 The title of Miehal Martin's address is Tackling the Crisis, Ireland, Brexit, and the future of the European Union. And I think it's a very apt title. We most certainly are in a crisis. And it's a crisis that not only applies here, not only applies in Northern Ireland, but I think applies very definitely to the European Union. And there is a danger in my view that the Brexit will actually trigger or could actually trigger factors within the Union which might lead to a breakup or lead at the end of the day to a much smaller Union than the one that we currently have. So these talks from the party leaders are very important. They're very important for the future of this country, for the future of this island, and for the future of the European Union. And it's a great pleasure for me to welcome Miehal Martin, the leader of Ena Fáil. APPLAUSE I'm very happy to be here today. I'm very happy to be here today. The Institute has often created a very new and well-known approach to this. No one can doubt that we are experiencing a decisive moment in modern history. At the tail end of the deepest economic shock since the end of the Second World War, many of the core social and political foundations of nation-states and the international community are on the strain. You don't need to be a historian to see dark parallels between recent developments and some of the most catastrophic decades of the last century. It will soon be six months since a slim majority in the United Kingdom voted to leave an organisation founded on the core principle of European nations working together to deliver peace and prosperity. Now, this was not a generous and optimistic vote. It was not a vote founded on inspiring people with a positive vision. It emerged from an ugly, negative, and, as admitted in a spate of recent books, dishonest campaign. And it was also destructive, pulling down an edifice with no credible plans on what to do next. The leave vote was an explicit step backwards towards a time of greater competition and a narrow, exclusive definition of national sovereignty. It took a country once committed to the cause of building multilateral obligations down a unilateralist road. I believe it will be seen as one of the most self-damaging referendum results ever produced in a democracy. Damaging to Britain, damaging to its neighbours, damaging to the cause of free societies. In spite of the shambles of the British government's policy since June the 1st, I have no doubt of since June that the Brexit means that the United Kingdom will cease to be a member of the European Union. Within this, the UK will exit on terms which are damaging to trade, limit freedom of movement, and it will involve ongoing volatility. We can be certain that there will continue to be uncertainty and that this will not do anybody any good. The threat to this island is profound and our ability to respond is at present highly limited. There is consensus on the fact that Brexit will be economically damaging, socially divisive, and politically challenging. Mr. Barnier yesterday suggested a timescale of 18 months to reach an agreement in order for ratification within the treaty defined limit. This is a reasonable assessment and it confirms once again that we've absolutely no time to lose. But we must first avoid the trap of seeing the response to Brexit as an issue to be dealt with on its own. This completely misses the wider context for the vote and the challenges which we have to meet. All too often we and other countries take a narrow approach in the face of major issues. We seek ways of addressing specific concerns but miss the wider context. At this moment of time, we simply have to accept that this is not business as usual. We need a new scale, urgency, and ambition to our work if we are to achieve the core objectives of securing prosperity, peace, and even democracy itself. It would not be right to talk at length about managing Brexit but to ignore everything else that is going on. I want to address what I see as the four major challenges facing us at the moment. And these are limiting the impact of Brexit on this state, limiting the impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland, securing the future of the European Union, and defeating destructive populism. It is important to start with some basic principles. I am, my party, are absolutely clear on where we stand. We believe that rule-bound, independently enforceable cooperation between nation-states is the only means of securing high-living standards, peaceful relations, and the ability to respond to the many challenges of globalization. No other approach has ever come close in the scale of progress delivered for all sections of society. For us, the European Union has lost none of the urgency which propelled its founders to sign the Treaty of Rome 57 years ago. It is a slow-moving and imperfect entity, but its achievements are profound. A Europe of competing nation-states offers us nothing but a return to a cycle of destructive competition. For smaller nations, it would be devastating because we oppose a race to the bottom and because we want the place at the table to influence our opportunities and international affairs, we are absolutely committed to continued full, active, and constructive membership of the European Union. We believe that the worst periods of destruction in modern history have been defined by weak international organizations and the belief in projecting strength rather than seeking cooperation. We also believe that trade is an essential part of delivering high standards of living. In Ireland, a turn away from supporting access to overseas markets would set us back nearly 60 years. I believe that a strong and secure majority of Irish people believe that Ireland must remain