 So wonderful, great. I welcome you very warmly to the second panel, which is supposed to discuss the future, the challenges ahead, what we should look like in five years. And I mean, as you all know, the first years of the SSM was very much about setting up the organization, establishing the relationship with the NCA's, establishing supervisory approaches for the most relevant topics. It was about some crisis cases. We had to work with two. And now, I mean, after five years, the question is what do we see on the horizon? What kind of challenges do we see? What should we look like in five years? Where should we move towards? I think before we go into media's race, I would like to introduce very quickly, not the whole CV, because you know everybody here on the stage. But I would like to stress or point out some specificities of the panelists here. And I think we have a wonderful set of panelists here from different perspectives, bringing together to get the best view of the next five years. We have with Sven Giegolt, MEP and co-reparateur for the SSM regulation, if I remember correctly. And we have with Sir Jonathan Fall, two in German translated into English. You would call it the birth father of the SSM. They had, well, quite a fair share of work with us. And they had their own perspectives of what we are supposed to do. I'm pretty sure 2012, 13, when the regulation was discussed. We have with my good friend Jonathan Fichter, somebody who will bring the view, the perspective from the outside on the SSM. And with his vast experience in some supervisor authorities in the US, if I remember correctly, OCC, and the IMF, and the World Bank, et cetera. And you were? FDIC? And if I remember correctly. OCC Super. Yes, exactly. Many, many, many experiences. We will have the outside view. And then with Elke Koenig, we have a former Supervisory Board member, so you will have, and you still have the deepest insight, because you are participating in our Supervisory Board meetings on several topics regularly. And we have with her as a chair of the SRB, one of the important stakeholders of the SSM. So a very distinguished group here. And I hope for a very lively debate. And the first question, the kickoff questions I would like to ask is, well, we want to ensure the success of the SSM in the next years, too. So what do you think we need to do in order to ensure the success? What should the next five years look like? Do you see anything on the horizon what is necessary to do with regard to the institutional setup? What would you tell us with regard to what should we encourage the banks to do? Going a little bit more, perhaps, into the supervision. The last panel did a little bit of future already, but that was very much focused on the regulatory part. So this would be my first question. And I would start with Sven, if you do not mind, because I know him to be a very critical brain. And I just hope that we will get some lively discussion about it. I hope you don't mind me saying this. Oh, you can. We are German and don't have to be nice. That's not our role. So anyway, we get on anyway and stick together. Well, first of all, it's a bit ironic to ask that question about the institutional setup after yesterday night. Because not last night, not the one, but the one before, is rather Monday night, is rather symbolic. Because I would say there was a lot of ambition to change things also institutionally. And the result was rather insulting for the country which tried to bring that change. And the best banking supervision cannot succeed if there is not a sound macroeconomic environment and sound institutions for the common currency. And that is what shows so clearly the limits. And equally, we all have lots of dreams what we could do if we had a treaty change. But I don't see any treaty change in the foreseeable future. So some of the key limits which the SSM had are treaty-based limits. So it's not very logical to be responsible for cross-border banking, but not for supervision. It is not very logical to have the responsibility for the banks, but not equally for other business models which are not formally banks, but take similar risks and compete in similar markets. And this is difficult to overcome in the framework of the existing treaties. And therefore, we have restrictions which we cannot easily overcome. Therefore, one wish to the ECB as a whole, but to SSM as well is to not to disengage from these debates, but to play an active role. And I can only say that despite of what has been said very often in Germany about the ECB, it was very much the ECB and Mario who went regularly to the meetings of the council and insisted on much more common economic and financial policy in Europe. And equally, I have seen very often in the European Parliament that opinions by the ECB and also opinions of the SSM were extremely helpful to break certain lobby-driven, national-driven, special-interest opinions. So therefore, I can only say also in the future, the SSM should and the ECB should play an active role in promoting policy responses and regulatory responses which are in the common European interest and in order to have a counterweight to too much nationally-driven exemptions. So