 I'm going to get started here. I'm Sharon Squisoni, and I direct the proliferation and prevention program here at CSIS. And I'm very pleased that you could join us here today. The focus of our program is generally nuclear related. So I'm especially pleased to be able to branch out a bit today and host this luncheon for His Excellency Ahmed Uzum Choo. Have I pronounced it correctly? Before I begin introductions, I'd like to just make a few administrative notes. This event is streaming live, and it's on the record. So please, please turn your cell phone ringers off out of respect for everybody here. We're going to leave plenty of time for questions from participants. And just when the time comes, I ask that you introduce yourself and your organization and keep your comment or question brief. So we're quite honored here today to have Ahmed Uzum Choo. He was appointed Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in December of 2009, and he began his term in July of 2010. He has a long-distinguished career in the Turkish Diplomatic Corps, both in the Middle East and Europe. He's represented Turkey as the permanent representative to the UN Office in Geneva at NATO at the Conference on Disarmament. He was ambassador to Israel from 1999 to 2002, has served in Vienna and was a consul in Aleppo, Syria in the 1980s. I can't imagine a better background for your current job. We have a lot to talk about today. The OPCW just completed its third five-year review conference, and Mr. Uzum Choo has just returned from site visits in the US. And of course, Syria is on everybody's mind with the allegations of chemical weapons use. So I give the floor over to you, sir. Thank you, Sharon. Thank you very much for this opportunity. I want to thank all those who are attending today. I think this is an opportunity for me, in fact, to share my thoughts about the current state of affairs at the OPCW. And of course, we'll discuss this situation in Syria with regard to chemical weapons and other issues. And I will also speak briefly about the outcome of the review conference that we, in fact, had a month ago. I believe that the passage of time only confirms that international treaties and agreements freely negotiated and accepted are indeed an effective means to establish a system of global governance based on shared values, objectives, and responsibilities. Even in an area as complex as international security, the example of the chemical weapons commission strongly confirms the validity of multilateralism in dealing with those challenges. And in fact, the OPCW has been shown as a good example of effective multilateralism over the years. We have recently concluded an important event in the history of the OPCW, the third review conference. The review conferences are being held every five years. And this was particularly significant because it took place against the background of a major transition for the organization. And Syria, of course, was one of the topics that has been addressed during the conference. I am pleased to say that the conference ended successfully, providing a much needed boost to our work, even as we know that challenges lie ahead. Set up in 1997, the organization has enjoyed 16 productive and fruitful years. The most visible and accountable of its accomplishments was the distraction under international verification of the declared stockpiles of chemical weapons. The convention, in fact, represents a first in the history of disarmament and nonproliferation of WMDs, as now comparative regimes exist in the area of nuclear or biological. The unique features of the convention are its balance of rights and obligations and a robust system of verification. The key to our success has been the ability of the OPSW to demonstrate how a complete one on an entire category of WMDs can, in fact, be implemented in practice. Our work represents several dimensions. Verification provides the basis of confidence in the effectiveness of the treaty. At the same time, assistance and protection against chemical weapons and international cooperation for peaceful uses of chemistry address the expectations of our diverse clientele. Membership of the convention has expanded rapidly to 188 state parties. Only eight countries have yet to join it. Verification of distraction of declared chemical weapons has thus far been the major focus of our work. 80% of those chemical weapons have already been destroyed. The United States has reached a level of 90%. Russian Federation is the other major process of state. Both these states make state progress towards complete distraction. Their commitment to eliminating chemical weapons deserves full acknowledgement and praise. In fact, my presence in the US on this occasion is an account of a visit by the members of the Executive Council of the OPSW to do two sites in one in Pueblo, Colorado, and the other one in Ruga, Kentucky, which are under construction at the moment. And the members of the council are here to acquire a better understanding of the US efforts to completely destroy its chemical weapons and transparency also leads to an appreciation of the genuine constraints that have prevented the US, as well as Russia, to complete the task by the final deadline, which was expired, in fact, on 29 April last year. Russian Federation also hosts similar visits every two years. On the whole, we are today on the verge of reaching global zero on chemical weapons, touching that my son will be a momentous occasion, we hope, in the next five, six years. This would mark the first time in our history that an entire category of WMDs gets eliminated very privately. While this would obviously be a cause for celebration, it also, naturally, raises certain questions about the future of the regime in the post-destruction phase. These questions concern our emerging priorities, if not about the very relevance of the treaty to our future security needs. My response to these issues is quite empathetic. All threats have not disappeared. The convention is not yet universal. The prohibition on chemical weapons does that with elimination of declared chemical weapons, or even after the possibly non-declared ones have also been eliminated. The organization will continue to remain responsible for assuring that chemical weapons will never reemerge. In other words, the non-properation function will outlive disarmament. If anything, in the face of the challenges we face, we need to redouble our efforts to strengthen the prohibition on chemical weapons globally in order to attain a world that's free from chemical weapons. This requires, of course, continued hard work and international cooperation. If we take the case of Syria, it made a starting... This country made a starting near admission last year about possession of chemical weapons. This was followed by allegations of use of CWs on its territory. States parties to the convention have expressed their deep concern that chemical weapons may have been used in Syria, and they are underlined that