 Every Arab thinks that the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 was some grand conspiracy. This war that would establish the state of Israel and cement its existence, Arabs have conditioned themselves to believe that they didn't see coming, and that the West in all its might, the British, the Americans, and all the Zionist-loving nations had it in for the Arabs and supported the Jews blindly, whether politically, financially, and militarily. But nothing could be further from the truth. Wars are one on the ground, by humans participating in the gruesome fighting and killing of each other. And regardless of any real Western support on the political and financial front, no Western nation, no Western nation was involved in the real military clashes that led to Israel's eventual victory. So why is it easier for Arabs to believe and buy into such a conspiracy? Well, because the truth hurts, and in this instance, it hurts real bad. Neqba is the word used by Palestinians and Arabs alike when referring to the moment of the loss of the nation of Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel. But do you truly want to know what the word Neqba should be about? Well, it definitely shouldn't be about the effect, being the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homes and country, as everyone thinks. It should be about the cause of the event. The Neqba is effectively about the way in which Arabs systematically messed up big time in this Arab-Israeli war. This is going to be a very controversial conversation for some. But who cares about ruffling some feathers here and there? Facts are facts, and when we diagnose the Neqba from every angle, the facts reveal that this painful event comes down to a singular element, and that's vision, and the fundamental duality of this vision reflects the attitudes and subsequent actions by each side. But before expanding on the issue of vision, let's talk numbers. Israel, Palestine, the Arab nations of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq were involved in this war. And to provide some contextual facts, the Israeli population at the time numbered just over 600,000, while the collective population of the Arab nations involved totaled 40 million. Israelis were half the size of the Palestinian population and only 3% of the Arab nations total, meaning a ratio of one Israeli for every 67 Arabs. Upon the start of the war, many Arab leaders from across the political landscape shouted claims that this war was going to be one of attrition in response to the calling for assistance by the Palestinians as well as the protection of Muslim holy land from the grips of a Zionist enemy. Arab nations projected that their people would volunteer en masse throwing themselves towards the front lines, responding to calls of jihad. So based on this preface, how many soldiers were involved in this war? If I said to you that less than a grand total of 200,000 Israeli and Arab soldiers were involved, would that surprise you? It's substantially less just to be clear. Around 160,000 would be a fairly accurate figure. That's for both Israeli and Arab soldiers. And more shockingly was the fact that the majority of this number were Israeli forces whose numbers eventually grew up to 100,000. How can Israel with a population ratio of one to 67 Arabs feel the military personnel ratio of 1.67 to one? Meaning that for every three Israelis on the ground, there were only two Arab soldiers. Whose failure or success was that? What's even more mind-boggling is that records show that Israeli forces at the start of the war had a single rifle per three soldiers. Be aware, this war was one fought through infantry and without all the advanced weaponry in the air or heavy military equipment like tanks. No, this was a man-to-man combat on all fronts. So how does this all compute? How does it even make sense? All indicators projected that the Arabs with their overwhelming size and ability could easily have overcome the Israeli defense forces. Why did the Arabs lose? And so convincingly. So let's go back to the notion of vision as the main culprit for Arab failure. In a nutshell, Arabs had none. Their first flaw was that Arabs underestimated their enemy. On all fronts, seemingly expecting success when the war hadn't even started and it shows clearly from the lack of preparation, organization and coordination between the various nations involved. Six nations each with armies and militias that weren't consolidated into a single force. No central command or collective strategy that aimed efforts towards overcoming the enemy. From a military strategy perspective, the Arabs had a supreme advantage as they were able to attack Israeli forces from many fronts. The north with the Syrian Lebanese forces, Jordan and Iraq from the east and Egypt from the south, also not to be forgotten with the Palestinian militias from within. Yet again, such an advantage came to naught. But why such lack of cooperation? Well, to have such unity, one must have a single vision. And that wasn't the case. The Palestinians themselves had no central authority. They were scattered political