 Well, it's time for our first topic on the breakfast this morning. Good morning to you. If you've just joined us, it's the breakfast on Plus TV Africa, and it is a Friday Flex edition. Nigeria has lost $100 billion to the Northeast conflict, and that's according to UNICEF. And it's obvious that human lives, the loss of human lives is even far greater than the money that Nigeria has lost to this conflict. Since the early 2000s, Nigeria has experienced this conflict. You talk about the Boko Haram, you talk about the Eastwap, and it's just been very, very critical to a lot of things that we have experienced, especially in that part of the country. And I've been joined by Mohamed Abdul-Lahi, who is a public affairs analyst this morning, to take a look at this. Good morning to you, Mohamed. Good morning Nigerians. It's my pleasure to be here. Mohamed, where are you joining us from this morning? Lagos, actually. Lagos, so it's not Kaduna today. Oh, you're not in Kaduna this morning? Yes, yes. OK, let's start by going down memory lane to how this whole conflict started. OK, there are actually many factors to it. Obviously, there is a religious face, there is ethnic face, and then in some other cases, there's the natural resources that is actually causing a whole lot of the crisis that is going on. So majorly in my own observations, for someone who have lived in the North for several years and still visit the North regularly for work and leisure, those are the three spheres. I mean, three challenges or three things that have ravaged the North in the past years, like I mentioned earlier, religion, the natural resources in some areas, and then the ethnic crisis. For instance, if we go deep into the North East, for instance, in Tarabah, the Juku and the Fulani, it's not actually about the religion there, it's more of the ethnic crisis, the lack of tolerance by each of the parties. Again, I will not stand here to, like, apportion blame to any of the tribes. For me, what I feel is most challenging is the fact that each of the divide have refused to shield their sword, each of the divide have refused to accept each other as brothers and sisters and one family, so it is quite astonishing. And if you come to Kaduna, for instance, not West here, and some of the challenges have been religion to be very candid. In fact, I schooled in Kaduna, Kaduna Polytechnic, my first degree was in Kaduna Polytechnic. The then governor did a very good job, I mean, McCarthy, Senator McCarthy did a very good job. In my five years in Kaduna then, there was no single crisis. But again, you could see the divide between the Christians and the Muslims. The Muslims were largely up not, I mean, not on Kaduna not upward, why the Christians are largely, you know, situated in southern Kaduna. So in fact, when it's 4 p.m., 5 p.m., if you are not a Christian and you are probably in Kaduna not, you are a big jitri that you want to go back to your own area and buy it first. Hello, Mohammed. Hello. Okay, go ahead. If you go to Zamfara, where, you know, pandits are currently ravaging, it's more of actually the natural resources there. I mean, areas where you have gold and so on and so forth. So, you know, these are how the challenges have been across the North and chiefly among these states, I mean, the Bono state, we all understand that, yes, it was a religious, you know, misunderstanding that escalated the crisis in the first place. I mean, Mohammed Yusuf studying the Boko Haram, telling people that Western education is actually not acceptable. And then you have some people who brought into that idea, and even though he wasn't, he wasn't, how do I put it now? He wasn't violent in his initial thought, but because he died in police cells, according to reports, and then his followers began to take revenge from police and security agencies. And before you know what's happening, we refuse to manage the crisis at that level, and it escalated to what we have today, and Boko Haram has been designated as one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the world. So these are the challenges that we have, and these are, I think in my own opinion, these are how these crises began to brew across Nigeria. Yeah, you just touched on my next question briefly, because these conflicts have spawned one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. How would you say that the federal government, you said back then they didn't handle it well, but how would you say in the recent years that the federal government has handled these and the state governors in the affected areas? How would you say they've handled this crisis and the attendant crisis, conflicts that have come from it? Yes, it depends. In my earlier sessions, I talked about the then governor of Karduna State, did a very good job seriously. In my five years in Karduna, there was no single crisis. You have the military guys and military barracks stationed everywhere, because Karduna was very volatile then. I was talking about 2004, 2008, 2009, yeah. So Karduna was very volatile, but you know, you have security apparatuses stationed everywhere across Karduna, whether it's Southern Karduna, whether it's Karduna North, just everywhere. You know that you can't just for many people are there, I mean, there are security agencies to checkmate what you are doing. So it actually worked. But again, I think in recent years, with some of the utterances and some of the actions of the immediate past governor in Karduna, there is a kind of distrust again, particularly from the Southern Karduna Axis who felt, I can justify that anyway, but you know, people from that Axis just felt, not talking about Malam Naseo Erufai. They felt the ex-governor, I mean, the former governor Naseo Erufai neglected that Axis and allow one turn destruction of human lives and properties. So there has been not too perfect handling of the situation by whether the federal government and even the state government, because you realize one of the challenges is actually even the constitution that vested everything with regards to security just on the federal government. The state government gives these excuses to say, you know, we are handicapped. We can't control the police. We can't control the army. We can't control, you know, the security apparatus. They have to get their clearance from Abuja. Even while things are going on and far away, you know, Southern Karduna or, you know, the villages in Jaws and, you know, the far away areas in Bournemouth. So they have their excuses. And