same, is admitting that other things may be good or bad quite independently of the pleasure which accompanists them. A pleasure is, in fact, merely a misleading turn which conceals the fact that what we are dealing with is not pleasure but something else which may indeed necessarily produce pleasure but is nevertheless quite distinct from it. Mills, therefore, in thinking that to estimate quality of pleasure is quite consistent with his hedonistic principle that pleasure and absence of pain alone are desirable as ends has again committed the fallacy of confusing ends and means. For take even the most favorable supposition of its meaning, let us suppose that by a pleasure he does not mean, as his words imply, that which produces pleasure and the pleasure produced. Let us suppose him to mean that there are various kinds of pleasure in the sense in which there are various kinds of color, blue, red, green, etc. Even in this case, if we are to say that our end is color alone, then although it is impossible we should have color without having some particular color, yet the particular color we must have is only a means to our having color if color is really our end. And if color is our only possible end, as Mills says pleasure is, then there can be no possible reason for preferring one color to another, red, for instance, to blue, except that the one is more of a color than the other. Yet the opposite of this is what Mills is attempting to hold with regard to pleasures. Accordingly, a consideration of Mills' view that some pleasures are superior to others in quality brings out one point which may help to determine the intellect. With regard to the intuition, pleasure is the only good. For it brings out the fact that if you say pleasure, you must mean pleasure. You must mean some one thing common to all different pleasures, some one thing which may exist in different degrees but which cannot differ in kind. I have pointed out that if you say, as Mills does, that quality of pleasure is to be taken into account, then you are no longer holding that pleasure alone is good as an end, since you imply that something else, something which is not present in all pleasure, is also good as an end. The illustration I have given from Collar expresses this point in its most acute form. It is plain that if you say, Collar alone is good as an end, then you can give no possible reason for preferring one color to another. Your only standard of good and bad will then be color, and since red and blue both conform equally to this, the only standard, you can have no other whereby to judge whether red is better than blue. It is true that you cannot have color unless you also have one or all of the particular colors. They, therefore, if color is the end, will all be good as means, but none of them can be better than another even as a means. Far less can any one of them be regarded as an end in itself. Just so with pleasure. If we do really mean pleasure alone is good as an end, we must agree with Bentham that quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin, is as good as poetry. To have thus dismissed Mills' reference to quality of pleasure is therefore to have made one step in the desired direction. The reader will now no longer be prevented from agreeing with me by any idea that the hedonistic principle, pleasure alone is good as an end, is consistent with the view that one pleasure may be of a better quality than another. These two views, we have seen, are contradictory to one another. We must choose between them, and if we choose the latter, then we must give up the principle of hedonism. 49. But as I said, Professor Siegwick has seen that they are inconsistent. He has seen that he must choose between them. He has chosen. He rejected the test by quality of pleasure and has accepted the hedonistic principle. He still maintains that pleasure alone is good as an end. I propose therefore to discuss the considerations which he has offered in order to convince us. I shall hope that discussion to remove some more of such prejudices and misunderstandings as might prevent agreement with me. If I can shoe that some of the considerations which Professor Siegwick urges are such as we need by no means agree with and that others are actually rather in my favor, rather in his, we may have again advanced a few steps nearer to the anonymity which we desire. 50. The passages in the methods of ethics to which I shall now invite attention are to be found in Book 1, Chapter 9, Section 4 and in Book 3, Chapter 14, Section 4-5. The first of these two passages runs as follows. I think if we consider carefully such permanent results as are commonly judged to be good other than qualities of human beings, we can find nothing that, on reflection, appears to possess this quality of goodness out of relation to human existence or at least to some consciousness or feeling. For example, we commonly judge some inanimate objects, scenes, etc. to be good as possessing beauty and others bad from ugliness. Still no one would consider it rational to aim at the production of beauty in external nature apart from any possible contemplation of it by human beings. In fact, when beauty is maintained to be objective, it is not commonly meant that it exists as beauty out of relation to any mind whatsoever but only that there is some standard of beauty valid for all minds. It may, however, be said that beauty and other results commonly judge to be good though we do not conceive them to exist out of relation to human beings or at least minds of some kind, are yet so far separable as ends from the human beings on whom their existence depends that their realization may conceivably come into competition with the perfection or happiness of these beings. Thus, though beautiful things cannot be thought worth producing except as possible objects of contemplation, still a man may devote himself to their production without any consideration of the persons who are to contemplate them. Similarly, knowledge is a good which cannot exist except in minds and yet one may be more interested in the development of knowledge than in its possession by any particular minds and may take the former as an ultimate end without regarding the latter. Still, as soon as the alternatives are clearly apprehended it will, I think, be generally held that beauty, knowledge and other idyll goods as well as all external material things are only reasonably to be sought by men insofar as they conduce either one to happiness or two to the perfection or excellence of human existence. I say human, for though most utilitarians consider the pleasure and freedom from pain of the inferior animals to be included in the happiness which they take as the right and proper end of conduct, no one seems to contend that we ought to aim at perfecting brutes except as a means to our ends or at least as objects of scientific or aesthetic contemplation for us. Nor again can we include as a practical end the existence of beings above the human. We certainly apply the idea of good to the divine existence just as we do to his work and indeed in a preeminent manner and when it is said that we should do all things to the glory of God it may seem to be implied that the existence of God is made better by our glorifying him. Still, this inference, when explicitly drawn, appears somewhat empires and theologians generally recoil from it and refrain from using the notion of a possible addition to the goodness of the divine existence as a ground of human duty. Nor can the influence of our actions on other extrahuman intelligences beside the divine be at present made matter of scientific discussion. I shall therefore confidently lay down that if there be any good other than happiness to be sought by man as an ultimate practical end it can only be the goodness, perfection or excellence of human existence. How far this notion includes more than virtue? What its precise relation to pleasure is and to what method we shall be logically led if we accept it as fundamental are questions which we shall more conveniently discuss after the detailed examination of these two other notions pleasure and virtue in which we shall be engaged in the two following books. It will be observed that in this passage Professor Sitchwick tries to limit the range of objects among which the ultimate end may be found. He does not say what that end is but he does exclude from it everything but certain characters of human existence and the possible ends which he does exclude do not again come up for consideration. They are put out of court once and for all by this passage and by this passage alone. Now is this exclusion justified? I cannot think it is. No one, says Professor Sitchwick, would consider it rational to aim at the production of beauty and external nature apart from any possible contemplation of it by human beings. Well, I may say at once that I for one do consider this rational and let us see if I cannot get anyone to agree with me. Consider what this admission really means. It entitles us to put the following case. Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful as you can. Put into it whatever on this earth you most admire. Mountains, rivers, the sea, trees and sunsets, stars and moon. Imagine these all combined in the most exquisite proportions that no one thing jars against another but each contributes to the beauty of the whole. And then imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth containing everything that is most disgusting to us for whatever reason and the whole as far as may be without one redeeming feature. Such a pair of worlds we are entitled to compare. They fall within Professor Sitchwick's meaning and the comparison is highly relevant to it. The only thing we are not entitled to imagine is that any human being ever has or ever by any possibility can live in either, can ever see and enjoy the beauty of the one or hate the foulness of the other. Well, even so supposing them quite apart from any possible contemplation by human beings still is it irrational to hold that it is better that the beautiful world should exist than the one which is ugly. Would it not be well in any case to do what we could to produce it rather than the other? Certainly I cannot help thinking that it would and I hope that some may agree with me in this extreme instance. The instance is extreme. It is highly improbable not to say impossible we should ever have such a choice before us. In any actual choice we should have to consider the possible effects of our action upon conscious beings and among these possible effects there are always some I think which ought to be preferred to the existence of mere beauty. But this only means that in our present state in which but a very small portion of the good is attainable the pursuit of beauty for its own sake must always be postponed to the pursuit of some greater good which is equally attainable. But it is enough for my purpose if it be admitted that supposing no greater good were at all attainable then beauty must in itself be regarded as a greater good than ugliness. If it be admitted that in that case we should not be left without any reason for preferring one course of action to another we should not be left without any duty whatever but that it would then be our positive duty to make the world more beautiful so far as we were able since nothing better than beauty could then result from our efforts. If this be once admitted if in any imaginable case you do admit that the existence of a more beautiful thing is better in itself than that of one more ugly quite apart from its effect on any human feeling then Professor Situic's principle has broken down. Then we shall have to include in our ultimate end something beyond the limits of human existence. I admit of course that our beautiful world would be better still if there were human beings in it to contemplate and enjoy its beauty but that admission makes nothing against my point. If it be once admitted that the beautiful world in itself is better than the ugly then it follows that however many beings may enjoy it and however much better their enjoyment may be than it is itself yet its mere existence adds something to the goodness of the whole. It is not only a means to our end but also itself a part thereof. End of Chapter 3, Part 2 Chapter 3, Part 3 of Principia Ethica this Libra of Astrocording is in the public domain recording by Fredrik Karlsson. Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore. 51. In the second passage to which I referred above Professor Situic returns from the discussion of virtue and pleasure with which he has meanwhile been engaged to consider what among the parts of human existence to which as we saw he has limited the ultimate end can really be considered as such end. What I have just said, of course, appears to me to destroy the force of this part of his argument too. If, as I think, other things than any part of human existence can be ends in themselves then Professor Situic cannot claim to have discovered the Sumum Bonum when he has merely determined what parts of human existence are in themselves desirable. But this error may be admitted to be utterly insignificant in comparison with that which we are now about to discuss. It may be said, says Professor Situic, that we may regard cognition of truth, contemplation of beauty, free or virtuous action as in some measure preferable alternatives to pleasure or happiness, even though we admit that happiness must be included as a part of ultimate good. I think, however, that this view ought not to commend itself to the sober judgment of reflective persons. In order to show this, I must ask the reader to use the same twofold procedure that I before requested him to employ in considering the absolute and independent validity of common moral precepts. I appeal, firstly, to his intuitive judgment of the due consideration of the question when fairly placed before it, and secondly, to a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary judgments of mankind. As regards the first argument, to me at least, it seems clear after reflection that these objective relations of the conscious subject, when distinguished from the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them, are not ultimately and intrinsically desirable. Any more than material or other objects are when considered apart from any relation to conscious existence. Admitting that we have actual experience of such preferences have just been described of which the ultimate object is something that is not merely consciousness, it still seems to me that when, to use Butler's phrase, we sit down in a cool hour, we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness in one way or another to the happiness of sentient beings. The second arguments that refer to the common sense of mankind obviously cannot be made completely cogent. Since, as above stated, several cultivated persons do habitually judge that knowledge, art, etc., not to speak of virtue, or ends independently of the pleasure derived from them. But we may urge not only that all these elements of ideal good are productive of pleasure in various ways, but also that they seem to obtain the commendation of common sense, roughly speaking, in proportion to the degree of this productiveness. This seems obviously true of beauty, and will hardly be denied in respect of any kind of social ideal. It is paradoxical to maintain that any degree of freedom or any form of social order would still be commonly regarded as desirable even if we were certain that it had no tendency to promote the general happiness. The case of knowledge is rather more complex, but certainly common sense is most impressed with the value of knowledge when its fruitfulness has been demonstrated. It is, however, aware that experience has frequently shown how knowledge long fruitless may become unexpectedly fruitful, and how light may be shed on one part of the field of unknowledge from another apparently remote. And even if any particular branch of scientific pursuit could be shown to be devoid of even this indirect utility, it would still deserve some respect on utilitarian grounds. Both as furnishing to the inquirer the refined and innocent pleasures of curiosity and because the intellectual disposition which it exhibits and sustains is likely on the whole to produce fruitful knowledge. Still in cases approximating to this last, common sense is somewhat disposed to complain of the misdirection of valuable effort so that the mead of honor commonly paid to science seems to be graduated, though