the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances would be reprehensible and completely contrary to the legal norms and standards of the international community. They have also expressed their support for the cooperation in accordance with the convention between the Office of the United Nations in the context of investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons. As you know, the Secretary General has authorized an investigation in Syria that initially involved a request by the Syrian government, followed by two other requests from other member states to investigate additional incidents. Subsequently, the modalities for investigation could not be agreed between the UN and Syria. The Office of the United Nations appears to be the only international body that has the capability to conduct the credible investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons, and we maintain our readiness to do so by continually investing in and testing our preparedness. However, as Syria is not a state party to the convention, the Office of the United Nations does not have the legal ability or authority to conduct any verification activities in that country and so on. Therefore, in accordance with our standing arrangements with the United Nations, which go back to the year 2000, we have a relationship agreement between the two organizations, and we have also a specific provision in our convention, according to which the Office of the United Nations has the obligation to put at the disposal of the U.S. Secretary General if he requests its resources for a fact-finding mission within the context of alleged use. And in this context, we responded positively, of course, to the U.S. Secretary General's request, and a group of 15 Office of the U.S. experts have been made available, and they are still on standby. We had an advanced team for a while, actually for almost a month in Cyprus, that we actually withdrew recently. In the past, the Office of the U.S. has made several de-marches to state slot party in order to communist them for their accessions. This includes Syria, and I recently wrote also, I mean, recently, last November, to the Syrian foreign minister, urging his government to join the convention. And this was followed by a joint letter between myself and the U.S. Secretary General. We sent jointly signed letters to the eight heads of state and government, requesting them to join the convention without further delay. When the OPSW was allowed to conduct this work, the results have been generally positive. This is evident in the case of Libya, a state party which they experienced a severe internal conflict and is now happily on the road to a new future, despite the serious difficulties that were constituted, turmoil in Libya, working closely with this government, the new government, and with the vital cooperation and support by a number of states parties, including the United States. We are on track as soon as closing the chapter on Libya's chemical weapons. Just as the situation in Syria requires the cooperation of the members of the UN, the universality of the convention can also benefit from efforts of countries that enjoy good relations with the concerned states. And this is especially true in the case of the Middle East, where a major initiative to hold a conference to discuss the establishment of weapons of mass traction free zone seems to have stalled. As far as the OPSW is concerned, we consider this initiative consistent with our own objectives for full universality and have provided all possible support to the facilitated Finnish ambassador, the undersecretary Ambassador Leiava. As regards the future direction of our work, more broadly, our state parties, the global chemical industry, and various other stakeholders within our membership need to remain fully engaged in order to trade the path that will strengthen the global men on chemical weapons. Our goals need to be retooled to contemporary and future security needs. It took a hundred years to reach a point where nations agreed to a total prohibition on CWs and to destroy their stockpiles. And maintaining this prohibition will require a continuation of a collective effort. Under the terms of the convention and the guidance provided by the policy-making organs, our work includes inspections at commercial chemical plant sites. 2,200 such inspections were conducted so far in almost nearly 5,000 declared sites worldwide. We also monitor imports and exports of designated chemicals. We identify discrepancies between those declarations and reconcile them with concerns to these parties. We carry out assist and protection capacity-building activities for emergency response. We promote knowledge sharing and the peaceful use of chemistry. We also productively engage with the global chemical industry, the scientific community, and the public at large. In our present-day world, the convention offers a vanguard against the possible use of toxic chemicals. Progress towards accomplishing a major objective of the convention, namely the discernment, sets the stage to consider how best its other core objectives can continue to be effectively served. In the future, we will seek to make the convention better known amongst those who are not familiar with it. And I must stress here that unfortunately, unlike nuclear and sometimes biological, two chemical weapons commission, the OPSW, are poorly known. And some actually think that it's due to its success. Victim of its own success, they say. I don't know if it's correct or not, but the reality is that it's not well known. Therefore, this requires additional efforts for public diplomacy that we are trying to do. And this is a fact in this context that I'm here today. And there is also a need to raise awareness among the relevant communities, like the scientific community, as well as the chemical industry. We have a scientific advisory board composed of 25 eminent experts from different parts of the world. And they have taken a more practical role in this field. They have a temporary working group on outreach and education, which we appreciate. And we will soon start implementing their recommendations in this respect. We have seen over the years that the priorities of state's parties have changed. For instance, in view of the threat driving from non-state actors, particularly terrorists, threat perceptions, they have more focused on capacity building for emergency response to lower intensity incidents. And we provide support in this context to state's parties. We encourage them to establish regional and subregional centers. We are also working closely with the European Union, which is in the process of establishing CVI centers in different regions. The demand, actually, this led also us to work more closely with the chemical industry on chemical safety and security issues. We want to do more in this context. That is a clear requirement by our state's parties in this area. And the chemical industry associations worldwide will become a closer partner for us, especially in order