 I don't have to do anything right now. I have to stand at the podium, but you can't if you wish. Either way. OK, that's fine. Hi, sorry we're a little late. Good afternoon. My name's Michael Swain. I'm a senior associate here at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I work on China slash Asia related security issues. I've been here for about 14 years working on that. Before that, I was at the Rand Corporation. And it's my pleasure today to be presenting to you and moderating a discussion with Stephen Lilly, my left, who is the director of the Asia Pacific Directorate in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK government. Stephen was former ambassador to the Philippines from 2009, 2013, but also has been associated more broadly with the Asia Pacific Directorate and group within the FCO for many years. Going back, I think, to the 1980s, is it? Yes, the late 80s. 1980s, late 80s. So he's a veteran. He was also a UK Consul General in Guangzhou and director of the UK Trade and Investment Office in India, so very much of an old Asia hand and a China hand in particular, speaks Mandarin. And involved with Asia Pacific Policy for the UK is, at this point in time, a very interesting period, as we all know. Growing trade and investment in Asia, Asia is fast becoming the major driver of global development in many ways, especially China. But also growing concerns, particularly in Washington, about continued stability, the implications of China's economic slowdown for stability economically and, to some degree, also concerns about China's growing imprint in Asia and elsewhere on the security front. All of this producing a lot of turbulence that makes, I'm sure, Stephen's job interesting. As the UK looks towards its Asia policy, and as we well know, the UK has been very actively engaged in improving and enhancing its position in Asia and working with major countries in the region, and particularly China. Probably in all of its relations in Asia, from a Washington perspective, as I said to Stephen a minute ago, the most notable two elements of the UK policy have been with regard to China. One of them has to do with the UK's decision to become a founding member of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which then, in some ways, opened the door to the entrance into that founding membership of other European countries and allies of the United States, as well as Asian ones. And the second was the dynamics surrounding President Xi Jinping's recent state visit to the UK, where there was an enormous emphasis by Prime Minister Cameron and other senior UK officials about the importance of the UK-China relationship and the need to have closer relations. And Prime Minister Cameron, in fact, making a comment about UK-China relations being the best among the West, which was an interesting comment to make. So both of these incidents, both of these activities, have generated a lot of commentary, a certain amount of criticism, to some degree, in the United States, much of which I think is overblown. But nonetheless, it has certainly brought the UK and its position in Asia into a greater level of attention in Washington. So we're really lucky to have today Ambassador Lilly here to speak to us about the UK's policy towards the Asia-Pacific. He'll speak for about 20, 25 minutes, and then we'll have a Q&A. Stephen, over to you. Well, Michael, thank you very much for the kind invitation. And it's always a pleasure to be in Washington, DC. And it's a real honor to have the opportunity to address such an important and well-informed audience here at the Carnegie Endowment. My thanks go to Michael and his team for hosting me here today. The pleasure for me also to take a couple of days away from the office in London, from following the discussions of the Chinese National People's Congress, from looking forward to the Korean Workers' Party Congress in May, and to experience some real politics here in the US, to see close up the election process, which is transfixing many of us in the UK, to find out what the experts really think about the electoral prospects of Frank Underwood. But in all seriousness, television is not a bad place for me to start. In Britain, the news screens are dominated by the EU debate, by European migration, by Russian aggression, by the Middle East, and by the US primaries. Asia gets a lot less airtime. But my central message today is that despite this, Asia, and in particular East Asia and the Pacific, for which I am responsible, matters to the United Kingdom. In my remarks today, I will describe the UK's growing engagement with the Asia Pacific region. I will highlight its importance to Britain and Europe as an engine of global growth and prosperity. I will reject the perception that our engagement is limited to commerce or to any single country in the region. The importance of Asia Pacific to Britain is strategic as well as economic. And while we're enthusiastic about the opportunities, we, like the US, are also concerned about the trend towards strategic tension. Against that background, the case for transatlantic dialogue and collaboration in the region is as strong as ever to ensure a prosperous and stable Asia Pacific underpinned by respect for the rules-based international order. The UK, of course, is no stranger to Asia Pacific. We've been trading with the continent for four centuries. The historic, political, and people-to-people links are numerous, nowhere