a committed and positive member of the European Union. However, this relationship is likely to change significantly, both because of the impact of Brexit and the wider need for reform of the Union. The recent fiscal and economic statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer confirmed the near-uniform view that Brexit will damage the United Kingdom's economy. Longer-term projections using a range of scenarios from a softish Brexit to a WTO Brexit show a permanent average loss of 1.8% to 3.2% of national income before incorporating the results of negotiations and the payment of a divorce settlement. Chancellor Hammond has predicted a major negative fiscal impact over the next five years. The ESRI has taken UK projections and completed a substantial work in modeling the impact on the 26-county economy. The results are depressingly similar, in fact, slightly worse on average. A hard Brexit would, they believe, cut nearly 4% from national income, 3.6% from wages, and employment levels would fall by 2% if no significant intervention is made. Work published on Monday did suggest that mitigation could come from companies relocating here, though this benefit is highly speculative while the damage is, at least in part, already underway. We face a profound choice. Do we stand by and let the slow-motion car crash hit us, or do we act? I believe that this is a moment comparable to LeMasse's decision to open our economy to the world. He saw the threat of continued underperformance and accepted that a major departure was required. I believe we have to do everything possible to protect economic integration on this island. We have to seek special status for trade within this island and then develop a range of bilateral measures to protect the ability of people here to live, work, and have full entitlements wherever they choose. We also have to have a new clarity about what structure we are aiming for in our economy and how we will seek to deliver the level and quality of employment we need. As a continuing member of the European Union, Ireland has a right to expect a substantial demonstration of solidarity from the other post-Brexit members. We are faced with a profound threat because of the actions of another state on which we had no influence. We are showing solidarity with the European Union and it must show us the same. In addition, and far more practically, the EU cannot afford to let members suffer for remaining true to the Union. This means, first of all, a willingness to find ways of reflecting the special needs of this island in the final Brexit agreement. The repeated comments of Mr. Barnier that he sees the impact of the border as a priority in the negotiations is a welcome first step. Turning this general commitment into specific action requires us to be to the fore in making proposals. In order for us to have any credible impact on the outcome, we have to step up the time and resources we invest in our diplomatic activity. We do not have enough diplomats in place to ensure that every government is fully up to date in what Ireland is seeking and to lobby for their support. Equally, the relevant Brexit coordination structures within government do not have enough full-time personnel for the scale of what is involved. Nothing is more important to our long-term future at this moment and Brexit needs emergency levels of staffing and resources. What has not yet been put on the table is the fact that whatever deal is agreed, there are certain negative impacts of Brexit which will be unavoidable. Many businesses and communities are already suffering from the dramatic fall in Stirling's value and the likely long-term volatility of the exchange rate undermines their current business model. We have to be able to help them to mitigate the immediate impact and we have to be able to help them to diversify their markets. State aid rules, as they have traditionally been applied, serve an important purpose in underpinning the competition between member states. However, I don't see how we can properly help those most impacted by Brexit within these rules. I believe the European Union should accept the principle that it must lead in mitigating the impact of Brexit on member states. As part of this, it should allow direct aid, particularly to help companies through a period of transformation and to diversify their products and markets. On a more national level, Brexit makes the case for being much more aggressive in pursuing the knowledge economy policies which have worked so well in the last decade and a half. Investment in research and innovation has directly led to the creation of high-value, secure employment in sectors which remain vibrant during the recession. Progress in decommoditizing or trade has been swift and must now go much further. What was a very successful focus for research support has become too directive and the loss of research talent from our universities must be reversed or permanent damage will be done. If there's one thing we should have learned from the failures of the past and the sustained success of previous research policy, it is that if we enable our best people, they will exceed all expectations. We need to get back to that spirit. And we also need to diversify through growing the importance and export focus of small and medium-sized enterprise. If we want to keep pace with innovation and the natural cycles of success and decline which impact on businesses and industries, then a more dynamic and innovative SME sector is not an option. It is an urgent necessity. In terms of our East-West relations, we have to find new ways of maintaining them. There has been an undeniable drift and equality of these relations in the last six years. In some ways, the strand, three structures of the