perhaps unconsciously by a terrible exact utilitarian scale. Certainly the moment the legitimacy of any branch of scientific inquiry is seriously disputed as in the recent case of the dissection, the controversy on both side is generally conducted on an avowedly utilitarian basis. The case of virtue requires special consideration, since the encouragement in each other of virtuous impulses and dispositions is a main aim of men's ordinary moral discourse so that even to raise the question whether this encouragement can go too far has a paradoxical air. Still, our experience includes rare and exceptional cases in which the concentration of effort on the cultivation of virtue has seemed to have effects adverse to general happiness through being intensified to the point of moral fanaticism and so involving a neglect of other conditions of happiness. If then we admit as actual or possible such in-philosophic effects of the cultivation of virtue, I think we shall also generally admit that in the case opposed, as opposed to general happiness, should be the criterion for deciding how far the cultivation of virtue should be carried. There we have Professor Sitchwick's argument completed. We ought not, he thinks, to aim at knowing the truth or at contemplating beauty except insofar as such knowledge or such contemplation contributes to increase the pleasure or to diminish the pain of sentient beings. Pleasure alone is good for its own sake. Knowledge of the truth is good only as a means to pleasure. 52. Let us consider what this means. What is pleasure? It is certainly something of which we may be conscious and which therefore may be distinguished from our consciousness of it. What I wish first to ask is this. Can it really be said that we value pleasure except insofar as we are conscious of it? Should we think that the attainment of pleasure of which we never were and never could be conscious was something to be aimed at for its own sake? It may be impossible that such pleasure should ever exist, that it should ever be thus divorced from consciousness. Although there is certainly much reason to believe that it is not only possible but very common, but even supposing that it were impossible that is quite irrelevant. Our question is, is pleasure as distinct from the consciousness of it that we set value on? Do we think the pleasure valuable in itself or must we insist that if we are to think the pleasure good we must have consciousness of it too? This consideration is very well put by Socrates in Plato's dialogue Philebus 21a. Would you accept Protarchus, Socrates, to live your whole life in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? Of course I would, says Protarchus. Socrates, then would you think you needed anything else besides if you possessed this one blessing in completeness? Protarchus, certainly not. Socrates, consider what you are saying. You would not need to be wise and intelligent and reasonable nor anything like this. Would you not even care to keep your sight? Protarchus, why should I? I suppose I should have all I want if I was pleased. Socrates, well then, supposing you lived so, you would enjoy always throughout your life the greatest pleasure? Protarchus, of course. Socrates, but on the other hand, in as much as you would not possess intelligence and memory and knowledge and true opinion, you would in the first place necessarily be without the knowledge whether you were pleased or not. For you would be devoid of any kind of wisdom, you admit this. Protarchus, I do. The consequence is absolutely necessary. Socrates, well then, besides this, not having memory, you must also be unable to remember even that you ever were pleased. Of the pleasure which falls upon you at the moment, not the least message must afterwards remain. And again, not having true opinion, you cannot think that you are pleased when you are. And being bereft of your reasoning faculties, you cannot even have the power to reckon that you will be pleased in future. You must live the life of an oyster over some other of those living creatures whose home is the seas and whose souls are concealed in shelly bodies. Is all this so, or can we think otherwise than this? Protarchus, how can we? Socrates, well then, can we think such a life desirable? Protarchus, Socrates, your reasoning has left me utterly dumb. Socrates, we see, pursuates Protarchus that hedonism is absurd. If you are really going to maintain that pleasure alone is good as an end, we must maintain that it is good, whether we are conscious of it or not. We must declare it reasonable to take as our idyll, an unattainable idyll it may be, that we should be as happy as possible, even on condition that we never know and never can know that we are happy. We must be willing to sell in exchange for the mere happiness every vestige of knowledge, both in ourselves and in others, both of happiness itself and of every other thing. Can we really still disagree? Can anyone still declare it obvious that this is reasonable, that pleasure alone is good as an end? The case it is plain is just like that of the colors, only as yet not nearly so strong. It is far more possible that we should someday be able to produce the intense pleasure without any consciousness that it is there than that we should be able to produce more color without its being any particular color. Pleasure and consciousness can be far more easily distinguished from one another than color from the particular colors. And yet even if this were not so, we should be bound to distinguish them if we really wish to declare pleasure alone to be our ultimate end. Even if consciousness were an inseparable accompaniment of pleasure, a sine qua non of its existence, yet if pleasure is the only end, we are bound to call consciousness a mere means to it in any intelligible sense that can be given to the word means. And if, on the other hand, as I hope is now plain, the pleasure would be comparatively valueless without consciousness, then we are bound to say that pleasure is not the only end, that some consciousness at least must be included with it as a veritable part of the end. For our question is now solely what the end is. It is quite another question how far that end may be attainable by itself, or must involve the simultaneous attainment of other things. It may well be that the practical conclusions at which utilitarians do arrive and even those at which they ought logically to arrive are not far from the truth. But insofar as the reason for holding these conclusions to be true that pleasure alone is good as an end, they are absolutely wrong and it is with reasons that we are chiefly concerned in any scientific ethics. 53. It seems then clear that hedonism is an error so far as it maintains that pleasure alone and not the consciousness of pleasure is the sole good. And this error seems largely due to the fallacy which I pointed out above in Miele, a theory of confusing means and end. It is falsely supposed that since pleasure must always be accompanied by consciousness which is itself extremely doubtful, therefore it is indifferent whether we say that pleasure or the consciousness of pleasure is the sole good. Practically of course it would be indifferent at which we aimed if it were certain that we could not get the one without the other but where the question is for the sake of what is it desirable to get that which we aim at? The distinction is by no means unimportant. Here we are placed before an exclusive alternative. Either pleasure by itself even though we can't get it would be all that is desirable or a consciousness of it would be more desirable still. Both of these propositions cannot be true and I think it is plain that the latter is true once it follows that pleasure is not the sole good. Still it may be said that even if consciousness of pleasure and not pleasure alone is the sole good this conclusion is not very damaging to hedonism. It may be said that hedonists have always meant by pleasure the consciousness of pleasure though they have not been at pains to say so and this I think is in the main true. To correct their formula in this respect could therefore only be a matter of practical importance if it is possible to produce pleasure without producing consciousness of it. But even this importance which I think our conclusion so far really has is I admit comparatively slight. What I wish to maintain is that even consciousness of pleasure is not the sole good. That indeed it is absurd so to regard it and the chief importance of what has been said so far lies in the fact that the same method which shows that consciousness of pleasure is more valuable than pleasure seems also to show that consciousness of pleasure is itself far less valuable than other things. The supposition that consciousness of pleasure is the sole good is due to a neglect of the same distinctions which have encouraged the careless assertion that pleasure is the sole good. The method which I employed in order to show that pleasure itself was not the sole good was that of considering what value we should attach to it if it existed in absolute isolation stripped of all its usual accompaniments. And this is, in fact, the only method that can be safely used when we wish to discover what degree of value a thing has in itself. The necessity of employing this method will be best established by a discussion of the arguments used by Professor Sitchwick in the passage last quoted in the exposure of the manner in which they are calculated to mislead. 