 Chapter 11.2 of the 9-Eleven Commission Report. This is LibriVox Recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to find out how you can volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. 11.2. Policy The Road to 9-Eleven again illustrates how the large, unwieldy U.S. government tended to underestimate a threat that grew ever greater. The terrorism fostered by Bin Laden and Al Qaeda was different from anything the government had faced before. The existing mechanisms for handling terrorist acts had been trial and punishment for acts committed by individuals, sanction, reprisal, deterrence, or war for acts by hostile governments. The action of Al Qaeda fit neither category. Its crimes were on a scale approaching acts of war. But they were committed by a loose, far-flung, and tabulous conspiracy. With no territories or citizens or assets, it could be readily threatened, overwhelmed, or destroyed. Early in 2001, D.C.I. Tenant and Deputy Director for Operations James Povat gave an intelligence briefing to President-Elect Bush, Vice President-Elect Cheney, and Rice. It included the topic of Al Qaeda. Povat recalled conveying that Bin Laden was one of the gravest threats to the country. Bush asked whether killing Bin Laden would end the problem. Povat said he and the D.C.I. had answered that killing Bin Laden would have had an impact, but would not stop the threat. The CIA later provided more formal assessments to the White House reiterating that conclusion. It added that in the long term the only way to deal with the threat was to end Al Qaeda's ability to use Afghanistan as a sanctuary for its operations. Perhaps the most incisive of the advisers on terrorism to the new administration was a whole over Richard Clark. Yet he admits his policy advice, even if it had been accepted immediately, and turned into action would not have prevented 9-11. We must ask when the U.S. government had reasonable opportunities to mobilize a country for major action against Al Qaeda and its Afghan sanctuary. The main opportunities came after the new information the U.S. government received in 1996 and 1997, after the embassy bombings of August 1998, after the discoveries of the Jordanian and Rissan plots in late 1999, and after the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000. The U.S. policy responds to Al Qaeda before 9-11 was essentially defined following the embassy bombings of August 1998. We describe those decisions in Chapter 4. It is worth noting that they were made by the Clinton administration under extremely difficult domestic political circumstances. Opponents were seeking the president's impeachment. In addition, in 1998-99, President Clinton was preparing the government for possible war against Serbia. He had authorized major airstrikes against Iraq. The tragedy of the embassy bombings provided an opportunity for a full examination across the government of the national security threat that bin Laden posed. Such an examination could have made clear to all that issues were at stake that were much larger than the domestic politics of the moment. But the major policy agencies of the government did not meet the threat. The diplomatic efforts of the Department of State were largely ineffective. Al Qaeda and terrorism was just one more priority added to already crowded agendas with countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. After 9-11, that changed. Policymakers turned principally to the CIA and covert action to implement policy. Before 9-11, no agency had more responsibility or did more to attack Al Qaeda during day and night than the CIA. But there were limits to what the CIA was able to achieve in its energies worldwide efforts to disrupt terrorist activities or to use proxies to try to capture or kill bin Laden and his lieutenants. As early as mid-1997, one CIA officer wrote to a supervisor, all we're doing is holding the ring until a cavalry gets here. Military measures failed or were not applied. Before 9-11, the Department of Defense was not given the mission of ending Al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. Officials in both the Clinton and Bush administration regarded a full U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as practically inconceivable before 9-11. It was never the subject of formal interagency deliberation. Lesser forms of intervention could also have been considered. It would have been the deployment of the U.S. military or intelligence personnel or special strike forces to Afghanistan itself or nearby, openly, clandestinely, secretly or covertly with their connection to the United States hidden. Then the United States would no longer have been dependent on proxies to gather actionable intelligence. However, it would have needed to secure basing and overflight support from neighboring countries. It would have taken political, military and intelligence effort would have been required extending over months and perhaps years with associated costs and risks. Given how hard it has proved to locate bin Laden even today when there are substantial ground forces in Afghanistan, its odds of success are hard to calculate. We have found no indication that President Clinton was offered such an intermediate choice was given any more consideration than the idea of invasion. These policy challenges are linked to the problem of imagination we have already discussed. Since we believe that both President Clinton and President Bush were genuinely concerned about the danger posed by al-Qaeda, approaches involving more direct intervention against the sanctuary in Afghanistan apparently must have seemed, if they were considered at all, a disproportionate to the threat. Insight for the future thus not easy to apply in practice. It is hardest to mount a major effort when the problem still seems minor. Once the danger is fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing action is easier, but it then may be too late. Another possibility short of putting U.S. personnel on the ground was to issue a blunt ultimatum to the Taliban by a readiness to at least launch an indefinite air campaign to disable the region's limited military capabilities and tip the balance in Afghanistan's ongoing civil war. The United States had warned the Taliban that it would be held accountable for further attacks by bin Laden against Afghanistan U.S. interests. The warning had been given in 1998, again in late 1999, once more in the fall of 2000, and again in the summer of 2001. Delivering it repeatedly did not make it more effective. As evidence of Al-Qaeda's responsibility for the coal attack came in during November 2000, National Security Advisor Samuel Berger asked the Pentagon to develop a plan for a sustained air campaign against the Taliban. Clark developed a paper laying out a formal specific ultimatum, but Clark's plan apparently did not advance to form a consideration by the small group of principals. We have found no indication that the idea was briefed to the new administration or that Clark passed his paper to them, although the same team of career officials span both administrations. After 9-11, President Bush announced that Al-Qaeda was responsible for the attack on the USS Cole. Before 9-11, neither president took any action. Bin Laden's inference may have been that the attacks at least at the level of the coal were risk-free. End of Chapter 11.2 Chapter 11.3 of the 9-11 Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to find out how you can volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leanne Howlett. The 9-11 Commission Report. Chapter 11.3 Capabilities. Earlier chapters describe in detail the actions decided on by the Clinton and Bush administrations. Each president considered or authorized covert actions, a process that consumed considerable time, especially in the Clinton administration, and achieved little success in the direction of intelligence. After the August 1998 missile strikes in Afghanistan, naval vessels remained on station in or near the region, prepared to fire cruise missiles. General Hugh Shelton developed as many as 13 different strike options and did not recommend any of them. The most extended debate on counter-terrorism and the Bush administration before 9-11 had to do with missions for the unmanned predator, whether to use it just to locate bin Laden or to wait until it was armed with a missile so that it could find him and also attack him. Looking back, we are struck with the narrow and unimaginative menu of options for action offered to both President Clinton and President Bush. Before 9-11, the United States tried to solve the al-Qaeda problem with the same government institutions and capabilities it had used in the last stages of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. These capabilities were insufficient, but little was done to expand or reform them. For covert action, of course, the White House depended on the counter-terrorist center and the CIA's directorate of operations. Though some officers, particularly in the bin Laden unit, were eager for the mission, most were not. The higher management of the directorate was