 Good morning, and thank you for joining us at the U.S. Institute of Peace for a discussion on India's foreign policy toward its crisis-stricken neighborhood. My name is Dan Markey, and I'm a senior advisor here at USIP in the South Asia program. And today I'm joined by Dr. Avinash Palawal. Dr. Palawal is a reader in international relations at SOAS, University of London. Prior to this position, he was the deputy director of the SOAS South Asia Institute. He taught defense studies at King's College London and was the defense academy postdoctoral fellow also at King's. He specializes in the international relations of South Asia. His first book, My Enemy's Enemy, India in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to the U.S. withdrawal, was published by Hearst and Oxford University Press in 2017. It details India's role in Afghanistan during and after the Cold War. His forthcoming book, India's Near East, A New History, which will be published by Hearst in 2024, unpacks India's faltering attempts to exert control over its eastern hinterland and the neighboring states of Bangladesh and Myanmar. Avinash holds an MA and PhD in international relations from King's College London and a BA in economics from the University of Delhi. Formerly a visiting fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, he briefly worked as a foreign affairs journalist before entering academia. Avinash, it's great to have you here. Thank you. Now, over the next 45 minutes or so, I'm going to ask Avinash a few questions. Then what we're going to do is we're going to open the floor to participation from the room as well as online. For those of you who are joining us online, please use the chat box on usip.org to ask your questions. Before asking your questions, if you're in the room, if you wouldn't mind stating your name and affiliation, we'll make sure to use those before we dive right in. Now, by way of context for this conversation, I think everyone here is following South Asia closely enough to appreciate that India's neighbors, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, are themselves undergoing turmoil that has pretty direct consequences for India. So if we look to the west in Pakistan, you would say over the past year, plus Pakistan has been in a state of poly crisis characterized by political turmoil, economic challenges, surging violence, and so on. In Bangladesh to the east, the dispute over upcoming elections has cast a real shadow over nearly every aspect of political life. And over the past month or so, street protests have gotten a great deal more violent. And in Myanmar, the 2021 military coup complicated India's domestic policy in the bordering states of the Northeast, as well as India's regional and global policies as New Delhi has struggled to navigate an effective approach for dealing with the Myanmar military. And in all three of India's nearby neighbors, China has actively extended its influence in recent years. And of course, since 2020, we've seen serious India-China border tensions along the line of actual control. So with all of that in mind, Avinash, your research has focused on what I would describe as a deep interconnectedness between India and its nearby neighborhood. India's relations with the countries that I've mentioned are not just conducted between capitals, but between communities and political economies that are currently and historically have been tied together. And I think this is definitely true in Pakistan, we think about that somewhat, but also very much true in Bangladesh and Myanmar, although obviously the specifics are different. So what I'd like to do is begin with a general question that gets to some of your deep historical expertise on the region before we pull back and do something of a tour of these various challenges facing India. So my question is, what would you say is the single most important way in which India's neighborhood relations are affected by these deeper historical attachments? Or to put it a little bit differently, what does New Delhi do differently as it manages these neighborhood relationships as compared to how it conducts itself with other countries in the world, say the United States or Japan or Russia? Thank you. Thank you, first of all, for having me here. It's an honor to be here at USIP. And thank you for that excellent question, right? I mean, there is something that I've always felt that India's neighborhood policy in particular is in some shape or form an extension of its domestic politics. Now, of course, the argument that domestic politics and foreign policies invariably tied is a very obvious argument to make. In the neighborhood, you see it get much more pronounced. And I think the co-driver, and I think this is a continuing driver, post-independence still, in a different ideological gap, but till today, is this desire in New Delhi to make sure that the republics or the states that exist in your neighborhood, whether it's Pakistan, whether it's Bangladesh, Myanmar, other countries, they are actually, they survive this table. And that anxiety, that anxiety about the stability of these countries goes back to the moment of partition, which is still in some shape and form actually playing out and animating both the anxieties and aspirations of India's political class, right? So this idea that we are looking at a neighborhood which is actually politically and socially quite torn, there are large minorities, sizable religious and ethnic minorities, linguistic minorities in each country, both India and its neighborhood, those are really difficult political questions to kind of come to grips with, to tackle on an ongoing basis, which have no silver bullet. So when you are dealing with all those kind of fractious issues and trying to figure out an effective, workable states in an international system, you want your neighborhood to be stable just like yourself, because that is important for your own stability. So this desire of stability has, I feel, always animated it, because instability would lead to movement of people across borders. Now, what we see as lines on maps and assume that these are international states completely working independently with their independent kind of interests and ideas are actually often very intertwined. If there is a meltdown, a political or an economic meltdown, for example, in Bangladesh, it will directly impact India's own domestic politics. So that desire in terms of movement of people, in terms of political unrest, political violence, we have seen that Assam's politics, I mean, the politics of the state of Assam, has direct correlation to what happens in Bangladesh in some which way or form. So that desire has been a continuing desire. And that does mean that the idea or the rhetoric of democracy or liberal or participatory politics, as understood, especially in Washington, D.C. or the United States, but also in Europe, has a very different color and caliber. When you think about it from an Indian perspective in its neighbor OTS, that is desirable, no, that is not very pressing stability is even if it's not at the, you know, the second issue, which I would say is very important and it resonates with this desire of these neighboring states remaining stable is that once they are stable, what do they do with relation to you, right? There has always been a security concern. And it again goes back to the deep anxieties that we saw kind of emerge between India and Pakistan before the 71 United Pakistan, but also looking at countries in your east from a particular kind of religious or ethnic prism or the prism of, you know, conflict dynamics, cross-border conflict dynamics. So if you have anyone in power in your neighborhood who has an antithetical or an ideological outlook which militates against who is in power in New Delhi, that is a very sound recipe for having a conflict at hand, right? So security dynamics then become very much salient in India's calculation in its approach towards its neighbors. So it does prefer political leaders in power who are at least respectful of your national security interests. And I think that's another continuing theme. Whether you explain that, whether you explain that in liberal kind of secular categories or whether you explain that in Hindu nationalist categories is a separate point. But that is something which I would say the political elite in Delhi is quite united. And that brings me to the last point of your question of how is this different from how India does politics or geopolitics or does foreign policy with great