 Welcome to another episode of Critical Conversations, where we talk about hot topic issues related to American Muslims and other targeted communities. Today we're going to talk about Kashmir, a land that covers 86,000 square miles and is home to approximately 14 million people. It is claimed by both India and Pakistan, and the two nuclear armed neighbors have fought multiple wars over the region. Pakistan controls one-third of the territory, and India administers two-thirds of Kashmir. These two territories are divided along the de facto border called the line of control. Over the past 30 years, there has been a separatist movement in Indian-administered Kashmir that has sought independence from Indian rule and has often turned violent. India has responded by using preponderant military force and engaging in gross human rights violations. More than 70,000 people have died in the conflict, and tens and thousands of more have been either maimed or have been disappeared by the Indian state. Kashmir was most recently in the news when in August 2019, India revoked Article 370 of the Constitution, which over the past 70 years had given some semblance of autonomy to people in Indian-administered Kashmir. With this move, India brought Kashmir under its direct rule and imposed a communication and security lockdown that further exacerbated the humanitarian situation there. Today we're going to talk about developments in Kashmir since August 5th, and also about what lies ahead. Often the discourse surrounding Kashmir is dominated by narratives propagated by either India or Pakistan. Today we're going to talk about Kashmir, its history, the conflict, and aspirations of the Kashmiri people purely from a Kashmiri perspective. To help us understand that, we are very fortunate to be joined by Professor Muhammad Junaid, who is a Kashmiri scholar, an activist, and also a cultural anthropologist. He's also assistant professor at the Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts. Professor Junaid, thank you so much for joining us. My pleasure. Thank you for having me here. So let's begin by, could you give us a brief overview of Kashmir's history after British colonial rule ended in the Indian subcontinent in 1947? So to understand the post-1947 Kashmir, we have to really go back a little bit into the history. Kashmir, as you know, is this Malian region, a huge country. For centuries before 1947, Kashmiris have imagined that place as a country. In Urdu, in Kashmiri, they use the term Mulk, Mulk-e-Kashmir, which is the country of Kashmir. It is a land of multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-religious communities. Has gone through a variety of kingdoms and been part of empires, but throughout most of its history, it has been a kind of independent, semi-independent or an autonomous region. Even until 1947, Kashmir was a semi-independent region. That was controlled by, ruled by the Dogras, who had been given this territory in lieu of their support to the British in their war against the Sikhs in 1846. And from 1846 to 1947, the Dogras ruled Kashmir. And this was a Hindu dynasty? Dogras were a Hindu dynasty, but the majority of the subjects of this kingdom were Muslims. In 1947, until 1947, more than 70% of the population was Muslim. And 25%, 28% were Hindus, and 3% were Sikhs. But the rulers were Hindus. In 1947, when the British left the subcontinent, as you know, the partition took place. For the partition, there was a cabinet mission, which basically told the Indian, you know, the princely states, and Kashmir was one of them, to either join India or Pakistan, or decide to remain independent. And in 1947, Kashmiris did not know whether, they did not know that they would have to make that choice. Since 1931, there had been a mass uprising against the Dogra ruler, because the Dogras were feudal monarchy, heavily taxing the Kashmiri Muslim peasants, and artisanal classes. And so there had been a mass uprising for equality, just as democracy... See, right, you know, citizenship. And on the borders, there had been, like, uprisings to secede from the Dogras. So in 1947, when this moment arose, which Kashmiris hadn't imagined, they thought their mass mobilization was primarily against the Dogras. It was not an anti-colonial movement, although Kashmiris did express solidarity with anti-colonial struggles in South Asia. For them, it was primarily seeking equality in the small-key Kashmir, in this country of Kashmir. And in 1944, there was a Kashmir document, which was a very progressive document adopted by the prominent Kashmiri political party at that time, National Conference, which envisaged independent, democratic, even socialist republic of Kashmir. And Kashmir had, although there was National Conference, there were multiple other political parties. So it was a pluralistic region with dynamic politics, with diversity of thought. In 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir dithered. He delayed whether to join India or Pakistan, or to declare independence. So at the time when, in August 1947, when both India and Pakistan were established and created as independent entities, by then the Dogra had not, ruler had not yet decided whether he was going to exceed to India or Pakistan or remain independent. Exactly. And in August 1947, he did sign a standstill agreement with Pakistan. He sent a similar standstill agreement to India, which did not sign it. And the standstill agreement basically said that relations will continue, the status quo will continue, until they reach a decision about what they wanted to do. Yes. And standstill agreement principally was designed to allow the rulers time to decide what they wanted to do. I mean, and they had to make this decision based on the composition