also yesterday, we had the CRDCRA deal. And now you can see a total change. There's lots of good things in the new rules, but you can also see lots of special interests. And unlike last time, Sylvie, last time it was that the special interests mainly came from the council. It is said to say that this time a lot of special interests also came from the parliament. And they not only came from the groups of the center-right, they also came from the center-left. And that is something which I see with great concern. So you can now count software investment as capital. Come on. Is this serious? And I can give you more examples, but I will not bore you. And therefore, I think the main wish I would have is prepare that the institutional setup will not change under these circumstances dramatically. Use the space you got. Be creative in using it. And do not always say, this was not our key mandate. Because in the end, financial stability also depends, for instance, on the absence of financial criminality. Look at the large German institution. So there is no such limit to say, we have no mandate for financial criminality. But then suddenly you have solvency issues triggered by exactly that criminality. So therefore, take the mandate of financial prudence seriously and interpret it in a way which is robust and not in an over-narrow way. Even if not, everybody in Europe will be happy about that. So I don't know whether this was provocative enough, but I would say that is what I mean. Don't worry, Sven. I knew for sure that you would deliver. But let me go to Sir Johnson. I mean, Sven tells us we are supposed to be bold and brave. And in particular, not only with regard to the task we got via the lawmaker, but at the margins of the task or the indirect ones, or perhaps even not the task we did not get, yeah? AML, for example. Do you think that the political climate right now is one which promotes or fosters supervisors which are tough, which use their discretion, which try to set policies for banks ensuring equal treatment, et cetera, which try to set expectations? Do you see a change there? I mean, looking ahead, what would you think we will get as an answer? Frankly, no, I don't, or at least not enough. We have to learn how to progress without a crisis, hoping that there isn't one. We make progress in after a crisis, and we do a lot, and then we get tired, and we get complacent, and we want to move on. Not we in this community, but the political world in general. That is happening all over the world. And what we have to do in Europe, because the stakes are very high for us, is I'll come to my own country in a minute. I know that I'm the token Brit up here. But we Europeans, I can still say that, and I will continue to say that, by the way, we Europeans have to find a way to substitute for crisis as a driver of regulatory progress. And the only answer is, very easy to say, political leadership. Political leadership in the European institutions, in their broadest sense, and in the member states. Are we doing very well at that at the moment? Obviously not. Is 2019 a big year? It certainly is. There will be a new leadership, new leaderships at various levels in all the European institutions. And we will finally find out what sort of Brexit. There you are. Here we are. We are having, and it won't be an overnight sudden understanding of a new relationship. There will be another five years of, I hope, rebuilding a sensible relationship in the continent of Europe with the United Kingdom, which, at least as I see things today, but every hour brings new developments in London at the moment, I think Brexit is going to happen on the 29th of March. But I don't know in what circumstances. So we will have to take account of those circumstances in this particular world, for this particular institution, for Andrea in his future role. The building or the maintenance of Andrea is essentially a Londoner these days. Andrea will have to build and maintain the relationships he and you, Danielle, and others have built up so that we have sound, sensible regulatory and supervisory cooperation between the European Union, between the Euro area and the United Kingdom. But again, putting my country to one side for a minute, the obvious tasks are a genuine rulebook, a genuine single rulebook. We are very far from that. We've made enormous progress, frankly, thanks to the crisis and the hard work of several people in this room. But it's not yet single. There are bumps all over the place in the playing field. We know that. And one has to consolidate what has already been achieved while keeping the focus on what remains to be done. Will we Europeans collectively summon the political will to do it? Again, I hope a crisis doesn't occur again to force it. I remember sitting in my office with Ignacio Angeloni, and we would say to each other, we don't have the right toolkit today. We are making sure that our grandchildren have the right toolkit when the time comes. Now, since then, I have grandchildren. And they're not ready to supervise banks yet. But we were thinking that there wouldn't be a crisis for a very long time. How can we be sanguine about that today, given the challenges which we