powers? Well, look, this invariably gives a color of, you know, this neighborhood is something that India feels that it has natural dominance in. It has much more, it should have much more say in how the politics plays out. The core principles that guide, let's say, Indo-U.S. interaction in categories of, you know, shared values of democracy, shared values of rules-based order. I think even though important and desired in the neighborhood, that is not the first port of call on how India would make its policy. Let's say to its Bangladesh or Myanmar, right? So what is driving its operational practice in terms of whether it's talking to the Hinta, in Nepito, or supporting Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh or not talking to Pakistan are those very basic, very powerful, very compelling drivers where the dual need of stability and security is much more supreme than the idea of democracy and participatory politics, even if it is desired. Thank you. Great answer and comprehensive and sweeping, as I imagine your next book will be. And I do want to just linger on this because I think you have some important points to make here, not just with respect because you've answered well how India's management of its relations with its neighbors may be different than it is with other global players, but flip it around a bit, if you would, and think about how these relationships may have changed India. Because I know you've given this some thought as well, particularly in its early and founding days, how that's affected India's own development, because as all of us know, these were parts, in a sense, of India or of British India. And so the interconnection also has a consequence for India itself. Yes. Thanks. That's a great question. And look, in terms of an I'll go back in time, I'll go back to the moment of partition and that's such a seismic event. Now, everyone who's interested in South Asia looks at the subcontinent knows the partition is important. But I think and it's been studied quite intensely, especially in the context of the India, Pakistan's standoff over Kashmir or boundary disputes in the West. But perhaps relatively less so in the East. And one thing which I'm increasingly realizing, and that's partly going to be the main pitch of the book as well, that India's diplomacy, regional diplomacy and its nation building are actually deeply intertwined. Who is in power in Dhaka, in Rangoon or Nepito, in Karachi or Islamabad? How do they approach questions of protecting minorities within their own countries? In this case, it would be Hindu minorities in, let's say, Pakistan or Bangladesh after 71. It would be Indians or of different, you know, cross religion in Myanmar. Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan Tamil question, right? How do these states deal with questions of minority protection and rights has a very direct consequence on how you do politics domestically as well? It actually features because these are neighbouring states in your electoral calculus. Asam is a very classic case in point, but not the only one where movement of people has a very direct consequence of how electoral roles look, which party benefits from that electoral role, right? These are very animated debates. I do think that, you know, this larger shifting of Indian politics from a center left gravity, especially during the 70s and 80s to this larger lurch towards the right over the last two or decades, perhaps after 1992, but definitely post 2014 has as much a link to how India's neighborhood itself changed as much as India did, right? There is a reason why, for example, the revocation of Article 370 from Jammu Kashmir in 2019 as it was done is so ideologically central to how the Jansang or the Bharatiya Janta Party views not just India, but the region itself. It is restructuring the terms of relationship with India's neighbour as much as people or the citizens of India, right? In the east, we saw the Citizenship Amendment Act, the introduction, the recrafting of the National Register for Citizens. None of these issues that we see play out today with such degree of ferocity, with such degree of commitment from the government of India are actually new. The National Register of Citizens was created in 1950. That has animated the politics of Assam. Since then, the Jansang was created in 1950-51 because of the expulsion, of systematic expulsion of Bengali Hindus from East Pakistan in 1949, but continuing, continually so even afterwards, right? So these developments have had quite a powerful impact on how India has come to see itself. And I'll give you just two short examples. There is a very potent sort of narrative that India was a soft state for a considerable period of time, till, of course, now it has become a very powerful, strong state, a muscular state. And when you actually look at the history, you realise that it is actually a pretty hard state from birth, because it has no other option in its own worldview, but to have a very robust kind of security-centric policy, because you're dealing in your perspective with people who you want to accept your nation-nationalist project but are resisting, whether it's the Nagas or later the Meezos, in Kashmir eventually, even in South, there were language movements, which became very violent in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere. But if you extend that logic of diversity and social conflict beyond the boundaries post-partition that we see, then you start realising that, look, we are actually looking at a very diverse, very polarised situation across the subcontinent. And this domestic politics, as we understand it in Pakistan and Bangladesh, has a very powerful geopolitical link. Commonal violence in 1960s West Bengal had a direct resonance on the position of Hindus in East Pakistan and vice versa. In fact, we saw tit-for-tat rioting happening between the two Bengals, so to say, and suddenly you realise that commonal violence takes a geopolitical aspect, right? So those are strains which we see flesh out in different shapes and forms today. Fascinating. Thank you. And I think we're going to come back to some of these themes, but I want to pivot a little bit now to contemporary situation. And I want to start, in a sense, in the West with Pakistan, of India's regional relationships. Of course, Pakistan is the one that, at least here in Washington, has received the most attention over the years. We all know about their deep and continuing historical differences, the fact that both have nuclear weapons, the fact that both have gone to war multiple times, keeps this storyline fresh in our minds. So I'd like to just, in simple terms, get your sense of the state of play today. You can take this any way that you like, but one angle here would be that both sides are coming to elections in this next year. So politics, in a sense, is bringing them to not the same place, but a convergence of sorts. And there are ways in which we've seen politics create trouble in their relationship in the past, certainly in the lead-up to elections in 2019. That was very much a part of the Indian story. But at the same time, perhaps this opens a window for a reset in the relationship as leaders come back with a fresh mandate or come in with a new chapter. So how do you think of this? I do think that once the electoral cycles are over, now, in India, it's a largely stable, kind of predictable process in that sense. And there is, I mean, of course, no one can predict elections in South Asia. So I don't want to say that this is going to be 100% the case, but there is a very strong chance of Prime Minister Narendra Modi getting a third term. That is almost an assumption that the bureaucracy is working with. It would be a renewed mandate. What that means is yet to be seen, at least in a domestic sense. But if that coincides with the rise or the assumption of power in Pakistan by a civilian face, which New Delhi believes is someone they can work with, someone they can engage with, without the baggage of expectation that this would lead to a resolution of some of the longest-standing issues, Kashmir and other things, at least. And that individual would most likely be Navash Sharif, with support, I'm assuming, with the military establishment, General Munir. There is likely to be a window of opening sometime in the middle or later half of 2024. That is something both sides want to happen. They might not put it out in official policy. That is something that has geopolitical logic, given India's very kind of heightened security situation on the