unenthusiastic. The CIA's capacity to conduct paramilitary operations with its own personnel was not large and the agency did not seek a large-scale general expansion of these capabilities before 9-11. James Pavitt, the head of this directorate, remembered that covert action promoted by the White House had gotten the clandestine service into trouble in the past. He had no desire to see this happen again. He thought, not unreasonably, that a truly serious counter-terrorism campaign against an enemy of this magnitude would be business primarily for the military, not the clandestine service. As for the Department of Defense, some officers and the Joint Staff were keen to help. Some in the Special Operations Command have told us that they worked on plans for using Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and that they hoped for action orders. JCS Chairman General Shelton and General Anthony Zini at Central Command had a different view. Shelton felt that the August 1998 attacks had proved a waste of good ordinance and thereafter consistently opposed firing expensive Tomahawk missiles merely at Jungle Gym terrorist training infrastructure. In this view, he had complete support from Defense Secretary William Cohen. Shelton was prepared to plan other options, but he was also prepared to make perfectly clear his own strong doubts about the wisdom of any military action that risks U.S. lives unless the intelligence was actionable. The high price of keeping counterterrorism policy within the restricted circle of the counterterrorism security group and the highest level principles was nowhere more apparent than in the military establishment. After the August 1998 missile strike, other members of the JCS let the press know their unhappiness that in conformity with the Goldwater-Nickels reforms, Shelton had been the only member of the JCS to be consulted. Although follow-on military options were briefed more widely, the Vice Director of Operations on the Joint Staff commented to us that intelligence and planning documents relating to al-Qaeda arrived in a ziplock-red package and that many flag and general officers never had the clearances to see its contents. At no point before 9-11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the mission of countering al-Qaeda, though this was perhaps the most dangerous enemy then threatening the United States. The Clinton administration effectively relied on the CIA to take the lead in preparing long-term offensive plans against an enemy sanctuary. The Bush administration adopted this approach, although its emerging new strategy envisioned some yet undefined further role for the military in addressing the problem. Within defense, both Secretary Cohen and Secretary Donald Grumsfeld gave their principal attention to other challenges. America's homeland defenders faced outward. NORAD itself was barely able to retain any alert bases. Its planning scenarios occasionally considered the danger of hijacked aircraft being guided to American targets, but only aircraft that were coming from overseas. We recognized that a costly change in NORAD's defense posture to deal with the danger of suicide hijackers before such a threat had ever actually been realized would have been a tough sell. But NORAD did not canvass available intelligence and try to make the case. The most serious weaknesses in agency capabilities were in the domestic arena. In Chapter 3, we discussed these institutions, the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the FAA, and others. The major pre-911 effort to strengthen domestic agency capabilities came in 2000 as part of a Millennium After Action Review. President Clinton and his principal advisors paid considerable attention then to border security problems but were not able to bring about significant improvements before leaving office. The NSC-led interagency process did not effectively bring along the leadership of the Justice and Transportation Departments in an agenda for institutional change. The FBI did not have the capability to link the collective knowledge of agents in the field to national priorities. The acting director of the FBI did not learn of his bureau's hunt for two possible al-Qaeda operatives in the United States or about his bureau's arrest of an Islamic extremist taking flight training until September 11th. The director of Central Intelligence knew about the FBI's Musawi investigation weeks before word of it made its way even to the FBI's own assistant director for counter-terrorism. Other agencies deferred to the FBI. In the August 6th PDB reporting to President Bush of 70 full field investigations related to al-Qaeda, news the president said he found heartening. The CIA had simply restated what the FBI had said. No one looked behind the curtain. The FAA's capabilities to take aggressive, anticipatory security measures were especially weak. Any serious policy examination of a suicide hijacking scenario critiquing each of the layers of the security system could have suggested changes to fix glaring vulnerabilities, expanding no-fly lists, searching passengers identified by the CAP's screening system, deploying federal air marshals domestically, hardening cockpit doors, alerting aircrew to a different kind of hijacking than what they had been trained to expect or adjusting the training of controllers and managers in the FAA and NORAD. Government agencies also sometimes display a tendency to match capabilities to mission by defining away the hardest part of their job. They are often passive, accepting what are viewed as givens, including that efforts to identify and fix glaring vulnerabilities to dangerous threats would be too costly, too controversial, or too disruptive. End of Chapter 11.3 Recording by Leanne Howlett Chapter 11.4 of the 9-11 Commission Report This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to find out how you can volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leanne Howlett The 9-11 Commission Report Chapter 11.4 Management Operational Management Earlier in this report, we detailed various missed opportunities to thwart the 9-11 plot. Information was not shared, sometimes inadvertently or because of legal misunderstandings. Analysis was not pooled. Effective operations were not launched. Often the handoffs of information were lost across the divide separating the foreign and domestic agencies of the government. However the specific problems are labeled, we believe they are symptoms of the government's broader inability to adapt how it manages problems to the new challenges of the 21st century. The agencies are like a set of specialists in a hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms and prescribing medications. What is missing is the attending physician who makes sure they work as a team. One missing element was effective management of transnational operations. Action officers should have drawn on all available knowledge in the government. This management should have ensured that information was shared and duties were clearly assigned across agencies and across the foreign and domestic divide. Consider for example, the case of Medar, Hasmi and their January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur, detailed in Chapter 6. In late 1999, the National Security Agency, NSA, analyzed communications associated with a man named Khalid a man named Nawaf and a man named Salim. Working level officials in the intelligence community knew little more than this, but they correctly concluded that Nawaf and Khalid might be part of an operational cadre and that something nefarious might be afoot. The NSA did not think its job was to research these identities. It saw itself as an agency to support intelligence consumers such as CIA. The NSA tried to respond energetically to any request made, but it waited to be asked. If NSA had been asked to try to identify these people, the agency would have started by checking its own database of earlier information from these same sources. Some of this information had been reported, some had not, but it was all readily accessible in the database. NSA's analysts would promptly have discovered who Nawaf was, that his full name might be Nawaf al-Hazmi and that he was an old friend of Khalid. With this information and more that was available, managers could have more effectively tracked the movement of these operatives in Southeast Asia. With the name Nawaf al-Hazmi, a manager could then have asked the State Department also to check that name. State would promptly have found its own record on Nawaf al-Hazmi, showing that he too had been issued a visa to visit the United States. Officials would have learned that the visa had been issued at the same place, Jeddah, and on almost the same day as the one given to Khalid al-Madar. When the travelers left Kuala Lumpur for Bangkok, local officials were able to identify one of the travelers as Khalid al-Madar. After the flight left, they learned that one of his companions had the name al-Hazmi, but the officials did not know what that name meant. The information arrived at Bangkok too late to track these travelers as they came in. Had