54 With regard to the second of them it only maintains that other things which might be supposed to share with pleasure the attribute of goodness seem to obtain the commendation of common sense, roughly speaking in proportion to the degree of their productiveness of pleasure. Whether even this rough proportion holds between the commendation of common sense and the philosophic effects of that which it commends is a question extremely difficult to determine and we need not enter into it here. For even assuming it to be true and assuming the judgments of common sense to be on the whole correct, what would it show? It would show certainly that pleasure was a good criterion of right action that the same conduct which produced most pleasure would also produce most good on the whole. But this would by no means entitle us to the conclusion that the greatest pleasure constituted what was best on the whole. It would still leave open the alternative that the greatest quantity of pleasure was as a matter of fact under actual conditions generally accompanied by the greatest quantity of other goods and that it therefore was not the soul good. It might indeed seem to be a strange coincidence that these two things should always, even in this world be in proportion to one another. But the strangeness of this coincidence will certainly not entitle us to argue directly that it does not exist. That it is an illusion due to the fact that pleasure is really the soul good. The coincidence may be susceptible of other explanations and it would even be our duty to accept it unexplained if direct intuition seemed to declare that it was not the soul good. Moreover, it must be remembered that the need for assuming such a coincidence rests in any case upon the extremely doubtful proposition that philicific effects are roughly in proportion to the approval of common sense. And it should be observed that though Professor Sitchwick maintains this to be the case his detailed illustrations only tend to shoe the very different proposition that a thing is not held to be good unless it gives a balance of pleasure. Not that the degree of accommodation is in proportion to the quantity of pleasure. 55. The decision then must rest upon Professor Sitchwick's first argument. The appeal to our intuitive judgment of the due consideration of the question when fairly placed before it. And here it seems to me plain that Professor Sitchwick has failed in two essential respects to place the question fairly before either himself or his reader. 1. What he has to shoe is, as he says himself, not merely that happiness must be included as a part of ultimate good. This view, he says, ought not to commend itself to the sober judgment of reflective persons. And why? Because these objective relations when distinguished from the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them are not ultimately and intrinsically desirable. Now this reason which is offered as shoeing that to consider happiness as a mere part of ultimate good does not meet the facts of intuition is, on the contrary, only sufficient to shoe that it is a part of ultimate good. For from the fact that no value resides in any part of a whole considered by itself we cannot infer that all the value belonging to the whole does reside in the other part considered by itself. Even if we admit that there is much value in the enjoyment of beauty and none in the mere contemplation of it which is one of the constituents of that complex fact it does not follow that all the value belongs to the other constituents namely the pleasure which we take in contemplating it. It is quite possible that this constituent also has no value in itself that the value belongs to the whole state and to that only so that both the pleasure and the contemplation are mere parts of the good and both of them equally necessary parts. In short, Professor Sitchwick's argument here depends upon the neglect of that principle which I try to explain in my first chapter and which I said I should call the principle of organic relations. The argument is calculated to mislead because it supposes that if we see a whole state to be valuable and also see that one element of that state has no value by itself then the other element by itself must have all the value which belongs to the whole state. The fact is, on the contrary that since the whole may be organic the other element need have no value whatever and that even if it have some the value of the whole may be very much greater. For this reason as well as to avoid confusion between means and ends it is absolutely essential to consider each distinguishing quality in isolation in order to decide what value it possesses. Professor Sitchwick on the other hand applies this method of isolation only to one element in the whole he is considering. He does not ask the question if consciousness of pleasure existed absolutely by itself would a sober judgment be able to attribute much value to it. It is in fact always misleading to take a whole that is valuable or the reverse and then to ask simply to which of its constituents does this whole owe its value or its vileness. It may well be that it owes it to none and if one of them does appear to have some value in itself we shall be led into the grave error of supposing that all the value of the whole belongs to it alone. It seems to me that this error has commonly been committed with regard to pleasure. Pleasure does seem to be a necessary constituent of most valuable holds and since the other constituents into which we may analyze them may easily seem not to have any value it is natural to suppose that all the value belongs to pleasure that this natural supposition does not follow from the premises is certain and that it is on the contrary ridiculously far from the truth appears evident to my reflective judgment. If we apply either to pleasure or to consciousness of pleasure the only safe method that of isolation and ask ourselves could we accept as a very good thing that mere consciousness of pleasure and absolutely nothing else should exist even in the greatest quantities. I think that we have no doubt about answering, no. Far less can we accept this as the sole good even if we accept Professor Sitchwick's implication which yet appears to me extremely doubtful that consciousness of pleasure has a greater value by itself than contemplation of beauty it seems to me that a pleasurable contemplation of beauty is certainly an immeasurably greater value than mere consciousness of pleasure. In favor of this conclusion I can appeal with confidence to the sober judgment of reflective persons. 56. 