Good Friday Agreement have allowed a formal interaction replace what should be a more organic approach. It has been worrying to hear that the arguments concerning the architecture of the agreement advanced by the British government in the High Court in Belfast are now in the Supreme Court in London. The emphasis has been on dismissing the relevance of European Union-related provisions and an insistence on the right of the UK government to act unilaterally. This week, the Supreme Court has been told that the British government believes it has the prerogative to unilaterally withdraw from international treaties, even where commitment to those treaties is enshrined in statutory law. The implications of this doctrine for solemn agreements with this country are serious. When we signed the British Irish Agreement, we removed any capacity, far the government are indeed a raucous to act unilaterally. We changed our constitution and gave joint institutions power in our jurisdiction. As I will mention, there are many other areas of concern relating to Northern Ireland, but at a basic level, we need explicit assurance from the government of the United Kingdom that this fundamental agreement rests on more than ministerial indulgence. On a cultural level, the seamlessness of movement back and forth across the Irish Sea has benefited us both and must be maintained once the protection of European Union law is removed. The building of respect and understanding between us was facilitated by the fact that our leaders met regularly at European Union meetings and worked often to a shared agenda. Until 2011, for decades, the new Prime Minister received a T-shirt as one of his or her first official visitors. Our relationship can't be taken for granted. We should review the working of the East-West relationship and consider a more systematic approach to contacts between Dublin and London post-Brexit. The decision of a clear majority in Northern Ireland to vote remain is not something which can be lightly dismissed. Unfortunately, there has been effectively no acknowledgement of this or of the Scottish Remain vote in statements from ministers in London. It's Downing Street's position that these votes have zero relevance to deciding core Brexit policy. Secretary of State David Davis made a lengthy statement to the House of Commons in September in which he made only one passing reference to Northern Ireland. Last month, another lengthy statement referenced Northern Ireland only so far as to reject the idea that Northern Ireland has any distinct rights to challenge our delay London's approach. While most senior government members have said that Northern Ireland is a priority, this has not been reflected in any specific policy statement or in the makeup of key committees. Yet Northern Ireland is the region which is most exposed to post-Brexit impacts. Incredibly, there has been only one independent review of Brexit's potential impact on Northern Ireland. It is stark in its findings. There is currently no positive scenario for the economic impact of Brexit and many which are extremely negative. The closest to a neutral scenario is one where Northern Ireland has access to the customs union while also using regulatory freedom to squeeze costs of employment. There are, of course, also important implications of the Brexit process for the post-Good Friday situation. Funifoyle has two starting points in relation to Northern Ireland's position post-Brexit. First, the will of the people of Northern Ireland must be reflected in the final outcome. Imposing the full impact of hard Brexit on Northern Ireland is unacceptable. Second, Dublin must promote and support special status for Northern Ireland in whatever way possible, consistent with our remaining full and active members of the European Union. Last in the economic arguments is a simple fact about protecting the rights of citizenship. Following Brexit, Northern Ireland residents will retain their full right to European Union citizenship through their right to hold Irish citizenship either jointly or as a sole citizenship. This right to Irish citizenship is established by birth, family or ongoing residents. It is recognized in a binding international treaty between Ireland and the United Kingdom and it is reflected in European Union law. This will continue to those born well after Brexit takes effect. What this means is that post-2019, Northern Ireland will contain the largest concentration anywhere of EU citizens living outside of the boundaries of the European Union. It is an absolute obligation on the European Union to reflect this unique reality with a special status for Northern Ireland and it is also an absolute obligation on the United Kingdom to reflect this unique reality in seeking a special status for Northern Ireland. My party will never support proposals which reduce access for Northern Ireland residents to the basic rights of European Union citizenship. In the context of a vote in the Doyle or elsewhere, this is a fundamental position for us. And to be clear, we will also oppose any proposal to force people in Northern Ireland to choose between full Irish citizenship including EU citizenship and UK citizenship. This would mark an unacceptable move away from the core principle of coexistence and respect which has underpinned the incomplete but still dramatic progress of recent years. The not quite British passports issued to residents of Hong Kong in the past will not be replicated for Irish passports. There are certainly enormously complex hurdles to be overcome but Northern Ireland accounts for only 3% of the population and 2% of the GDP of the UK. A special status for Northern Ireland would not undermine the core negotiating objectives of either London or Brussels. It's also important for us to acknowledge that the position of the UK government does impact under solemn agreements which underpin institutions and relations within the island and with our neighbours. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's formal submission to the High Court and Belfast in the Agnew and Others case is disturbing in its tone and implications. It reveals an attitude to the role of the Northern Ireland Assembly which is a serious concern and confirms a number of potential absurdities post Brexit. The legal submission sought to effectively define and irrelevant EU-related provisions of the Northern Ireland Act and Good Friday Agreement. In a phrase which was found throughout the submission, it accepted that ongoing membership was, quote, assumed but insisted that this did not, quote, require membership. In the submission, and again this week in the Supreme Court, the Northern Ireland Office argued not just that legislative consent is not required but more particularly that the Northern Ireland Assembly has fewer rights in this regard than the Scottish or Welsh assemblies. The submission states at length that the devolution of certain legislative authority is a mere convention which can be ignored at will. Let no one be in any doubt, a principle of no obligatory consultation and no legislative consent is not consistent with the spirit or intent of the agreements. In a development which has not received enough attention, the Northern Ireland Office has acknowledged that European Union law will continue to have a role in Northern Ireland post Brexit. In the Agnews submission it stated, and I quote, it is accepted that the legislative and executive competence of the Assembly and ministers is limited by the requirement to act in compatibility with European Union law, unquote. It also accepts that the coordination relations with the EU is included in paragraph three, section three of strand two on the workings of the North-South Ministerial Council. Take these elements together and the legal situation according to the British government is that Northern Ireland will post-Brexit have institutions which assume but do not require membership of the European Union which are required to act in compatibility with EU law and are tasked with coordinating with Dublin on relations with the European Union. And so returning to the basic point about the United Kingdom's duties to honour agreements, these provisions cannot legitimately be changed without our consent and cross-party consent in Northern Ireland. It could of course take its new unilateral doctrine to the next level and say that it can change these provisions without agreement. What would this say about mutual respect and honouring the spirit of the peace process? If we link the points I've made concerning the continued EU citizenship of Northern Ireland residents, the Northern Ireland vote for remain, the legal status of the European Union in the peace settlement and the disproportionate impact of Brexit in Northern Ireland, something becomes very clear. The UK has an obligation to seek and the European Union is obliged to support a generous special status for Northern Ireland post-Brexit. The Irish government of course carries both obligations and for the most respect the vote of its citizens in the 1998 referendum by protecting the agreements which now form part of our constitution. As a final related point, the application of the European Convention on Human Rights in Northern Ireland cannot be unilaterally removed by London without abrogating existing agreements. The Convention predates the European Union and is a Council of Europe initiative which seeks to define the values of democracy and human rights in Europe. Quite apart from the fact that the UK is obliged to maintain the Convention's force in Northern Ireland, stepping away from the Convention would involve the UK taking a position it would share only with increasingly authoritarian governments. Addressing the impact of Brexit in Northern Ireland has not been helped by the continued partisan tactics of key political actors. Our most consistently anti-European Union party, Sinn Féin, is running around claiming to support it. It is even demanding the retention of an EU citizenship that it campaigned against. Unfortunately, the Assembly failed to take action to seek to vindicate the rights of the remain majority. Its response has yet again failed to match the scale of the threat posed to the people of Northern Ireland. Independent research has detailed a steady decline over the last nine years in the faith of the people of Northern Ireland in the commitment of politicians to focus on issues which matter for the community as a whole. Brexit is an opportunity for Northern institutions and parties to demonstrate that they can come together to tackle collective threats. Let us all hope that it does not become another missed opportunity. I've no doubt that the strong will of the Irish people is for us to remain a member of the European Union. Our future and the future of the Union are intertwined, and this reinforces the need for us to be more active in shaping the Union. Its achievements are sustained and unequaled, but today it faces existential threats. We cannot be neutral in this. We cannot sit back and wait for others to come forward with proposals, and we must not support a drift defined by limited discussions and a narrow agenda. The European Union can only have a long-term future if it continues to be a credible vehicle of hope for countries who want to secure high standards of living and the protection of basic democratic European values. There is a very real danger that this hope will be lost unless there is a further round of significant reform. The handling of the economic