the authorities there already been keeping an eye out for Khalid al-Madar as part of a general regional or worldwide alert, they might have tracked him coming in. Had they been alerted to look for a possible companion named Nawaf al-Hazmi, they might have noticed him too. Instead they were notified only after Kuala Lumpur sounded the alarm. By that time the travelers had already disappeared into the streets of Bangkok. On January 12th, the head of the CIA's al-Qaeda unit told his bosses that surveillance in Kuala Lumpur was continuing. He may not have known that in fact Madar and his companions had dispersed and the tracking was falling apart. U.S. officials in Bangkok regretfully reported the bad news on January 13th. The names they had were put on a watch list in Bangkok so that Thai authorities might notice if the men left the country. On January 14th, the head of the CIA's al-Qaeda unit again updated his bosses, telling them that officials were continuing to track the suspicious individuals who had now dispersed to various countries. Unfortunately, there is no evidence of any tracking efforts actually being undertaken by anyone after the Arabs disappeared into Bangkok. No other effort was made to create other opportunities to spot these Arab travelers in case the screen in Bangkok failed. With evidence in Madar's passport, one of the logical possible destinations and interdiction points would have been the United States. Yet no one alerted the INS or the FBI to look for these individuals. They arrived unnoticed in Los Angeles on January 15th. In early March 2000, Bangkok reported that Nawaf Al-Hazmi, now identified for the first time with his full name, had departed on January 15th and had been assigned flight to Los Angeles. Since the CIA did not appreciate the significance of that name or noticed the cable, we have found no evidence that this information was sent to the FBI. Even if watch listing had prevented or at least alerted U.S. officials to the entry of Hazmi and Madar, we do not think it is likely that watch listing by itself had prevented the 9-11 attacks. Al-Qaeda adapted to the failure of some of its operatives to the United States. None of these future hijackers was a pilot. Alternatively, had they been permitted entry and surveilled, some larger results might have been possible had the FBI been patient. These are difficult what-ifs. The intelligence community might have judged that the risks of conducting such a prolonged intelligence operation were too high. Potential terrorists might have been lost track of, for example. The pre-9-11 FBI might not have been judged capable of conducting such an operation. But surely the intelligence community would have preferred to have the chance to make these choices. From the details of this case or from the other opportunities we catalog in the text box, one can see how hard it is for the intelligence community to assemble enough of the puzzle pieces gathered by different agencies to make some sense of them and then develop a fully informed joint plan. This is the most important in a transnational case. We sympathize with the working-level officers drowning in information and trying to decide what is important or what needs to be done when no particular action has been requested of them. Operational Opportunities 1. January 2000 The CIA does not watch list Khalid Al-Madar or notify the FBI when it learned Madar possessed a valid US visa. 2. January 2000 The CIA does not develop a transnational plan for tracking Madar and his associates so that they could be followed to Bangkok and onward, including the United States. 3. March 2000 The CIA does not watch list Nawaf Al-Hazmi or notify the FBI when it learned that he possessed a US visa and had flown to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. 4. January 2001 The CIA does not inform the FBI that a source had identified Khalad or Tafiq Ben-Atash, a major figure in the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole as having attended the meeting in Kuala Lumpur with Khalid Al-Madar. 5. May 2001 A CIA official does not notify the FBI about Madar's US visa, Hazmi's US travel or Khalad's having attended the Kuala Lumpur meeting identified when he reviewed all of the relevant traffic because of the high level of threats. 6. June 2001 FBI and CIA officials do not ensure that all relevant information regarding the Kuala Lumpur meeting was shared with the Cole investigators at the June 11 meeting. 7. August 2001 The FBI does not recognize the significance of the information regarding Madar and Hazmi's possible arrival in the United States and thus does not take adequate action to share information, assign resources, and give sufficient priority to the search. 8. August 2001 FBI headquarters does not recognize the significance of the information regarding Musawi's training and beliefs and thus does not take adequate action to share information, involve higher level officials across agencies, obtain information regarding Musawi's ties to Al Qaeda and give sufficient priority to determining what Musawi might be planning. 9. August 2001 The CIA does not focus on information that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is a key Al Qaeda lieutenant or connect information identifying KSM as the Muqtar mentioned in other reports to the analysis that could have linked the Muqtar with Ramzi Ben-Al-Shib and Musawi. 10. August 2001 The CIA and FBI do not connect the presence of Madar, Hazmi, and Musawi to the general threat reporting about imminent attacks. Who had the job of managing the case to make sure these things were done? One answer is that everyone had the job. The CIA's deputy director for operations, James Pavett, stressed to us that the responsibility resided with all involved. Above all, he emphasized the primacy of the field. The field had the lead in managing operations. The job of headquarters he stressed was to support the field and do so without delay. If the field asked for information or other support, the job of headquarters was to get it right away. This is a traditional perspective on operations and traditionally operations had great merit. It reminded us of the FBI's pre-911 emphasis on the primacy of its field offices. When asked about how this traditional structure would adapt to the challenge of managing a transnational case, one that hopped from place to place as this one did, the deputy director argued that all involved were responsible for making it work. Pavett underscored the responsibility of the particular field location where the suspects were being on the other hand, he also said that the counter-terrorist center was supposed to manage all the moving parts while what happened on the ground was the responsibility of managers in the field. Headquarters tended to support and facilitate, trying to make sure everyone was in the loop. From time to time, a particular post would push one way or headquarters would urge someone to do something. But headquarters never really took responsibility for the successful management of this case. Hence, the managers at CIA headquarters did not realize that omissions in planning had occurred and they scarcely knew that the case had fallen apart. The director of the counter-terrorist center at the time, Kofor Black, recalled to us that this operation was one among many and that at the time it was considered interesting but not heavy water yet. He recalled the failure to get the word to Bangkok fast enough, but has no evident recollection of why the case then dissolved unnoticed. The next level down, the director of the Al-Qaeda unit in CIA at the time, recalled that he did not think it was his job to direct what should or should not be done. He did not pay attention when the individuals dispersed and things fell apart. There was no conscious decision to stop the operation after the trail was temporarily lost in Bangkok. He acknowledged, however, that perhaps there had been a letdown for his overworked staff after the extreme tension and long hours in the period of the millennium alert. The details of this case illuminate real management challenges past and future. The U.S. government must find a way of pooling intelligence and using it to guide the planning of and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations involving organizations as disparate as the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the military, and the agencies involved in homeland security. Institutional management. Beyond those day-to-day tasks of bridging the foreign domestic divide and matching intelligence with plans, the challenges include broader management issues pertaining to how the top leaders of the government set priorities and allocate resources. Once again, it is useful to illustrate the problem by examining the CIA. Since before 9-11, this agency's role was so central in the government's counter-terrorism efforts. On December 4, 1998, DCI Tenet issued a directive to several CIA officials and his deputy for community management stating, we are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the community. The memorandum had little overall