 Hi, this is Peter Bergen. I'm Vice President at New America for Global Studies and Fellows. Assana Bas, Professor Assana Bas, is a distinguished professor of international relations at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. He's also a former national fellow at New America. And he's the author of multiple books, including the Taliban Revival and the Prophet's Air, which actually that book was part of his project when he was a New America fellow. He's the author of this new book, The Return of the Taliban, which in a kind of cosmic coincidence was reviewed in the current New York Review of Books by Steve Cole, favorably reviewed, who was former president and CEO of New America. So it's really a pleasure to have Professor Abbas on the program today and he's going to talk about some of the big themes and stories in his book, and then I'll engage him in a little bit of Q&A and I will also moderate questions from the audience. If you have a question, put it in the Slido and I'll feed them to Professor Abbas as we go. Thank you. Thank you so much, Peter. I'm really delighted and honored to be here and I'm really grateful. Also, I remember our first meeting maybe I think 20 years ago, right after 911 and our conversations on the profiles of those terrorists. Thank you for your support over the last two decades or so. My comments today in my remarks may sound a bit more dramatic, and that I owe to my voice because of the allergies. I'll try to speak a bit slowly and may have to sip tea throughout, so bear with me for that. First and foremost, I think I would frame that this book is a story of the latest twist in the history and dynamics of Taliban. This book is also about US negotiations with Taliban, the Doha team. You cannot understand the return of the Taliban or the Taliban revival or the resurgence without understanding those critical almost two years when these extensive conversations were happening in Doha actually longer than that, you can expand that span to about four years also, but two years is kind of more extensive. The book is also one on a lighter note about those negotiations. Perhaps we will not know the full story of the negotiations unless we have access to what I'm told by many friends who are aware of this. The WhatsApp messaging record between Zalme Khalilzad, the ambassador and Mullah Baradar because most of the conversations on the sidelines happen on those WhatsApp messages I'm told. The book is also about Taliban.gov, meaning the personalities and the policies of Taliban, which I must say upfront in some ways are quite distinct and different from what had happened under the Taliban one government. And in the book I have explained Taliban 1.0 as those the original movement and their first experience in the government from 1996 to 99 or 2000, you can say. Second Taliban 2.0, I frame as the insurgency years because those are the years Taliban had gone into their sanctuary in the Pakistan, Afghanistan border region and Kuwait are some in Karachi elsewhere, and then they resurrected. Then there were these shadow governments, they had a new strategy which was completely different from when they were in government the first time or from the years of the movement that is in itself a different set of circumstances and policies. Taliban 2.0 and Taliban 3.0, I frame it from the years 2019 onwards when the negotiations happened and of course in the last two years or so. And the book is also last but not the least about the Afghan people, because they are the ones who are the victims of not only these last two years specifically and but the last 20 years of insurgency and this half hearted state building project and even before that the Afghan jihad years. So for the last 40 years or so, Afghanistan and Afghanistan specifically have been through hell, just one anecdote up front. I was just recently talking to a friend who held a very senior position in Afghanistan and the final days he was appointed in a very, very important position he couldn't reach in time to take up that position. But when I asked him, and because I knew him well, I asked him I said oh sorry I should have interviewed you before the book. And he said no maybe I was not in a position because most of us who struggled so hard to make Afghanistan a new Afghanistan. We have gone through frustration, depression or so many different ways. This has been so traumatic so Afghan diaspora and their trauma, not only diasporas outside still they have something to look up to in terms of hope, prosperity, some chance to make two ends meet, but those who are in Afghanistan are still struggling. So this is a book also about the story of the Afghans in that sense. And last but not the least, I would argue, this is also a bit puzzling. The story is about the puzzling part of why after so many years of investment in Afghan security, Afghan police, a new leadership so to say empowering of the middle class. There was not a single shot that was fired in defiance when Taliban walked into Kabul. We cannot just put that story aside. Something happened. I think that is should not have been that puzzling for those who have spent some time understanding the history of Afghanistan. If we had known the history of Afghanistan, that that should not have been that puzzling. But these are the range of issues that I've talked in the book, but I'll pick about four topics in the first about remaining 1213 minutes or so to briefly touch upon, and these are the main themes. I'll begin with also gain a story. This is about the final moments of the collapse of Kabul, if you may call that the escape of our money. And I must add, I had one part of the story, which I, which I'd heard from some very, very credible sources. And this is an academic book I am where my head is an academic in part of academia. So these things have to be verified many more times and I had to be much more careful. But a lot of information I received after the book was published because many officials, many members of the government to any government others who reached out to me and said, either your story is incomplete, or some said incorrect or some some added the new aspect so I hope the paperback will have even a more fuller story but the story goes like this, what I have mentioned in the book. And then the final moments, Ashraf Ghani, when he had intentionally decided not to be part of the negotiation deal to give credit to Zalma Khalilzad to some extent, there's a lot of discredit also for the Doha deal but the credit is, I mean he tried till the end to involve Ashraf Ghani. And Ashraf Ghani was convinced because of his old history of last about at that time 30, 40 years that he was believing in a conspiracy theory, which was that it is between Zalma Khalilzad, Karzai and Mullah Baradar