to build such capacities with small and medium enterprises. Seems to be a challenge. More global chemical industry companies, of course, are much better equipped, but the same cannot apply to smaller ones. Therefore, we will address together with the chemical industry associations those important issues. And many industry representatives, in fact, do underline that the safety and security in the chemical field are the two sides of the same coin. So there is actually a merit working together with the organization in this domain. I think the fact that, in fact, the 6th General of the United Nations attended for the first time our review conference last month shows how far the organization has come in commanding international recognition and which we appreciate. And I mentioned the outreach education that we will focus more. And finally, let me say that the lessons of our accomplishments are important, not only for the future of our own regime, but also hold relevance for international work on this armament in general. And it's my hope that we can work together with institutions such as the CSIS to propagate the story of chemical weapons ban, which might engender hope and can inspire us collectively in our quest for a better world. Thank you for your attention. And I'm prepared to take your questions and speak more on issues of common interest. Thank you. Thank you. We have a full agenda of topics that we can cover. I would like to, however, introduce Dr. Cindy Vestergaard, who is my in-house expert for a short while. Cindy is a visiting fellow here at CSIS and she is normally in Copenhagen with the Danish Institute for International Studies. We're working on a project together. She's been at the Danish Institute since 2007, but before that, she was with the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and she has much more knowledge about chemical weapons than I may ever have. And I would also like to bring your attention to this recent publication that you may have gotten as you walked in. Cindy wrote a short policy perspective on chemical weapons-free Middle East. So Cindy, I will give the floor to you for a bit as a discussant and then we will move to audience questions. Great, thank you so much, Sharon. And thank you for your... First of all, actually, what I would like to do is kind of be another cheerleader for the Chemical Weapons Convention in that this is a treaty that rocks. And it is not certainly well known that actually one of the things I think that shows how it rocks is that we're actually in the longest chemical piece that we've actually ever had, 25 years. But this raises the issue of Syria. So if we're in a potential situation where we have a non-state party potentially breaking that piece, and now as you're saying that the advanced team is actually, I guess, disbanded and is no longer in Cyprus, what does that mean for the current situation and the ability for the international community to be able to respond to this, to these allegations and the threat that unfortunately still exists today? As you might know, the UN Secretary-General has appointed Head of Mission, an expert from Sweden, early in mid-March, no, late March, sorry. We received requests on 20th March from the Secretary-General. I think the appointment was made a few days later. So this Head of Mission came to the Hague, to our organization, and he worked closely with the other experts that we made available. There were three more experts from the WHO at that organization who came from Geneva, and they prepared themselves for a deployment to Syria and they advanced them to Cyprus, in fact, was aimed at this purpose, which couldn't happen. And at the moment, this team is collecting information from different sources. I think they have been in contact with some states' parties, member states, and they may also go to neighboring countries, if necessary, as they understood. They are working very independently. We don't interfere with their work, and they will, I'm sure, prepare a report for the U.S. Secretary-General later on, and they will actually report what they found out, but it's unfortunate that they didn't have the ability to go to the site and to interview the victims and collect samples, and we debuted to analyzing them. We have a network of 22 designated laboratories throughout the world, which go through proficiency tests every year, and which have the capability, in fact, to analyze the environmental samples, like clothes or other water, soil, but also we have undertaken recently three years ago. In fact, some contacts with other laboratories, they may not be the same, which are capable of carrying out analysis of biosamples. So in investigation of alleged users, the latter is extremely important, having the ability to analyze blood urine, plasma, and others. Therefore, we want to develop further discapability and establish a new network for those laboratories. There will be some overlaps, but they may not be the same in certain cases, and this will enhance our capability for the future. But at the moment, we have already made some arrangements with some of them in case we, you know, the investigation team does collect some samples and that's required an analysis. So we have the team on standby, and the investigation develops otherwise. They will be ready to be deployed. They are well-trained experts from different expertise, in fact. And so we are innovating more now. So there sounds like there is still a mandate in the sense of trying to collect as much information in the meantime as they can surrounding the situation. That's right. But that, of course, is also challenged by time, and the ability that time passes by to be able to get into the zones. That's also correct. I mean, we all know that the samples may degrade, and we may not have the ability, in fact, to find out from these analysis. But on the other hand, even interviewing the victims, doctors, the health officials, or collecting other information, pictures, so that could be useful. In terms of the larger discussion within the Middle East, if I can take it to also the issue of incapacitance and riot control agents, in the sense that we are witnessing not just the potential of allegations of chemical weapons use, but also the potential misuse of incapacitance and riot control agents, which I'll just, for lack of a better term, lump them together as incapacitance. And if maybe you could talk about what the results of the review conference were in looking at this area, which has a little bit of a loophole within the Chemical Weapons Convention, where we're actually in a situation where the soldier is actually protected against the use of these agents in terms of a method of warfare, but the civilian is not. So I'm wondering if you could maybe talk about what, in terms of looking at the OPCW moving from one of destruction to maintaining a chemical piece. How does incapacitance work within that area? In the commission, it was clearly stated that the riot control agents cannot be used as a method