effect on mobilizing the CIA or the intelligence community. The memo was addressed only to CIA officials and the deputy for community management, Joan Dempsey. She faxed the memo to the heads of the major intelligence agencies after removing covert action sections, only a handful of people received it. The NSA director at the time, Lieutenant General Kenneth Minahan, believed the memo applied only to the CIA and not the NSA because no one had informed him of any NSA shortcomings. For their part, CIA officials thought the memorandum was intended for the rest of the intelligence community given that they were already doing all they could and believed that the rest of the community needed to pull its weight. The episode indicates some of the limitations of the DCI's authority over the direction and priorities of the intelligence community, especially its elements within the Department of Defense. The DCI has to direct agencies without controlling them. He does not receive an appropriation for their activities and therefore does not control their purse strings. He has little insight into how they spend their resources. Congress attempted to strengthen the DCI's authority in 1996 by creating the positions of deputy DCI for community management and assistant DCI's for collection, analysis, and production and administration. But the authority of these positions is limited and the vision of central management clearly has not been realized. The DCI did not develop a management strategy for a war against Islamist terrorism before 9-11. Such a management strategy would define the capabilities the intelligence community must acquire for such a war, from language training to collection systems to analysts. Such a management strategy would necessarily extend beyond the CTC to the components that feed its expertise and support its operations linked transparently to counter-terrorism objectives. It would then detail the proposed expenditures and organizational changes required to acquire and implement these capabilities. DCI Lieutenant and his deputy director for operations told us they did have a management strategy for war on terrorism. It was to rebuild the CIA. They said the CIA as a whole had been badly damaged by prior budget constraints and that capabilities needed to be restored across the board. Indeed, the CTC budget had not been cut while the budgets had been slashed in many other parts of the agency. By restoring funding across the CIA, a rising tide would lift all boats. They also stressed the synergy between improvements of every part of the agency and the capabilities that the CTC or stations overseas could draw on in the war on terror. As some officials pointed out to us, there is a tradeoff in this management approach. In an attempt to rebuild everything at once, the highest priority efforts might not get the maximum support that they need. Furthermore, this approach attempted to channel relatively strong outside support for reducing terrorism into backing for across-the-board funding increases. Proponents of the counter-terrorism agenda might respond by being less inclined to loosen the purse strings than they would have been if offered a convincing counter-terrorism budget strategy. The DCI's management strategy was also focused mainly on the CIA. Lacking a management strategy for the war on terrorism or ways to see how funds were being spent across the community, DCI Tenet and his aides was difficult to develop an overall intelligence community budget for a war on terrorism. Responsibility for domestic intelligence gathering on terrorism was vested solely in the FBI, yet during almost all of the Clinton administration, the relationship between the FBI director and the president was nearly non-existent. The FBI director would not communicate directly with the president. His key personnel shared very little information with the National Security Community. As a consequence, one of the critical working relationships in the counter-terrorism effort was broken. The Millennium Exception Before concluding our narrative, we offer a reminder and an explanation of the one period in which the government as a whole seemed to be acting in concert to deal with terrorism. The last weeks of December 1999 preceding the Millennium. In the period between December 1999 and early January 2000, information about terrorism flowed widely and abundantly. The flow from the FBI was particularly remarkable because the FBI at other times shared almost no information. That from the intelligence community was also remarkable because some of it reached officials, local airport managers and local police departments who had not seen such information before and would not see it again before 9-11, if then. And the terrorist threat in the United States even more than abroad, engaged the frequent attention of high officials in the executive branch and leaders in both houses of Congress. Why was this so? Most obviously it was because everyone was already on edge with the Millennium and possible computer programming glitches, Y2K, that might obliterate records, shut down power and communication lines or otherwise disrupt daily life. Then Jordanian authorities arrested 16 Al Qaeda terrorists planning a number of bombings in that country. Those in custody included two U.S. citizens. Soon after an alert customs agent caught Ahmed Rassam bringing explosives across the Canadian border with the apparent intention of blowing up Los Angeles airport. He was found to have Confederates on both sides of the border. These were not events whispered about in highly occupied intelligence dailies or FBI interview memos. The information was in all major newspapers and highlighted in network television news. Though the Jordanian arrests only made page 13 of the New York Times, they were featured on every evening newscast. The arrest of Rassam was on front pages and the original story and its follow-ups dominated television news for a week. FBI field offices around the country were swamped by calls of U.S. citizens. Representatives of the Justice Department, the FAA, local police departments and major airports had microphones in their faces whenever they showed themselves. After the millennium alert, the government relaxed. Counter terrorism went back to being a secret preserve for segments of the FBI, the Counter Terrorist Center, and the Counter Terrorism Security Group. But the experience showed that the government was capable of fighting against terrorism. While one factor was the pre-existence of widespread concern about Y2K, another, at least equally important, was simply shared information. Everyone knew not only of an abstract threat, but of at least one terrorist who had been arrested in the United States. Terrorism had a face. That of Ahmed Rassam and Americans from Vermont to Southern California went on the watch for his like. In September of 2001, DCI Tenant, the Counter Terrorist Center and the Counter Terrorism Security Group did their utmost to sound a loud alarm, its basis being intelligence indicating that Al Qaeda planned something big. But the millennium phenomenon was not repeated. FBI field offices apparently saw no abnormal terrorist activity and headquarters was not shaking them up. Between May 2001 and September 2008, there was very little in newspapers or on television to heighten anyone's concern about terrorism. Front page stories touching on the subject dealt with the wind-up of trials dealing with the East Africa Embassy bombings and Rassam. All this reportage looked backward, describing problems satisfactorily resolved. Back page notices told of Titan security at embassies and military installations abroad and government cautions against terrorism. All the rest was secret. End of Chapter 11.4 Recording by Leanne Howlett Chapter 12.1 of the 9-11 Commission Report This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to find out how you can volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Mary Rodey The 9-11 Commission Report Chapter 12.1 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge Three years after 9-11 Americans are still thinking and talking about how to protect our nation in this new era. The national debate continues. Contouring terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national security priority for the United States. This shift has occurred with the full support of the Congress, both major political parties, the media and the American people. The nation has committed enormous resources to national security and to countering terrorism. Between fiscal year 2001 the last budget adopted before 9-11 and the present fiscal year 2004 total federal spending on defense including expenditures on both Iraq and Afghanistan Homeland Security and international affairs rose more than 50% from 354 billion to about 547 billion. The United States has not experienced such a rapid surge in national security spending since the Korean War. This pattern has occurred before in American history. The United States faces a tremendous exertion of national energy then as that surge transforms the landscape comes a time for reflection and