2. That the value of a pleasurable whole does not belong solely to the pleasure which it contains may, I think, be made still plainer by consideration of another point in which Professor Sitchwick's argument is defective. Professor Sitchwick maintains as we saw the doubtful proposition that the conduciveness to pleasure of a thing is in rough proportion to its commendation by common sense. But he does not maintain what would be undoubtedly false that the pleasantness of every state is in proportion to the commendation of that state. In other words, it is only when you take into account the whole consequences of any state that he is able to maintain the coincidence of quantity of pleasure with the objects approved by common sense. If we consider each state by itself and ask what is the judgment of common sense as to its goodness as an end quite apart from its goodness as a means, there can be no doubt that common sense holds many much less pleasant states to be better than many far more pleasant. That it holds with mill that there are higher pleasures that are more valuable though less pleasant than those that are lower. Professor Sitchwick might of course maintain that in this common sense it's merely confusing means and ends. That what it holds to be better as an end is in reality only better as a means. But I think his argument is defective in that he does not seem to see sufficiently plainly that as far as intuitions of goodness as an end are concerned he is running grossly counter to common sense. That he does not emphasize sufficiently the distinction between immediate pleasantness and conduciveness to pleasure. In order to place fairly before us the question what is good as an end we must take states that are immediately pleasant and ask if the more pleasant are always also the better. And whether if some that are less pleasant appear to be so it is only because we think they are likely to increase the number of the more pleasant. That common sense would deny both of these suppositions and rightly so appears to me indubitable. It is commonly held that certain of what would be called the lowest form of sexual enjoyment for instance are positively bad although it is by no means clear that they are not the most pleasant states we ever experience. Common sense would certainly not think it as efficient justification for the pursuit of what Professor Siegwick calls the refined pleasures here and now that they are the best means to the future attainment of a heaven in which there would be no more refined pleasures. No contemplation of beauty no personal affections but in which the greatest possible pleasure would be obtained by a perpetual indulgence in bestiality. Yet Professor Siegwick would be bound to hold that if the greatest possible pleasure could be obtained in this way and if it were attainable such a state of things would be a heaven indeed and that all human endeavours should be devoted to its realization. I venture to think that this view is as false as it is paradoxical. 57 It seems to me then that if we place fairly before us the question is consciousness or pleasure the soul good the answer must be no and with this the last defense of hedonism has been broken down in order to put the question fairly we must isolate consciousness or pleasure we must ask suppose we were consciousness or pleasure only and of nothing else not even that we were consciousness would that state of things however great the quantity be very desirable no one I think can suppose it so on the other hand it seems quite plain that we do regard as very desirable many complicated states of minds in which the consciousness of pleasure is combined with consciousness of other things states which we call enjoyment of so and so if this is correct then it follows that consciousness or pleasure is not the soul good and that many other states in which it is included only as part are much better than it once we recognize the principle of organic unit is any objection to this conclusion founded on the supposed fact that the other elements of such states have no value in themselves must disappear and I do not know that I need say any more in reputation of hedonism 58 it only remains to say something of the two forms in which a hedonistic doctrine is commonly held egoism and utilitarianism egoism as a form of hedonism is the doctrine which holds that we ought each of us to pursue our own greatest happiness as our ultimate end the doctrine will of course admit that sometimes the best means to this end will be to give pleasure to others we shall for instance by so doing procure for ourselves the pleasure of sympathy of freedom from interference and of self-esteem and these pleasures which we may procure by sometimes aiming directly at the happiness of other persons may be greater than any we could otherwise get egoism in this sense must therefore be carefully distinguished from egoism in another sense the sense in which altruism is its proper opposite egoism as commonly opposed to altruism is apt to denote merely selfishness in this sense a man is an egoist if all his actions are actually directed towards gaining pleasure for himself whether he holds that he ought to act so because he will thereby obtain for himself the greatest possible happiness on the whole or not egoism may accordingly be used to denote the theory that we should always aim at getting pleasure for ourselves because that is the best means to the ultimate end whether the ultimate end would be our own greatest pleasure or not altruism on the other hand may denote the theory that we ought always to aim at other people's happiness on the ground that this is the best means of securing our own as well as theirs accordingly an egoist in the sense in which I am now going to talk of egoism an egoist who holds that his own greatest happiness is the ultimate end may at the same time be an altruist he may hold that he ought to love his neighbor as the best means to being happy himself and conversely an egoist in the other sense may at the same time be a utilitarian he may hold that he ought always to direct his efforts towards getting pleasure for himself on the ground that he is therefore most likely to increase the general sum of happiness end of chapter 3 Chapter 3 Part 4 of Principia Ethica this Librivox recording is in the public domain recording by Fredrik Karlsson Principia Ethica by G.E. Moore 59 I shall say more later about this second kind of egoism this anti-altruistic egoism this egoism as a doctrine of means what I am now concerned with is that utterly distinct kind of egoism which holds that each man ought rationally to hold my own greatest happiness is the only good thing there is my actions can only be good as means insofar as they help to win me this this is a doctrine which is not much held by writers nowadays it is a doctrine that was largely held by English hedonists in the 17th and 18th century it is for example at the bottom of Hobbes ethics but even the English school appears to have made one step forward in the present century there are most of them nowadays utilitarians they do recognize that if my own happiness is good it would be strange that other people's happiness should not be good too in order fully to expose the absurdity of this kind of egoism it is necessary to examine certain confusions upon which its plausibility depends the chief of these is the confusion involved in the conception of my own good as distinguished from the good of others this is a conception which we all use everyday it is one of the first to which the plain man is apt to appeal in discussing any question of ethics and egoism is commonly advocated chiefly because its meaning is not clearly perceived it is plain indeed that the name egoism more properly applies to the theory that my own good is the soul good than that my own pleasure is so a man may quite well be an egoist even if he be not a hedonist the conception which is perhaps most closely associated with egoism is that denoted by the words my own interest the egoist is the man who holds that a tendency to promote his own interest is the soul possible and sufficient justification of all his actions but this conception of my own interest plainly includes in general very much more than my own pleasure it is indeed only because and insofar as my own interest has been thought to consist solely in my own pleasure that egoists have been led to hold that my own pleasure is the soul good their course of reasoning is as follows the only thing I ought to secure is my own interest but my own interest consists in my greatest possible pleasure and therefore the only thing I ought to pursue is my own pleasure that it is very natural on reflection thus to identify my own pleasure with my own