more so than in Commonwealth countries like Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore, with whom we also have a unique military partnership in the form of the five powers defense arrangements, or with Brunei, where we have a military garrison. Our links are particularly evident in Hong Kong, where the common law system and separation of powers are an essential British legacy, and the cornerstones of that city's continuing success as an economic and financial hub. Distance was never an inhibition to British engagement with Asia, and it is even less of an obstacle in a networked world. Since David Cameron first became Prime Minister in 2010, the British government has been looking east with renewed vigor, with a deliberate increase in diplomatic resources, high-level visits, and new bilateral dialogues. This is our very own pivot to Asia, or if you prefer, our very own rebalance. We have invested in new partnerships, upgrading our relations with China, and devoting new attention to the emerging powers of ASEAN, where we now have an ambassador or high commissioner in all 10 capitals. One of the big news stories of last year, as Michael alluded to, was President Xi Jinping's state visit to London, and it was a huge success in public and in private. But I'd also like to highlight the fact that Prime Minister Cameron's first visit outside Europe, following his re-election last May, was to Jakarta, Singapore, Hanoi, and Kuala Lumpur, a clear signal of commitment to ASEAN and the importance that we attach to it. As the centre of Asia's economic and security architecture, and as the world's newest single market. And just this Monday, we hosted the Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister in London for the UK-Vietnam Strategic Dialogue. Our British rebalance has also meant reinvesting in established friendships with Australia and New Zealand, home between them to almost 1.5 million Britons, to South Korea, where our soldiers fought shoulder to shoulder in the Korean War, and which is now also a key partner for high-tech collaboration. And with Japan, a country whose existing investments in the north-east of England alone produce more cars than the whole Italian automotive sector, whole Italian automotive industry, and which has now established itself as Britain's closest security partner in the region. Our engagement with Asia Pacific is structured according to the three pillars of the government's national security strategy published last December. Protecting our people, projecting our global influence, and promoting our prosperity. These are largely self-explanatory, but it's important to note that a key element of the projecting global influence objective includes promoting respect for and protecting the integrity of the rules-based international order. There is no disputing that prosperity is a key driver of our engagement with Asia Pacific, as it is for other European states and for the US. This will continue to be the case. Even as the Chinese economy enters its most challenging period, since the relaunch of reform and opening by Deng Xiaoping in 1992, the fact remains that Asia Pacific will be one of the essential engines of global growth. The British government is supporting our companies to expand their business in the region, both by hands-on trade development assistance and by leading the push to expand the European Union's network of free trade agreements with different Asia Pacific countries. The EU career free trade agreement is already delivering significant benefits to the UK exporters of goods and services. Agreements with Vietnam and Singapore await ratification. The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement is at an advanced state of negotiation. We want to see negotiations on the EU-Thailand free trade agreement in a bayon since the 2014 military coup we started. But the idea that the UK is only interested in commerce in Asia is wide of the mark, just as it would be equally wrong to say that the US is only interested in security. The two are inseparable. You can't have a prosperous region if its member nations feel insecure. That is why we have been steadily upgrading our defense cooperation with Japan, including through a two plus two mechanism, the latest round of which was held in Tokyo in January. Corresponding mechanism with Australia, known as Orkman, takes place in London in spring, and Asian security will be top of the agenda. As the only Western member of the P5 countries to have an embassy in Pyongyang, we take a close interest in the threat to international peace and security posed by the DPRK. And we cosponsored last week's Security Council Resolution 2270 in response to the recent North Korean nuclear test. We have been an active contributor to domestic peace processes in Southeast Asia, in the Southern Philippines, and in Burma, drawing in part on our successful experience of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. We will continue to support both these processes beyond the forthcoming political transitions in both countries. And we will continue to work with Indonesia and Malaysia to counter the threats of extremism and terrorism. Our engagement with Asia Pacific is underpinned at every level by our support for fundamental global values, including human rights, democracy, and respect for the rules-based international order, which we have worked jointly with the US to promote and project over the past 