reevaluation. Some programs and even agencies are discarded. Others are invented or redesigned. Private firms and engaged citizens redefine their relationships with government working through the processes of the American Republic. Now is the time for that reflection and reevaluation. The United States should consider what to do the shape and objectives of a strategy. Americans should also consider how to do it organizing their government in a different way. Defining the threat In the post 9-11 world threats are defined more by the fault lines within societies than by territorial boundaries between them. From terrorism to global disease or environmental degradation the challenges have become transnational rather than international. That is the defining quality of world politics in the 21st century. National security used to be considered by studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states following industrial might. To be dangerous an enemy had to muster large armies. Threats emerged slowly often visibly as weapons were forged armies conscripted and units trained and moved into place. Because large states were more powerful they also had more to lose they could be deterred. Now threats can emerge quickly an organization like Al Qaeda had quartered in a country on the other side of the earth in a region so poor that electricity or telephones were scarce could nonetheless scheme to wield weapons of unprecedented destructive power in the largest cities of the United States. In this sense 9-11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests over there should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America over here. In the same sense the American homeland is the planet. But the enemy is not just terrorism some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy the catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is a threat posed by Islamist terrorism especially the Al Qaeda network its affiliates and its ideology. As we mentioned in Chapter 2 Osama bin Laden and other Islamist terrorist leaders draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within one stream of Islam a minority tradition from at least Ibn Taimiya through the Founders of Wahbism through the Muslim Brotherhood to Saeed Qatbi that stream is motivated by religion and does not distinguish politics from religion thus distorting both. It is further fed by grievances stressed by bin Laden and widely felt throughout the Muslim world. Against the US military presence in the Middle East policies perceived as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim and support by Israel. Bin Laden and Islamist terrorists mean exactly what they say to them America is the font of all evil the head of the snake and it must be converted or destroyed. It is not a position with which Americans can bargain or negotiate. With it there is no common ground not even respect for life on which to begin a dialogue it can only be destroyed or utterly isolated. Because the Muslim world has fallen behind the West politically, economically and militarily for the past three centuries and because few tolerant or secular Muslim democracies provide alternative models for the future, bin Laden's message finds receptive ears. It has attracted active support from thousands of disaffected young Muslims and resonates powerfully with a far larger number who do not actively support America and the West is deep even among leaders of relatively successful Muslim states. Tolerance, the rule of law political and economic openness the extension of greater opportunities to women these cures must come from within Muslim societies themselves the United States must support such developments but this process is likely to be measured for decades, not years it is a process that will be violently opposed by Islamist terrorist organizations both inside Muslim countries and in attacks on the United States and other Western nations the United States finds itself caught up in a clash within a civilization that clash arises from particular conditions in the Muslim world conditions that spill over into expatriate Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries our enemy is two-fold Al-Qaeda a stateless network of terrorists that struck us on 9-11 and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world inspired in part by Al-Qaeda which has spawned terrorist groups and violence across the globe the first enemy is weakened but continues to pose a grave threat the second enemy is gathering and will menace Americans and American interests long after some have been laden and his cohorts are killed or captured thus our strategy must match our means to two ends dismantling the Al-Qaeda network and prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism Islam is not the enemy it is not synonymous with terror nor does Islam teach terror America and its friends oppose a perversion of Islam not the great world faith itself lives guided by religious faith including literal beliefs in holy scriptures are common to every religion and represent no threat to us other religions have experienced violent internal struggles with so many divers adherents every major religion will spawn violent zealots yet understanding and tolerance among people of different faiths can and must prevail the present transnational danger is Islamist terrorism what is needed is a broad political military strategy that rests on a firm tripod of policies to attack terrorists and their organizations prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism and protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks more than a war on terrorism terrorism is a tactic used by individuals and organizations to kill and destroy our efforts should be directed at those individuals and organizations calling the struggle a war accurately describes the use of American and allied armed forces to find and destroy terrorist groups and their allies in the field notably in Afghanistan the language of war also evokes the mobilization for a national effort yet the strategy should be balanced the first phase of our post 9-11 efforts rightly included in the military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al-Qaeda this work continues but long term success demands the use of all elements of national power diplomacy, intelligence covert action law enforcement economic policy foreign aid public diplomacy and homeland defense collecting others we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort certainly the strategy should include offensive operations to counter terrorism terrorists should no longer find safe haven where their organizations can grow and flourish America's strategy should be a coalition strategy that includes Muslim nations as partners in its development and implementation our efforts should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is as much or more political as it is military the strategy must focus clearly on the Arab and Muslim world in all its variety our strategy should also include defenses America can be attacked in many ways and has many vulnerabilities no defenses are perfect but risks must be calculated hard choices must be made about allocating resources responsibilities for America's defense should be clearly defined planning does make a difference identifying where a little money might have a large effect defenses also complicate the plans of attackers increasing their risk of discovery and failure finally the nation must prepare to deal with attacks that are not stopped measuring success what should Americans expect from their government and the struggle against Islamist terrorism the goal seem unlimited defeat terrorism anywhere in the world but Americans have also been told to expect the worst an attack is probably coming it may be terrible with such benchmarks the justifications for action and spending seem limitless goals are good yet effective public policies also need concrete objectives agencies need to be able to measure success these measurements do not need to be quantitative government cannot measure success in the ways that private firms can but the target should be specific enough so that reasonable observers in the White House the Congress the media or the general public can judge whether or not the objectives have been attained vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy al-Qaeda and its affiliates are popularly described as being all over the world adaptable resilient needing little higher level organization and capable of anything the American people are thus given the picture of an omnipotent unslayable hydra of destruction this image lowers expectations for government effectiveness it should not lower them too far our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters yet the group was fragile dependent on a few key personalities and occasionally left vulnerable by the marginal unstable people often attracted to such causes the enemy made mistakes like Khalid al-Midhar's unauthorized departure from the United States that required him to enter the country again in July 2001 or the selection of Zakarias Musawi as a participant