that three of them together want to build this new government in Afghanistan by kicking Ashraf Ghani. He thought it was a lot of this was about himself so a plane was waiting. This is what I've mentioned the book and in the final moments, just as a reaction as a revenge, he gave a tip to the Hakkani's and we know that Hakkani's were among the first ones to rush into Kabul and that is very important because Taliban is not a monolithic group. They had so many different factions and powerful groups, who was at that time supposed to get their hand or their kind of control and important ministries in Kabul were supposed to get more power. And Hakkani's were among the very first ones, that's why Ministry of Interior was in his hand. He was powerful otherwise also but he was strategically ahead of others. And the view is that he got a tip from the Ghani and the Ghani gave the tip, which sounds initially when I heard was impossible but when I got this confirmation because Ashraf Ghani wanted to take revenge from Zalma Khalilzad, from Baradar, from Karzai, not to allow Mullah Baradar to be at the helm of peace. Now the second part of the story is that it was not only one plane that was waiting at the Kabul airport for Ashraf Ghani, that was of course from UAE to take him first to a Central Asian destination and then from there to UAE but there was another plane also from Qatar Airways, which was also ready and in that case Anas Hakkani was involved, some of the very famous and very respected Ghilani family was involved, there were some others. Karzai was on board, Karzai was really on board on this story as I heard and the plan was that Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah will be taken to Doha and there will be an interim government in place, led by Mullah Hebatullah who will stay in Kandahar but the cabinet in Kabul will have some members of the previous government from Ashraf Ghani including Karzai and so many others and some of the Taliban members and this government in Kabul will be led by Mullah Baradar. Now the reason only I'm mentioning spending some time explaining this is that if that had happened, the second story of the second plan had worked out, things would have looked much more in control or because Mullah Baradar and this I've now come to my second part of my point, which is Mullah Baradar represent part of Taliban who were seen as pragmatic, I'm intentionally avoiding using the word moderate because that has other connotations, but pragmatic for sure. He had spent so much time in jail in the Pakistani guest houses as well where he was mistreated for sure and he had gone through a rethinking and this he was not alone in this rethinking. There were many other Taliban leaders who had gone through this rethinking Mullah Wasik who's the head of the Taliban intelligence today. According to official public announcements, he met the deputy director of CIA at least twice in recent months because of some discussions on Daesh or Islamic state of Khorasan as we call that. So there are others as well, Khair Khwa. The other names I will not mention because I was told their position is very precarious. The point that I'm leading to is my second major point after the whole conspiratorial theory of what happened in the last days is that there are divisions within Taliban which are very important for us to understand. Even if we leave out the history, what has happened has happened in the prevailing circumstances. It is Taliban in Kandahar led by Mullah Abdullah, who is someone who is very different in orientation in his religious perspective in his worldview, which is very dogmatic, very extremist. His speeches tell us and also that is reflected by the Chief Justice Abdul Hakeem Ishaq Zayi whose book I had a chance to read and I have mentioned that in detail in the book. It's a book. It's about the governance system. He has given a new model and the book is not only full of bigotry. It is traumatic actually to read that book for any person and if I may say that as a Muslim reading that book because the extremist and distorted version of Islam that this brand of Taliban believe in is very, very painful and problematic. But that is what Kandahar is. That is what they, the Kandahar hardcore Taliban are known for. And when I had asked this one question to many officials in Pakistan, in Central Asian states as well, some Americans who were following this very closely as part of their duty. Everyone who I asked, have Taliban changed? They said no, not really logically. And that is true for those who are in Kandahar today. Those in Kabul, it's a different story in many ways. And these are the ones, for instance, unlike the Taliban 1.0, that this Taliban 3.0 has members who have a couple of them are PhDs from Islamic University in Islamabad. I have confirmed that Islamic University in Islamabad is not a traditional madrasa. It's a modern Islamic university, like many in Malaysia and Malaysia and other places. And so they are graduates of there. Their new cabinet has, or leading positions also have one position for the chairman of the board of cricket. In fact, cricket, that position was really sought after. If there's any fist fight or any violent act that happened among the Taliban, that was over the position of the top position for the cricket board. There are others, not normally mentioned in Western media, if I may say, those who are Hazara Shias, two of them, a couple of Tajiks and Uzbek. Again, this is not inclusive government in the way we would like to project. And I at times get surprised when we give them the kind of requirement to Taliban be inclusive. Well, we were there for 20 years. We spent a trillion dollar. We tried it. We gave everything into it. Now for us in negotiations to ask them for inclusive government is kind of a joke, my apologies. They're not going to listen to these things. It was our negotiated deal, which provided them a way into Kabul. No one can deny that. I am not against those negotiated deals at this time linking this with my second large point, which is about the divisions within Taliban. Those who we engaged with in Doha were mostly those pragmatic elements, so many of them. Some of us now think that they were lying to us. No, they were truthful. It is only that the hard-liners were mostly not sitting in those negotiations. And so that part has to be very clear. There were promises made during negotiations that were broken. There are other very, very controversial points of Doha negotiations also, but I'm not going into those details except mentioning just one point that I heard from many negotiators from the US side who said, we thought we are going to deal with these extremists who will not be able to even converse properly and they stunned us by their organization, by