of their population, and the geographical contiguity of their borders. Sure. And the majority population was Muslim, and its geographical contiguity was with Pakistan. Its rivers, its roads, and its, you know, cultural ties kind of flowed westward, not southward. Southward, they were mountains. You know, high mountains, there were no roads. And in August 1947, the Maharajas, you know, backers in his southern province of Jammu, which was basically a fiefdom of the upper caste Hindus, they started massacring Muslims from the region, driving them out, thinking that eventually, when the moment comes, like Pakistan might take over Kashmir, we must, you know, keep Jammu for India. I see. And so from August 1947 to mid-1948, there's this process of ethnic cleansing that goes on in Jammu. Jammu city, for instance, used to be a Muslim majority city. By the end of it, it was a Muslim minority city. Close to half a million Muslims were forced to migrate from the region, and close to 237,000 Muslims were massacred in Jammu city and to the south. These events became critical to the later dispute. And so he asked, when the stories of these massacres were circulating, they were reaching northwest frontier province and other regions, the people from there who were called the Kabbalis, they started coming in in support of the Muslims. Right. So this was in October 1947, when Bhutan tribesmen went over into Kashmir and tried to control that territory by force. Yes. Some of them perhaps were given directions by the Pakistani military officers, but most of them were very disorganized. In fact, I mean, the legions of their disorganization are pretty common in Kashmir even now. So they arrived in northern Kashmir, and the Maharaja whose capital was in Srinagar, he fled the city, leaving the subjects, you know, undefended. And what he did was he sent a delegation to Delhi, asking them to sign the instrument of accession. He wanted to sign accession with India. And India said, we will sign the accession and provide you military help. And the accession was based on three things. That India would have control over defense, communications, and external affairs. And accession itself was temporary because the Maharajas knew that most of the population was Muslim who would have wanted Kashmir to be independent, you know. And so he made it conditional that eventually when conditions are right, Kashmir people of the state would be asked their will, and they will determine their future status. Of course that never happened, India and Pakistan went to war. Kashmir was divided, as you pointed out, between India and Pakistan. The line of control was drawn through the heart of Kashmir. And since last, you know, 73 years, Kashmir has remained divided and a dispute with three main parties. Absolutely. Absolutely. And so until last year, until August of 2019, as I mentioned earlier, India had been governing Indian-administered Kashmir under Article 370, and it had sort of, again, given some semblance of autonomy to that Kashmiri region where they would elect local politicians, you know, and there was a state assembly, et cetera. Last year in August, it revoked that, and there's been a huge communication and security lockdown, as I mentioned earlier. So what are the conditions now in Kashmir? Can you just give us an update about the security and the communications lockdown, and also what is the situation as far as the humanitarian conditions are concerned? Since 73 years, India has been at war with the people of Kashmir. It has used different methods to suppress Kashmiri voices. Of course, as I said, the initial connection between India and Kashmir was conditional that eventually there would be a right to self-determination, which was also expressed by the UN Security Council Resolutions 47 and several other resolutions. But India denied the plebiscite even though its leaders had publicly promised that to the people of Kashmir. Second, it consistently rigged elections, arrested leaders. Even Sheikh Abdullah, who had endorsed accession with India, a conditional accession, was arrested in 1953 and put behind bars for years. And since 1990, India basically launched a counterinsurgency warfare in Kashmir. It may turn Kashmir into this space of exception where normal rules of civil liberties did not exist. Kashmiri rights could be denied anytime. And from 1990 to the present, more than 85,000 people have been killed, majority of them at the hands of Indian forces. And since August of this year, that process has continued. It has taken an extreme turn where Kashmiri freedom of expression has completely been taken away. They're not allowed to use internet. Now, after seven months, they're allowed to use some internet but not social media. They've been arrests of everyday Kashmiris, not even political activists, for using social media. I mean, it's a really brutal regime in Kashmir. Of course, on the international stage, people remember India as the land of gurus and Gandhi and whatnot. But to Kashmiri, you look at it from the Kashmiri perspective. It's been a really tough state. It has acted towards Kashmiris like a colonial power and imperial power would towards the colonized. Absolutely. And we'll sort of get to that part as well. It seems as if now that the communications blackout is lifting very, very slowly. Things are getting a little bit better in that the schools are reopening, businesses are reopening. And there seems to be some sense of political activity as well that is sort of resuming in the valley, and not so much in terms of the old political guard because many of the political party's leadership still remains detained. But there seems to be a third political front as they're dubbing it, like there's some new political actors that are