of warfare. So this is prohibited. And as to the incapacitance agents, which may not be within the category of riot control agents, and which are being used for law enforcement purposes for by certain countries, according to some experts of service, this is a loophole, as you said, according to others, these are covered in fact by the general purpose criterion, according to which no state party has the ability to use any toxic weapons beyond the actual dose which are allowed according to the commission. So no country could use such chemicals for actually still deep or for little purposes. But this issue was discussed during the review conference. There was, we were very close to an agreement to address this issue in the coming years. This didn't happen at the time, but this doesn't mean that the issue will disappear from the agenda of the OPCW. I know that there's a number of countries which are interested in discussing this. And I think it's going to happen in the coming years. And I hope that there will be a common ground in fact to break up the issue. Is there a method also or a sense of training in terms of how best to be able to use incapacitance, for example, not in enclosed spaces or is there some type of training program that could happen or that does happen? No, actually we don't have any particular program other than the SSI protection program. We train the experts coming from states parties both in the Hague and as well as on a regional basis how to protect themselves. And of course there are people against the use of toxic chemicals and how to use the protective gears and the equipment, how to identify the agent which might be used and how to protect them, how to counter such threats. But we don't make any differentiation between those toxic chemicals and ICS. The other context within the Middle East is looking at the custody, the security possession. And of course now we're looking at potential use. When in addressing chemical security issues with non-state actors and we're talking about the role of global industry here, how can the states and industry work together? Is it a need for better regulation, more legislation or is there something else that can go from the bottom up or certain types of standards that need to be in place? Actually global industry, chemical industry doesn't want any more regulations. They think that they have enough regulations and which is correct. They are subject to different controls. They are part of a responsible care program which relates also to chemical safety. But the purpose of such a cooperation I think it would not be to develop new regulations for the industry. But rather build capacities wherever it's needed together. Share some best practices. Do you use the OPSW for sharing best practices? In certain countries, in certain parts of the world, these kind of safety measures, security measures are not accurately adequately put in practice. So we want to remedy this, which is in the interest of the global community, the international community. So any loophole in any part of the world in terms of chemical safety and security may affect others. No one, no country is immune to such threats. Therefore, bearing this in mind, I think it would be in the interest of all our states parties, 188, and we hope that's going to increase in the new future, will be engaged in this collective endeavor. We have about 84, 85 countries which declare chemical plant sites worldwide. And many others do not have such declarable sites. Nevertheless, we want to engage them. That's why we have this, in fact, a international cooperation on the peaceful use of chemistry, which constitutes a major incentive for the developing world. But they are important to implement the convention domestically through legislation so that they can monitor, for instance, the imports, exports, these countries may be used for the use of chemical material transfers. So it's, I think, in our common interest to get them on board. So all this relates to, I think, a closer cooperation with the global chemical industry. I have time for one more? Sure, but can I ask a quick? And this is, I hope, in Naivete. How is Taiwan handled? That's tough question. With a big chemical industry and not a party, too. We have, as the UN has, one China policy. So China is, as you present, the chemical industry. They have, they are actually the biggest country in terms of declarations of chemical industrial sites. So they declare about 1,500. Wow. Nearly one-third of declared sites worldwide. But there's a cap for each state party. They don't receive more than 20 inspections per year. And Taiwan is not covered by this regime yet. So that's the family issue, I said. But they do declare. No. Oh, they don't declare sites. Thank you. End of my question. That was a very good one. One of the things that was also, there was a very seminal statement made about sea-dumped weapons, as I understand. And I think this is one of the things that maybe I should underscore to the audience is that over the course of the 20th century, at least half a billion metric tons of chemical weapons were produced. And that's what makes this treaty so fantastic. In that chemical weapons were certainly horizontally and vertically proliferated. And a lot of this was dumped into the seas. And maybe you could talk about the legacy that the OPCW can deal with when it comes to cleaning that up. Sea-dumped weapons are not covered by the commission by this regime. But when they come to the surface, of course, the state's parties may ask the support of the OPCW technical sector. We may send our experts to identify the weapon domination and to help them how to handle it. And we debut, of course, to destroying it. Having said that, some states' parties had shown an interest in addressing this issue within the OPCW. And recently, during the reviewing conference, four countries, both countries and other countries, have raised this issue. And there is a common understanding now that the state's parties, which are interested, may address the issue on a voluntary basis within the OPCW, which will be used as a platform. So does it mean that the OPCW will be further involved in this matter? It's not yet clear. So it will depend on the outcome of those informal discussions that will be held. Thank you. Thank you so much. We will open the floor for questions. And we have two microphones, two roaming microphones, Bonnie Jenkins and Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins. Good morning. I think it's up. Good afternoon. First of all, I want to thank you for this presentation. I think it's very good. And thank you, Director General Zunku, for coming here and speaking with us and doing this outreach, following the state's parties meeting that you had recently in The Hague. I'm happy to hear about some of the decisions that have been made and conclusions regarding chemical safety and security. I think that's a strong step forward. And also happy to hear about some of the recognitions about the role of centers