northern border with China. It does suit Indian policymakers to have a ceasefire, as we can see, at the line of control, but perhaps take it one step further to, if not resolve issues, to kind of maybe talk about resumption of trade, even if it's smaller items. There's a case to be made on that count. And that logic dictates equally, powerfully, for the Pakistani security establishment, who is facing one of the most pressing security threats on its western side from Afghanistan, the Teriq-e-Taliban Pakistan insurgency, the resurgence, or third time, third avatar of the Baloch insurgency in some shape and form, has actually, I mean, that situation has worsened since the arrival of the Afghan Taliban in 2021. So there is a need, there is likely to be a moment, and that is exactly when I would put on my historians' ad and say, caution. And there is two reasons for that, right? Look, the structural realities of the domestic situations of these two countries is just not conducive enough for a serious dialogue to last. In the case of Pakistan, that will not be a deficit of intent, that will be just the reality of a poly crisis, wherein your economy is continuingly so in going in a tailspin, the political situation is such that the military wants to be in power, but absolutely have no responsibility. That you just keep on rotating the wheel of the civilian face, because someone else need to take responsibility of the economy, even though the military is just as important as an economic player, as much as it is a political and an armed player in that country. So I think Pakistan might just fail to deliver, even if we keep the questions about how it is dealing with its frustration for not being able to actually do anything by India's strategic decision to abrogate Article 370 in 2019. There is considerable frustration within the Pakistani army that they have not been able to kind of push back. On the Indian side, I do believe there is a lot more agency that the leadership enjoys. I do not think that the BJP will be really hamstrung by political opinion to not be able to exploit that opportunity. In fact, they can really sell that to the domestic audience and find acceptability as a big kind of hearted move during a new mandate. And India is trying to be the bigger player, the more generous partner, not partner, but a generous neighbor in that sense. And if Pakistan fails to deliver, then you can always go back and say that, look, this is something that we have done before and they didn't deliver. Having said that, let's assume for a second that Pakistan delivers and India builds on that conversation. Then how far you take that given how anti-Pakistan the political sentiment is. So even if you can sell that rapprochement for a period of let's say six months, one year, can that last, can that kind of, because then you'll come to questions that were being asked between 2004 and 2007 by their respective leaderships, then they were in part of this composite dialogue, people-to-people connection. And that fundamentally as of today militates against the domestic politics of both India and Pakistan. So that is where I would suggest caution, but I do hope that it's actually the two countries badly need to talk to each other for a variety of different reasons. And it is actually in their interests to build some sort of an understanding, go back to the drawing table and say that look, this animosity has not helped any of the two players in any which way. Now even with the caveats that you've just introduced, seeing an India-Pakistan conversation return to some kind of a composite dialogue, something like that would be, I agree, a positive step. But you've introduced the China angle here. And in a way as a positive factor, that is India's concerns about China actually lead it to be more open to opening a conversation with Pakistan. But I wonder how that plays out both in Indian minds and expectations, this two front threat. Yes. How India perceives this and how in your own view whether India should perceive it in those terms and what then that would mean for the prospects of an India-Pakistan rapprochement in the same lines that you've already explored. So first of all, China will always be present in this issue. India will always think about the Chinese equation or the Chinese question when talking to Pakistan, even though there is a very powerful bilateral dynamic to this relationship. Let me answer your question of this idea of two front threat going back more in time to let's say the 1960s on late 1950s when the two front threat actually took shape, took birth. And join it to the Galwan moment in 2020 when there was a brief moment of anxiety in India that you could probably see a two front threat materialize in a kinetic sense. Look, 1962 war with China really traumatizes India but it's actually the 1965 war with Pakistan that actually concretizes or awakens Indian security planners for a real operational sort of synergy between the Pakistani armed forces and the PLA in China to jointly do something against India. And that leaves India very vulnerable in a military and a security sense both in the North but also in the East. Now, since then till now, the fundamental of India's diplomacy, especially in the neighborhood has not necessarily been to kind of create a wedge between Pakistan and China even if that would be a great thing to do but to make sure that the alignment that exists between these two countries does not get operationalized in a military sense during moments of crisis. And I think that is likely to dominate the practice and that is shaping India's response towards the ceasefire that we see since 2021. That was very much in response to the fact that Pakistan under general Kamat Javed Bajwa did not exploit Indian vulnerability when it was facing the Chinese threat and a very different quality of Chinese pressure in the North in Galwan. That remains the case but having said that I think from the Pakistani perspective, there is a different kind of reality when they're dealing with the Chinese is that the bet that you put on China even though it's important even though there is alignment of interest to keep some, to counterbalance India to a certain degree has actually not paid the dividends that Islamabad expected it to pay. China is not the kind of strategic savior in a financial or a military sense that you actually wanted it to be, that you expected it to be. So Islamabad faced disappointment with two of its main allies historically speaking both the United States and China. So in that case, what do you do? In that case, you actually need to recraft multi-alignment not in an Indian sense but in a Pakistani sense. And that's where I think the fact that both General Bajwa and General Munir is very focused domestically right now but may reach out to the United States not to kind of arbiter between the two countries but to lubricate that kind of a conversation that remains to be the case. What Beijing will do at that point in time is yet to be seen and that's for me an unknown but I do think that shapes the environment very strongly so. So I take it that your view is that maybe India in a sense official India overestimates the degree of joined threat between Pakistan and China and part because Pakistan has actually gotten less in terms of strategic assistance from China than they would like. Is that a fair characterization? Overestimation is not the term I would use but I do think because 2020 there was a moment where it could have played out. That was just a very realistic estimation that and we do know that they were Pakistani army officers intelligence officer who were coordinating or liaisoning with the PLA during that crisis of course. So I don't think overestimation but I do think there is a deep seated anxiety a historically grounded anxiety around that and that anxiety might look as a stretch the farther you go from the region but if you are a policy maker taking a decision from New Delhi at that point in time, it would seem very real. So I think India would never risk kind of underestimating it. It would rather risk overestimation than underestimation in this particular instance. Good, thank you. Okay, let's shift gears again. Now we're gonna head to Bangladesh. I had an opportunity just a little over a month ago to be in Dhaka with a few of my USIP colleagues and that was just before this latest uptick in political protests and street protests but it's been clear for some time of course that Bangladesh's elections would be a huge test not just a political test but