still face? OK. I leave you at the end, getting the outside view. Eke, I mean, we heard now a very clear task coming from Sven and the more political background and basis from Jonathan. I mean, when you look forward for the next five years, what would you like the SSM to do, and what do you think we need as a basis in order to be successful to do this? And that might be even the more difficult question. I was just saying, is that a simple question, as a start, as a warm-up? But let me do something totally different. I still remember, Daniel, when we were sitting in the high-level group that was there to establish the SSM. Compared to the times then, I think you have achieved an enormous task. And we have an SSM. Let's start with that. And I think I never heard such an understatement than the speech of Mario Draghi. If you always add a plus to whatever he said in praise of the SSM and of you, I think you are getting closer to truth. So I think thank you, first and foremost, for the cooperation. So where are we? I think we have done quite a lot on getting to a level playing field in supervision. Do we have the real toolkit to get there always there? I would agree with when sometimes you need to be challenging. But what I'm a bit more concerned in looking at what was agreed in recent days, what is the result of the trilogue, we need to be very careful on the political side, not to roll back. Because clearly, we have now I'm very much more focusing on our own framework, so BRRD and SRMR. We've achieved a lot also there to strengthen some areas. But we have also introduced the invitation to wrink fencing within the banking union. It's called phishing option or the like. And I think we need to be very carefully monitoring what's happening there. Isn't this more fragmenting than supporting? If the total number is x, and now you allow everyone to decide the slice of his piece of the pie, you might end for the home country or for the center with a surprisingly small piece where you would like to have a bigger piece. So that's one thing. But to look forward and in your introduction, you said, let's go for the next steps. I think there is clearly ongoing work in the SSM. And I won't interfere. It's your work. But there is also a part of the work which we are still just have started because the SRB came one year later and is now building up. Emerald, minimum requirements for eligible liabilities and own funds, needs to be built up. Some banks are struggling in building up the regulatory capital. Now, for those, it might not be easier that they also have to build up the needed emerald to make themselves resolvable. But if you can't build up the capital, the logical alternative is you shrink into the capital you have. So that we need to consider for banks. And the second one is clearly to address impediments starting from data and going into bifarm or cumbersome topics. So all in all, to make banks resolvable is something which is clearly on our list, but also on the SSM list. And we have to work together. And we have to make sure that it's not for supervisors and for resolution authorities to make the bank resolvable. It's for the banks to make themselves resolvable for us to push and to guide them. This is the one area where I think we have joint work to be done. The second part is clearly finalizing the reforms. After Monday night, we have a backstop. You should read the term sheet fast. And then you see all the positive parts. If you read fast enough, you don't see what is missing. And the second part, but what's clearly missing still in the backstop, is the part on liquidity. We need a solution for funding in resolution. And what I mean now is not how to protect the death of a bank. I mean how to be able to have a convincing short-term funding option after resolution weekend until the market kicks in. So we are talking about viable and solvent banks. This is an area which is still missing. There are some sentences in, so we have to push hard together. Second part is clearly there has been the idea, and we mentioned FDIC, where we can take a lot of inspiration from, that there was the idea to have three pillars for the banking union. Now, the versions you hear are between the third pillar, being Edis, is in coma. It's on life support. Or someone said you need to have a fresh start with another name for it. But we definitely need an answer, which also goes to what Jose Maria was talking about. How do you deal with mid-size and smaller banks, not all banks will fall under a resolution regime. So if a smaller bank has to disappear, you have to have a convincing solution, which also goes to you need to have fit for purpose insolvency procedures, because that's what it is about. I stop here because I could otherwise go on with a long list of what we have to work together on not all for us to be done or for you to be done, but to be achieved together by the industry, by regulators, by legislators, it just needs to be done. So it will not be a boring job for the next five years. I'm very sure. Jonathan, you have a very genuine perspective on the SSM, not only because you are from the outside and you have a vast experience, but you were one of the reviewers of the 40 reviews we had in four years. 