of excellence in working with existing centers and the importance of chemical security and safety regionally. My question is in response to some of the comments you made about the chemical industry and chemical security and some of the things that might be needed in terms of what we can increase in terms of chemical security. I am US representative to the G.A. Global Partnership, which you may know something about. It's a 25-member partnership which includes all the G.A. countries but also includes a number of other countries like Mexico, Denmark, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Belgium, Australia, for example. And we've been in existence, it's been in existence since 2002 and its main purpose is to fund projects to prevent WD terrorism. So a number of activities and projects that are funded by these countries are covered under the Global Partnership. Last year we established in the Global Partnership a chemical safety and security sub-working group. And what this allows is for there to be a lot more focused funding and discussion on chemical safety and security. So it's a new group and the GP has only had one meeting so far. We'll have another meeting in early June. And so one of the issues that this new group is gonna be looking at is what should it be funding in the area of chemical safety and security? What should be the areas of focus? What should be the regions that we should be? Increasing attention and also increasing funding. So I take on board what you said already about what we can do in terms of the chemical industry. They don't want a lot of new regulations but there's things that we can do like sharing best practices, for example, and building capacity. So are there any other thoughts that you have in addition to those and those are good? Any other thoughts that you can think of in ways in which you can take advantage of this existing body of countries who are going to be looking at ways in which you can fund chemical safety and security in the future? Thanks. Thank you, Ambassador Jenkins. Let me first express my appreciation for the continuing support of yours to the OPSW. And we will try to play an active role in this group, working group that you just mentioned. And we are in the process, in fact, of developing some new ideas. I understand the next meeting will take place in London because the UK is the rotating chair. And we will come up with some new ideas in this context. Clearly, we don't want to upset the chemical industry. We consider them as an important partner. They have been involved in the development of the convention. So they have been involved in the negotiation of the convention for years. And we have had a continuous interaction since then during the implementation phase. We are now in the process of developing a mechanism for more regular interaction with the chemical industry. The ICCA seems to be the globally-representative industry association. But the Chinese and the Indians are not involved. So we want them also to be represented in this mechanism interaction. What you want to do to develop certain programs for capacity building in the chemical safety, which meet the expectations and the needs of the industry. So I think it's in their interest because as I said earlier, the big companies, in fact, are well-equipped, but whereas the small and medium-sized enterprises are not. So they cannot reach out to those medium-sized enterprises. Therefore, we may be a partner, in fact, to do it in the coming years jointly. So that's how I see the niche, in fact, area that we should work together. But we will come up with more concrete, in fact, proposals for the June, before the June meeting. Thank you. Ambassador Krushen, I'm in with Global Security Newswire. Just a couple of questions on the advanced team itself. Can you say when they left Cyprus and how the team had been broken down between experts from the OBCW, WHO, and perhaps other organizations? Actually, we had several experts on the ground, so they changed. And the idea was not really to conduct any work there, but to prepare the ground for the deployment of the larger team if it happened, which didn't happen. So recently, we had one expert from the OBSW and another expert from the UN, in fact, who was involved in the planning. So there were two. And they were thrown, I guess, a week ago. All right, so, yeah, beginning of this week. Dr. Aimees, that's all. Thank you for joining us today. I'm gonna return to the top of du jour, which is, of course, Syria. Obviously, it's not exactly clear what has happened. We don't have all the facts. We're not sure what has been used, definitively, much less, who might have been using. Everybody can make their reasons. But it seems to me like there is a quandary about what to do and how to prevent future use. And there are a number of options that are being discussed in Washington, whether it's establishing a no-fly zone, which wouldn't actually take care of missiles or rockets. Or maybe swooping in to secure the stockpile or trying to bomb it. Do you know whether or not you've got it all is one of the questions there. Might you release toxic clouds over civilian populations with bombing? Or trigger Al-Assad's threat to use chemical weapons in the event of foreign intervention with an attempt to secure the stockpile? So there are a lot of things being discussed all with serious drawbacks. The reason I'm gonna ask you this question is because it falls underneath the edges of the chemical weapons convention. And that is, what about defenses? The treaty has a provision that all members are obligated to provide assistance in the event that another country is threatened by the use of chemical weapons or ungoes a chemical weapons attack. In this case, clearly the drawback is Syria's not a member. But we have a humanitarian crisis that could explode exponentially if chemical weapons are used or any chemical, toxic chemicals used in a widespread fashion. And I wonder if you thought there was some advantage to providing defenses to the Syrian civilians as well as to this free Syrian army in these circumstances because 188 countries have made that pledge. Thank you, Amy for these comments. And in fact, your comments do raise several questions. Let me pick up some of them. Since the Syrian crisis began in March 2011, as the technical secretary, in fact, we addressed several scenarios. And one of the scenarios, for instance, was the possibility that the state's parties, neighboring Syria, may feel the threat of use of chemical weapons, especially after the July statement last year by the Syrian Spokesman, and may request some assistance from the organization and state's parties under Article 10 of the Convention. So what we should do, this didn't happen, but this could have happened. And in such a case, of course, the requesting state party has to substantiate the perceived threat and should make clear what it needed in terms of protection, what kind of equipment, what kind of expertise, and so on. And we would have