a test almost of state stability and whether the nation would hold together and as you've observed in a variety of publications India has a lot invested in its relationship with Bangladesh but not just in relations with Dhaka officially or Bangladesh generally but with Sheikh Asina in particular. So I wonder how if you could give us a better sense as to how New Delhi perceives this relationship and especially the peculiar and special relationship it has with Bangladesh's current leader. Thank you, Dan. One thing I think that undergirds India's perception and that's been borne out in reality as far as Bangladesh is concerned is the fact that there is a feeling that Bangladesh as a country has historically and that's because of what happened in East Pakistan before 1971, how the war was fought, the war of liberation, what the war actually did to the different people who were fighting for Bangladesh and Bangladesh is fighting for that not Indian policy or Pakistani approach. There was a lot of schism between different political parties whether it was the Awami League, the Jama'at-e-Islami, the Bangladesh-Jama'at-e-Islami, the left movements depified by Maulana Bhashani that this particular body politic has struggled to deal with non-violent transitions of power, historically. It has struggled to basically figure out how do you transition power in a respectable manner and I would not even take it as far as the question of democracy or participation. It's simply that you need to figure out how to deal with transitions and you have struggled with that. How do you deal with the polity and there are good reasons for that. This is not something I blame the Bangladeshi leaders for lack of imagination or parochialism. It's simply that this was a country which was born really bereaved of some of the core resources that a state requires. It faced one of the most devastating famines in 1974 which actually does not get the kind of due respect that is required to understand the geopolitics of the region but also the politics of Bangladesh and why they are so anxious about poverty and so aspirational about development even as seen up today. I think there is a calculation in that context that look, you are dealing with two big political parties led by two big families which are whether it's the Zia-Rahman's family, Khalid Zia or the Mujibur Rahman's family, Sheikh Hasina and the third party is of course the armed forces which has always been a politicized entity in Bangladesh and you have to basically play around these three power poles and you take a decision that which of these three or how can you shape the world view and the realities of these three so that they do not adopt policies which undermines three core asks that India has always had in relation to East Pakistan and Bangladesh since 1947, 48 and the three asks is one protection of minorities in this case Hindus in Bangladesh or East Pakistan not allowing that soil to be used by anti-India insurgent groups or militant groups especially focused on the Northeast India state building project in the Naga areas was really violent, really limitedly successful and even now they are struggling as we can see in Manipur not just with the Nagas but even the Kuki Zomi communities and the third ask has always been to connect when you partition a land to connect it takes a very different political logic so India wanting to connect infrastructurally build that railway line which was destroyed in 1965 build that road that would take us to Chittagong Port give us some birthing rights at Chittagong Port is a transshipment port that goes back to the anxieties and the realities created by partition this was actually, I mean some of the biggest economic impact of the partition of 1947 was actually felt in the East more than the West and this is something that Indian policy makers historically have struggled with even the idea of act East or look East previously it actually was birthed in 1968 so what Indian policy makers are today saying that we want better connectivity with Bangladesh or Myanmar the idea was officiated within India's power corridors during Indira Gandhi's time in 1968 and that has been a story of struggle and continually so from that perspective which of the people which of the political players in Bangladesh can deliver that best for a continuing period and that is where Indian calculation comes in and that's the idea of security and stability kicks in that look it is Sheikh Hasina who can deliver it's Sheikh Hasina who has delivered so from an Indian vantage point between 2009 and right this point in time and we talk Sheikh Hasina has delivered in terms of protecting Hindu minorities yes they have been attacks against Hindus occasionally in 2021 the Durga Pooju attack was quite an anomaly in that sense but it believes that fundamentally she has actually delivered on that count the insurgencies or the kind of separatist elements today find much more space in Sakharin, Myanmar or China even than Bangladesh so you have given on some of your two core security concerns and deliver to a certain extent on connectivity and that allows India to say that look she has given us what we want now she's facing trouble domestically for her own kind of policy crisis that she imposed and the contradictions that you build by having kind of you know compromise elections have successively you broke your own social contract that's your problem but for us you're a good bet and that is where India's policy drive continues that we will continue to invest in you we do not know how others will react we do not trust the BNP because they actually went completely the other way on these issues when they were in power between 2001 and 2006 or 1991 and 1996 if not before so this is what is actually driving it's just this sense of anxiety that if the BNP comes to power in free and fair elections which they most likely will because there's such deep and widespread anti-incumbency against Hasina they might adopt policies which will directly hurt India's national interests and will most likely complicate the security and the electoral dynamics both of West Bengal and of Assam if there is a big movement of minorities out of Bangladesh so that is what is really animating and it is completely at odds with how people in Washington DC view Bangladesh and its politics so you've given us a great senses to that perspective and I'd like to just push this out a little bit into the future into an imagined future when India's interests in security and stability and in particular its desire to see Sheikh Hasina be the guarantor of those things may come in to be jeopardized very directly how far do you think India might go to protect those interests what will India do if there is something that looks like a almost a political meltdown in Bangladesh in terms of saving the person of Sheikh Hasina I think India would do what it takes if it requires emergency military kind of capabilities to be mobilized I do think that is something India would not want Hasina to be harmed in a physical direct sense that's very clear we've had historical instances when those moments did come into play but if there is a serious meltdown I think there is a feeling in India that let's assume for a second that the Avami League due to mass unrest due to a political economic crisis economic meltdown I think might happen before or it will segue into the political moment that we have seen if there is that moment where Avami League is forced out of power for whatever reason then who comes to stabilize it goes back to this idea of stability who enters the fray in terms of stabilizing and the only force that there is who can do that, who can deliver are the armed forces of Bangladesh so if I were sitting in Delhi right now I would be thinking plan B and plan C would be make sure that if that happens if a 2007 moment comes back when 2007, 2008 or two years of military KTK government that's not what you desire you want the elections to go through Sheikh Hasina to remain in power the international community the western all to accept the status quo reality even if there's some sanctions okay fine they won't bite as much but if that does not happen then you want to have an individual from the armed forces of Bangladesh who respects your interest so I would believe that India would put its trust more in those officials to come and play the KTK's role if not the landlords than the BNP at this point in time interesting so there's just a quick follow up on that there's an interesting political alignment or so it