70 years. From speaking up for democracy in Burma and Thailand, to highlighting human rights abuses in Vietnam and China, to championing the rules-based trade and investment regime across the continent, we and the rest of the European Union reject the proposition that Asia should operate according to a different set of rules or values to the rest of the global system. Indeed, the example of Burma is particularly poignant in this regard as that country goes through a remarkable period of transition from dictatorship to democracy. Britain and the United States and other like-minded partners can take satisfaction in the support that we have offered to the Burmese people on this journey over many years. Although significant challenges remain there, this transition should stand as an inspiration to the rest of Southeast Asia. For together, the ASEAN member states have the potential, if they choose to make their region a model of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and open trading economies in Asia Pacific. Britain's emphasis on the rules-based international order is nowhere more relevant than in respect of the situation that we currently see in the South China Sea. The tensions we see there worry Britain and Europe, just as they worry you here in the United States. Be clear, Britain, like the United States, does not take a position on the individual claims in the South China Sea. We do take a view on how they are pursued. The UK opposes any actions which are likely to increase tensions in the South China Sea, including militarization. We urge all parties to exercise restraint, to pursue the settlement of disputes peacefully in accordance with international law, and to uphold freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight. We are taking a close interest in the international arbitration in the Hague and have stated publicly that its decision will be binding on all parties. I hope it's clear that we in Britain take a broad view of our interest in Asia Pacific and that our engagement spans the region. Ours is an all of Asia policy. Or to paraphrase Lyndon B. Johnson, when it comes to the Asia Pacific, Brits can walk and chew gum. Accordingly, the proposition that we're only interested in China and that that interest is exclusively commercially driven is wrong. Yet I am well aware that this is not necessarily the view in parts of Washington and that there have been misgivings here about Britain's approach to China. So let me now say something about that particular element of our Asia policy. First, our China policy is ambitious. It is ambitious in scope, ambitious in terms of what we seek to achieve, ambitious in terms of what we expect of China. I will return to that. Second, our policy is based on openness. We are open to Chinese business and investment. For example, we are developing new areas of financial services cooperation between London, Hong Kong and Shanghai with the first renminbi clearing bank outside China and Hong Kong and the first RMB sovereign bond issue in Europe. We are welcoming China as an investment, as an investor in our new generation of civil nuclear power generation along with France and Japan. We are open to Chinese people. We have around 130,000 Chinese students in the UK. Our new two-year multiple entry visa service launched in January will facilitate increased numbers of students, business visitors and high net worth tourists. Our goal incidentally is to emulate the US 10-year multiple entry visa. And we are open to Chinese innovation and ideas, including on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank where UK and wider European involvement has produced a credible new institution which the World Bank and Asian Development Bank are willing to do business with. But openness is not a one-way street. So we are pressing hard for China to reciprocate the access that it enjoys in Europe with similar opening at home, including through a high quality EU-China Investment Treaty. And we have made clear to the Chinese that we have a stake in them successfully delivering the ambitious economic reform agenda which was set out at the third plenum. The extent of our economic interconnectedness makes this a crucial issue for the UK as for the US and other major economies. Openness does not mean being naive. Quote our foreign secretary. We approach China with our eyes open. British ambition goes hand in hand with British realism. We don't ignore the risks or avoid disagreements with China on international issues, including the use of cyberspace, on regional issues, including the South China Sea, or on Chinese domestic issues where we have a legitimate interest. For example, on human rights or on Hong Kong. Third point that I want to emphasise about our China policy is that it is not narrowly bilateral. It is anchored in our regional approach as part of our all of Asia policy, recognising the interdependences between what we do with China and our engagement with China's neighbours. And it seeks to multiply impact by working closely with the rest of the European Union, not just on free trade agreements, but because the EU is fundamentally a rules-based organisation committed to universal values. More than that, our policy seeks to engage China on the global stage. Hence the label we have agreed with Beijing of a comprehensive global strategic partnership. The defining challenges of the early 21st century cannot be tackled by one country alone, but through international partnership. Whether we are talking about climate change or global pandemics, international terrorism or nuclear proliferation, protection of intellectual property rights, or the humanitarian challenge of Syria, China as a leading global economy and a 21st century major power as a role to play. This is not what we hope to see, but what we require. As Spider-Man and some of our other great countrymen have said, Winston Churchill, Teddy Roosevelt among them, with great power comes great responsibility. China has derived great benefit from the post-war international settlement. It has a responsibility to support the rules-based international order and every interest in doing so. Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, many commentators describe the US-China relationship as one of competition and cooperation. I will close my comments today by suggesting that the same thing could be said, but in a much more positive way about transatlantic coordination on Asia Pacific. On the one hand, there has always been legitimate and healthy competition between friendly nations for commercial advantage in third countries, including in Asia. This will continue to apply between Europe and America as it applies within Europe itself. But this cannot disguise or stand in the way of our shared values and strategic interests, including in a prosperous and stable Asia Pacific region underpinned by respect for the rules-based international order. The tone of US and European discussion of Asia Pacific will sometimes vary. But when it comes to the substance, there is much less to divide us than some have suggested and much more to unite us. In that respect, the potential for transatlantic cooperation on Asia is as great as it ever has been. Thank you. Well, we have about half an hour for Q&A. I just want to take the, and I'll get to, but and others, the prerogative of the chair to ask you a question or two or get your comments on it. One of them is the future of the UK and the EU. A lot, I'm not asking you to predict anything about that. But I guess, I guess I would be interested in hearing your sense of what you think from your perspective, the stakes are involved in this for UK policy in Asia. If you, I mean, you made reference several times in your remarks to the EU and the EU's engagement in Asia and the UK has played a major role in that. Here to make any comments on how important you see this issue in affecting Asia policy. I may care to the press officer at the British embassy may not care for me to say very much. What I would say is we have, the Prime Minister has reached his renegotiation of our membership with the European Union and has now strongly recommended that the British people vote in favour of remaining in a reformed European Union. The British government sees that as firmly in the UK national interest. One of the reasons for that is because of the influence that our membership of the European Union gives us, the ability that it gives us to multiply our impact and more effectively achieve objectives. And I think that people in the US administration have spoken eloquently and effectively on that. And I think that the same of Asia-Pacific in a region where we are interested in the evolution of free trade through free trade agreements which the European Union is a real champion of and the UK within the European Union is a real champion of free trade but also in a region where the future of the rules-based international order is at stake a great deal to offer by way of example. My second question to you is another easy one, Hong Kong. Yeah, Hong Kong. Well, I do deal with Hong Kong. Yes. What's your sense about, first of all, what is the UK's position on the entire issue of the democracy movement in Hong Kong and the tensions that that has created within that former British colony? And going forward, what do you see as some of the problem? It's a very important issue for us, Hong Kong. It's important for a wide range of reasons. There are over 3 million people living in Hong Kong with different forms of British nationality. It is a hugely important international, financial and economic hub including for British business. But fundamentally what really matters about Hong Kong is that we signed an international agreement with China to return Hong Kong to China but on the premise of the one country, two systems principle with Hong Kong people running Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy with the retention of the capitalist system and all the rights and freedoms that they enjoyed under British rule. And ever since the handover in 1997 the UK government has closely monitored developments in Hong Kong. We have reported to Parliament every six months we continue to do that and that reflects our legal, political and moral obligations towards the people of Hong Kong about which we are very clear. Now, overall since 1997 one country, two systems has been a big success story. An enduring issue has been about the pace of movement towards democracy pace of movement towards democracy as provided for in the Hong Kong basic law. In Britain we don't approach this ideologically or dogmatically. Our view is that it is in Hong Kong's interests you have greater democracy that will improve the functioning of government that it will increase accountability of government and that democracy will be an important addition to the other essential ingredients of Hong Kong's