4-0, by the way. But I value your experience and your opinion and your position very much. So I think you can give us an insight and what do you think we need to do with regard to supervision the next five years. And looking into the macroeconomic environment, there are some questions coming up. And the regulatory environment, the tools are very important, but there's another site in this work too. So please. OK. Well, thank you. Because the long list, what to do, you know? Before I begin, the other panel violated their mandate and went into the future a bit. So I want to violate the mandate of this, if I can, and just say how one exceptional job Danielle has done in setting up the SSM. And you're right. It is you, but it is Sabine. It is the senior management. It's the staff, as Sabine said, I undertook a review and talked to some folks who had been setting up the SSM. And they had no idea this was going to be a 24-7 job for several years. Also the NCA's. I think the leadership of the NCA's in supporting this centralized focus in Frankfurt also deserves some credit, so I think it's. And I think also, and I sent both Danielle and Sabine a note when they joined saying it was great to have people with a lot of institutional knowledge staying in public service, giving up the huge salaries that everyone was being offered to go work in the industry. So you have my respect. I've got three things that I'd like to quickly throw out, and it's tough with so many smart people and going at the end of two panels. But something that I don't think has had quite as much mention as I would give it is NPLs in continuing to work down the legacy NPLs. I think as an outsider, when you talk to folks about the European banks, that's something that's always raised. And while I think the SSM has made a lot of progress in reducing the level of NPLs, they're still very high for developed countries with economies going. And boy, did we live in an uncertain world. And we've talked about complacency. I think that crises tend to be cyclical. There will be another one. And if there is ever a time for banks to build their capital and shed those assets that are non-performing, and that gets to, I guess, Klaus's point about the weak earnings. You don't make a lot of money on NPLs. So getting income up in part is getting rid of those NPLs or getting them down. The second piece, which has also been mentioned, is the consolidation of the industry. And I don't think supervisors should pick winners and losers or pick who should do what. But when you have a system in Europe where so many banks are not earning their capital, I think it is incumbent upon the SSM to put pressure on the management and the boards of those banks if they're not viable. And if you don't want to end up being resolved, you go for a voluntary merger. You go for some type of acquisition. And you do that looking European-wide. We talked a little bit about the US experience. We used to have statewide banking effectively. We had a lot of banks in Texas, which were doing very well until we had an energy crisis. When there was a crisis, there were no local banks in state banks that could be acquirers. Everybody was weak and you had to turn outside that turned to North Carolina to bring banks in. Similarly in Europe, if in a country you have, and Europe is so big that you're going to have some areas of the world doing very well and others doing poorly, in those regions that are doing poorly, you have to be able to look to banks outside of that region to come in. They have the capital. They're in a position where they can do an acquisition. Being limited to national banks, so to speak, and it was said earlier, Europe's got to get to the point where you have European banks and it's not cross-border if a Dutch and a German bank merge. My third recommendation is ultimately, I think, the SSM needs to be a centralized supervisor. I think that there has been a lot of progress. I think Danielle or Mr. Draghi mentioned 2,000 supervisors in the NCA's and 1,000 in Frankfurt. But I think over time, when Andrea takes over, there has to be a centralized management of all of the resources for both SIs and LSIs. When a small member country gets into difficulty, you can't, and it's LSIs, you can't rely on the local supervisors to take it. Having, again, spent a lot of time in the U.S., we often moved a lot of supervisors from the Northeast to deal with the energy problems in the West or the Midwest when there were ag problems. Those of you remaining in the SSM have to view the entire, I guess it's 5,000 staff as a resource that can be devoted to dealing with problems. That means comparable, competent benefits. You can't have, we talked about two classes of banks, the small and the SSIs, similar to the supervisors. The supervisors have to be a team. They have to have the similar type of benefits so that there's, it's enough. But I would move towards much more of a centralized approach. You see, that's why we need an outside view because somebody from inside would never be able to say this. To think it, but to say it is something else. That was a different institutional setup, you know, a question and not