the mandate to coordinate such an assistance. And we made, you know, we undertook some exercises, tabletop exercises within the secretary to be in order to review our procedures and to be fully prepared for responding to such requests. As to the population, civilians living in Syria, which may feel the same threat, we don't have such a mandate as the Office of the Year to address those questions. But clearly the United Nations, in fact, the UN agencies which provide humanitarian assistance and others have a global mandate. And if they requested some support from the Office of the Year for these scenarios, they could always ask our expertise, which didn't happen, but I think in that case, I would need, in fact, a decision by the policymaking organs of the organization to provide such a support. We don't know who used what, as you said. And we don't have the ability to verify it. And, but what is important from my point of view is the serious threat that pose those chemical weapons stock files, which are reported to be up to 1,000 metric tons, which is a constable stock dispersed throughout the country and of all kinds of chemical weapons. So as long as they continue to exist, they pose such a safety and security threat. And of course, one would wish that these weapons would be under control earlier and be addressed with a view to destroying them. Let's hope that this issue will be addressed, for instance, at the upcoming, hopefully planned conference to be held in Geneva and the more pressure we put on the Syrian regime on this issue. What I welcome is that the international community as a whole seem to be united on this issue, although they may have different positions with regard to Syria and its future. I think on the possession of chemical weapons, on the use of chemical weapons, they seem to be unified and opposed to any use of them. Shanzanis, Andrew. Thank you for being here, Mr. Director General. My name is Andrew Kershawk. I work for Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, which is a Department of Energy site out in the other Washington, Eastern Washington. My question is about inspections, particularly on other chemical production facilities. I know that the OPCW uses statistical methods to determine where they visit, but is there a role for open source information from the internet or social media, either in feeding into the statistics or once sites have been selected and maybe targeting down the inspections themselves? Thank you. We have a selection methodology based on certain criteria, but which is the interim because there is no consensus yet among states parties on one criterion which is not yet defined. Therefore, we have developed a software which selects nearly 240 sites to be inspected on a yearly basis by our inspectors. And one of the criteria, for instance, is to select the most relevant sites above a certain level of production of certain chemicals, but we want also to ensure as equitable geographical distribution. There are countries which do not declare more than a limited number of sites, so we want to keep a reasonable interval between two inspections through those countries. In certain cases, it happened to be 15 years, which is very long, 10 years. So we want to reduce it to six to seven years, even if one country, for instance, declared one site. As to the use of open sources, our inspectors, before going to those sites, they, of course, have access, for instance, to the website of a particular company which they study, and they may use some other open sources, but for the preparation of, sorry, for the identification of sites to be inspected, we don't have the mandate to use such sources. Some states' parties are opposed to it, and they argue that only the declarations can provide a basis for the declarable sites. So we follow this line. We cannot identify, for instance, some chemical sites which could be declarable, but which are not declared by states' parties using open sources, so we don't have the mandate. Question in the back, and then. Thank you. My name is Goliol Simidisi. I work at CRDF Global, and our organization implements various programs to promote international science collaboration, kind of to piggyback off Ambassador Jenkins' question, the awareness of chemical safety and security, perhaps at the university level, not even at the, in addition to the industry level, have you seen throughout the developing world that there's an understanding of a nuance between chemical safety, which I would assert unintentional misuse, versus chemical security, which would be intentional misuse, and do you think kind of inculcating a culture of chemical security at the university level, at the post-graduate level, can kind of, in the future, promote a culture of chemical weapon non-proliferation in the long term? Thank you. I think you have very well defined the ultimate goal of ours, and you're right, there might be some accidental use, and which needs, of course, an effective response, but a primary objective should be to raise awareness about the risks associated by handling these chemicals, and preventing any access to them, for instance, by terrorists and others, and also to ensure some basic security, physical security measures in all those sites. This, again, requires a very wide collective effort. The ICCA, as the Global Association, in fact, does promote such measures, and they promote also the membership to the Chemical Weapons Commission as one of the criteria, in fact, to be members to their own association. I think for the future, they may do a little more, for instance, by promoting the investors, possible potential investors in the developing world, to pay more attention to safety measures and to safety awareness-raising as well as capacity-building. I think that this is an area that we could do more collectively. Dan Horner from Arms Control today had a couple of questions about the proposed UN inspection in the passage of time. Just to give a little more detail about what is and is not possible to be found at this point, because for example, I've heard that there has been serious degradation. Now, it may be possible to find some things, but you would need much more precise information about the locations to get to it. Is that your understanding as well? And then secondly, in addition to the point that you made about being able to interview victims and doctors, is there a political value in having the team go in, even if they aren't able to find out a lot, is to establish a precedent for future situations like this? Thanks. I think in some statements by the UN officials, it was made clear that the team's mandate would be to identify what was used rather than who used, and which didn't happen clearly, but they would focus on the chemicals which might be used. And as to this serious degradation of samples, our experts told me that in certain cases, for instance, for environmental samples, the, in fact, the degradation would be quicker, whereas for bio-samples, some in-depth analysis could