success of which is above all the rule of law. And so we continue to advocate that we were disappointed that the modest proposals for further democratic reform last year were voted down. We still believe that it's in Hong Kong's interests to find a new way through on democracy and we believe that it's important that the Hong Kong government and the different democratic parties from across the political spectrum in Hong Kong re-engage with each other to continue the debate about how to move forward with democracy and not to put the democratic issue the constitutional reform issue on hold until the next administration. We don't see that as being... You didn't raise the issue of the booksellers but I'll pre-empt your next question which we have commented on in our regular six-monthly reports on Hong Kong. Our most recent one has said in very clear terms that we are concerned about the events around the disappearance of these five publishers and booksellers in Hong Kong. We are concerned about the implications for freedom of expression in Hong Kong. We're concerned about the specific implications of a British citizen being abducted. And we have said explicitly that that is a violation of the joint declaration and that is a significant criticism that we have made but we remain committed to and we remain ultimately confident in Hong Kong as a vibrant centre of the finance of the economy and of a centre that can make a real contribution to the future development of China as a whole. Thank you. Thank you, Steve. But do you still... Okay, I think your hand went up first. So please say briefly who you are, please, and limit your comment or questions to something quite short. Thank you. Bud Cole, National Defence University. Ambassador, thank you for your remarks. I wondered if you could cite Britain's position on the current dispute in the East China Sea, particularly with respect to the value of Senkaku Islands. Again, our approach to the East China Sea is very similar to our approach to the South China Sea. We don't take a position on the underlying sovereignty claims. We do take a position on how they are pursued and we have been concerned by the rising tensions in these China Seas and we worry about those because of the risks of escalation and the risks of escalation leading to unintended conflict. So, as with the South China Sea, we believe that it's essential that those claims are pursued peacefully and that there is dialogue to address those. I think you had your hand up second, sir. Go ahead. Yeah, Swamin Chattopadhan from the Indian Embassy. After the Dalai Lama's visit, for a certain period there was a stalemate in the relations between China and the UK. Then suddenly we saw that during Xi Jinping's visit, Redar carpet welcome and meeting with the Queen and everything. So, we were quite surprised and what was the reason for Britain to have such a sudden shift towards China and that's the thing. And in your speech you have mentioned so many times about rule-based economic or the international order. But that is one thing which has always been kind of in the leveling against China that it's not following the rule-based thing. So, how do you see your relations with China on this issue that rule-based thing? Okay, well, thank you very much for the question. Britain over successive governments has pursued strong and positive relations with China. We've seen the potential of China for a long time. We have long valued the importance of strong relations with China. 1997 in many ways was the big turning point when we completed the handover of Hong Kong and since then we have worked actively to build up the dialogues between China and the UK. We have a rich array of high-level dialogues in many ways and there are in those of the US we have a strategic dialogue an economic and financial dialogue a people-to-people dialogue. We have annual Prime Minister, stroke, Crimea level summits. Along the way there have been ups and downs as frankly there are in many bilateral relationships. And there was a significant difference of opinion during 2012 to 2013 related to Tibet. But we have moved on from there and since then we have returned to what I think is the normal course in UK-China relations which is to pursue strong and effective relations with China but relations which are underpinned by our values and by our national interest and that has not changed. The state visit is a little bit misunderstood and therefore I will just take a couple of minutes to talk about that. We do state visits every year in the UK we do two a year in enormous circumstances and since I've been doing my job I have been involved in the organisation of a state visit by the President of South Korea a state visit by the President of Singapore and a state visit by the President of the People's Republic of China. The format for these state visits is it's exactly the same. There are lots of golden carriages involved there are lots of beef eaters there are bagpipes there are state banquets there are thick red carpets and all of this the difference is that the media was a lot more interested in Xi Jinping's visit than it was in the visit of the President of Singapore and therefore there is this misperception that has grown up somehow we were doing something that was completely different for Xi Jinping's visit than we would do for other state visits. Of course the Prime Minister quite rightly devoted a lot of personal time and attention