so much, you know, link to the treaty. I mean, looking into the consolidation, I would like to pick up, you know, the second part of Jonathan's answer. What do you think could the lawmaker do in order to help and promote consolidation? Well, I... And by the way, I mean, you want us to take over tasks which are not really totally ours. Perhaps the lawmaker can help their tool to, you know. I was trying, of course, I was with my first answer, showing our weakness and playing the ball back to you. And that is, of course, true. So if we look at the inability since six years to come forward with a Eurozone reform and we are seeing the signs of backlash in regulatory issues with the absence of a crisis, as Jonathan is saying, in these moments, institutions are stronger than policymakers. So institutions have a clear mandate. The ECB has a clear mandate for the stability of the currency. The SSM has a far-reaching mandate when it comes to prudence and solvency. And you can interpret this narrowly or widely. And I was not saying overstepping the mandate, taking the mandate seriously and seeing in the real world what touches and endangers solvency. And if you look at what endangers solvency, you can go very far. And I can be now a bit more provocative. We cannot close, for instance, the problem of the sovereign risk. I've seen it several times in trial lock. It's the one who's not to be named solvency risk of sovereigns. So it is unsolvable politically at the moment. But you have pillar two. So, and which is a very wide mandate, look at all the additional risks which are not covered elsewhere, put it literally. You have tackled with the NPL issue, which was politically not solvable. I see some people being nervous. I would recommend the same with financial crime. It was evident that national supervision of financial crime was not working. And then you got it on the level of LSIs, banking failures, and even with SSM institutions in Latvia. And there are more institutions which are severely weakened because they did too much financial crime. So, therefore, it is a problem which is covered by your mandate. And I can only say with the responsibility for the stability of your institutions, you should take that fully seriously. And there's something which the ECB can do without any law change in law. And I know Andrea in his former function was insisting a lot on transparency. When is the SSM making public the pillar two requirements and the results of its own stress testing on an institution by institution basis? I think this is something you could do in order to ensure a level playing field. And it would give more teeth. In pillar two, we have the difference between requirements and guidance. If this would be fully transparent, it would make the whole system would give it more teeth. Perhaps it cannot be done from today or from tomorrow. But you can say, in two years, it will be public. And then institutions can prepare. So I think there is still a lot of space in the laws we have already agreed. And in the absence of a severe crisis, it is not the moment when lawmakers will be the most likely to achieve but institutions. And you are a strong institution. You have a strong mandate. And Daniel has shown how much you can do. And I only wanted to announce it to you. There will be a small surprise. I wanted to give the two of you a balloon journey. When you are to have a far look over the skyscrapers. And the two of you together, because it is great. It is true. Daniel achieved immensely. And I can only praise her for that. But you also achieved it together. And it was always one of my deep satisfactions that we have put two women above all the banks. I loved that. And I love that. And I'm still happy about it until today. And I would even love more this picture having two women on a balloon looking over the city of Frankfurt. And I will give that to you. But I studied the compliance rules. If I would have given it to you today, they probably would have taken it away. So therefore, I will wait until the two of you, and I hope it will take a long time, two of you are out of office, and then you get it. And the legal department can now study whether this is a breach of compliance rules or not. But I will give it to you anyway. So that is the, and I think you really deserve that balloon flight to look over all the banks without having to meet one of the bankers yourself and none of the ESSM staff yourself at that moment. Many thanks already up front. Well, I mean, you see, we need to be bold and brave again, yeah? If I've understood this correctly and I could at least answer, I wouldn't... But for you, you're not afraid of heights. Not at all. Don't worry, don't worry. I'm very stable and... even in a balloon. No, I think we very clearly see that that all here on the stage, yeah, see necessity to move forward, yeah? That the work is not yet finished, yeah? You want us to move forward bold and brave and to use all the space we have, yeah? But going now into the details, yeah? You didn't answer the second part of my question with the consolidation. Do you... Shall I tell you what I think about this? Yeah, please. Of course, it is, first, if banks don't earn return on