sort of coming into play. And I'm wondering if you could talk a little bit about that, but also in the context of how have political parties that have been operating in Kashmir, most notably the National Conference, more recently the People's Democratic Party, and others that have sought to represent Kashmiris through elections, how have regular Kashmiris viewed those parties and their relations with New Delhi? So Kashmiri politics is a wide spectrum. On one side are those parties that are called the Tehrik parties. Tehrik parties are multiple formations that basically demand right of self-determination for Kashmir. They have the most popularity in Kashmir. Their activists are typically in jail, arrested, killed, and they suffer immensely. On the, in the middle where some of these parties that you mentioned, National Conference and the PDP, these were, these have been parties who have made compromises with India to the extent where in Kashmir people think that they represent Indian interests in Kashmir rather than Kashmiri interests in Delhi. And but with the BJP regime, they, even they don't beat, they're not trusted. So that's why some of their leadership is in the jails. Although these, this leadership acted like the glove on the Indian bayonet until very recently. The ones who were like helping India oppress their own people. And now what you call the third front, there's not a third front really, this is like a collection of assorted individuals who have business interests in Kashmir and are willing to play the Indian playbook. You know, they're willing to throw Kashmiris under the bus and tell Kashmiris that okay, neither the right to self-determination nor possibility of full citizenship can be achieved. We can simply ask for statehood, you know, we can limit it powers and we must live as a subservient to Indian interests in Kashmir. We cannot pursue our own interests. And of course the BJP likes them, they would like them to, to be propped. And I have strong doubts that they will have any legitimacy in Kashmir. Right. And like, you know, parties like the PDP that were recently in power, they're also sort of, you know, perceived with some level of doubt and suspicions as far as the population is concerned. So since 1990 there has been a separatist movement in Kashmir. Can you talk a little bit about who makes up that movement because there's a wide range of groups, some of them secular, some of them religious, some of them who've resorted to violence, others who have not. So could you talk a little bit about that mix of groups that makes up the separatist movement and also what do you think is going to be the future of this particular movement after, you know, restrictions are lifted and people are allowed to move around again? Well, let me just push back against the term separatist. Kashmiri movement has not been separatist. I mean, you can be separatist if you agree to the union or if you're part of the union. All right. So the separatists have never imagined themselves to be part of the Indian Union. Kashmir had, as I mentioned in the introduction, had its own identity, its own independence. It has lived for centuries as an independent country, longer than both India and Pakistan have existed. So the history of that movement goes back years, especially since 1931, has taken multiple forms from emancipation from 1931 to 1947 to national sub-termination or national liberation from Indian occupation since 1947 onwards. It existed as peaceful, democratic mass mobilizations at different times, but at some times it has existed as underground movement. In 1990, with Indian repression increasing in Kashmir, many young activists decided to cross over to the other side of Kashmir, which is the Azad Juman Kashmir or the Pakistani control side of Kashmir. Got limited training from there, came back. Of course, there were no match for the Indian military might. And of course, started this mass mobilizing. The goal was really to kind of reduce the fear of India from within the Kashmiri public sphere. That has continued. So this national liberation movement has taken multiple forms. India has suppressed all of its different variants. Of course, the armed movement has been crushed. And they now existed. There are only probably 200 to 300 of them in Kashmir right now. But a majority of the movement has existed in a non-armed fashion. And those activists have been severely crushed as well. Most of them spend time in jails. Even some who advocate Gandhian methods have been put in jail. So do you have a lot of confidence in terms of where that movement is going to go? The non-violent movement that has been a first half determination that has been going on for years. Where do you think that's going to go in the coming months? See, one can never tell where the history is moving towards. When you talk to Kashmiris, they ask, what is our option? The Indian state has basically told them that if you can only exist as second-class citizens and subservient to the Indian interests, you cannot control your own destiny and fate. So that seems like most Kashmiris are unwilling to live that life. People around the world don't realize that there are 15 million Kashmiris around the world, including 13 million in that region, Kashmir and the Indian side and the Pakistani side. It's a huge place. Lots of people. There are probably 100 other countries that have smaller populations and are independent and free and relatively prosperous. Kashmir has great potential. It can economically develop. It has a history of a tradition of progressive politics. But being under India prevents all of that from happening. And we have proof. We have the historical proof. We have tried India for years, 73 years, and it has not happened. So a lot