to that visit it would to my mind be ludicrous for the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to have the opportunity to build a personal relationship with the President of the world's most populous country and the world's second largest economy and then not to take that opportunity so he very likely was very closely involved. What I would also say about a state visit in the UK is that the pomp and pageantry of these events is at the fore these are not working level visits these are visits where we celebrate the relationship we show respect for the visitor we have many other occasions for difficult discussions with different countries and we have those difficult discussions including with China so do not judge the UK-China relationship on the basis of the state visit it's important to look at it in its totality final point on the state visit is just to say that the state visit projected fantastic images of the UK into hundreds of millions of TV sets and smartphones across China this has had a huge and beneficial impact on the perceptions of the Chinese people towards the UK I think sometimes as diplomats we are too focused on the government-to-government relationship when we're building relations and it's really important that we remember the people-to-people relationships and it's very important that we are shaping the positive perceptions of and informing people in China about the United Kingdom and I think I've achieved that David, David, Sydney David, Sydney with the CSIS and formally with the State and Defense Departments two related questions I appreciate it very much as I'm sure many people did your comments about the importance of transatlantic cooperation on issues particularly East Asia however, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank issue I and many others outside the administration criticized our mistaken strategy and our pathetic execution of it to present Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank but the perception is that the United Kingdom on that issue moved alone did not consult, did not work with and essentially backdoor the United States on this decision so our government was surprised by that that was seen outside the administration circles but by many people that I know as something that cut at that cooperation secondly, the United States and Japan as you recognized for both major Pacific powers both of us play-have a growing interest in the role of India whether it's as a balancing power to China as an ally but a different kind of relationship with India in many ways reflects values many more than the commercial interests in your presentation I didn't really hear the word India but when US and Japanese policymakers talk about China policy they invariably do focus on India so it seems to be another area where our strategic approaches are divergent well, thank you for those two questions and observations I mean on the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank I think it is important that we are as policymakers spending less time on post-mortar over the AIIB and that we are spending time talking to each other about how we ensure that we don't have that kind of misunderstanding or communication problem on a major issue of common interest again and so a big part of our job is to make sure that we are really tightly coordinated on difficult issues in future the point about the AIIB issue is that there are two legitimate points of view about how to shape the future of the AIIB the US administration took the view that the most effective way to shape it was by pressure from the outside the UK government took the view that the most effective way to shape it was by engaging from the inside and I said out in my speech why I think that our engagement from the inside along with European partners in Australia and New Zealand has had beneficial effects there was so much I think the anxiety about the AIIB it does reveal a very important point it reveals a very important point that the UK and US are two intensely strong and important friends and allies for each other and that's why it was surprising but the really important point is about our friendship and our alliance on India well I had three wonderful years as a diplomat in India and I apologise to our colleague from the Indian Embassy for not mentioning that in my presentation that is because my interests as Director Asia Pacific are congruent with Danny Russell's responsibilities as Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific and therefore India is not part of my purview but what I can say is that just as we have been building strong partnerships with emerging powers in East Asia so we are also building strong partnership with India which fulfils many of the attributes that I have discussed a country with which we have a long historical relationship, a country with which we have huge people to people including the very important Indian diaspora in the UK a country which subscribes to the same values of democracy as the UK does and so yes that is a relationship with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary our whole cabinet also invest in a huge effort Let's go somewhere in the back, yes ma'am Hi, my name is Mindy Cutler I'm Director of Asia Policy Point and we're a little think tank in town In 2013 the British government was the leader of the G8 in pressing a declaration on ending sexual violence and conflict Three days ago the Japanese