their coherence, by their following their talking points, by their extraordinary negotiation skills. So those many of them are now some in Doha, some are holding cabinet positions in Kabul. And this brings me to my last point on those other people I'm making a case in the book that we need to negotiate with or engage with. Negotiations is all, of course, had happened previously but engagement and what do we mean by engagement. It is not necessarily recognition. And by the way, in the regional sense, they are for all practical purposes already recognized. Uzbekistan is giving them free electricity. They're already now talking to Tajikistan despite the border problems. Pakistan has its own linkages and control, not as dominant as before because now Doha is huge influence also. We learned the Prime Minister of Qatar landing in Kandahar having meeting with Mullah Abatullah and that explains that influence, UAE, Turkey, they all have influence and China, Chinese Prime Minister was recently meeting Muttaki, the Foreign Minister of Taliban as if he's meeting them ahead of a very important country. So Russia also is stuck in their own chaos and darkness will be Ukraine so that I'll leave that for the time being but China and other countries are already engaged with them. For us, the engagement means our interest on security, whether it is about some remnants of Al Qaeda or Daesh, it is about our investment also of 20 years. I don't think that all that investment has gone to the dogs. Taliban never burnt down Kabul. Taliban those who went into Kabul unlike Taliban 1.0 went into the ministries. They tried to hire more people of course they're bigotry about women, girls education and that is mostly coming from Kandahar and there's some evidence to that as well, but to give credit where do they are trying to I'll not say modernize, but adapt to the new Afghanistan that they are faced with. That's why engagement might be a word to go. And I'm the very last point I know I've come to the 20 point 20 minute kind of deadline is a point which in my various other events, never got a chance to talk about, which is the impact of the Diubandi School of thought, what Taliban's rise mean for the political movements in the Islamic world. I think this is I'm calling this a new religious movement also in some ways. Part of this is very bigoted part of this is very dogmatic, but we need to engage with that idea as well, because if this this this whole project succeeds also, it has other kind of implications for the regional and that's why Central Asian countries Uzbekistan I was in Uzbekistan before the book interviewed people and I asked them, you're kind of known for your progressive or secular views. How come this this kind of warmth with Taliban, and that is I learned out of fear, because they think there are people in those countries which can be inspired by Taliban Pakistan is paying through its nose by by supporting a one Taliban seeing Taliban Pakistan have done. I'll close by this just one paragraph and that's Peter I'll end it with this with my last paragraph of my book, but there's something in there which the message is important. I argue, ultimately, perhaps if those tasks with deciding the fate of Afghanistan were more compassionate and more thoughtful things would be different today. Sadly, that's not the case, but there are more pages to be written a destiny to be fulfilled. Only time will tell what the new fate creators will do with their friends. One can only hope they will write in the language of peace and poetry, not the dogmas strife and sorrow of yesterday's hands. Perhaps the issue at heart was our nine optimism have foreign interventions dangerously reminiscent of colonial endeavors proved to be effective ever I should have added. If there's anything to be said definitely. It is that the Afghan people deserve better, and that hope is not lost. We need to reimagine what and who the Taliban are today. It is worth remembering that shifting the lens from one of guns and graveyards to one of potential and peace is a burning desire and long awaited right of the people of Afghanistan in the land of poets mystics and melodies pieces not and cannot be impossible. Thank you. Thank you, Professor of us. Yeah, when I, when I was in Afghanistan, the last time it was controlled by the Taliban I remember having a conversation with two Afghan pilots, you know, and obviously, and they were flying for Ariana the at the national airline. Obviously, pretty educated and pretty relatively sophisticated and I and I said to them, you know, we will know what what's wrong with the Taliban but this was a 97, but they have bought peace. And they said, Well, you can have security in a prison. So clearly the war has sort of finished the Taliban have won their far better arm this time around I mean we left $7 billion the United States left $7 billion worth of military equipment behind the National Resistance front has is for the moment really they can't have it has no international support. They can't supply itself through Tajikistan like it did. The last time it was, you know, in the pre 911 era. There isn't any resistance to speak of. And so, on the, yeah, on the plus side the war is over on the minus side you have the Taliban better armed I think war extreme this time around because I, I hear I hear what you say about the pragmatic Taliban I'm not sure it makes really any difference because at the end of the day, this is not a democracy or anything close. It's a theocratic dictatorship and what the commander of the faithful says, even if people disagree with it they have to go along with it so his view is women shouldn't be educated above the age of 12, the women shouldn't work for the United Nations that women should only work in extremely can you know, like, pinning out women's toilets was what the mayor of Kabul said. The fact that there was this pragmatic element I'm not sure it really means anything it's like saying that, you know, there were pragmatists inside Stalin's cabinet, that might have been true. But, but does it really matter and so that really gets this question of engagement. Obviously, I mean I thought what you said is very interesting this sort of day factor recognition by the Chinese and the Turks and Qatar and the Pakistanis and it was back to Stalin and I mean, that's all true and it's to some extent even the United States is really on West and other US officials for specific purposes have had to engage with the Taliban. But what's, what's the end game here I mean, and I, this is not a. I don't think there's a good answer to this question, I mean, because it's a huge it's a terrible dilemma. You've got this theocratic dictatorship, which is actually, I think in many ways worse than the last time around. I mean, even