seems between India and China in Bangladesh in terms of support for the existing regime and an emphasis on stability is this a right read and then beyond that does India what concerns does India have even if it is on the same page with China on Sheikh Hasina what concerns does it have or to have with China's involvement so again a very important question look on the face of it there is uniformity of posture where China is supporting Sheikh Hasina India clearly supports Sheikh Hasina and that might make some believe that there is uniformity of interest or alignment of interest and I would disagree with that interpretation India and China are trying to out bit each other to influence Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League there have been battles fought in terms of which officials get promoted within the bureaucracy within Awami League who gets more privilege which economic actors within Bangladesh get more privilege who are they tied to in terms of their economic interests their economic networks and that's a battle we see having been fought on this landscape of connectivity as they call it wherein China wanting to build a port in I think Sonadia was there in 2014-15 then it was scrapped and now they want to pitch for Matarabadi the Dhaka transportation corridor the metro that they have built has been using Chinese capital and Chinese sort of even expertise I think that might make people believe that this is something that maybe India and China will actually silently enter an understanding I doubt that I doubt that this is one thing that Indian policy makers and this is where also divergences come in if you talk to a security policy maker or who views Bangladesh very strongly from a security prism this is actually a cause of concern despite Hasina having delivered so much and this for Hasina is very important to have that outreach to China to assert her autonomy vis-a-vis India you don't want to be in a very tight dependency with New Delhi either there is a whole body of opinion which is critical of India and your country and you have to respect that political reality that social reality and how do you do that if you don't do it by tilting towards Pakistan which you don't want to and there's no need to give in the situation in Pakistan that's going towards the Chinese China is doing that not only to keep Indians on the toes but also to keep the West on its toes in Bangladesh but this is a country in which you want to kind of have some presence keep the Indians kind of a bit anxious and let the West kind of do its advocacy on democracy but have some degree of footing have that kind of geopolitical anxiety kind of boiling to some degree on balance I think India is much more confident as far as China's presence is concerned in Bangladesh given its own equities yes security people are much are concerned about Chinese presence but they are also very aware that beyond a point shake Hasina as someone who will not cross India's red lines even on the China question fascinating okay let's shift over now to Myanmar where perhaps India is a little less comfortable with the Chinese presence clearly at least from the outside it looks like your characterization of India's concerns being about stability and security or the principal drivers for how it has related to Myanmar certainly since 2021 since the coup there but perhaps much longer span as well but right now as we're sitting here it looks like the military is in trouble and it looks like the ground situation in terms of the shift in power within Myanmar may be more challenging even than it has been for India to navigate so if you could play out a little bit how you expect New Delhi is seeing these events and how it may respond to them so you know Myanmar is at such such a critical crossroads done and I think it's at a crossroads out of its own fault with the coup that was initiated in February 2021 it did kind of trigger a very different caliber of resistance which I don't think we have seen in a long time you cannot compare the pushback that the Yunta received after 2021 to what it did after 1988 when the 888 movement kind of an Aung San Suu Kyi literally returned from Oxford to take charge of the democracy movement 88 was a moment when there was internal turmoil within the Yunta but we had seen a military dictatorship since 1962 at least if not 58 right in 2021 we see a 10-year hiatus where even if ill-liberally so there were pockets of freedom political, economic, social at least for the majority communities that are living in Myanmar the Burma Buddhist heartland the lower Burma Myanmar as we know it in Rangoon Napito, Yangon Napito and that generation really saw promise and opening and a window to be able to kind of engage with global processes and really kind of come out of the clutch of the Yunta and that culling that very abruptly in 2021 has really increased a lot of has created a lot of anxieties what we are seeing today is absolutely unprecedented income, you know, not unprecedented the last time I would say we saw that kind of intergroup ethnic cohesion to push back in a kinetic sense against the Yunta because it's a military kind of entity that is ruling quite brutally so was in 1949 at the moment when men Burma actually got independence right that was the only time when there was a real serious threat to the state of post-colonial Burma and you know what being so conscious about stability it was the Indians who came to the support of then government of Unu very militarized government and gave them offensive weaponry worth 125 tons for the Yunta to stand so the survival of the Burmese state is actually due to Indian support and of course India has lost that right of place over the decades in Myanmar today I think the reading is not that different from the orthodoxy that has governed India's policy or perspective towards Myanmar since that point in time since 1949 the policymakers are likely to see this as increased instability and they would not pin the cause of instability to what was happened or what was done by the Yunta in February 2021 and this is where we qualitatively completely differ in how most observers use the situation there and how the West views the situation there they believe that the only source of stability or the part of the solution has to be Nepido and the Yunta and today what they might see moving forward is a breach between China and Nepido with all this offensive because this offensive has played out with Chinese support so I will not be surprised that instead of diversifying its relationship in any meaningful way with all the different actors in that broken polity India might actually in the next six months or one year actually double down on its support for the military regime I would not be surprised Fascinating so I'm going to ask one last question and then I'm going to open up the floor to our audience again here in person as well as online for questions but the last one is just a follow up on this last point if I'm not mistaken there's an interesting convergence maybe of worldview between a Hindu nationalist India and this current military junta and I wonder what you would think about that and also if you can broaden out it just a little bit about the implications for its neighborhood and if you'd like beyond for an India that has leaders that have this kind of worldview which at least on its face looks different from what came before aspects of certainly of continuity but also of change I wonder how you think about that No, that's actually this is arguably one of the least appreciated aspect of the politics that binds India and Myanmar rather than just the policy elements of it or the kind of the strategic elements of it it is absolutely when I was doing my research for the book I was quite astonished to see that one of the I mean there has been a lot of anti-Indian xenophobia in Burmese society Burmese politics and we have seen that kind of take kind of very clear state practices to push Indians out especially in the 1950s definitely in the 60s and that kind of racial politics exists in Myanmar regardless of anything but one outfit which has never been stopped from practicing is the Sanatan Dharam Swamsevik Sank and the individuals who lead that are actually they were trained as pracharaks as volunteers as activists by the Rastriya Swamsevik Sank in India and there is a very kind of underappreciated strain of ideological alignment here where at least for the Hindu right and the Bama Buddhist right or that nationalist Sangha nationalism that look essentially you're