crisis showed an organization's slow to act and with insufficient ability to help regions and countries at critical moments. After all of the changes of policy and the implementation of the fiscal treaty, the Union has still not addressed the failings exposed in the period 2008 to 2012. It is a disconcerting fact that without the use by Mario Draghi of the three words, whatever it takes, key elements of the Union may have collapsed. A core part of the Euro crisis and its economic impact was the failure to create a genuine monetary Union. Even the architect of the policy, Jack DeLore, has admitted that there were serious flaws in the structure of the horizon. In spite of many changes, including a new treaty, these flaws have not been fully addressed. The banking Union is incomplete. Its main provisions cover only a small percentage of the banking market and excludes banks which have a regional systemic importance. As we saw in 2008, relatively small banks can set off a very wide crisis. The European Central Bank continues to work with one hand behind its back. It has been helpful only due to strong leadership and the willingness to go to the very edges of what can be legally justified under its mandate. It needs certainty that it can act at will, not just in terms of an inflation target, but also a wider economic mandate. I believe we need to revisit the overall architecture of European fiscal policy. As my party said when campaigning for the fiscal treaty, even though we were in opposition, it is only part of the solution. The exercise of control of fiscal policy is legitimate, but the absence of any positive fiscal stabilizers is a potentially fatal flaw. Put another way, there are controls to try and stop countries getting into trouble through spending and borrowing too much. However, there's almost nothing to help countries which get into trouble. Beyond anything else, the absence of funding to help countries get through crisis is a flaw unique to the euro in the history of monetary unions. In the United States, for example, most states have balanced budget requirements in their constitutions. When they get into trouble, the adjustments are severe, but they are mitigated by large-scale automated transfers from other states through federal entitlement programs. They tend not to acknowledge it, but this is an exercise in everyday solidarity which was to the core in that country's incredible development following the 1930s. In Germany, solidarity transfers between lander have been central to rising prosperity in previously lesser developed regions, such as Bavaria. The European Union can scold and it can exhort, but it cannot help significantly. It can launch grand-sounding initiatives on youth unemployment, but the economic impact of the funding is close to zero. Part of the negative impact of anti-EU rhetoric in the UK over the last 30 years is that it made discussions more risk averse and the budget became a zero sum game. At less than 1% of European income, the European Union's budget is marginal to shaping the economic future of Europe. The goal of making Europe a dynamic knowledge-intensive economy is absolutely right, but the programs for delivering this are too small to make a significant difference. It is also important to remember that when monetary union was proposed, a core principle was that states had to be helped in order to avoid the benefits getting concentrated in the powerful economies. Cohesion through investment was as important as control of spending. Every member state must be able to see a credible route forward, to develop and to protect progress on living standards. Unless we change policies, this core principle may be lost. I welcome the recent shift of the Commission on how it interprets fiscal rules and the end of the policy of promoting avoidable austerity by encouraging countries to run fiscal policies which damage the shared economy. Within the Eurozone, we should consider some increased form of permanent funding for the budget with the proceeds specifically directed at supporting innovation and helping countries and regions faced with immediate crises. The best form that this could take would be through some small but dedicated taxation instrument. This would break the incentive to constantly short-change budget negotiations. And the Union must also show that it understands its own limits. The attempts to radically expand existing commission competences in certain areas is worse than the distraction. It demonstrates a highly partial agenda. Tax harmonization, both direct proposals for this and attempts to use existing competition law to achieve it, has nothing to do with securing growth and prosperity within the Union. It is a highly partial agenda which is economically irrelevant to the real challenges facing the Union. No study has been produced showing that existing or potential proposals will raise the Union's growth level. But as recently as this week, it has been shown that this agenda poses a serious threat to some smaller economies, including Ireland. Equally, the commission's targeting of certain multinationals is both unfair and an enormous waste of time. There is no difference between current cases and the decade-long insistence by the commission on the now discredited claim that Microsoft had secured a permanent monopoly in the web browser sector. These cases regularly target non-European countries which are headquartered outside of larger member states and they involve both a rhetoric and policies which present Europe as a cold house for world-leading innovation. Long-term, this strategy will not be central to convincing the public that the commission is on its side but may do substantial damage to faith in its understanding of the modern economy and ability