and Ramzi Binalshi transfer of money to him the US government was not able to capitalize on those mistakes in time to prevent 9-11 we do not believe it is possible to defeat all terrorist attacks against Americans every time and everywhere a president should tell the American people no president can promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9-11 will not happen again history has shown that even the most vigilant and expert agencies cannot always prevent determined suicidal attackers from reaching a target but the American people are entitled to expect the government to do its very best they should expect that officials will have realistic objectives clear guidance and effective organization they are entitled to see some standards for performance so they can judge with the help of representatives whether the objectives are being met End of Chapter 12.1 Chapter 12.2 of the 9-11 commission report this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to find out how you can volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Bob Siebold The 9-11 commission report Chapter 12.2 Attack terrorists and their organizations the US government joined by other governments around the world is working through intelligence law enforcement, military financial and diplomatic channels to identify, disrupt, capture or kill individual terrorists this effort was going on before 9-11 and it continues on a vastly enlarged scale but to catch terrorists or foreign agency needs to be able to find and reach them No Sanctuaries The 9-11 attack was a complex international operation the product of years of planning bombings like those in Bali in 2003 or Madrid in 2004 while able to take hundreds of lives can be mounted locally their requirements are far more modest in size and complexity they are more difficult to thwart US government must build the capacities to prevent a 9-11 scale plot from succeeding and those capabilities will help greatly to cope with lesser but still devastating attacks A complex international terrorist operation aimed at launching a catastrophic attack cannot be mounted by just anyone in any place such operations appear to require time space and ability to perform competent planning and staff work a command structure able to make necessary decisions and possessing the authority and contacts to assemble needed people, money and materials opportunity and space to recruit, train and select operatives with the needed skills and dedication providing the time and structure required to socialize them into the terrorist cause judge their trustworthiness and hone their skills a logistics network able to securely manage the travel of operatives move money and transport resources explosives where they need to go access in the case of certain weapons to the special materials needed for a nuclear, chemical, radiological or biological attack reliable communications between coordinators and operatives and opportunity to test the workability of the plan many details in chapters 2, 5 and 7 illustrate the direct and indirect value of the afghan sanctuary to al-qaeda in preparing the 9-11 attack operations the organization cemented personal ties among veteran jihadists working together there for years it had the operational space to gather and sift recruits indoctrinating them in isolated desert camps it built up logistical networks running through pakistan and the united arab emirates al-qaeda also exploited relatively lax internal security environments in western countries especially germany it considered the environment in the united states so hospitable that the 9-11 operatives used america as their staging area for further training and exercises traveling into out of and around the country and complacently using their real names with little fear of capture to find sanctuary terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed most lawless places in the world the intelligence community has prepared a world map that highlights possible terrorist havens using no secret intelligence just indicating areas that combine rugged terrain, weak governance room to hide or receive supplies and low population density with a town or city near enough to allow necessary interaction with the outside world large areas scattered around the world meet these criteria in talking with american and foreign government officials and military officers on the front lines fighting terrorists today we asked them if you were a terrorist leader today where would you locate your base some of the same places come up again and again on their lists western pakistan and the pakistan afghanistan border region southern or western afghanistan the arabian peninsula especially saudi arabia and yemen and the nearby horn of africa including somalia and extending southwest into kenya southeast asia from thailand to the southern philippines to indonesia west africa including nigeria and molly european cities with expatriate muslim communities especially cities in central and eastern europe where security forces and border controls are less effective in the 20th century strategists focused on the world's great industrial heartlands in the 21st the focus is in the opposite direction toward remote regions and failing states the united states has had to find ways to extend its reach straining the limits of its influence every policy decision we make needs to be seen through this lens if for example iraq becomes a failed state it will go to the top of the list of places that are breeding grounds for attacks against americans at home similarly if we are paying insufficient attention to afghanistan the rule of the taliban or warlords or narco traffickers may re-emerge and its countryside could once again offer refuse to al-qaeda or its successor recommendation the u.s. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries for each it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run using all elements of national power we should reach out listen to and work with other countries that can help we offer three illustrations that are particularly applicable today in 2004 pakistan afghanistan and saudi arabia pakistan pakistan's endemic poverty widespread corruption and often ineffective government create opportunities for islamist recruitment poor education is a particular concern millions of families especially those with little money send their children to religious schools or madrasas many of these schools are the only opportunity available for an education but some have been used as incubators for violent extremism according to karate's police commander there are 859 madrasas teaching more than 200,000 youngsters in this city alone it is hard to overstate the importance of pakistan in the struggle against islamist terrorism within pakistan's borders are 150 million muslims scores of al-qaeda terrorists many taliban figures and perhaps usama bin laden pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and has come frighteningly close to war with nuclear armed india over the disputed territory of kashmir a political battle among anti-american islamic fundamentalists the pakistani military and more moderate mainstream political forces has already spilled over into violence and there have been repeated recent attempts to kill pakistan's president pervez musharov in recent years the united states has had three basic problems in its relationship with pakistan on terrorism pakistan helped nurture the taliban the pakistani army and intelligence services especially below the top ranks have long been ambivalent about confronting islamist extremists many in the government have sympathized with or provided support to the extremists musharov agreed that bin laden was bad but before 9 11 preserving good relations with the taliban took presidents on proliferation musharov has repeatedly said that pakistan does not barter with its nuclear technology but proliferation concerns have been long standing in very serious most recently the pakistani government has claimed not to have known that one of its nuclear weapons developers a national figure was leading the most dangerous nuclear smuggling ring ever disclosed finally pakistan has made little progress toward the return of democratic rule at the national level although that turbulent process does continue to function at the provincial level and the pakistani press remains relatively free immediately after 9 11 confronted by the united states with a stark choice pakistan made a strategic decision its government stood aside and allowed the us-led coalition to destroy the taliban regime in other ways pakistan actively assisted its authorities arrested more than 500 al qaeda operatives and taliban members and pakistani forces played a leading part in tracking down ksm abu zubadia and other key al qaeda figures in the following two years the pakistani government tried to walk the fence helping against al qaeda while seeking to avoid a larger confrontation with taliban remnants and other islamic extremists when al qaeda and its pakistani allies repeatedly tried to assassinate musharov almost succeeding the battle came home the country's