the pre 911 Taliban didn't ban you and women from working with UN, which is of course the UN is very dependent on women working for it to provide services to millions of Afghans, but many of whom are women. So, and then on the other hand, you know, if you if you don't deal with them, 97% of the population is living below at or below the poverty line. It's a cute hunger. So it's a dilemma and I just be curious to see sorry for my extended question, but you prompted a lot of a lot of questions and thoughts. I mean what, what, let's start with the United States and then let's just start with, you know, allied countries. You should the United States and countries like, you know, the UK and EU countries be doing. And, you know, you mentioned the de facto recognition in a sense is that sort of good enough with the Prime Minister of Qatar being in coming to speak to, you know, is that is that probably the better the best approach out there. I wish we don't know. I really appreciate the comments because these you touched upon all the important points also these are strong counter arguments to my point, but starting off for I mean of course when we talk about democracy and values these are very important, but most of our partners are dogmatic authoritarian monarchies. So so democracy is in terms of the partnership is never been the top priority it should be. I would absolutely agree. When I said pragmatic or why this Taliban are different and then I'll come to this question on US and allied countries what we need to do, or what are the possibilities and you're right they're no good answers. They are bigoted. They are extremists in the same way they were before, especially the Kandahar group, the only difference is there's this the power equilibrium between Kandahar and Kabul is something to really watch about. There was no such thing before. And women yes they are curved they step by step they're pushing back. In fact, but also that there is no shuttle cock workers in Kabul, the women are also in fact there's if there's any one group. This is what I'm showing defines to Taliban it is women of Afghanistan, who are constantly continuously protesting these hazard young women others educated. There's so many pictures and videos of that happening in Afghanistan regularly. I think that that that is that is different. Also, when I talk to many members of the minority communities of the Sufi groups in the sheer groups. There are changes some some changes are very clear. For instance, unlike the massacres of the Shia Hazara, the last time around in the demolishing of the Buddha statue. Also, this time, the Ashura processions which is the sheer mostly commemorated by shares and Sufis, but also by many Sunnis. There's fixed days for that. Those days had approached right after the Taliban take over in August 2021. Taliban allowed that to happen. They allowed the black flags that the black flags that tragically are now associated with Daesh, but those are also the black banners are for commemoration of Karbala for many shares and Sufis, those were allowed. I interviewed many people I said this in I think one major news network that Taliban are not as harsh against the Shia Hazaras and Sufis and I received many calls from my friends from Afghanistan also who said this is only for show in the urban areas because they know international media is there. They in the rural areas they're kicking out everyone from shares from the jobs they're taking away their land so they're these contradictions there. However, I would argue that there is relatively more attempt of engagement from the Taliban side today, then was the case in the previous regimes. That's why, as you mentioned Ambassador Tom West, I think a very thoughtful diplomat, he among very, our Doha office also, I think they're regularly meeting people. They have a very good understanding of the profiles of different people. They are not trying to micromanage perhaps they cannot. But if I had to guess about the Katri Prime Minister's visit to Kandahar, I would think this was this happened because of the Western pressure. Most likely US this is my guess, and because he realizes that he cannot stay in that world that he wants to operate in and he's getting defines from among all the people surprisingly by by Siraj Hakani who challenged him twice or twice. And this was not a figment of anyone's imagination, because right after that Zabir La Mujahid, the spokesperson of Taliban, a kind of criticized Hakani. So these debates, I'm not saying they've become pluralistic, these internal debates and the fact that these debates are not leading to violent conflict is kind of a sign of hope to me that those pragmatic elements, not necessarily Siraj Hakani it's very hard to categorize him as a pragmatic with blood of American soldiers and so many others on his hands. But in the current circumstances, he he's operating and acting as someone who's on the side of the pragmatics who want to engage with others as well. What we can do further is not try to micromanage, but try to build on the regional consensus, because I'm convinced that if Iran Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, UAE and Qatar, and China maybe. These five, six countries have a consensus on girls education, for example, and if they're representative of these six, seven countries, walk into Kabul or to Kandahar and give an ultimatum. That will be more powerful than anything else and Taliban will have to abide by. So US should be thinking not only of bilateralism, which which which was throughout the case in our engagement, other than some allies who are there. You can just ask the Brits, ask the Europeans how much say they had in the our policy making towards Taliban or Afghanistan during the 20 years, you will get different answers, and especially it changed initially it was strong when especially with NATO and and those cases it was strong but ultimately became our decision negotiations whereas was our decision. So, this time around, we need to be multilateral, we need to engage more with the regional countries, because some of our interests are still at stake in Afghanistan. Yeah, I mean, I, I hear you, I, but at the same time, you know, when the Taliban were a power last time three countries did recognize them Pakistan, UAE and Saudi Arabia no one is recognized and this time precisely on the issue of girls education and treatment and women in jobs. It seems that there are people ready to recognize them I mean clearly. I think people have made it clear to the Taliban that they're not going to be recognized if they don't change their approach to, to, to women and girls. But they could, their approach has actually got worse in the last two years not better. I mean so I hold, look, I may be great if we could wave a