interest and that it has generally been done by modern moralists may be admitted but when professor Sitchwick points this out he should have also pointed out that this identification has by no means been made an ordinary thought when the plain man says my own interest he does not mean my own pleasure he does not commonly even include this he means my own advancement my own reputation the getting of a better income etc etc that professor Sitchwick should not have noticed this and that he should give the reason he gives for the fact that the ancient moralists did not identify my own interest with my own pleasure seems to be due to his having failed to notice that very confusion in the conception of my own good which I am now to point out that confusion has perhaps been more clearly perceived by Plato than by any other moralist and to point it out suffices to refute professor Sitchwick's own view that egoism is rational what then is meant by my own good in what sense can a thing be good for me it is obvious if we reflect that the only thing which can belong to me which can be mine is something which is good and not the fact that it is good when therefore I talk of anything I get as my own good I must mean either that the thing I get is good or that my possessing it is good in both cases it is only the thing or the possession of it which is mine and not the goodness of that thing or that possession there is no longer any meaning in attaching the my to our predicate and saying the possession of this by me is my good even if we interpret this by my possession of this is what I think good the same still holds for what I think is that my possession of it is good simply and if I think rightly then the truth is that my possession of it is good simply not in any sense my good and if I think wrongly it is not good at all in short when I talk of a thing as my own good all that I can mean is that something which will be exclusively mine as my own pleasure is mine whatever be the various senses in relation denoted by possession is also good absolutely or rather that my possession of it is good absolutely the good of it can in no possible sense be private or belong to me any more than a thing can exist privately or for one person only the only reason I can have for aiming at my own good is that it is good absolutely no call should belong to me good absolutely that I should have something which if I have it others cannot have but if it is good absolutely that I should have it then everyone else has as much reason for aiming at my having it as I have myself if therefore it is true of any single man's interest or happiness that it ought to be his whole and this can only mean that that man's interest or happiness is the soul good the universal good and the only thing that anybody ought to aim at what egoism holds therefore is that each man's happiness is the soul good that a number of different things are each of them the only good thing there is an absolute contradiction no more complete and no refutation of any theory could be desired yet professor sigwick holds that egoism is rational and it will be useful briefly to consider the reasons which he gives for this absurd conclusion the egoist he says may avoid the proof of utilitarianism by declining to a either implicitly or explicitly that his own greatest happiness is not merely the ultimate rational end for himself universal good and in the passage to which he here reverses as having there seen this he says it cannot be proved that the difference between his own happiness and another's happiness is not for him all important what does professor sigwick mean by these phrases the ultimate rational end for himself and for him all important he does not attempt to define them largely the use of such undefined phrases which causes absurdities to be committed in philosophy is there any sense in which a thing can be an ultimate rational end for one person and not for another by ultimate must be meant at least that the end is good in itself good in our undefinable sense and by rational at least that it is truly good that a thing should be an ultimate rational end means then that it is truly good in itself and that it is truly good in itself means that it is a part of universal good can we sign any meaning to that qualification for himself which will make it cease to be a part of universal good the thing is impossible for the egoist happiness must either be good in itself and so a part of universal good or else it cannot be good in itself at all there is no escaping this dilemma and if it is not good at all what reason can he have for aiming at it how can it be a rational end for him that qualification for himself has no meaning unless it implies not for others and if it implies not for others then it cannot be a rational end for him it cannot be truly good in itself the phrase an ultimate rational end for himself is a contradiction in terms by saying that a thing is an end for one particular person or good for him can only be meant one of four things either one it may be meant that the end in question is something which will belong exclusively to him but in that case it is to be rational for him to aim at it that he should exclusively possess it must be a part of universal good or two it may be meant that it is the only thing at which he ought to aim but this can only be because by so doing he will do the most he can towards realizing universal good and this in our case will only give egoism as a doctrine on means or three it may be meant that the thing is what he desires or thinks good and then if he thinks wrongly it is not a rational end at all and if he thinks rightly it is a part of universal good or for it may be meant that it is peculiarly appropriate that a thing which will belong exclusively to him should also by him be approved or aimed at but in this case it will belong to him and that he should aim at it must be parts of universal good by saying that a certain relation between two things is fitting or appropriate we can only mean that the existence of that relation is absolutely good in itself unless it be so as a means which gives case two by no possible meaning then that can be given to the phrase that his own happiness just escape the implication that his own happiness is absolutely good and by saying that it is the ultimate rational end he must mean that it is the only good thing the whole of universal good and if he further maintains that each man's happiness is the ultimate rational end for him we have the fundamental contradiction of egoism that an immense number of different things are each of them the soul good and it is easy to see that the same consideration apply to the phrase that the difference between his own happiness and another's is for him all important this can only mean either one that his own happiness is the only end which will effect him or two that the only important thing for him as a means is to look to his own happiness or three that it is only his own happiness which he cares about or for that it is good that each man's happiness should be the only concern of that man and none of these propositions true as they may be have the smallest tendency to show that if his own happiness is desirable at all it is not a part of universal good either his own happiness is a good thing or it is not and in whatever sense it may be all important for him it must be true that if it is not good his not justified in pursuing it and that if it is good everyone else has an equal reason to pursue it so far as they are able and so far as it does not exclude their attachment of other more valuable parts of universal good in short it is plain that the addition of for him for me as ultimate rational and good important can introduce nothing but confusion the only possible reason that can justify any action is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be realized and if anyone says that the attainment of his own happiness justifies his actions he must mean that this is the greatest possible amount of universal good which he can realize and this again can only be true either because he has no power to realize more in which case he only holds egoism as a doctrinal means or else because his own happiness is the greatest amount of universal good which can be realized