dealing all the separatism that you see whether it's in India's northeast whether it's in the minority ethnic areas of you know, northern and eastern and western Myanmar they actually blame it less to the ethnic categorization of the communities that reside in those areas more to the religious conversion that happened towards Christianity they see that look had Christianity not you know, had Christian missionaries during the colonial period British, American, Canadian missionaries not converted these people to Christianity they would have actually accepted their place as second-rate citizens effectively in a federal asymmetric federal union as they see it at least in the Myanmar case in India's case it was less parochial and that is where I feel that that that that idea it continues to shape the world views of both the Hindu right and the Bama and a good case to actually focus this you know to really you know lend focus to this particular alignment is the Rohingya crisis it is, you know, we have seen India kind of electorally kind of manipulate the issue of Rohingyas whether it's in Jammu or Hyderabad or elsewhere in Delhi there are communities who came long before the exodus began in 2017 they actually saw this primarily from a Muslim lens and a separatist lens so the Nepidos advocacy has been the Rohingyas are basically a community that is seeking separatism just like all other states and which for any western observer or any observer of the country of its contemporary politics makes no sense and you go back into the archives and it makes perfect sense the Indians have actually historically from 1949 to 2023 broadly subscribed to the similar view of the Rohingyas or the Mujahid parties as it was known then that look this was a separatist movement and it took its shape it took birth during the Second World War the V-Force, it was supported by the British and during partition the Bhutan-Mangdo belt in North Rakhine the communities there literally went to Jinnah and said look we should be part of Pakistan because we are a Muslim dominated demography and that idea has stuck even if it is not real and true in practice so those are, I think that's something which needs to be teased out more it needs to be studied more and just to have lost caveat yes there is a Hindu nationalist element to it there is a religious element to it even as a kind of liberal Nehru in India Nehru himself viewed the spread of Christianity in these areas in not very different lengths than what you would see the Hindu nationalists view it he was not very pleased by the fact that a lot of missionaries were quite active so I would be also cautious not to put all the causality of this alignment only towards a particular world view that seems to dominate in India today this was something that Indians shared even during Nehru and Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi's period even if they didn't make much of it at least in policy rhetoric and official discourse fascinating thank you okay so as promised I'm going to open the floor to your questions please raise your hand and we have microphones that will come to you so I think I see one straight back yeah and if you could say your name and affiliation that would be great thank you excellent talk Lucas Meyers with the Wilson Center so you know in the recent weeks in Myanmar we've seen the resistance offensives prove quite successful particularly on the border with India in Sagaing and Chin state and some of the border posts appear to have been taken in the open source and so I'm curious would that change India's policy at all if the border for instance falls out of the Hoontas control I don't think it would change theory's basic fulcrum of India's policy which is still supportive of the Hoontas I don't think that will happen and a good comparative case would be what happened in Afghanistan in 2021 India supported the Islamic Republic to the last day before it actually tilted away and pivoted away and started reaching out to the Taliban and that was a nine month period before India went back and opened its embassy so unless the resistance is able to topple the Hoontas I don't foresee India shifting its policy preemptively given the shifts that we see on the battlefield they still view this as a very fluid battlefield they still view the Hoontas offensive despite its success being strategically limited they do not I don't think New Delhi is putting its bet on a collapse of the Hoontas in totality maybe more so on the breakup of Myanmar but then they see that this was a breakup that was more or less in effect even before right so yes things of the fault lines have become sharper but that does not that has not kind of completely imploded the polity in terms of your point on Indomiyanma border especially in the Rikador border in Mizoram the Chin National Front has taken up that border post in More and Tamu border crossing the Hoontas is still controlling the crossing even if the PDAF and other resistance kind of groups are very active in Tamu itself I do think that India has outreach and access to these groups but I don't think that India would do anything that would empower them in a strategic sense the way we see happening in terms of bearing support for the Three Brotherhood Alliance at least not for now I do think there is a debate on this I'm not saying that this is a settled question this there's a growing debate as the situation evolves in India especially in the intelligent circles and the defense circles but the policy circles who actually craft and articulate that policy I don't think they would jump that gun anytime soon great yep Nalanti from USIP can you, on Bangladesh can you comment on India's ability to shape Sheikh Hasina with regard to the Western criticisms to US criticisms of the elections essentially the current period previous elections are have you detected India trying to shape Sheikh Hasina in being responsive or giving the appearance of being responsive to some of these concerns about how the conduct of elections or do you not see that at all do you see the current administration being completely in alignment with Sheikh Hasina or how does that compare to the Congress party or I'm just curious to get your thoughts on that look I don't think there would have been much difference had a Congress government been in power in New Delhi and approaching Bangladesh today as has been the case with the BJP I don't think so because the structural realities of that relationship are such that even Congress would have been anxious for about exactly the same issues that the BJP is so I would not necessarily in case of Bangladesh I would I don't give ideology I mean of course it's there this whole concern about Jamaat coming back into political play and kind of you know extracting a price in terms of targeting Hindu minorities which is a big kind of lightening rod in terms of Indian domestic politics today but those concerns were there and would have continued to be there had a Congress government been in power in Delhi in terms of shaping Sheikh Hasina's approach or the response towards the pressure she's facing look she has been able to withstand a lot of Western pressure because she knows India has her back that's very clear she does know that even if India would push her into kind of you know editing stuff on the margins as they say it, right? The fundamental calculus is that whatever happens we are with you, right? And that creates a very paradoxical sort of a kind of moment or kind of a circumstance that on one hand India is selling its Western allies it's telling United States that yeah we also want free and fair election but the silent annexy here is that the contours of free and fair will be limited structurally and that is being done by the complete assault very kind of widespread assault on the opposition especially the BNP, right? And that is something which India is quite okay with they have in fact officially said that you know don't ascribe all this human rights violations and clamping down on the opposition to us that is Bangladesh's domestic politics we support the constitution and when they say that we support the constitution that's basically actually backing Haseena's claim that the constitution does not allow a military any caretaker government, any caretaker government, right? So I do think that they want to shape it they do want her to get out of this as kind of you know stain free so to say in a political sense as possible but they're also very real about the limits of that so this is where I would say the