help identify any possible chemical after a certain period of time, depending on the chemical. But so the time may not be that short as something, for instance, a week or two weeks, but it may be a little longer. I cannot give you a definite precise answer on that, but I'm told that it can go up to a month, sometimes two months, too. As to the setting up precedent, you may know that the such investigations, in fact, were held in the past before the establishment of the OPSW under the mandate of the underdospice of the U.S. Secretary General based on a Security Council's resolution as well as a UN General Assembly resolution. And the teams were composed of, on an attack basis, by experts. And these investigations, such investigations, in fact, were conducted sometimes months later than the alleged incidents of use. So there are already some precedents, if you wish, in the UN context. This is the first time that OPSW, since it's established in 1997, that it was called to support the fact-finding mission. And we, of course, one would hope that everything went smoothly and we would be able to deliver what we were expected to deliver. But if it didn't happen, clearly, I think the OPSW should not be held responsible for that. We are a technical organization. We are making available our technical resources, capabilities, and all the rest, which are political, are being addressed somewhere else. So that's what I can say. Paul Bernstein from National Defense University. Thanks for your remarks, sir. Sticking with Syria, I'd like to just pose a hypothetical to you and get your reaction to it. Let's assume for a moment that at some point a friendly government emerges in Syria. Can you envision the OPCW assisting such a government in tasks such as securing and inventorying the CW stockpile it holds, if it has yet to make a clear commitment to joining the CWC? I think we have the mechanisms already in place within the OPSW to provide assistance to states which are not party, but with a view to preparing them for membership, we do it, for instance, at the moment with Myanmar, with Angola, we proposed the same to South Sudan and Somalia. These four countries, in fact, closer than the other four, if you wish, from our point of view to full membership, and we sent some experts to those countries and to inform them about their obligations, but also to prepare for, for instance, their legislation, national legislation, and also the mechanisms they need for implementation, domestic implementation. Each state party has the obligations to set up a national authority which would be responsible for the coordination of, among different agencies, for the coordination of the implementation of the commission, so this involves customs and others, so that requires a lot of work. So this kind of assistance and support could clearly be provided to Syria too, and as to the identification of weapons and security of them, of course, we have such an expertise. I think if, you know, it comes from Syria, or, I mean, without speculating on its future, I think we have the necessary sources to do it. If there's a security council resolution or if there is a decision by the state's parties, by the executive council or some of the state's parties, I think we would be ready to do it. Thank you very much, Your Excellency. Andrew Turner from the UK. Could you expand a little bit on what the OPCW might be doing in terms of preventing physical proliferation from Syria, either in respect of forensic analysis of border crossing points or likely rat runs into neighboring states or what other support you might be providing to neighboring states to prevent the development of a spillover or wider problem set outside of Syria? We don't have the capability to go to the border areas and to monitor the transfers of any toxic chemical material from one country to another. But we have some training programs, in fact, where we hire some experts and try to build such a capacity. On the other hand, if there were transfers to state party of chemical weapons, there are mechanisms which may be involved, like challenge inspection, because it's strictly prohibited to bring in import or transfer chemical weapons to any state party. Therefore, they have the obligation to prevent it if it wasn't, then other states' parties may invoke the challenge inspection mechanism and we will have the obligation, which may be hardly prevented. This would require two-thirds majority by the executive council to prevent the conduct of such an inspection. Therefore, it's nearly an automatic mechanism which would be put in place. Then we would send our experts and verify the situation on the ground and make a report, in fact, to the executive council. So a challenge inspection mechanism, I think, would be the right mechanism to be invoked if such transfers are allegedly taking place. Do we have additional questions from the floor? I'm gonna just take my prerogative then as the chair to go back to some other issues. You mentioned on destruction that the US had destroyed about 90%. Yes. How is Russia doing on that score? And could you just give us a sense? I know there are a lot of experts in the room, but I'm not an expert. Why does it take so long for the destruction of these chemicals? What are the major factors that cause this, I don't wanna call it a delay, but to make it take so long. Let me begin with Russia. Russia has declared seven different storage sites and they reached a level of 72.3% of destruction recently. And they finished in two of them, four others are at the moment operational and one other is going to become operational by the end of this year. And one of the issues, of course, is that those chemical weapons cannot be transported. This is probably by law in the United States, they cannot transport from one state to another. And the same applies in Russia. Therefore, the chemical plant destruction sites had to be built next to the storage sites. If the other option was made available appropriate, so that could of course simplify the matter. And certain categories of weapons could be assembled in certain sites and with one technology, with one plant and so on, everything could be destroyed there, which didn't happen. And in the case of Russia, I think although they received a lot of support from other states' parties, both technologically and in terms of funding too, there were some initial difficulties in the 90s and later they were able to overcome and some technical problems with regard to certain munitions, certain weapons. Now they seem to be on track and they make a steady progress, which I welcome, but they were not able to meet the deadline. In the case of the United States, among the nine sites, so they finished in seven sites and two others are being built, as I said earlier, in Colorado and Kentucky. In Colorado, the construction is almost complete and in Kentucky it says 67%, and which will require a few more years. One of the actually issues is the safety. The safety comes first and this requires also a lot