at all in which case we have egoism proper and the flagrant contradiction that every person's happiness is singly the greatest amount of universal good which can be realized at all 61 it should be observed that since this is so the relation of rational egoism to rational benevolence which professor Sidgwick regards as the profoundest problem of ethics appears in quite a different light to that in which he presents it even if a man he says admits the self evidence of the principle of rational benevolence he may still hold that his own happiness is an end which it is rational form to sacrifice to any other and that therefore a harmony between the maximum prudence and the maximum rational benevolence must be somehow demonstrated if morality is to be made completely rational this latter view is that which I myself hold professor Sidgwick then goes on to show that the inseparable connection between utilitarian duty and the greatest happiness of the individual conforms to it cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated on empirical grounds and the final paragraph of his book tells us that since the reconciliation of duty and self interest is to be regarded as a hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental contradiction in one chief department of our thought it remains to ask how far this necessity constitutes a sufficient reason for accepting this hypothesis to assume the existence of such a being as God by the consensus of theologians is conceived to be would he has already argued ensure the required reconciliation since the divine sanctions of such a God would of course suffice to make it always everyone's interest to promote the universal happiness to the best of his knowledge now what is this reconciliation of duty and self interest which divine sanctions could ensure it would consist in the mere fact that the same conduct which produced the greatest possible happiness of the greatest number would always also produce the greatest possible happiness of the agent if this were the case and our empirical knowledge shows that it is not the case in this world that we would be completely rational we should avoid an ultimately and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is reasonable in conduct that is to say we should avoid the necessity of thinking that it is as manifest an obligation to secure our own greatest happiness maximum of prudence as to secure the greatest happiness on the whole maximum of benevolence but it is perfectly obvious we should not professor Sitchwick here commits the characteristic fallacy of empiricism the fallacy of thinking that an alteration in facts could make a contradiction cease to be a contradiction that a single man's happiness should be the soul good and that also everybody's happiness should be the soul good is a contradiction which cannot be sold by the assumption that the same conduct will secure both it would be equally contradictory however certain we were that that assumption was justified professor Sitchwick strains at a gnat and swallows a camel he thinks the divine omnipotence must be called into play to secure that what gives other people pleasure should also give it to him that only so can ethics be made rational while he overlooks the fact that even this exercise of divine omnipotence would leave an ethics a contradiction in comparison with which his difficulty is a trifle a contradiction which would reduce all ethics to mere nonsense and before which the divine omnipotence must be powerless to all eternity that each man's happiness should be the soul good which we have seen to be the principle of egoism is in itself a contradiction and that it should also be true that the happiness of all is the soul good which is the principle of universalistic hedonism would introduce another contradiction and that these propositions should all be true might be well be called the profoundest problem in ethics it would be a problem necessarily insoluble but they cannot all be true and there is no reason but confusion for the condition that they are professor sigwick confuses this contradiction with the mere fact in which there is no contradiction that our own greatest happiness and that of all do not seem always attainable by the same means this fact if happiness were the soul good would indeed be of some importance and on any view similar facts are of importance but there are nothing but instances of the one important fact that in this world the quantity of good which is attainable is ridiculously small compared to that which is imaginable that I cannot get the most possible pleasure for myself if I produce the most possible pleasure on the whole is no more the profoundest problem of ethics than that in any case I cannot get as much pleasure all together as would be desirable it only states that if we get as much good as possible in one place we may get as much pleasure on the whole because the quantity of attainable good is limited to say that I have to choose between my own good and that of all is a false antithesis the only rational question is how to choose between my own and that of others and the principle on which this must be answered is exactly the same as that on which I must choose whether to give pleasure to this other person it is plain then that the doctrine of egoism is self-contradictory and that one reason why this is not perceived is a confusion with regard to the meaning of the phrase my own good and it may be observed that this confusion and the neglect of this contradiction are necessarily involved in the transition from naturalistic hedonism as ordinarily held to utilitarianism Mill for instance as we saw declares each person so far as he believes it to be attainable desires his own happiness and he offers this as a reason why the general happiness is desirable we have seen that to regard it as such involves in the first place the naturalistic fallacy but moreover even if that fallacy were not a fallacy it could only be a reason for egoism and not for utilitarianism mill's argument is as follows a man desires his own happiness is desirable further a man desires nothing but his own happiness therefore his own happiness is alone desirable we have next to remember that everybody according to mill so desires his own happiness and then it will follow that everybody's happiness is alone desirable and this is simply a contradiction in terms just consider what it means each man's happiness is the only thing desirable several different things are each of them the only thing desirable this is the fundamental contradiction of egoism in order to think that what his arguments tend to prove is not egoism but utilitarianism mill must think that he can infer from the proposition each man's happiness is his own good the proposition the happiness of all is the good of all whereas in fact if we understand his own good means it is plain that the latter can only be inferred from the happiness of all is the good of each naturalistic hedonism then logically leads only to egoism of course a naturalist might hold that what we aim that was simply pleasure not our own pleasure and that always assuming the naturalistic fallacy would give an objectionable ground for utilitarianism but more commonly he will hold his own pleasure he desires or at least will confuse this with the other and then he must logically be led to adopt egoism and not utilitarianism 63 the second course I have to give why egoism should be thought reasonable is simply its confusion with that other kind of egoism egoism as a doctrine of means this second egoism has a right to say you ought to pursue your own happiness sometimes at all events it may even say always and when we find its saying this we are apt to forget its proviso but only as a means to something else the fact is we are in an imperfect state we cannot get the ideal all at once and hence it is often our bound and duty we often absolutely ought to do things which are good only or chiefly as means we have to do the best we can what is absolutely right but not what is absolutely good of this I shall say more hereafter I only mention it here because I think it is much more plausible to say that we ought to pursue our own pleasure as a means than as an end and that this doctrine through confusion lends some of its