 Anyway, Akinori, it's your turn. Thank you. Two previous speakers discussed development finance, but I think I'm going to speak about world economy, a main thrust of your paper. Let me begin with the U.S. economy. I hope you remember that I was optimistic about prospect for U.S. economic slowdown a year ago. I continue to be optimistic. And the U.S. economy is now at a full employment. On top of this, the fiscal policy stimulus that has been incorporated in the Inflation Reduction Act, strange name, and CHIPS Act is materializing in terms of expansion and business investment in the U.S. The stimulative tax effect will continue in 2024 and beyond. 2024 is, of course, a presidential election year under the Split Congress. So there will be no new fiscal initiatives, but there continues to be stimulative effects of the past legislation. In light of both the employment at present and fiscal stimulus in the pipeline, I think the Federal Reserve will be cautious about monetary easing. They may begin to lower the federal fund rate target in 2024, of course, but perhaps only to the extent consistent with increases in the unemployment rate. In other words, no preemptive easing, but cautious easing or measured pace easing is likely. As long as fiscal policy is expansionary and monetary policy cautious, that means high IS curve, investment savings curve, and high liquidity curve, LM curve, in terms of Mandel-Flaming's framework, economic growth will continue with relatively high real interest rates and the strong U.S. dollar on exchange markets. Stock prices will fluctuate perhaps within a range where monetary tightness, relative tightness puts a lid on price-earning ratio and economic growth supports return on equity. Let me segue through the Chinese economy. We all know that the Chinese economy is under a few structural adjustment pressures, for example, burst of property bubbles and debt overhang, communist policy of tightening grips with business, actually more widely over civil society in general, which is stifling entrepreneurship in China, and lastly, an unfavorable demography. At the same time, China's economic slowdown has been accentuated by the so-called silicon cycle, which goes up with IT-related production in the global market for two years and goes down for two years on average. 2023 was a declining period and now the cycle seems to be hitting the bottom. We heard the same story in previous sessions by semiconductor experts, actually. Just like Japan experienced cyclical ups and downs during the first decade after the burst of property and stock bubbles, the Chinese economy will also show cyclical ups and downs even when structural adjustment pressures put a damper on its trend growth. In 2024, the silicon cycle will turn favorable for China's economic growth from a cyclical viewpoint. It is also the case for Korea and other Asian economies as well as Germany, all of which manufacturing is a key industry, therefore sensitive to the silicon cycle. With respect to finance, I have a lot to say, but perhaps I would come back if you are interested in the following session. And also, many people are interested in the similarity and differences between Chinese burst of the bubble now and the burst of the bubble in Japan in the 1990s. But I defer the discussion also at a later stage. Open up for a lot of questions to you, if I understand. If you are interested. Thank you very much. Can I add to all what you say, which is absolutely true, that the U.S. apparent prosperity is really based also on a bigger account deficit. And the difference between Europe and the U.S. is based partially, it seems to me, on the overall, you said that, of course, policy mix, which is much more expensive in the U.S. than in Europe, also including the fact that the depressive effect of the war in Ukraine is hitting the European significantly. But the open under the circumstances are more or less speaking under the control of the IMF persons, but more or less balanced or with a slight surplus when the U.S. is still permanently in deficit. But there is also for possible questions the demographic issue in the long run of China, which looks a little bit like the Japanese, but much worse when I look at the figure. I think it's absolutely terrifying because you didn't have a period where there was a one child per household in Japan. But the price to be paid for this policy in China looks very big. But thank you very much for your concise speech, if I may, and for reserving the case for responding to questions.