I think they are right to some extent, even though they are the chief executive officers of their various states. So but if you, contemporarily as well, Kudos must go to the present governor of Bournemouth state, for instance, what he has been doing. I have been to Bournemouth. In fact, two years ago I was in Bournemouth. I was in a camp called Bakasi Camp. The day I was there, that was the last day the camp was closing. You know, and in fact, I know in the past two, three years, the present governor, Professor Zulum, has done so well in trying to relocate people who are initially in the IDP camps to their, you know, to some of the states, sorry, some of the areas where in the past four, five, six or even more years, nobody dared to step. So he's been doing well. He's been distributing palliatives. In fact, he's not mountain in the state. You know that they are called upon, palliatives are there, monies are being channeled towards making their lives better and so on and so forth. So in that axis, I mean, I would say Kudos to the Bournemouth state government because they've done quite well at least, you know, in their own little capacity as a state government compared to what the federal government is doing. But by and large, I feel it's beyond just militarization. I think we need to go more into dialogue. We need to go more into checkmating what are the root causes of this conflict. These are the only ways we'll be able to deal decisively and end this conflict, this conflict in time rather than just militarization. Because these people are, for instance, the Boko Haram, they are willing to die. So if someone is willing to die for a cause, militarization doesn't really, for me, solve the problem. We need dialogue and we need to, like I said, checkmate the root causes. And the root causes, whether I want to say it or not, is poverty, is lack of exposure, is negligence of some of the duties of government in those areas. So it's something that we really need to have a discourse on beyond just the militarization of trying to solve the problem. Yeah, indeed, we've seen different governors come and go with different approaches. And then we've had different times, you know, the military saying that they have defeated Boko Haram or that they have tamed Boko Haram and then they come out from nowhere and seem to say, you're not, you know, you haven't done nothing to me. Before the former governor of Buenos States left, autumn, we had him repeatedly so frustrated on television crying out and calling on the former president, Mohamed Abu Hari. And at some point, he made very, very damaging statements, you know, you know, what's your take on this theory? Now this has continued because some elites are benefiting from the continuation of these conflicts. Yeah, it's no doubt that there are very many people, perhaps the elites that are benefiting because war is not cheap actually. It's actually very expensive. And like I mentioned earlier from how and where Boko Haram started. Some of the, I mean, some of the atelerees and some of the things they carry around to fight the Nigerian army and the Nigerian state at this present time, it's unimaginable. It's not something that you buy with even a hundred million lira. These things are so sophisticated that you need a hundred of millions, if not more, of USDs and hard currencies. So how does this happen? How is this gaining ground? So how are they being able to make? Hello, Mohamed. Yeah, see, there are some of the things that we need to checkmate. There are some of the things that we need to trace. For instance, we need to trace a whole lot of the funding of Boko Haram, a lot, a lot of the fundings of of these bandits and so on and so forth, these killer hats men and so on and so forth. I remember two, three years ago in Fargo where United Arab Emirates, some Nigerians were mentioned and even apprehended for funding Boko Haram, for funding terrorism in Nigeria. So what are they? Where they apprehended? I know some names where Nigerians were asking for the names. We're mentioning Amban, yeah, yeah, Apologies, yeah. So we have the federal government then trying to sheet the names, those names. So these are some of the things that we need to dissect, we need to look on, look up on and then, you know, take a decisive decision on how to deal with the situation. So if I, if I, if I may answer your question correctly, yes, many elites are, you know, these guys have got sponsors within and outside Nigeria, but it is the root job of government to find out who these people are and then take the appropriate action. Okay. Well, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union Commission, they adopted a regional stabilization strategy. How effective would you say the strategy has been? What do we know about it right now? It's quite a bit strange to me, I must confess. I don't really have, what is it called, a whole lot of knowledge about the strategy. But what I know, I know sometimes ago there is the, I mean, what is the AU or even the echoers that talked about a kind of tracing the funding of these terrorists, you know, having a kind of collaboration within themselves, within the echoer state to trace particularly the funding and so on and so forth of the terrorists. Because if you look at it vis-a-vis a very well, terrorism, I mean, even the Boko Haram specifically is not only affecting Nigeria, it's affecting Nigeria, it's affecting Chad and then we have information saying these are spillovers from the war in Libya and some other places. So, and in fact, these are some of the fears why people are scared of, people are scared of, you know, another book out of war in Nigeria because this is a country that has border with modern, that borders moderns about at least five Nigerian states, particularly in the North Eastern region, Borno, Adamawa, Taraba and so on and so forth. So, if you have another conflict there, definitely it will affect Nigeria the worst because people, the refugee crisis will be there and then are we ready at this moment to have at least one or two more millions of people flocking into our own country, are we ready with all the crisis that we have in terms of poverty at the moment, food shortages at the moment and the skyrocketing cost of everything, are we ready to have that kind of challenge? So you know, these are the questions and yes, whether the strategy is working or not like I mentioned earlier is something that I'm not too familiar with, but I know the region, the regional body is working