plausibility to the utterly distinct doctrine of egoism proper my own greatest pleasure is the only good thing 64 so much for egoism of utilitarianism not much need be said but two points may seem deserving a notice the first is that this name like that of egoism does not naturally suggest that all our actions ought to be judged according to the degree in which they are a means to pleasure its natural meaning is that the standard of right and wrong in conduct is its tendency to promote the interest of everybody and by interest is commonly meant a variety of different goods classed together only because they are what a man commonly desires for himself so far as his desires have not that psychological quality which is meant by moral the useful thus means and was an ancient ethics used to mean what is a means to the attainment of goods other than moral goods it is quite an unjustifiable assumption that these goods are only goods as means to pleasure or that they are commonly so regarded the chief reason for adopting the name utilitarianism was indeed merely to emphasize the fact that right and wrong conduct must be judged by its results as a means to the strictly intuitionistic view that certain ways of acting were right and others wrong whatever the results might be in thus insisting that what is right must mean what produces the best possible results utilitarianism is fully justified but with this correct contention there has been historically and very naturally associated a double error one the best possible results were assumed to consist only in a limited class of goods roughly coinciding with those which were popularly distinguished as the result of merely useful or interested actions and these again were hastily assumed to be good only as means to pleasure the utilitarians tend to regard everything as a mere means neglecting the fact that some things which are good as means are also good as ends for instance assuming pleasure to be a good there is also a tendency to value present pleasure only as a means to future pleasure and not as strictly necessary if pleasure is good as an end also to weigh it against possible future pleasures much utilitarian argument involves the logical absurdity that what is here and now never has any value in itself but is only to be judged by its consequences again of course when they are realized would have no value in themselves but would be mere means to still further future and so on and infinitum the second point to serving notice with regard to utilitarianism is that when the name is used for a form of hedonism it does not commonly even in its description of its end accurately distinguish between means and end it's best known formula is that the result by which actions are to be judged is the greatest happiness for the greatest number but it is plain that if pleasure is so good provided the quantity be equally great an equally desirable result will have been obtained whether it be enjoyed by many or by few or even if it be enjoyed by nobody it is plain that if we ought to aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest number this can only on the hedonistic principle be because the existence of pleasure in a great number of persons seems to be the best means available for attaining the existence of the greatest quantity of pleasure this may actually be the case but it is fair to suspect that utilitarians have been influenced in their adoption of the hedonistic principle by this failure to distinguish between pleasure or conscious of pleasure and its possession by a person it is far easier to regard the possession of pleasure by a number of persons as the soul good than so to regard the mere existence of an equally great quantity of pleasure if indeed we were to take the utilitarian principle strictly and to assume then to mean that the possession of pleasure by many persons was good in itself the principle is not hedonistic it includes as a necessary part of the ultimate end the existence of a number of persons and this will include very much more than mere pleasure utilitarianism however as commonly held must be understood to maintain that either mere consciousness of pleasure or consciousness of pleasure together with a minimum adjunct which may be meant by the existence of such consciousness in at least one person is the soul good this is its significance as an ethical doctrine and as such it has already been refuted in my refutation of hedonism the most that can be said for it is that it does not seriously mislead in its practical conclusions on the ground that as an empirical fact the method of acting which brings most good on the whole does also bring most pleasure utilitarians do indeed generally devote most of their arguments to showing that the course of action which will bring most pleasure is in general such as common sense would approve we have seen that professor Siegwick appeals to this fact as tending to shoe that pleasure is so good and we have also seen that it does not tend to shoe this we have seen how very flimsy the other arguments advanced for this proposition are and that if it be fairly considered by itself it appears to be quite ridiculous and moreover that the action which produce most good on the whole do also produce most pleasure is extremely doubtful the arguments tending to shoe it are all more or less vitiated by the assumption that what appear to be necessary conditions for the attainment of most pleasure in the near future will always continue so to be and even with this vicious assumption they only succeed in making out a highly problematical case how therefore this fact is to be explained if it be a fact need not concern us it is sufficient to have shoe that many complex states of mind are much more valuable than the pleasure they contain if this be so no form of hedonism can be true and since the practical guidance afforded by pleasure as a criterion is small in proportion as the calculation attempts to be accurate we can well afford to await further investigation before adopting a guide whose utility is very doubtful and whose trustworthiness we have grave reason to suspect 65 the most important points which I have endeavoured to establish in this chapter are as follows 1. must be strictly defined as the doctrine that pleasure is the only thing which is good in itself this view seems to owe its prevalence mainly to the naturalistic fallacy and mill's arguments may be taking as a type of those which are fallacious in this respect Siegwick alone has defended it without committing this fallacy and its final refutation must therefore point out the errors in his arguments 2. mill's utilitarianism is criticized it being shown A. that he commits the naturalistic fallacy in identifying desirable with desired B. that pleasure is not the only object of desire the common arguments for hedonism seems to rest on those two errors 3. hedonism is considered as an intuition and it is pointed out that mill's allowance that some pleasures are inferior in quality to others imply both that it is an intuition and that it is a false one B. that Siegwick fails to distinguish pleasure from consciousness of pleasure and that it is absurd to regard the former at all events as the sole good C. that it seems equally absurd to regard consciousness of pleasure as the sole good since there were so a world in which nothing else existed might be absolutely perfect Siegwick fails to put to himself this question which is the only clear and decisive one 4. what are commonly considered to be the two main types of hedonism namely egoism and utilitarianism are not only different from but strictly contradictory of one another since the former asserts that my own greatest pleasure is the sole good the latter the greatest pleasure of all is the sole good egoism seems to owe its possibility partly to the failure to observe this contradiction a failure which is exemplified by Siegwick partly to a confusion of egoism as a doctrine of end with the same as a doctrine of means if hedonism is true egoism cannot be so still less can it be so if hedonism is false the end of utilitarianism on the other hand would if hedonism were true be not indeed the best conceivable but the best possible for us to promote but it is refuted by the refutation of hedonism End of Chapter 3