of Kashmiris believe that resistance is the only option. And we have to wait for our moment. We look at the history and see new states are forming all the time. Yes, we live in a really difficult time where a future looks really dark. Big countries are becoming belligerent, occupying. We see what is happening in Middle East and Crimea elsewhere. But as someone said, people think that the present is going to last forever. It's not. The present itself is a utopia. So what is the next generation of Kashmiris? I mean, they have grown up pretty much since the National Liberation Movement began in 1990. So that's all that they have seen. And do you feel like they are more engaged with the resistance? Are they disillusioned with it as they're sort of living under this kind of occupation? I think that in general, the sentiment has always been there for independence. I mean, Indian state has kind of like systematically alienated Kashmiris from 1947 onwards, denying them any political space. So it's logical for Kashmiris to kind of like express sympathy, but also they are fully aware of their history and their aspirations. And growing up in a place like Kashmir, you can't but become cynical, you know, because you see soldiers everywhere, you see depression, you see the ugliest form of occupation going on. People who've been blinded by pallets and young boys and girls who are taken to, you know, interrogation centers, torture centers and whatnot. So but having said that, there are critiques of the resistance, not, you know, it's not like a uniform resistance, there are different, multiple kind of visions within the resistance. Some may not agree with the Islamist versions of it, some may not agree with the liberal secular versions of it. Right, right. In fact, let me sort of turn to that. You know, there are armed groups, and you said that they're very limited in number now, but there are armed groups like Hezbollah, Majaheddin, Jesheh, Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba that have been involved in this movement in Indian administrative Kashmir. They're all based in Pakistan and have received military training, equipment, support from the Pakistani government, the Pakistani military, however you'd like to see it. And so could you speak a little bit about how local Kashmiris, and I know local Kashmiris have joined some of these groups as well, as was evidenced by the suicide bombing that happened in Bulwama last year in February, where it was a local Kashmiri who had joined Jesheh Muhammad and had sort of become part of that. But how do Kashmiris generally feel about these groups and their presence and their impact on the nonviolent resistance that's going on? And while the groups may be based in Pakistan, the majority of their card are Kashmiri, young Kashmiris from mostly from rural and smaller towns. As I said, the number is pretty small, you know, they are not a match for the Indian military might. They, in fact, they get killed as soon as they join these groups. They are poorly trained, they don't have resources. It's not like Taliban, you know, and Pakistani military in the 1990s was much more involved when they used to give them weapons and they were like Pakistani militants and Afghani militants who were involved. But from 2001, Pakistani military has completely kind of stepped outside. I mean, if you look at some of these younger folks who are joining these groups, they snatched weapons from police officers and whatnot and so they've been overblown in the media, but their actual impact, their physical impact on conflict is very little, except like when something like this blowing up of soldiers happens. Or something big and huge like that happens and it does bring both countries to the brink of war. And so even though their numbers might be small, but you feel like there has been a shift in the Pakistani military's approach to these militant groups? Yeah, I mean Pakistani state has, I think it's a good question to ask like the role of the Pakistani state. In the early 1990s, the major political formation in Kashmir armed resistance was led by Jumu Kashmir Liberation Front, which was mostly a secular pro-independence group, pro-unification group. And when it became popular, the Pakistani state started sponsoring pro-Pakistan groups, so Hezboil Mujahideen and several other, although Hezboil Mujahideen was an indigenous group, but there were other groups eventually that were brought in, populated mostly by Afghan and Pakistani militants. Which to most Kashmiris, if you ask them, although they had goodwill from Kashmiris, but they did more damage to the cause than help. How? Can you elaborate on that? I mean their vision was not aligned with the aspirations of Kashmiris. Kashmiris wanted independence, Kashmiris wanted end to the occupation, while their goals were much more broader Islamists, which did not find resonance in Kashmir. Kashmiris do not see themselves part of some global caliphate and stuff. And some of these groups are also perhaps perpetuating a pro-Pakistan vision, right? So calling for the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan, and that also did not align with local Kashmiri sentiments. There is a sentiment for Pakistan in Kashmir, there are some constituencies which are pro-Pakistan, and for them these groups would have aligned. But I think the polls that have been done by different groups, or what you get, the sense you get from people, is that most people would prefer independence, not be under either India or Pakistan. So thank you so much Professor Junaid, we have sort of reached the end of our time for the first part of our discussion, so we'll conclude it here. Please stay tuned for part two on our discussion with Kashmir, on Kashmir. Thank you so much.