 Today, we're here with General Michael Nogada, director of strategy at the National Counterterrorism Center. And previously, General Nogada served as the commander of Special Operations Command at SICCOM. Welcome, General. Thank you. We were talking just before. And I was speaking to you here at the occasion of the U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit. And I was noting that there was a quote from Ms. Elizabeth Sherwood Randall, an advisor of the Homeland Security, who said, nowhere is the evolution in the global terrorism landscape more vivid than in Africa, where terrorist groups from Al Qaeda branches to ISIS affiliates now collectively occupy vast swaths of territory and extract benefits from millions of suffering people. And it is this evolution of global terrorism that I'd like to first ask you about. How do you see this terrorism landscape and how it's evolved since 9-11, and how would you characterize the threat today? I am quite worried about the trajectory of this landscape, while it is inarguable that in some places and some cases, whether it's the United States or the international community, we have made elements of progress against a variety of different extremist elements around the world, particularly the violent ones. But I personally believe, I believe this when I was the strategy director at NCTC, I still believe it today as a private citizen, the overall arc, the overall trajectory of violent extremism in all its forms around the world continues to get worse. It is getting worse at different rates, but globally I would argue it is getting worse. So whether it is in Africa or elsewhere, unfortunately I believe that to be true. Regarding Africa, several things immediately come to mind. I used to do counter-terrorism operations in Africa when I was on active duty. But while it is certain, it is true, that both African nations and countries like the United States and other European countries that have attempted to assist Africans with their growing violent extremist problem, those efforts have borne some fruit. Certainly we have been able to interdict some serious threats. We have been able to remove a pretty significant number of senior leaders of a variety of terrorist groups. The movements themselves, however, as a general rule continue to thrive and in too many cases continue to expand. So I agree with the quote you just read from. But the other thing that comes to mind is that countries like the United States, even European countries that are far closer to Africa than America is, we don't generally put African violent extremism at the top of our strategic priority list. We tend to prioritize other threats as being more dangerous or more important. Frankly, I think there's a little bit of a willful attitude that Africa just isn't that important, that I've seen both in the U.S. government and in foreign governments, and I think that contributes to the problem as well. But at the end of the day, the problem is absolutely getting worse. Throughout your career, I know that you've had a lot of experience as an expert in countering these types of threats with the kinetic response. But I know you think a lot about the non-kinetic responses to terrorism. And the idea that they need to join up, that these things are not mutually exclusive, that there needs to be both a military response and a civilian response. How do you see that, and what is your thinking on the needs there for this encountering violent extremism? That is a great question. I have come to believe because of the experiences I've had, both in actual counterterrorism operations, but also having to wrestle with strategy and policy issues that flow from counterterrorism, both in my own capital as well as other international capitals. I very strongly believe that the use of kinetic power, whether it's military or law enforcement, is absolutely necessary. But I think we too often assume that the use of kinetic power can achieve more than it actually can. What I mean by that is, in my judgment, the use of force, whether it's law enforcement or military against a terrorist or a terrorist movement, is useful really for two reasons. One is to save lives. If you have the opportunity to prevent or preempt a lethal operation, you should absolutely do it if you have the ability. We've certainly grown our ability to do that in the last 20 years. Or to bring people to justice. They are guilty of some horrible act and need to be brought to justice, and the use of force is often required to do that because they won't go willingly in most cases. And those are two very important objectives. But here's what kinetic counterterrorism cannot do. It cannot prevent people from becoming terrorists. And in some cases, I think any veteran of places like Iraq or Afghanistan has seen them for themselves. If you make too many mistakes in the use of kinetic power, you'll inadvertently create more terrorists. But regardless, kinetic power cannot solve the problem of why do people become terrorists. That requires a non-kinetic approach. That requires addressing everything from societal ills to economic corruption to political malfeasance and a whole raft of other things for which law enforcement or military power is not particularly useful and in many cases quite counterproductive. But I'll guess I'll finish by saying these other things, which I am certainly not an expert in as a military officer, but one thing I have observed in more than two decades of counterterrorism is as hard as kinetic operations can be and often quite dangerous, they pale in comparison to how difficult solving societal, economic, political, cultural issues that are the fountainhead of terrorism. Is there a whole of continent approach that may be missing or what are your thoughts on that? I don't think I've ever seen any country have a whole of government or whole of Africa governmental approach. And there may be at least a few good reasons for that. I mean it's such an enormous land mass and it is so diverse in every imaginable way that a single approach to the continent may not be achievable. But whether or not that's true, of course African populations wherever they may be on the continent, they of course will care a great deal about the emergence of a terrorist threat within their own country. It's a totally rational reaction. But countries outside of Africa, whether it's Europe or the Middle East or the United States or others, they pick and choose what parts of terrorism in Africa they care about. Now that's not irrational. Again it is an enormous continent, but I think it's important that we be honest with ourselves speaking as an American and I believe what I'm about to say applies just as much to my European colleagues, my Middle Eastern colleagues that worry about counterterrorism in Africa. Rather predictably we prioritize the things we care about in Africa based on things like do they produce petroleum, do they influence or could they potentially hinder the commercial maritime flows