magic wand over this and they, because I think what has happened is a classic mirror imaging problem here which is. We assume that because we would do the following if we were in charge in Afghanistan. We assume that they want international recognition so much that they will actually change the key part of their ideology, which is, because that's what we would do. This is a huge mistake that any intelligence professional would not make. In fact, you know when you spent 20 years fighting a religious war, which you then have a divinely ordained victory. The last thing you're going to do is give up what you regard as a very important part of your ideology and I, you know, I think that, you know, we've been and I say we I mean lots of people have been including the people who negotiated this terrible agreement with the Taliban suffered from a great deal of wishful thinking about who they are and what they were going to do. Because they've done nothing we now have two years of evidence right so it's not like it's almost two years and August the 15th, 2021. Their repression has actually deepened and you say that, you know they're not killing has our as well. That's a pretty low bar. And by the way, I don't think it's impossible that they might. You know, we're early days right I mean that that can change. And certainly, I think you know some what you're saying about, you know, in the rural areas, you know they're probably actually doing more repression than than has been reported so I just, you know I wish I wish that you know that all the wishful thinking was true but it turns out that none of it was true. I do think I'm entirely agree with you, but I entirely entirely agree with you to an extent that what you mentioned is very, very accurate about and about the Kandahar base time. I'm seeing those in Kabul have different approach and for example I was interviewing senior member of the Taliban, and I asked this question about girls education and this was in within the last year. Just before the book went to press and I wanted to look at the funny things of my conclusions, and he kind of confronted me by saying, he said, you think we are not concerned about our daughters one of my daughter is studying in Qatar, the other one is studying post graduate and want to be a scholar in UAE. Many Taliban leaders were holding important cabinet positions are very clear about these issues. The hope is I'm saying that some of them might be able to push and change the agenda or reverse it. And having said that, let's say for the sake of argument, this idea of how extreme they are on the side for a second. The second large point is that tragically is the reality. And in many parts of the world, changes happen changes are happening in Saudi Arabia. So five years ago, whenever we would use the word Wahhabism, we were using it in terms of extreme bigotry, the number of people who were under distress in Saudi Arabia in my minority communities was huge women couldn't drive. So this is change of one man, MBS. I'm not saying I'm a big fan of him, but the changes that are happening. So that negativity about Wahhabism is there are many people who are rethinking things change. The current reality is and what was happening previously Saudi Arabia now that the society remains very conservative in certain rural areas. What I'm saying is this, we cannot say that this is just Taliban being very dogmatic they have some support base in some rural areas where a mix of tribalism extremist worldview lack of education is forcing them to be on the side of Taliban. It will be better for the internal reaction to happen pushing back Taliban. It will be a great day when Taliban Afghans will push back Taliban and there is more democratic order or some of those who left Afghanistan with all the investment of them. The Dostams, the Ismail Khans, the Atta Muhammad Noors, the Karsai's, the Abdullah Abdullah's, they two of them are still there, but many others who we thought are the greatest partners they are the most enlightened people. Where are they? Because that's we thought they're bringing tourism and democracy. None of them stood there. Some of them should have thought about getting killed there so that they could have some honor in their life. So if those were the partners and if those are the people we are again hoping, there are people in Washington DC who are making a case today. Let's start with the NRF, the opposition support. Let's the opposition show that they are capable of defying it and then we support them. But at the moment, Taliban are at the helm of phase. I personally think and I'm not happy to have this confusion. It's painful for me being my roots in that region also and seeing what they have done to so many people. I say it out of very traumatic understanding of these issues that they are at the helm of phase. They're not going anywhere in five to seven years. And we only have to look, we have used the use of force option before. So this time it has to be more creative, some more skills, some more pressure, push them, sanctions. I think some of the sanctions are the right way to push them because Taliban are not ready to give up electricity. Taliban, with their top members having a million followers on Twitter, they're dependent on internet, they're dependent on all these things. These are all tools in our pocket which we can use. The day the internet is switched off, that's a way we can push them and pressurize them. So there are ways still to work with them through diplomatic channels, also some pressures which may empower some of the relatively pragmatic elements. That's my point. I hope you're right, but you know, according to the most recent UN report and we're going to have another one coming soon, you know, 41 cabinet or sub cabinet members of Taliban are already sanctioned so it's like, you know, we've also like the history of sanctions as you know, Hassan is actually producing regime change behavior. It's not a very rich example that's all going to be South Africa. There's all going to be Iran during the Obama years, but generally speaking, you know, regimes like North Korea, or the Taliban, we started sanctioning the Taliban before 911. You know, so the sanction regime has been around for a long time. Anyway, I hope you're right. And when you say they're going to be around for a while, I don't disagree. In fact, I more than don't disagree, I completely agree. For the reasons we've already discussed that better arms, there's no really strong opposition of any kind. What exists is outside in Tajikistan, it's not inside the country in any meaningful way. There are, you know, pockets of resistance, but it's very minor. But there are some things that can change the politics around this and I'd like you perhaps to reflect on them so we