government was condemned by the UN for its so-called agreement between itself and Korea and on its progress regarding the comfort women and they used as their support the UK government's support of these two statements Can you comment on that? What is the British government going to say to Japan? Because there were British comfort women and the Japanese government in its papers to the UN said that there were no evidence of coercion Well, I'll be honest and say I'm not completely up to speed with the specific document or announcement that you refer to I will say that we have welcomed the agreement that was reached at the end of last year between Japan and Korea on the comfort women issue It counters everything in the declaration that was done by promulgated by the UK with the G.A. All I can say is we have consistently encouraged Japan and South Korea to work together to resolve historical differences, very severe differences and we have welcomed the agreement that those two countries have reached as a positive step forward About the British comfort women I think we're going to have to go on to another question. Yes, sir Right there in the aisle No? Just in front, then I'll get to you Hi, I'm Prashant Parmaswarn with the Diplomat Magazine. Thanks a lot for your remarks. I'm wondering I had two specific questions on Southeast Asia The first is on Myanmar So Britain, among other countries, has been thinking hard about how it's going to engage Myanmar's military which is an interesting topic considering the NLD new government that's about to get into power I'm wondering if you could say some words about British engagement with Myanmar's military moving forward and how it's going to balance that with the new government in the country. And then secondly I'm wondering if you can talk a little bit about British perceptions about Thailand, specifically about some of the reversals and rights concerns that we've seen and I know that the EU and Britain in particular has a number of concerns, has expressed a number of concerns about rights concerns in Thailand with respect to fisheries but my specific concern is on dissidents and refugees some of whom are Chinese dissidents and refugees that have been repatriated into Thailand who have then disappeared and appeared in other countries including China. And this is a problem obviously that not only Britain is dealing with the United States and several other countries are dealing with it as well and I'm wondering if you think that the current approach that Britain has adopted towards Thailand with respect to its discussions with the Thai government is adequate to prevent further black sliding on rights and if not what more can Britain and other countries do to present this. Thanks. Okay well thank you starting with Myanmar or we referred to it as Burma still first of all I said in my speech we consider the transition in Burma to be quite a remarkable process and although that country faces considerable challenges going forward it's important first of all that we recognize the historic nature of what has been achieved about the transition from a military controlled government to a civilian led government about the successful way that elections were conducted and by the peaceful and orderly way that the transition is progressing it is clear that the Burmese government is going to face huge challenges going forward because the country faces immense challenges whether it's the different ethnic peace processes, the problems of the treatment of the Rohingya in Rakhine and just the sheer challenges of running a civilian government for the first time in decades and the British government is standing by Burmese people and by the new government and we will be providing significant forms of assistance as we have long been a major ODA donor to Burma we are engaging with the Burmese armed forces we have been engaging with them during the recent years of reform it is essential for the future stability of Burma that its armed forces take a different role and place in society and that place needs to be of a professional military accountable to and supporting the civilian administration and the UK like the US huge experience of how to run a professional civilian controlled military and because we do not have the same legal or congressional restrictions on us we are able to engage with the Burmese military to provide that kind of assistance and know how including by having some of our military go to Burma to exchanges with them and some Burmese military coming at different times to the UK we are not providing support for the military capabilities of the Burmese army we are providing support for their professionalization as an accountable military on Thailand the UK and the European Union have been very clear about the development since the 2014 coup if we talk about Burma moving forward as a positive example of democracy or if we look at Indonesia and what's been in terms of democratization and a successful embedded democratic process in Indonesia Thailand is going against the tide of history in ASEAN and the EU ASEAN based organizations supporting democracy and human rights can't approve of what has been done to overthrow democracy and moreover to abuse human rights in Thailand we have no argument that the Thai people was a very long friendship between the British people and the Thai people it's a very long friendship between the British monarchy and the Thai monarchy so