strategic falter continues to lie. I believe we have some questions from the audience online I want to get to those in a second but I just quickly wanted to follow up on this last point with respect to India's position on Bangladesh India has sort of jealously kept the United States or tried to keep the United States at arms length in all of these countries but has I think failed in certain ways particularly in Pakistan now seems to have grave concerns about what the United States is saying and doing in Bangladesh what do you make of that balancing act particularly as India and the US are coming closer together? See there is again that's a contradiction of India's foreign policy in 21st century where you are aligned with the United States but you don't want to be seen as being allied with the United States and this speaks out most I guess in the neighborhood where India still continues to believe that this is their neighborhood this is our neighborhood we determine the bottom lines and everything rest is up for negotiations both with adversaries like China and allies like the United States now I have a different reading of India's kind of welcome of extra regional powers in this neighborhood yes India did not welcome Western engagement especially during Indira Gandhi's time this sort of very securitized sense of this is our neighborhood or Indian Monroe Doctrine as they call it but India even then coordinated policy and practice with the Soviet Union 71 is a classic case in point the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty did not cause it didn't have a direct impact on Indian decision making to wage war but it gave it a very critical strategic blanket so I think India has the element of playing your big part allies in the neighborhood on a selective country by country moment by moment issue by issue basis that is how I see as this is how it's asserting its autonomy and power and some would say if you ask from a non-Indian perspective hegemony in the subcontinent and Bangladesh is a very classic case in point but in Sri Lanka we have seen amazing coordination between the United States and India and India realized that it needed the United States in Colombo in Maldives there is increasing alignment but that's not the case with Bangladesh or for that matter even Myanmar so this selectiveness of India we will tell you where we want your support not you coming and tell us where you want democracy that is basically in a nutshell India asserting itself in the neighborhood good point yes go ahead thank you so much Brigida from USIP with a couple questions from the audience combining a few on Bangladesh that have identified a real decline in public opinion within Bangladesh on India to what extent does this factor into India's policymaking and does it pose any long-term risks for India so yes the there is certainly a long-term risk if you have a neighboring country where a mass of public opinion does not view you favorably it could engender itself in the kind of lack of support you get when you play Australia in the World Cup final it could engender itself in violence against minorities on Durga Pooja Hindu minorities it could engender itself in terms of life threat to Indian diplomats on the ground it could engender itself in many different ways there is a risk that I think New Delhi is very alive to but there is also a feature if you look at this very aspect from Delhi's perspective that when was the last time we were actually you know quote-unquote loved by a mass body of opinion in our smaller in countries in our neighborhood arguably never so what do you put that kind of analytical political weight behind that lack of popularity to shape your policy I don't think New Delhi does that of course it does not want it of course it does not want to be it has worked a lot you know it's entire policy outreach it's outreach in terms of connectivity giving more visas people-to-people connectivity is meant to blunt that lack of popularity but it is not something that would get its fundamental calculus and that's where it kind of you know does not privilege democracy because participatory genuine electoral democracy from Indian perspective means a lot of anti-India populism in these countries great we have another question in the room and Brigida do we have more online or okay we'll come back to those so go ahead apologies for coming late it was another meeting but sorry I'm Bina Nebram right now senior advisor at USIP here on Indigenous issues yesterday one of the Manipura's biggest armed groups one of its factions signed a peace agreement and you mentioned about Thamu still standing strong when all the border towns are being controlled right by the pro-democracy forces and with the signing of this piece of code yesterday do you see New Delhi having a direct line through Manipura to supply Napidow with the materials that it need that's one thing the other thing is Avinash you and I we have been researching this area for almost a decade and a half we are talking about 45 million in India's Northeast and 60 million in Myanmar which has not seen peace for generations why do you think this region is in such a turmoil and what is the you mentioned about that India may see the breaking up of Myanmar and not giving up on the junta and vice versa what happened in Manipura in the last seven months we saw the creation of buffer zones we know that several parliamentarians from Myanmar are in Mizoram do you think that it may also do a similar impact in fact I had said that the Balkanization of Manipura can lead to the Balkanization of Northeast India and can hurt India's national security interests do you think New Delhi is acutely aware of this and do you think they are doing any steps because for us from the region this is a very real scenario and is New Delhi even aware that it's double talk and double doing can hurt its national security interest forget about confronting China so we are really worried about what's happening not just in northeast of India but across the Indo-Burma border which I call it and in ways in which the history of 100 million people are not in the textbooks of Yangon or in Delhi so there's 100 million people we don't even know who they are and how do we even as nations as concerned citizens and scholars to understand this region and bring about a piece that each of this region and its ethnicity is deserve thank you thank you Bina for that really important and pressing questions on the first issue of whether India having a line through Manipur to Nehpito I don't have access to that information so I don't know is my honest response is don't know I would not be surprised but I do think India has a very direct line to Nehpito as well and that is quite a functional line as far as I know in fact India has strived to really make sure that its lines to Nehpito don't get cut like they did between 1998 to 1992-93 that is something that you don't want history to repeat it's a bit like Afghanistan you want to talk to the Taliban because you don't want to be in a situation where you had no channel when they were in power between 1996-2001 and the Kandahar hijack happened so that those lines do exist in what shape form is something that of course is up to detail and up to for exploration on the issue of Manipur and the desire for peace and whether central government actually understands the dynamics I have a two part response on that Bina look in terms of actual political reconciliation post May 2023 when this new kind of new chapter of kind of social political conflict has really emerged in South Manipur I think right now there is a realization that in New Delhi might not have the capacities or the equities on the ground if not the intent or the political intent in New Delhi to actually resolve the inter-society kind of splits that we have seen play out between the Zohku communities and the Mehdi communities and that's why I think unfortunately so but the likelihood of that buffer zone which has been manned by India security forces running from Imfal to I think Chura Chantpur that is likely to continue that is not a long term solution I think everyone is aware of that but that is from India's perspective it would abate actual kind of conflict and you know loss of life and loss of property at least so that is it's a preventive defensive mechanism rather than a proactive resolution minded perspective on the point and that speaks to how the larger politics of the BJP has played out in the Northeast I think unlike the Congress which of course played different communities