to deliver a more innovative and stronger Union. Fundamentally, the Union must return to the spirit of solidarity which defined its creation and growth. The current habit of promoting every negotiation as a fight and every decision as a victory over someone else has undermined the ability to maximize the effectiveness of a Union with a constrained but still vital role. During the process of negotiations on Brexit, we must be a constructive participant in the wider debate on the future of Europe. Realistically, no major amending treaty is likely in at least the next five years. What can be achieved, though, is a move away from current damaging behavior and the adoption of a more ambitious and credible agenda. The past successes of the European Union may well be subjecting it to what Tocqueville called the revolution of rising expectations, but the threat is deep and requires urgent action. And, of course, central to this work must be fighting back against the wave of destructive populism evident in recent years. The combined impacts of greater social and economic globalization, the lingering damage of the Great Recession, institutional complacency, and the aggression of anti-democratic forces is a challenge to everyone. Populism is a term widely used, but there's no single understanding amongst the public of what it means. At one level, there is clearly nothing wrong with political movements giving voice to popular discontent. At moments of great uncertainty or even fear, disconnection from traditional politics and anger about issues is common and probably inevitable. However, the populism of today is more about cynical and sometimes sinister forces exploiting and actively encouraging division and conflict. In Europe, settled democratic states with high living standards have seen the politics of fear deployed and, unfortunately, often successfully. The main tactic has been to scapegoat anyone outside of the core national groups, to present them as threatening national identity and welfare. For any given problem, they can tell you who to blame, and it always involves acclaimed conspiracy against people like you. This populism also encourages even successful groups to see themselves as victims with people who disagree dismissed as venal elites. Movements and parties which take this approach are found in most political cultures, but at times of crisis, they can move into the mainstream. When you examine them, you find consistent characteristics. Firstly, they're all exploiting migration and refugees. As I've said in the dialogue recently, demonizing outsiders has been the road to hell for societies for many centuries, but especially in the last century. The challenges of mixing cultures, integrating new groups, and protecting the living conditions of all cannot be wished away. In fact, dismissing them is a sure way of increasing fear of others. However, the vast majority of the fears of outsiders have no basis in reality. The promotion of these fears is a political tactic by those who want to exploit the fear rather than actually address a legitimate issue. Time after time statistics show that the fear of immigrants is highest in places where there are the fewest immigrants. The one consistent point about the issue of immigration and refugees is that there are people who are ready to promote fear as a political tactic. The question is, how do we deal with this? The first thing is that we must not legitimize their rhetoric and distortions by bringing them into mainstream politics. In every country, when mainstream parties pander to the populists, the only thing which happens is that the populists are empowered. If there are unreasonable economic and social pressures from immigration, then deal with them, but don't set off a radicalizing spiral which can only end with cruel actions. Democratic parties can never win and should not compete in a race to the bottom. If we are to face down the populist tide, we also need to work harder to understand what is going on and to promote a greater public understanding. For example, terrorism is not a new phenomenon. As we know, it was invented in the late 19th century and was defined by the French as, quote, the propaganda of the act. Its very purpose is to inspire targeted societies to divide and to discard their values. 100 years ago, thousands of Irish soldiers were dying in a war directly sparked by an act of terrorism. Radical Islamic terrorists want Europe to stop being Europe. They want us to become repressive, divided, and radicalized. In response, we must recommit ourselves to the values of inclusive democracy. The next trade, which the populists share, is a rapid anti-Europeanism. To them, all problems can be blamed on the European Union. To the extreme right, the European Union is a left-wing conspiracy. To the extreme left, it is a right-wing conspiracy. Fundamentally, it's about a return to a Europe of competing nations, one where each is free to set its own rules and where each takes a narrow view of self-interest. A rules-based, strong, multinational European organization is not an idea forced on Europeans by an elite. It emerged from the fact that a Europe of competing nations states led to repeated and escalating conflict. For smaller countries and peripheral regions, it also led to a spiral of poverty. The generation which created the European Union understood the need for a new approach. And in many cases, such as ours, there were people who had led national liberation movements. We have to oppose the creeping and cynical Euroscepticism, which is such a powerful tool in the hands of populists. And the most effective way of doing this is to be far more active in promoting reforms which can improve the Union. The final consistent trade of the populist