capital, of course, that is a supervisory issue. On the other hand, there is not such a thing as a high profitability on capital. So we have to be careful to... There is, in a market economy, no need to have super high returns. We speak about a sufficient return. We don't speak about super high returns and there were expectations in the banking sector in the past which cannot be the yardstick for supervision. Also, there are banks which do not have as an objective to earn much more than they need. So there is in a social market economy, also cooperatives, there are mission-based institutions like also the Sparkassen in Germany and public banks which have not as an objective to have super high returns. And we should not act when we take that seriously, not act and say there's only a uniform model of banking and that is a stock market listed bank and only if you are having so high returns that you are not a potential victim of a takeover only then you are sound. This cannot be the yardstick. The yardstick... You are not talking about that one, yeah? Well, I have heard very strange remarks in the past in this regard and that's why I say it. I haven't invented it and this is very important but if banks are not able to earn enough to continue soundly, then of course... That's what I meant. Then of course I can only agree what you are saying. So then of course supervisors should exert pressure and of course as Europeans we have an interest to have more cross-border institutions. So I would also agree with this statement and that is something where I have not a problem and I think there was a very important remark made on the former panel. Not to confuse proportionality with low standards. Proportionality for me means that smaller and conservative institutions should not be overburdened with supervisory work but this level of soundness should be the same and that should not be confused but in order to gain the political space to insist also on the soundness of the LSI's it is important not to confuse the two things. If there's any suspicion that this is confused the political space will disappear and therefore I think and we have seen such signals in the past. So I think one has to live, one has to accept the plurality of the system but should of course insist that there is an equal and same level of soundness also in the LSI's and in the LSI's I think there was a certain luxism in some areas so I'm looking forward whether the NPL rules which came with the addendum will also be applied fully to all the LSI's so that seems to be important and that should be done. I couldn't agree more, I couldn't agree more but I saw Eke being nervous, she wanted to take the floor. I would just like to build a bit on what Swenor said. Of course there is not an absolute yardstick in return on equity and shouldn't be but you need to earn sufficient to make your capital adequate to your business model otherwise you're not sound and I think that's where we need to really put the focus on and to go one step further and we should not confuse ourselves in saying and if you're not sound then merge us off the problem. If you're not sound in a market economy then the most logical answer is you exit the market and our task has to be to ensure that also for a bank that is a bit of a specific animal compared to the shop next door you have a sound policy and you have a sound system for exit that merger is always a solution if it is a merger of an interesting viable core business of a bank that you merge with another bank and they're like fine but for merger you need a business model and Danielle has heard me that she would now be surprised if I wouldn't say it two awful ugly ducks don't make a brilliant swan so be aware that when you talk about mergers you should not create the problem for in two years time so I think we need to work by far more forceful all of us on making the sound basis for insolvency systems being fit for purpose for banks being resolvable and then use merger as one of the possible tools for some of the opportunities and I think this is the way forward this is how I see the FDIC partially works and I would just like to add because Sven also went to talk about elizize let's be realistic when you look at the last decades of failures we need to have an answer not just for G-SIPs we definitely need an answer for G-SIPs but we need an answer for the middle layer and for the smaller banks because they all compete in the same market push back a little bit yeah, yeah, yeah but let us go to Jonathan first and then well, both Jonathan I'm very sorry to sir Jonathan sir Jonathan sir Jonathan the other forget about the title except to distinguish between he's a Republican he's a Republican he's a Republican I'm not two points in the and I'm looking back to look forward in the period of negotiation of the SSM regulation the fundamental goals of what we were trying to do because of the crisis and because a lot of hard thinking were not the most difficult we had two big legal problems one was the treaty how far can we go and I agree with Sven with a different treaty we could have gone further we could go further today it's unlikely to happen in our five-year period so we are in