the sanctions that we have taken against Thailand are not directed at the Thai people but they do limit the level of political exchange and engagement with Thailand now I think that it is in our long-term interest to avoid Thailand becoming isolated from the West it is important to maintain engagement I think what we need to see from Thailand or rather from the thai junta is evidence of sincere and positive moves to respond to the concerns of Britain and the European Union and the United States now that is not only about making progress on the restoration of democracy and the promulgation of a new constitution but it includes responding to issues around human rights for example the use of military tribunals to try civilians the abuse of les majestés laws to crack down on dissent the use of so-called attitude adjustment sessions to deal with people who disagree with the junta would like to see Thailand engaging positively with other countries at its forthcoming periodic review at the Human Rights Council so there are things that Thailand can do that will create conditions for greater engagement with the West but the responsibility lies at the moment with Thailand Yes sir, right in the back and then I'll go over here Thank you I wanted to return to one aspect of the I'm sorry, my name is Amit Pandya I'm a lawyer one aspect of the Xi Jinping state visit that you didn't discuss and that is the controversy that there was about the allegedly differential treatment of supportive and protesting crowds during the state visit I was in Britain at the time I'm an American, I'm also a Britain as a Britain I must say and I invite your comment on this I must say that not only did that differential treatment seem to run against the grain of your government's stated attachment to fundamental global values such as democracy and human rights but it felt a little bit embarrassing as a matter of national self-respect that the pro Xi Jinping renter crowds would be allowed to celebrate while protesters were were not so would you comment on that please Yeah, I will comment by saying that I think the Metropolitan Police and also the Greater Manchester Police and the Thames Valley Police did an excellent job in terms of discharging professional duties of providing security that we provide for all VIP visitors for upholding the right of people to protest and express their views in accordance with the UK Human Rights Act and the police are always scrupulous about respecting the terms of that act at the end of the day they will legislate or hold the ring between or decide which protesters are going to get to stand where I'm afraid there were many people coming there many people coming to support Xi Jinping a lot of people coming to express contrary views on Tibet or on Falun Gong or on anything but at the end of the day those people all were subject to the same treatment of time just for maybe one or two we're almost at the half hour yes sir thank you there have been news reports that the BBC World Service may begin a Korean language broadcast service into North Korea you know recognizing the BBC's independent corporation I wonder if you can share anything with us about whether or when those broadcasts might begin I would love to but because the BBC is an independent organization of not accountable to the British government I I don't know the answer to that the BBC or it has been proposed that the BBC should do that but my understanding is that at the moment no decision has been taken I think we're one last question yes sir and then we'll have to bring this to a close briefly thank you sir I'm Dennis Halpin from the US Korea Institute formerly State Department in Congress I saw Ambassador you were Ambassador to the Philippines so as you know the territorial disputes between the Philippines and China and the South China Sea there's been a suit brought by the Philippines the permanent court of arbitration in the Hague they've accepted jurisdiction China does not recognize it but the decision might come out soon I was wondering does your government have any view on the 9-line which might be addressed in this court decision we don't know yet and also in general what are your views of how the Philippines and China and other parties that have disputes maritime disputes in the South China Sea should address these issues so as I said in my speech our fundamental position is that all countries should approach these issues through diplomacy through peaceful dialogue and in accordance with international law and although there are different views on the jurisdiction of the tribunal since the tribunal has concluded that it does have jurisdiction in this case then we have said publicly including in a joint statement that we issued with Japan at our 2 plus 2 meeting in January that the decision of the permanent court of arbitration will be binding on all the parties to that case in terms of the issue of the 9-line the fundamental position of the United Kingdom is that claimants should express their positions in accordance with unclassed and relevant international view great I think ma'am you'll have to if you can stay for a minute or two you might be able to ask the question I'll stay for a minute but congratulations well thank you all thank you for good questions and let's all join together to thank very much Ambassador and Director Lily for his remarks thank you great thank you it was very eager to ask you so I thought you could