different factions within communities it had a very counter insurgency centric approach to even electoral politics Congress that counter insurgency campaigns were very deeply tied to the Congress desire to have electoral dominance in states in Assam and elsewhere their alliances were formed accordingly with the BJP I think they have taken a call that you want to do a kind of ethnic or demographic arithmetic where the majorities are what they are and that has a very powerful impact on who you ally with how you deal with this current Chief Minister who is there in Manipur how do you deal with the conflict and partly that explains why even if you extend that logic of majoritarianism to Manipur why India would actually continue to support the Yunta and that also explains why UNLF which is a methi group primarily or a faction of UNLF a powerful faction has agreed to enter a ceasefire it raises the question about what does this mean in terms of ceasefire and accord if not more than a ceasefire actually with the kooky or zoo kooky groups in south and the kind of the elephant in the room the naga piece accord which has been kind of somewhere hanging in the middle forever effectively since 1997 definitely since 2014 those questions remain and I don't think anyone in New Delhi has a clear cut answer to that that is both because of the own politics but also because of lack of knowledge or lack of interest beyond a point in North East because it's just not electorally as salient in India's national parliamentary landscape as some other states like UPR for example and that is an unfortunate reality it militates against BJP's pitch that North East is very central to us ideologically that is the big pitch of the Hindu nationality this is part of the family and we are seeing breakage there but yeah it's a deeply worrying situation I don't foresee any immediate resolution in the near term unfortunately the Balkanization the Balkanization look I mean they have tried very hard to make sure that the kind of split that we have seen between the kooky's and the metis do not sort of spill over between the naga's and the metis or the naga's and the kooky's or have kind of ripple effects in Assam so they have gone on a lot of ways in Assam there has been a whole degree of a whole drive to sign accords with different groups even just yesterday while they signed the accord with UNLF it was even Ulfa iFactions were coming and giving weapons and there was a huge kind of celebration around that so they are trying to prevent that actually whether they succeed or not is of course an open question but that is I would say the basic policy right now to prevent to cut your losses to prevent damage and to prevent Balkanization as you see of the other fault lines in northeast and contain this to the geography that we have seen in South Manipur and then another question from online how does China's growing influence in Myanmar impact how India navigates its own relationship with Myanmar and particularly kind of consider regional security dynamics so China is you know partly India has always accepted Chinese dominance in Myanmar and it has always tried to kind of offset some of that influence by reaching out to Hinta by reaching out to other groups but it has also accepted the status you don't have the capability or the expertise to be able to do that beyond a particular point beyond a particular kind of effect and I think that is something that will continue to shape India's calculus how do you make sure that the China Myanmar economic corridor China's presence in Rakhine in terms of the Chokpu Port and the special economic zone economic footprint China's outreach are playing every kind of ethnic armed group both against each other and against the Hinta having equities with everyone it does not impact upon your own desire for some degree of stability in that country but also to be able to capitalize on that stability to build your own connectivity through Myanmar this whole idea of creating the a port in Saitway and then connecting the Saitway port all the way through a road two or three hundred kilometers into Mizoram that is something which is not going to happen given the security dynamics and that is something that India is really kind of trying to figure out that whether it can shape the politics or the realities at least in the Indo-Myanma border areas to at least achieve some degree of connectivity to be able to build a road and I think that is something that it will continue to struggle given the situation on the ground and even if you take China out of that equation it is likely to struggle regardless of that sorry ok we have one more question and then we'll wrap up Hi I'm Sheyes I'm a researcher at Johns Hopkins University thank you Vanash I have a question on India Pakistan guys you touched on this there have been attempts by the civilian leadership to establish dialogue which has been undercut by the military in 2021 the case was opposite is it fair to assume that there is no significant dialogue possible between Indian Pakistan till the military and the civilian leadership are sort of in comport on what the policy should be towards India yes basically that's a short answer to that but I think the bigger concern in India right now as far as Pakistan goes and I address this in the start of the conversation is not necessarily not exploring an opening after the elections if it does offer itself but how far you take it in which direction you take it and especially if it's Nawaz Sharif as a civilian head of state then things become easier it's easier to have a conversation if not substantially so the biggest question mark in India's mind today is General Munir what we saw post Galwan and the fact that General Bajwa did not exploit it in a military sense it did earn him considerable degree of respect and a bit of trust in India's top most political leadership and top power corridors and I think that is something that Munir is yet to replicate that trust question that does not mean that India does not necessarily actively mistrusts him they just don't know which direction and I'll give you an example why that doubt has kind of persisted in some sense if you look at the situation inside Kashmir Trist apart from the abrogation of Article 370 creation of Union territories India struggle with holding elections again or bringing in ushering in participatory politics in the new kind of realities there has been an attack and again almost on a weekly or bi-weekly or a fortnightly basis and we have seen that translate into casualties of Indian soldiers in different shapes and forms some of the attacks have been much more persistent much more concentrated they lasted days and you cannot have an attack that lasts for days in such a securitized setup when you're dealing with one of the most powerful counter incidences forces in the region without some degree of support or logistical support from professionals from on the side of the border and that is an assumption on which the Indian Armed Forces operate in Kashmir but that has political ramification is this continuity or continuing to keep the pot boiling even if at a low heat in Kashmir given the situation there is that policy if it is policy does it you know that means looking at a very different kind of a Munir who once he gets out of his kind of domestic problems will have a very different approach towards India even if he wants to talk or is it not policy and these are spoiler attacks being done by free agents so to say whether they are you know different lush curves and there are hard cuts and all the jai shen moments of the world or his bull and if that is the case then you have a different kind of a problem that can Munir deliver even if he wants to talk and that is an open question what is the Indian mind which side India's assessment kind of tilts on this question in the next 6 to 12 months will play a very important role in how far at least New Delhi goes in terms of taking that conversation on that note I'm afraid we've run run our time here Avinash let me thank you for sort of a thoughtful as I said tour of the region that one that is both strictly informed and then very much up to date up to the minute almost in terms of developments in the region it's been fantastic to have you here I'm glad you could spare some time to come across from the UK to join us here at USIP and to join our audience if you could join me in thanking Dr. I think that would be a great way to close thank you thank you thank you so much it's an honor to be here thank you