in the Mediterranean, in the Gulf or elsewhere? Does the terrorist group in any particular country pose a threat to their own citizens? And I think one of the unhappy consequences of the huge migrant crisis several years ago that flowed out of Africa into Southern Europe, preventing that from happening again. So these are not irrational reactions, these are not irrational calculations, but what it does mean is there's a mismatch between what Africans care about in terms of terrorism on their own continent and what other nations tend to prioritize. I mean Libya is a very good example. Libya is an oil producing country that has significant influence in the Mediterranean, could become a launching point for another migrant flow into Europe. So it is completely rational that European countries and the United States would worry a great deal about Libya. But what if Libya isn't the worst terrorist problem? The answer, again, rather rationally from these non-African countries will be, well we don't care as much about those other places. We care about Libya because of its geographic location, it's an oil producing country, it could influence maritime traffic in the Mediterranean, so that's why we're going to care and the fact that it's untethered from what Africans care about isn't particularly important. Another question is you speak about Europe and it just strikes me in thinking about Africa and Europe and counter-terrorism, the French and their work in Mali specifically but in Francophone Africa. And they're sort of pull out from the counter-terrorism approach, especially in areas where now we see Wagner's forces. Is this a call to action for the US to sort of step in? I'm not saying it's the French call to action, but does this call us to action to try to step in and what are your thoughts about that? The answer to your question in my judgment depends on as the problem continues to deteriorate which I am convinced it will particularly with the substantial withdrawal of French forces. Nature abhors a vacuum and that vacuum will be filled by something and it's probably going to be at least partially filled by the terrorist movements they went to fight. The answer depends on how much do we care about that. I personally believe the answer is eventually we'll get so bad we will have to care about and we will have to do something because that part of Africa is a part of Africa that for mostly for economic reasons but also for some political reasons the United States has to care about and if it starts going to hell which it might with the French withdrawal it'll get so bad we'll have no choice but to do something which of course we've done before. This is a little bit of rinse and repeat. We apply kinetic power or in this case the French apply kinetic power it diminishes the problem to a degree but as I've already indicated kinetic power can only achieve so much. There are other things that have to happen in terms of political, economic, societal reform which mostly have not happened in that part of the world. So as Western efforts to suppress through the use of force these violent extremist groups once that pressure is lifted and these other non-military arenas get worse the result is pretty predictable. And then as far as American interest I know you've also thought a lot and written about strategic rivalry issues and it comes to bear when you speak about West Africa and Western Sahel I think more about the literal states and our friends in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire and Benin and part of ECOWAS. Do you think that our concern particularly in the literal states and China's interest in Equatorial Guinea this might be one of the reasons why we'll look to try to quell these terrorist threats on the borders and the literal states? It should to a degree it has but in my judgment the United States and Europe were very slow in both anticipating and effectively reacting to the penetration of what I would characterize as malign actors in Africa whether it was the Chinese or the Russians. We saw it happening and in my personal opinion there was a lot of wishful thinking in Western capitals about how important this was, what it might lead to and so now it's a very large penetration. The Chinese and the Russians have to one degree or another in many African countries either eroded our traditional influence or in some cases supplanted our influence. Now there were some steps being taken while I was still on active duty to try to deal with this problem but this is a little like taking medicine after you become terribly sick as opposed to having a healthier lifestyle so that you never get sick in the first place and that's what we're doing. We're now trying to triage a malign actor penetration in Africa that we absolutely saw coming. It was absolutely predictable but we did so little as a collective not just the United States as an international collective we were so slow and hesitant and engaged frankly in my view and so much wishful thinking that one day we woke up and realized we had a hell of a problem that now we have to undo. I would just leave you with one last question in regard to the U.S. Africa Leaders Summit and what would you hope that we can get the administration and can get out of this great initiative with African leaders from all over the continent what are your hopes for the next few days? My hope for both the conference itself as well as for any international community consideration of the challenge of violent extremism in Africa lies in two related areas. One is just the general truth that I think is broadly accepted internationally at this point but we often struggle to translate it into action but that is that the single most important driver of violent extremism is a loss of confidence between the population of a given area and their own government. Unless and until the international community and African nations can find a reasonably successful formula for first halting the erosion of confidence and then ultimately reversing the erosion of confidence violent extremism in Africa as a strategic threat will remain with us forever. The second one perhaps a little more hopeful but anyone who's ever studied African realities knows it is the fastest growing population on earth the median age of Africans is astonishingly low there are many potential benefits for the world for that one being it is an enormous market and if we can turn it into a globally effective market it would not only do good for all the countries that wish to do business in Africa it would be good for Africans themselves because their lifestyle their ability to pursue their own futures would be enhanced by having a much stronger economic basis upon which to live but none of that is true none of that will be true so long as the world's collective efforts to deal with violent extremism in the continent continue to get the result we're getting which is that it keeps getting worse thank you so much for being with us today thank you I enjoyed it