and military factions, each with their own agendas. Different Arab nations also had competing visions. King Farouk of Egypt aspired to unify the Arab world as part of his own personal vision. Egypt's first priority in the war was to annex as much land as possible from partitioned Palestine. King Abdullah of Transjordan was exactly the same. Being a supporter of the partitioning of Palestine, his target was to usurp the West Bank in full, inclusive of Jerusalem. Lebanese and Syrian leadership themselves eyed parts of northern Palestine. Nouri Said, the prime minister of Iraq himself, had visions of sweeping across the Levant in establishing a unified Arab nation. But even worse than varying visions was the element of collusion that became evident between Israel and Transjordan. Previous to the war engagements, King Abdullah met with Golda Meir, the leader of the Jewish Agency at the time, to agree concessions the Israelis would make to the Jordanians if and when war would erupt. King Abdullah agreed to two main elements, that his army, the Arab Legion, the most powerful and well trained of the Arab armies would only proceed to overtake lands that were designated as Palestinian lands within the partition plan, and hence remove themselves completely from any real engagement with Israel. The other point agreed with Israel was the limitation of Iraqi forces accessing Palestine through Jordanian land, necessary to launch their military campaign, hence restricting the overall fighting power of the Arabs. The final nail in the Arab coffin in this war was the lack of Arab heart. What were they fighting for? Each nation was a fledgling nation that had substantial concerns at home. Nation regimes that were fairly unstable to say the least. They couldn't commit their full force of men and assets to a war that really wasn't theirs. And for some nations, a war that was often the distant, hundreds of kilometers away. For the Arabs, the Israelis would have the necessary foresight to plan for this moment. For Israel, this foresight was 2020, since even before the Arab revolt in Palestine of 1936. The Jews had been preparing for the eventuality of independence and the creation of their nation. The Haganah, the Jewish militia, created a centralized defense institution to combat any type of communal violence at the time. In 1943, all male Jews at the age of 17 in Palestine had to serve for two years in service of the nation. Many of these militias and conscripts ended up being trained by the British and departed for the battlefields of World War II Europe. Upon the ending of the Second World War, the Jewish nation now, with strong experience in welfare, further recognized that the population and army count was overwhelmingly in favor of Arabs. And it was concluded that a professional army must be formed, a full two years prior to the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War. Structural reforms were put in place to establish the Israeli Defense Force, the IDF. Between 1947 and 1948, the Jewish Authority incorporated numerous militias, including the Irgun and the Stern gang, into the Haganah, thus growing into a defense force numbering 32,000. An organized and trained army was a great start for the Israelis. But this alone wouldn't be enough to overcome the Arabs. More was needed and one of the most effective methods in history was to divide and conquer. This strategy would require diplomacy at its highest skill level. And this is why Israel offered King Abdullah of Transjordan the West Bank and Jerusalem in return for the abandonment of a full out war against Israel. Without the Arab Legion, Israel would have a much better chance of surviving and defeating the remaining less professional Arab armies. And finally for Israel, their foresight was imbued with a most important element of all. Heart. Israelis were fighting for a cause, for a home, for a nation. No matter how it was begotten, the promise and potential was real. And the possibility to have this dream destroyed were the Arab armies confronting them on the battlegrounds. Israel fought with no regard for casualty, always fought in the name and service of the nation. And with this heart, organization and strategy, Israel was successful in fulfilling its dream. The establishment of their nation. Israelis saw all of this coming. Arabs didn't. And to say that the establishment of the state of Israel came out of nothing and their overwhelming victory was sudden and shocking is extremely naive. Arabs were ill-prepared, chaotic in their actions and greedy in their own personal ambitions. The sad reality is that there never was Arab unity for the Palestinian cause, not in 1948 and less so ever since. You can blame the world on how the systemic immigration of Jews took place from the beginning of the 20th century till the war in 1948, as well as the creation of the Jewish nation through the help of the West, but Arabs can only blame themselves for the continued existence of Israel. The partition plan could have been a major failure and catastrophe for the Jews, only if the Arabs had won the war. But they didn't. That is the true nekba.