talked about the azaris. You know, when Obama changes mine on Iraq is because the ice because ISIS was threatening genocide on the ZD so, you know, Vice President Biden and Tony Blinken negotiated withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011 three years later, it could change his mind so the politics can change a President Trump in 2024 2025 could change his mind a President, Nikki Haley could change her mind a, you know, or a Democratic president could change his or her mind. If the if some things change so that the one thing would be the Taliban engaging in some sort of ethnic cleansing. Another would be Europeans showing up in Afghanistan for training who really were clearly planning attacks in Europe. Another would be an attack on an American target in the region I'm not saying in the United States that seems implausible. Another would be a major terrorist attack in India. So, you know, I'm not going to go into Lashkarat Tiber in Afghanistan. And the list goes on I mean so I do think the politics right now there. It's all good for them. And then of course you can have Afghans, you know, it is mass starvation in Afghanistan which is not at all out of the question that can change the politics around this as well so you won't. Beyond like how the situation might change. Very important points I think it can change also in the same train of thought and which I think, in comparison to the other cases you mentioned, unfortunately more likely that dash we know is quite active there still they were able to actually create big trouble for for Taliban themselves. Dash with some more footprint and so many other militant groups like Tariqa Taliban Pakistan, for example, trying to convince Afghan Taliban do something about them hand them over they were not handed over. And now Taliban are saying we'll move them into the other areas. So Taliban links with some of these extremist militant organizations are still intact. And in this day and age, with, with, with the access to internet and with so many other ways and the ease of move from Pakistan to Pakistan or to Iran, or even to Central Asia, and, and some terrorist activity happens in any European country or in the region or God forbidden in any way these places, then things will change very, very quickly. And I was mentioned this to one of my Taliban friends if I may call and enter one of the interlocutors who's a common friend between the Taliban and myself who arranged many interviews for me in Afghanistan. I was mentioned this to him. He said this is, this is one of the factors at play. Previously, we knew that Siraj Hakanis we even had just one picture of him on the FBI website. We were not fully aware of where the military commanders are. Now we have a much better picture. If we could take out al-Zawairi inside Kabul. We know where the office offices of Ministry of Interior Defense are. So these people are much more people are not say they are setting ducks but they, we have much better idea about their whereabouts, and the drone technology has also improved significantly. So they know also that if things change, it will be 15 strikes in the top 15 to 20 people Taliban leaders if they are taken out, it will have a huge impact. Let me ask you a son, so you're a former senior Pakistani police officer and so you mentioned the Pakistani Taliban, which seems to a large degree to be now headquartered in Afghanistan. And, you know, this, we're talking about policy dilemmas that Pakistanis got what they wanted which is Taliban running Afghanistan. At the same time, it comes at a pretty heavy price with the Pakistani Taliban launching a lot of I mean the packs as you know the Pakistanis themselves have carried out air strikes against Pakistani Taliban positions in Afghanistan. So, what's your view about where the Pakistanis are in terms of this policy dilemma. The Pakistanis are paying through their nose for their policy blenders and that is also tragically some not something new. One of the scholars and experts, including myself, we have been saying this for a long time that TGP and Afgan Taliban are two sides of the same coin. And Pakistan decided to continue to support the Afgan Taliban with their sanctuary whether their families, houses in Kuwaita or Peshawar or even Karachi. Mullah Omar had died in a hospital, the most advanced hospital in Karachi in 2013. So the point is, Pakistan's looked the other way and they were totally, they showed as if they are totally surprised when TGP, Afghan Taliban linkage was it seemed like an unbreakable bond of love and affection and alliance. So the Pakistani policy was initially they started getting some of them back. Those peace deals which had empowered the Taliban Pakistan in the first go. So in some ways I see Pakistan is not learned from any lessons. Now they are negotiating. They did some strikes as well. In Afghanistan, they pushed Taliban as well. And Afghan Taliban came out with very strong critical statements, whether it was Mullah Yaqub or some other leaders, because Pakistan is a very unpopular country in Afghanistan today. So their policy options are quite limited. There is some likelihood if TGP becomes stronger because we are hearing about different groups that had earlier splintered. They are merging. It's only a matter of time. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. There are other extremist groups like LET and Lashkar-e-Taybah is no more that active or strong like the way they used to be. They were somewhat dismantled but Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is very strong. LET and their linkages with Daesh are very strong. It's only a matter of time. And I think I'd heard one of the U.S. senior officials saying this in a Congressional testimony as well. It's a matter of six months to one year that these groups will be strong. Pakistan is so much stuck in its internal political-civil-military conflict that I'm not sure whether they are spending some really good quality time thinking about Afghanistan. If I have to project, they will make the same mistake by thinking that Afghan Taliban are their best friends even if it costs them internally. And that seems to be the direction, tragically. In the last quarter of an hour, we're going to turn to audience questions. So first one is from Martin Smith, who's the producer of a really excellent PBS series on the return of the Taliban. And his question, you alluded to these WhatsApp messages between Ambassador Khalzad and Mullah Baradar. I was just asking, would you, would you, would these ever come to light? Have you spoken to either man about them? And I would just add, since you've sort of raised this issue, I mean, we, we have the House Foreign Affairs Committee, you know, pushing for the descent cable, which has now been read