movements is that they are either close to increasingly authoritarian regimes or they are active apologists for them. The most serious issue is, of course, the rising aggression of Adam and Putin's government. It is superficial nonsense to say that pointing this out is a return to a cold war mentality. It's a simple statement of fact that Russia is today seeking to destabilize European politics. The evidence is clear to anyone willing to pay attention and has nothing to do with conspiracy theories. As for the propaganda dimension, this may be worse than it was before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia today is a primary platform for anti-EU political parties, especially from the extremes. The fake news phenomenon directly undermines fact-based democratic debate. And these parties work assertively to promote a line of ignoring the fact that Russia under Putin has developed a habit of invading and partitioning neighboring countries if they attempt to assert their independence. Unfortunately, if you look at the record of parliament's throat, Europe, including our own, you find politicians actively promoting Russian propaganda directed against democratic Ukrainian forces. While Russian aggression is an existential threat for many Ukrainians and millions of Syrians, I don't believe that it is for us. However, we and the rest of Europe must understand that for its own reasons, Russia has decided that encouraging extreme political forces in Europe is in its interests. We have to understand this and confront it when it arises. And we have to understand that we have our own breed of populists here. The shrill anti-EU rhetoric is present in Ireland. So, too, is the conspiracy theory of an elite working to oppress ordinary people. In the European Parliament, we have MEPs who vote consistently against resolutions which support the idea that Europe should support democratic forces elsewhere. We have parties here which promote policies such as ignoring private business, nationalizing large tracts of industry, and the state immediately spending up to 25 billion euros more. They also insist that only fat cats will have to pay and include the world's only, and these parties also include the world's only far-left parties which oppose property tax. Sunday's result in Austria is worth noting. The vote for the Freedom Party was incredibly high, especially for a well-off country with low unemployment and major growth since it joined the European Union. Alexander van der Belen won because he fought back. He increased his vote through a campaign which refused to cede patriotism to the populists. He used a national flag and the slogan, people who love their homeland don't divide it. He was 100% true to a generous and open vision of liberal democracy, and he showed that the center can win. Europe and the spirit of multilateral obligations is not anti-national. In fact, it is the exact opposite. We must always make this point and show how our sovereignty is enhanced, not undermined through this work. In this country, we need to insist that the Republican spirit of 1798 and 1916 was absolutely based on the idea of an international community, not on inward-looking nationalism. We should also point to our Republican constitution and what it says of the internationalist values of the generation which built this state. In 1937, adopting a constitution which explicitly says that Ireland is a state which honors international law and doing so in a free democratic referendum was a remarkable action by the Irish people. At this deeply challenging moment in European and world history, I keep going back to the powerful contribution of him and de Valera to the League of Nations. He was a figure known throughout the world as a leader of a movement to create a nation state, and he used his status to stand up for important values. He decried the weakness of international cooperation and rules-based organizations. In 1932, he told the League's assembly, and I quote, if the League is to prosper or even survive, it must retain the support and confidence of the public. On quote, he called for it to reform its work in light of the needs and views of the public and made a remarkably correct prediction, and I quote again, friends and enemies of the League alike feel that the testing time has come, and they are watching to see if that test will reveal a weakness presaging ultimate disillusion or a strength that will be the assurance of a renewal, on quote. How striking is that statement when you replace the words the League with the Union? Unfortunately, de Valera and others were not listened to then, or in 1936, when he spoke against international aggression and asked, will it be said when the array of tombs which stretch from end to end of Europe have been multiplied, that there had been plenty of time, but that the statesmen waited too long and the soldiers took control. We are not on the edge of a major conflict, but we are involved in a struggle for the future of close cooperation between European nations and the values which we should share. Brexit is a dramatic moment, bringing to its head a series of challenges. It is not just another crisis, it is the defining crisis of this generation. To get through it, we must show ambition and urgency. We must recognize the scale of the challenge. Protecting peace and prosperity on this island has to be our absolute priority, and central to this is recognizing the unique needs of both jurisdictions. But we must also work in the wider context. We must play a part in reforming the European Union and we cannot stand back from playing our role in fighting the destructive populism which threatens the very basis of democratic societies. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you.