the legal framework that we are in the second point is and this is ironical I suppose now we spent an enormous amount of time negotiating with the countries outside the Euro area to create a docking mechanism so that one day if they wanted to join the banking union they could do so both in the SSM and in the SRM of course the leading non-Euro country was the United Kingdom and they spent we spent with them hours arguing about these things knowing that it was largely fictitious and what we were really thinking about was I'll mention names Denmark, Sweden, others perhaps one day in five years time I'm not here to speculate it may well be that the banking union has more members it may well be that the Euro area has more members the effect of Brussels without I use Brussels generically Brussels without the UK could be in the next five years just to focus attention on the Eurozone much more seriously radically than has been the case here the two second point anecdotal but not without interest it so happens that many of the people in the commission's financial services department had a background in competition policy I did my successor Olivier Guerre-Saint-Dazs, Nadia Calvigno now distinguished minister of the kingdom of Spain did and so on so the relationship between the center and the national authorities was thought about very much in the light of what the European merger regulation had done which was to split jurisdiction and in the hope and I think realized over the years in merger policy and realized very quickly here too much more quickly miraculously quickly thanks to Danielle and her colleagues is that the intellectual leadership from the center in addition to all the legal rules creates a framework in which cooperation is the order of the day there are frictions no doubt from time to time but generally speaking that relationship in the regulatory operations of the European Union between central what the Americans would call federal institutions and member state institutions can work very well I would as add as an old commission hand as long as the commission has the requisite legal powers and the uh... the quality of people to uh... assert intellectual leadership secondly and this is an old competition person speaking in the question about consolidation of the uh... uh... eurozone uh... or indeed the EU uh... banking sector I would simply say uh... when there is a relevant market in the sense of a common regulatory space in which competition is really taking place across either the euro area the EU as a whole uh... that should be the framework in which uh... mergers between two banks should be assessed if that is not yet the case then I'm afraid still that every country will have to be looked at still as a separate jurisdiction but it would depend on the facts not quite a science but it's not far off where is competition really taking place for a certain number of categories of of users of consumers of banking services is it an individual country still or is it now uh... in a wider group of countries well and I would add with regard to national ring fencing there's another question uh... coming up you know where is the single jurisdiction I'd like to clarify one point and then uh... add one thing to the to-do list for the ssm the clarification is where I was promoting mergers and talking about texas with the failing banks and bringing out side banks in uh... was really different then in my pushing the consolidation the from my perspective it's really targeting the the twenty percent of the european banking system that is weak that's really having difficulty earning its capital and what i was trying to promote was not a japanese convoy system where you uh... bank it's into trouble and see me in it's your turn to pick it up but rather the ssm creating a regulatory environment where these weak banks voluntarily went out and looked for someone where they could uh... gather the economies of scale i mean one of the difficulties that was mentioned on the earlier panel was the lending limits and in some countries where you have very small banks and bigger corporations it's very tough not to have very large lending limits for particular bank because they're the only back around and i think one of the advantages of of much larger banks is that they're able to meet corporate needs better the recommendation that i was going to make and it was really the last couple of of comments brought this up supervision is not sexy or don't say this i think it's the most sexiest thing so we have never boring yeah that's not sexy and we have the risk of complacency and something that that i think is is critical and i i think daniel did a lot of this the nca's brussels need to regularly during these good times much stronger advocacy positions on things like the consolidation i mean i i take it that it's it's really the nca's in the national governments that are resisting having european wide banking germans went their own banks and i think it's a question of in fact all the things we've talked about npl's they're all in the best interests of the european citizens but parliamentarians we i did some work when i was at the fun with the competition commission and i would