by members of the committee. You've got that committee pretty active on this. Presumably they could ask Khalzad to testify and also produce some of these messages. On Zalmi Khalilzad, I can one mention, initially when I started talking to people for the book, I interviewed many and almost, almost every government official in the Department of State or Department of Defense, tried to blame everything on Zalmi Khalilzad. Just because of that evidence, I developed a little sympathy for the man, because I said everyone, no one is ready to take the blame. At the end of the day, it was the President of United States, President Trump, who had given a go ahead, who we know from various other books also was often heard shouting in the White House saying, where is my deal. And then Secretary of State at that time was fully on board. So Zalmi Khalilzad was given a task. He was the best man for the task because of his linguistic skills because of his background because of his knowledge. So he was trying to accomplish what he was tasked to do. Yes, of course, if we had differed in any way, he should have given up. I think he was all for it. He's a politically ambitious man as well. But he was also very capable. The way he interacted with the Pakistani intelligence and Afghans, it was something to be seen as very skillful in the negotiation terms. However, I heard from many people who were part of the negotiated negotiations, that what was happening in the room during the negotiations was often, they were missing gaps and they would later on know that in the evening or one of these days in between the negotiations, Zalmi Khalilzad continuously was engaged with Mullah Baradir, and they were different understandings. And Mullah Baradir at that time was shuttling between Afghanistan and between Doha and at times to Pakistan and going to Mullah Abedullah, getting the orders. So Zalmi Khalilzad was ahead of the rest of the negotiation team. But then the rest of the negotiation team, who later on is objecting with all the disrespect at that time, rather than now they have a different position. At that time, they should have gone, either they should have resigned or they should have gone to their principles and say that this is something wrong happening. The biggest challenge was with from Zalmi Khalilzad is forcing Ashraf Ghani to release those 5000 Taliban leaders, actually not only Taliban, Daesh leaders, Al-Qaeda leaders. I had heard firsthand from those who were responsible for managing them and securing that base, and where these prisoners were kept, that at least around some say 350, some say 500. But there was a significant number, which were so dangerous and about whom we had such solid evidence of there being not only top category terrorists, but having networks. How we let them go is inconceivable for me. I mean, was there no C-130 to get them in one plane and take them out? Someone has to be answerable about those questions. And we do know that the final calls made in this regard by Zalmi Khalilzad, those questions probably will come out. There's a Afghanistan Commission also. I'm forgetting the full name, which will investigate these things and look at the lessons learned. We must go through that learning process. Only then the full story will come out. The other chowdery who's a former New America fellow is the co-chair of that commission, and a couple of other New America commissioners, the cartig, among them. You know, JFK after the Bay of Pigs said, the victory has 100 fathers and defeat is an orphan. And so when, you know, there's a lot of people who are running away from this agreement because it was such a spectacular failure. And, you know, and Khalilzad is the principal architect of that. So it's not surprising that he's taking. And, you know, obviously he was working with the instructions of President Trump and also Secretary Pompeo and President Biden. They went through with the agreement, despite the fact that Taliban wasn't observing key parts of the agreement, which is entering into good faith for negotiations with the Afghan government. They are really cracking down on terrorist groups on its territory, neither of which it did. So the only part of the agreement that the Taliban really went along with was, we won't attack the Americans on the way out the door, which was a pretty easy thing to do because that's what they wanted to happen. So, we have a lot of other questions. So, from Mark Kustra, does Pakistan have still ever have as much influence of the Taliban as they did before the fall of the Ghani government? A lot of questions, I think, and I investigated that a bit in more detail and I talked to all the people who were directly working from Pakistan with the Taliban. And when the Pakistani intelligence chief had landed for the cabinet formation years, I think he was able to get five or six of his folks in the cabinet. There was one person, for example, Noor Mohammad Saqib, who's a graduate of Madrasa Haqqaniyan. I talked to Madrasa Haqqaniyan folks, I had gone to them actually asking them that seven or eight of your members were graduates of Madrasa Haqqaniyan now in cabinet. And they corrected me, no, not seven or eight, they are 17. And that list is in the book as well. Can I also give a quick clarification on that, because that's very interesting. So, if you, when you take on the name Haqqani, is that basically saying that you're a graduate of the Haqqaniya Madrasa outside Peshawar? Absolutely, thank you for asking this. Yes, this is an old Madrasa, called Madrasa Haqqaniyan. Anyone who's a graduate of this Madrasa gets this title Haqqaniyan. So this is not a tribe. Many of the Siraj Haqqani's and Jalaluddin Haqqani, they are from Zadran tribe. And that's from where the new acting Prime Minister Kabir also is from that Zadran tribe. But this is a link, this is like a title you're from Harvard or Yale, something like that. Nothing to do with your tribe. And 17 of the graduates of this university are now in the kind of almost 40 member cabinet in Afghanistan. When I asked them, I said, okay, I want to know about the profiles. There was this and this is about Pakistan's influence. There is this one person, Nur Mohamed Saqib, who's currently Hajj Affairs Minister, and he was known as the most sectarian of the guys, some of the entire Shia and entire Sufi Fatwas edicts were given by him in Pakistan. He was seen as such an extremist within Pakistan that the Madrasa Haqqaniya thought of failing him at one point. He had said that he wanted to publish some articles, they refused to publish his articles. He was such an extremist and Taliban were able to get him as a ministry of Hajj Affairs of all the positions. So Pakistan is influence through their government intelligence agency. Another example, I