tirelessly to have particularly the funding of the terrorism channels in West Africa checkmated so that the region can have peace. Well UNICEF says it has cost us a hundred billion dollars, destruction and displacement have set back the development of these states that are involved. I remember particularly JOS, Platter State, I witnessed one of the crisis there during my final year in the University of JOS and JOS used to have the biggest main market on West Africa and that particular crisis saw the destruction of that market and when attempts were made to rebuild the market, the market was burnt down again. So that's just an example of the kind of setback that this crisis is, you know, inflicted on some of the states that have been ravaged by the crisis. What do you think that the states can do even though they do not have, they are not, they are restricted, they have some sort of constraints in terms of the authority, but what can they do as states to shield their people and protect their property, protect their land, they can't just be crying, I mean, they achieve security officers and they enjoy a security vote don't they? Yeah, I think it's important that if you allow me say as a government in each state, you know, particularly as a governor, you understand that you are meant to govern for all irrespective of whether tribe, religion, and particularly the idea of whether people voted for you or whether a region voted for you or not. So we must start from there, you know, as long, immediately you are voted into power, you become, you know, a servant for all, a servant of all, you know, without dissecting which area is, you know, voted for you and which other area did vote you in and you start discriminating in that respect. What we have is some of the things that, you know, increases this hate, you know, that now, you know, becomes what we have as a full blown conflict in our state. So having said that, then it's very important we must also look at ways of actually amending the constitution. I'm a proponent of state police. I must tell you, you know, we can't have a central policing system just in Abuja and things are happening in, you know, the remote areas of Jaws, the remote area of Paraguay, Borno, you know, even by, even flight from what's it called, from Abuja to Borno is about two hours or more. So you have, then someone was given a directive from Abuja. Come on. It doesn't really make sense. Or you have, you know, commissioner of police who is, who doesn't, who doesn't understand, you know, the language in a particular setting, you know, doesn't understand the language, doesn't understand the culture being heard of maybe as a commissioner of police in a particular year. I think it doesn't really make sense. Seriously. If we are really bent on fighting these insurgencies, we must make things very local. In fact, up to the level of local government, yes, we must have the vigilantes, people who understand the terrain, who understand the area and empower local government chairmen to do good. You know, just recently, sorry for the digression, just recently we see in August state, you know, the, the, the, the, the kind of challenge local government chairman goes, they go through because they try to speak out against the government. You know, I don't think these are, these are, they are all the three tires of government. And in fact, the local government is the closest to the people. So why are you denying them their funds to carry out projects to affect their own people? So I think these are things we need to, we need to readdress, we need to address, and then we need to take a good decision for the benefit of a, particularly people in the rural areas. Don't forget, people in the rural areas are far more than people in the cities, you know. So that is why we need to empower the local government. We need to empower the state government in terms of security decisions. We need to have state police to checkmate these things before it gets out of hand. All right. Well, during my intro, I did say that no one knows when this conflict will end. I, no one knows. I don't know if you do know. However, we have a new sheriff in town. What are the conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms that you think that President Mohamed Ahmed Tanubu should be putting in place? Yes. Those are the things I mentioned earlier. I think, you know, we need to decentralize power. It's very important. We need to decentralize power to carry people along from all regions, from all religions, from all aspects, you know. We have a multicultural country. So it doesn't sit well that you have one part of the country dominating while the other is just like an onlooker, just like a passive citizen. I don't think it sits well. So that's why you mentioned the President earlier. The President, the President did well by making sure that, you know, earlier he, when he appointed the service teams, you know, each of the Nigerian regions, almost all, even not all, you know, had like a say. So it's like, yes, you know, we all own this country together. So I think that's a good way to start. But it doesn't just stop in appointing, stop by appointing service teams. We must go deeper. We must do better. And like I mentioned earlier, my suggestion is the state police. Seriously, I think for me, that would, that will to a large extent reduce some of the challenges and make us act faster. Then secondly, and most importantly, that I feel is that we need to go into the root cause of some of this conflict. It is because of religion, we should understand how to, what's it called, you know, deal with that. It is because of ethnic crisis, like I mentioned in Tarabah and some other environments, we understand probably the traditional rulers should be able to handle that and so on and so forth. So getting into the root causes trying to, you know, reduce poverty, trying to create employment for local people and so on and so forth, will also reduce some of these challenges. Well, thank you, Mohammed. I think we should also add, securing our borders and not allowing them to be so porous. Yes, very, very important to me. That's a very good one. Yeah, I agree. Thank you, Mohammed, for your time and insight on this very crucial topic. Thank you always. My pleasure. Mohammed Abdullah, public relations analyst has been my guest on our first hot topic. We'll be back for the second hot topic. We'll be taking a look at thrombosis. What is thrombosis and how do we prevent it? Find out in a moment.