vast unpoliced regions make pakistan attractive to extremists seeking refuge and recruits and also provide a base for operations against coalition forces in afghanistan almost all the 9 11 attackers traveled the north south nexus of kandahar keta karachi the belukistan region of pakistan ksm's ethnic home and the sprawling city of karachi remained centers of islamist extremism where the u.s. and pakistani security and intelligence presence has been weak the u.s. consulate in karachi is a makeshift fortress reflecting the gravity of the surrounding threat during the winter of 2003 2004 musharov made another strategic decision he ordered the pakistani army into the frontier provinces of northwest pakistan along the afghan border where bin laden and aiman al zawahari have reportedly taken refuge the army is confronting groups of al-qaeda fighters and their local allies in very difficult terrain on the other side of the frontier u.s. forces in afghanistan have found it challenging to organize effective joint operations given pakistan's limited capabilities and reluctance to permit u.s. military operations on its soil yet in 2004 it is clear that the pakistani government is trying harder than ever before in the battle against islamist terrorists acknowledging these problems and musharov's own part in the story we believe that musharov's government represents the best hope for stability in pakistan and afghanistan in an extraordinary public essay asking how muslims can drag ourselves out of the pit we find ourselves in to raise ourselves up musharov has called for a strategy of enlightened moderation the muslim world he said should shun militancy and extremism the west and the united states in particular should seek to resolve disputes with justice and help better the muslim world having come close to war in 2002 and 2003 pakistan and india have recently made significant progress in peacefully discussing their longstanding differences the united states has been and should remain a key supporter of that process the constant refrain of pakistanis is that the united states long treated them as allies of convenience as the united states makes fresh commitments now it should make promises it is prepared to keep for years to come recommendation if musharov stands for enlightened moderation in a fight for his life and for the life of his country the united states should be willing to make hard choices too and make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of pakistan sustaining the current scale of aid to pakistan the united states should support pakistan's government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education so long as pakistan's leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own afghanistan afghanistan was the incubator for al qaeda and for the 9-11 attacks in the fall of 2001 the u.s. led international coalition and its afghan allies toppled the taliban and ended the regime's protection of al qaeda notable progress has been made international cooperation has been strong with a clear u.n. mandate and a nato-led peacekeeping force the international security assistance force or isaf more than 10,000 american soldiers are deployed today in afghanistan joined by soldiers from nato allies and muslim states a central government has been established in Kabul with a democratic constitution new currency and a new army most afghans enjoy greater freedom women and girls are emerging from subjugation and 3 million children have returned to school for the first time in many years afghans have reason to hope but grave challenges remain taliban and al qaeda fighters have regrouped in the south and southeast warlords control much of the country beyond Kabul and the land is awash in weapons economic development remains a distant hope the narcotics trade long a massive sector of the afghan economy is again booming even the most hardened aid workers refuse to operate in many regions and some warn that afghanistan is near the brink of chaos battered afghanistan has a chance elections are being prepared it is revealing that in june 2004 taliban fighters resorted to slaughtering 16 afghans on a bus apparently for no reason other than their boldness carrying an unprecedented afghan weapon a voter registration card afghanistan's president hamid karzai is brave and committed he is trying to build genuinely national institutions that can overcome the tradition of allocating powers among ethnic communities yet even if his efforts are successful and elections bring a democratic government to afghanistan the united states faces some difficult choices after paying relatively little attention to building afghanistan during the military campaign u.s. policies changed noticeably during 2003 greater consideration of the political dimension and congressional support for a substantial package of assistance signaled a longer term commitment to afghanistan's future one afghan regional official plaintively told us the country finally has a good government he begged the united states to keep its promise and not abandon afghanistan again in the 1990s another afghan leader noted that if the united states leaves we will lose all that we have gained most difficult is to define the security mission in afghanistan there is continuing political controversy about whether military operations in iraq have had any effect on the scale of america's commitment to the future of afghanistan the united states has largely state out of the central government struggles with dissident warlords and has largely avoided confronting the related problem of narco-trafficking recommendation the president and the congress deserve praise for their efforts in afghanistan so far now the united states and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable afghanistan in order to give the government a reasonable opportunity to improve the life of the afghan people afghanistan must not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism the united states and the international community should help the afghan government extend its authority over the country with a strategy and nation by nation commitments to achieve their objectives this is an ambitious recommendation it would mean a redoubled effort to secure the country, disarm militias and curtail the age of warlord rule but the united states and nato have already committed themselves to the future of this region so far nato has made afghanistan a test of the alliance's ability to adapt to current security challenges of the future nato must pass this test currently the united states and the international community envision enough support so that the central government can build a truly national army and extend the central infrastructure and minimum public services to major towns and regions that relies in part on foreign civil military teams arranged under various national flags the institutional commitments of nato and the united nations to these enterprises are weak nato member states are not following through some of the other states around the world that have pledged assistance to afghanistan are not fulfilling their pledges the us presence in afghanistan is overwhelmingly oriented toward military and security work the state department presence is woefully understaffed and the military mission is narrowly focused on al-qaeda and taliban remnants in the south and southeast the us government can do its part if the international community decides on a joint effort to restore the rule of law and contain rampant crime and narcotics trafficking in this crossroads of central asia we have heard again and again that the money for assistance is allocated so rigidly that on the ground one us agency often cannot improvise or pitch in to help another agency even in small ways when a few thousand dollars could make a great difference the us government should allocate money so that lower level officials have more flexibility to get the job done across agency lines adjusting to the circumstances they find in the field this should include discretionary funds for expenditures by military units that often encounter opportunities to help the local population saudi arabia has been a problematic ally in combating islamic extremism at the level of high policy saudi arabia's leaders cooperated with american diplomatic initiatives aimed at the taliban or pakistan before nine eleven at the same time saudi arabia's society was a place where al-qaeda raised money directly from individuals and through charities it was the society that produced fifteen of the nineteen hijackers the kingdom is one of the world's most religiously conservative societies and its identity is closely bound to its religious links especially its position as the guardian of islam's two holiest sites charitable giving or zakat is one of the five pillars of islam it is broader and more pervasive than western ideas of charity functioning also as a form of income tax educational assistance foreign aid and the source of political influence the western notion of the separation of civic and religious duty does not exist in islamic cultures funding charitable works is