asked this to one of the lead Pakistani intelligence agents, that Mullah Yaqub, son of Mullah Umar, who's now the Defense Minister, that he has been saying nasty things about Pakistan. He laughed and he said, well, his family's in Karachi and we gave him a special plane to go and see his family. Let's see how many times more he can say this about Pakistan. Some of my friends said. Sorry, it's because we're running out of time and I want to get to it as many questions that we can. So there are two questions, one from Felipe and one from Dr. Kiran Pervez. They're basically essentially relates to what you're talking about. So what is the influence of the Deobandi tradition on the Taliban? What does Deobandi mean in this context and how does it influence their thinking? Thank you so much. I'll be brief. Deobandi is a political sect of the Sunni Hanafi Islam. Within the Sunni there are four schools of thought. There's Hanafi, which is a traditional Islamic school of thought, mostly followed by people in South Asia. That has a subset which is linked to a madrasa again. These madrasas have done terrible things in the region. I mean, sorry. To those who are the followers who like those for any reason. Deobandi tradition historically was an anti-colonial movement. So it had a political component and it is still Deoban school is still in India today. The Indian Deobandis kind of stayed towards more middle path. The Pakistani Deobandis started becoming more extremist. The Jamaat-e-Ollumai Islam, JUAF is a big political party. And then this is the Afghan jihad years, which made the Deobandi schools in Khyber Pakhtun for Pashtun areas more militant, more assertive. Because they were a minority Sunni school in Pakistan. They received most of the funding from at that time Gulf and Saudi Arabia. They became under the dictatorship. Today, the Deobandiism that Pakistan and Afghanistan season. Deobandi initially had no roots in Afghanistan. Afghanistan had strong Sufi roots also. But today's Deobandiism is from madrasa Haqqaniya. Madrasa Haqqaniya also is more of a traditional school now. And then I saw their curriculum. These war mongers and warriors that came out of the Afghan jihad and the Taliban movement and now holding power in Kandahar are really part of the problem. That wing or that segment of Deobandism has become really, really problematic. And that is very different from the mainstream Deobandism in India and Pakistan. This is a question from Senj sharing so about Iran, obviously there have been these border clashes between the Iranians and the Taliban. Yeah, before the last time the Taliban were in power you would call the nine Iranian diplomats were killed by the Taliban they Iran and Afghanistan almost went to war over that and think it was 98. So, the Iran Iran side is sort of complex relationship with the Taliban we've had leaders of the Taliban in Iran, living. What's the state of play right now between Iran and the Taliban they obviously Iran has a big embassy in Kabul. There are a lot of Afghan refugees in Iran. Some of those Afghans have been recruited for into Iranian militias for sort of Iran's own purposes. So what, how would you characterize the state of play right now. I have a subsection of a chapter on Iran, Iran is very actively involved in Afghanistan they have, by and large, a reasonably good relationship with them surprisingly. In fact, I heard that Mullah Abdullah in Kandahar is building a new security force are trained, which which is led by former Soviet Union trained Afghan Colonel. This is his Noorzai tribe, but the idea for this new IRCG type unit was given by Iran. Iranians are the ones who are also not only active in Kabul but they met Hibatullah also one of the few senior folks who met Hibatullah as well. And they they have some influence over that their water disputes and others, but the Iranian extension or extended kind of space in in Afghanistan, they are jubilant about it in Herat in other areas as well. Many people think Iran will necessarily work closely with the, with the Afghan shears or hazard that is not true. We know that the Iranian strategy was beyond these sectarian networks, and I think there are some water problems but overall, Iran, my project Iran will work closely with Taliban in coming years they they will offer them some training support as well that's what I'm hearing. Okay, and just one time for one final question from Narayan Kumar. How would you compare the leadership today of the Taliban compared to Mullah Omar. Is there other. Good question. Mullah Omar was not was not trained cleric. Mullah Hibatullah is so he has more credibility among the religious scholars, because he's called in some sheikh hadith, the expert on on on the hadith side which is the saints of Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him, and he so he he's more of a cleric and more of of an educationist. He was never a military commander himself. So he has more, it is in his interest to use the Sharia, they're they're distorted version of Sharia model much more. That's why we'll see many idiots that's why he's, he's creating trouble for those in Kabul, by telling them actually a Pakistani group visited Hibatullah, and he was kind of very rude to them, and telling them what do you know about the school because I am a teacher of this area so this is leadership is less pragmatic. He's less for engagement. He's more theoretical and he is this illusion. He said that in one of his speeches and I close with that that he said that the whole Muslim mama is looking at him, the Muslim mama is not looking at him. His more success for Hibatullah might be very problematic for the political Islamic movements in the region and even globally. Well, that raises one quick final question for me which is. So when Hibatullah says that he is the commander of the faithful. He is making the case that he is the commander of all Sunni Muslims, as much more than just Afghans right. True, and that is very problematic the title what he use Amirul Momineen that was used for the first four very important Islamic caliphs. And no one is challenging him I get surprised often if he had called himself caliph or a leader, a supreme leader, like the Iranians. He is in some ways following the Iranian model, I think. But his his claim that he has this religious authority is actually not accepted even in Pakistan. It is only some of ones who are close to him who are accepting this. It is only he who is fooling himself, I think, or I would like to believe. Well, thank you for your time today. The book is the return of the Taliban and great review in the New York review of books, and thank you for sharing your insights and your knowledge today. And thank you to the audience for listening. Thank you so much we really appreciate.