agree they were not supervisors they did not understand what the ultimate objectives were and so i think a lot more outreach advocacy both out of frankfurt but also the local nca's convincing the powers that be of the benefit of having a strong system having european banks that are too weak to support the local economy is in no one's interest but i mean you just said and we should have a regulatory environment uh... as a supervisor created creating a regulatory environment which uh... promotes you know voluntarily uh... movement of the best what do you mean in concrete to make up our shopping list is and it was mentioned pillar two you begin to jack up the capital requirements and if you have a bank cannot today even earn enough to pay for its current capital you you can begin looking around for this is that he said exit strategies uh... we're good times right now notwithstanding the eight hundred drop in the del jones yesterday these are pretty good times this is the time to be strengthening the banking system waiting for that that next that next pick up and it's it's going to come based on the past it will come from some surprising corner that we have no idea where it's going to be when you have you have some little signals but but capitals the the easiest that and i would also i would set much more aggressive in p l targets i would move l s eyes into the e c b if they don't meet that target so again we should be more bold and brave and and race capital uh... standards let's see the european law makers deals with us with regard to uh... uh... total capital uh... pillar two uh... not being only c t one but uh... eight uh... and eighty one etc uh... which is not really uh... a big support uh... uh... uh... uh... to to say it uh... bluntly uh... uh... well you know uh... you you are subpoena only to to play that ball uh... back the interpretation of the eighty eighty one rule uh... and the m d a trigger point was first diverted from the practice to the law and then the law uh... was now adapted to the practice you developed only to play that back uh... and everybody who knows the subject uh... knows exactly what i'm talking about and of course and uh... in the and that's yeah and that is different too i have to admit i i may uh... we but then we disagree here really because uh... because the current law uh... says very clearly if pillar two and there was in the law there's no difference between guidance and requirement is violated then uh... the m d a trigger point should be triggered this uh... has led to say additional safety margin for all banks from this uh... from the pillar two requirement by distinguishing between guidance and uh... requirement uh... which was not in the law but developed by the practice uh... of supervision they there was a de facto lowering of the capital requirement so uh... and that is not a conspiracy theory but uh... uh... this is uh... i think what has happened and now with the c r d c r r package this which was developed uh... uh... in supervisory practice has now been uh... that has now been put into the reformed uh... banking package uh... one can have a long debate whether the effect of the m d a trigger point uh... uh... on the whole pillar two requirement was wanted and one can discuss this but de facto there was a lowering of the effective uh... capital requirements so therefore that is a very sensitive issue because it is a huge amount of capital we speak about yeah but let me let me really uh... tried to uh... give a different picture here and i i i i do understand quite well that we had a discussion in the supervisory board and here as a practice to have a very clear pillar two requirement rule only and then we got r t s and and and uh... practice well it's not practice yeah it's quasi rulemaking from the other side what i was so it was not that way around yeah uh... to be very clear uh... uh... is when there i do not agree with you i fully disagree yeah uh... i remember correctly don't i i mean it's already three years ago yeah because we were tough yeah and hence we got uh... pushback and where did it start but again i mean my question was a different one not here not here i agree i know i know but not you exactly and daniel daniel daniel daniel if i say practice there are more supervisors than the ecb and you know exactly how it went i didn't say ecb i said the practice and you know that there were two other uh... supervisors which diverted from the law which were not in line with your policy and the commission which have should have ensured that the laws ensured everywhere didn't act so i was not put a playing that ball into your nice corner daniel that is good that it is out now very clear very clearly very clear i was i was rather looting to you know the the the question of whether pillar two requirements uh... should be only covered by ct one or and by additional uh... capital instruments too and and here i have to admit uh... coming from the tougher side yeah i i would have loved to stay with ct one and not to give an incentive to financial innovation uh... which we have seen before the crisis yeah and perhaps that we can agree upon because it is uh... it's it's it's it's this is not a good development