of testing. For instance, systemization as they call it, which includes testing of each equipment, which includes the training of the personnel who will handle those equipment. It does need a lot of time and in Pueblo, the systemization is likely to continue for the next two and a half years and once they will be sure about safety, then the plan will become operational. This is quite a dangerous, in fact, operation, labor intensive in each site, 1,000 people work and for each site, and increasingly more, there was a need for close interaction with local communities, which were concerned about the environmental effects of this distraction activity. And in the case of Pueblo and Kentucky, because of the assistance of local communities, the incineration methodology could not be applied, so they had to develop another technology of neutralization. There are more technical words that I don't want to use here, but anyhow, that actually prolonged the whole process. But I think among the state's parties, there was never a question about the commitment of major process states, Russia and the United States. Clearly, they asked for more transparency and according to a decision taken two years ago, one and a half year ago now, at the end of 2011 at the conference of state's parties, state's parties, processes, state's parties, US, Russia, as well as Libya, were allowed to continue the distraction and to complete it in the shortest time possible. That's the formulation which was agreed and with more transparency, so with more regular reporting and they tasked me also as director general to monitor the situation and based on independent sources from our inspectors, make an evaluation and make a report to the policy-making organs and report to them whether they are on track, whether they have taken all necessary measures to accelerate the process of distraction or not. So this reporting, quite, I should say, regular and strict reporting processes on the way and also the so is the distraction, but this will require a few more years. The Russians have identified the planned completion date, the end of 2015. We will see whether they will be, this is an internal planned completion date, which was approved also by policy-making organs. And in the case of the United States, this goes up to 2022, I guess, again, for the reasons that I just explained, but we hope that also the US is going to be able to finish a little earlier. I think that the boss who runs the whole program and the women. Can I actually follow up on that? And I think that this is actually an extremely important question you've asked and the challenges that you're talking about, because when we're talking about potential nuclear disarmament, I think this is always one of the interesting things where you're here, oh, we need to do it in the next 20 years, 10 years. And I think that the experience of chemical weapons disruption, not just in terms of the international, 24 years to negotiate the treaty, but then also the time that it takes for each country that possesses to go through the natural process that it has to in terms of talking to its communities that are going to be undergoing or close to destruction facilities, such as you just mentioned, what are the laws already in place in the different countries? But are there other examples that because of the success of the CWC and we're actually moving towards chemical zero, that could in some way offer lessons for some of the other WMD aspects? I think there is, and some, in fact, observers thought that similar programs could be emulated and applied to the interdismutant is to a possible nuclear disarmament process. For instance, the verification mechanism. I think there are lessons to be drawn from the CWC verification mechanism in the future. And both to the training of experts and the modalities of receiving such inspections and developing the national legislation in order to receive such these inspectors. So that's many others, in fact. So I think if we come to that stage and welcome, of course, the statement made by President Obama in Prague, so if we come to that stage, I think we would, I mean, many observers, experts would throw on the CWC experience and we'll find many elements that can be actually used for nuclear disarmament. I think we have one more question before we let you go. I'm Aaron Gluck from CNS. I was wondering, in regards to small to medium-sized enterprise engagement, is there a desired outcome from that engagement, whether it's joining the Responsible Care Initiative or if they're not comfortable joining RC if it's creating codes of conduct, switching from more toxic chemicals to using safer practices. Is there a certain outcome that you're looking for? On the code of conduct, in fact, this is an issue that we want to explore not only with regard to chemical industry, but with regard to scientific community as well. There have been some attempts on a national basis and some states parties had already done it. They developed some codes of conduct. We want to, you know, to provide a forum for sharing such practices, best practices with others. This is extremely important from my point of view because not only, you know, verification measures, import, export controls would be, you know, would lead us to the desired outcome and ultimate goal of ensuring the nonproliferation of those weapons and prevention of their reemergence. In addition to all this, we would need the awareness raising, as I said earlier, and education of those communities. It's in this context, I believe, that we have to educate also the small and medium enterprises and we have to engage them. How to do it, it will depend, I believe, it will vary from one country to another. It will depend also on their responsiveness. In some countries, the states parties believe that we should interact with the chemical industry through their national authorities, which we will do. I mean, they will be the focal point, if you wish, who will organize such an interaction. But I think they realize also that it's in their interest, in the interest of the government agencies, that their own industry becomes, you know, more capable and more aware of the security risks and safety risks. And I think this would also help some developing countries, in fact, to become more prepared to receive this kind of investments. So that might be also an incentive for them to develop such capacities and to express their readiness through their such capacities to receive more investments. The chemical industry investments have considerably shifted from Western countries to Asia, for instance, over the past 15 years. The Asian countries do host now, I guess, almost 50% of the chemical industry globally. Well, Mr. Azumchuk, this has been a fascinating conversation. We really appreciate your taking the time while you're here in Washington, D.C. You have a very important job, and we wish you all the best. Thank you. Thank you very much. Please join me. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.