an integral function of the governments in the islamic world it is so ingrained in islamic culture that in saudi arabia for example a department within the saudi ministry of finance and national economy collects zakat directly much as the u.s. internal revenue service collects payroll with holding tax closely tied to zakat is the dedication of the government to propagating the islamic faith particularly the wahabi sect that flourishes in saudi arabia traditionally throughout the muslim world there is no formal oversight mechanism for donations as saudi wealth increased the amounts contributed by individuals at the state grew dramatically substantial sums went through finance islamic charities of every kind while saudi domestic charities are regulated by the ministry of labor and social welfare charities and international relief agencies such as the world assembly of muslim youth are currently regulated by the ministry of islamic affairs this ministry uses zakat and government funds to spread wahabi beliefs throughout the world including in mosques and schools often these schools provide the only education available even in affluent countries saudi funded wahabi schools are often the only islamic schools some wahabi funded organizations have been exploited by extremists to further their goal of violent jihad against non-muslims one such organization has been the el haramain islamic foundation the assets of some branch offices have been frozen by the u.s. and saudi governments until 9 11 few saudi's would have considered government oversight of charitable donations as necessary many would have perceived it as interference in the exercise of their faith at the same time the government's ability to finance most state expenditures with energy revenues has delayed the need for a modern income tax system as a result there have been strong religious, cultural and administrative barriers to monitoring charitable spending that appears to be changing however now that the goal of violent jihad also extends to overthrowing the sunni governments such as the house of sad that are not living up to the ideals of the islamic extremists the leaders of the united states and the rulers of saudi arabia have long had friendly relations rooted in fundamentally common interests against the soviet union during the cold war in american hopes that saudi oil supplies would stabilize the supply and price of oil in world markets and in saudi hopes that america could help protect the kingdom against foreign threats in 1990 the kingdom hosted us armed forces before the first us led war against iraq american soldiers and airmen have given their lives to help protect saudi arabia the saudi government has difficulty acknowledging this american military bases remain there until 2003 as part of an international commitment to contain iraq for many years leaders on both sides to keep their ties quiet and behind the scenes as a result neither the us nor the saudi people appreciated all the dimensions of the bilateral relationship including the saudi role in us strategies to promote the middle east peace process in each country political figures find it difficult to publicly defend good relations with the other today mutual recriminations flow many americans see saudi arabia as an enemy not as an embattled ally they perceive an autocratic government that oppresses women dominated by a wealthy and indolent elite saudi contacts with american politicians are frequently invoked as accusations in partisan political arguments americans are often appalled by the intolerance anti semitism and anti american arguments taught in schools and preached in mosques saudi are angry too many educated saudi who were sympathetic to america now perceive the united states as an unfriendly state one saudi reformer noted to us that the demonization of saudi arabia in the u.s. media gives ammunition to radicals who accuse reformers of being u.s. lackeys tens of thousands of saudi who once regularly traveled to and often had homes in the united states now go elsewhere among saudi the united states is seen as blind with israel in its conflict with the palestinians with whom saudi's ardently sympathize although saudi arabia's cooperation against terrorism improved to some extent after the september 11th attacks significant problems remained many in the kingdom initially reacted with disbelief and denial in the following months as the truth became clear some leading saudi's quietly acknowledged the problem but still did not see their own regime as threatened and thus often did not respond promptly to u.s. requests for help though saddam hussein was widely detested many saudi's are sympathetic to the anti-us insurgents in iraq although majorities also condemn jihadist attacks in the kingdom as in pakistan yemen and other countries attitudes changed when the terrorism came home cooperation had already become significant but after the bombings in riyadh on may 12th 3 it improved much more the kingdom openly discussed the problem of radicalism criticized the terrorists as religiously deviant reduced official support for religious activities overseas closed suspect charitable foundations and publicized arrests very public moves for a government that has preferred to keep internal problems quiet the kingdom of saudi arabia is now locked in mortal combat with al qaeda saudi police are regularly being killed in shootouts with terrorists in june 2004 the saudi ambassador to the united states called publicly in the saudi press for his government to wage a jihad of its own against terrorists we must all as a state and as a people recognize the truth about these criminals he declared if we do not declare a general mobilization we will lose this war on terrorism saudi arabia is a troubled country although regarded as very wealthy in fact per capita income has dropped from $28,000 at its height to the present level of about $8,000 social and religious traditions complicate adjustment to modern economic activity and limit employment opportunities for young Saudis women find their education and employment sharply limited president clinton offered us of perceptive analysis of saudi arabia contending that fundamentally friendly have been constrained by their desire to preserve the status quo he like others made the case for pragmatic reform instead he hopes the rulers will envision what they want their kingdom to become in 10 or 20 years and start a process in which their friends can help them change there are signs that saudi arabia's royal family is trying to build a consensus for political reform though uncertain about how fast and how far to go crown prince Abdullah wants the kingdom to join the world trade organization to accelerate economic liberalization he has embraced the Arab human development report which was highly critical of the Arab world's political, economic and social failings and called for greater economic and political reform cooperation with saudi arabia against Islamist terrorism is very much in the US interest such cooperation can exist for a time largely in secret as it does now it cannot grow and thrive there nor on either side can friendship be unconditional recommendation the problems in the US-Saudi relationship must be confronted openly the United States and Saudi Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship that political leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend a relationship about more than oil it should include a shared commitment to political and economic reform as Saudis make common cause with the outside world it should include a shared interest in greater tolerance and cultural respect translating into a commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred end of chapter 12.2 recording by bob siebold chapter 12.3 prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism in october 2003 reflecting on progress after two years of waging the global war on terrorism defense secretary donnell rumsfeld asked his advisors are we capturing killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrasas and the radical clerics are recruiting and deploying against us does the u.s. need to fashion a broad integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists the u.s. is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists the cost-benefit ratio is against us our cost is billions against the terrorists costs of millions these are the right questions our answer is that we need short-term action on a long-range strategy one that invigorates our foreign policy with the attention that the president and congress have given to the military and intelligence parts of the conflict against Islamist terrorism engage the struggle of ideas the united states is heavily engaged in the muslim world and will be for many years to come this american engagement is resented the polls in 2002 found that among america's friends like egypt the recipient of more u.s. aid for the past 20 years than any other muslim country only 15% of the population had a favorable opinion of the united states in saudi arabia the number was 12% and two-thirds of those surveyed in 2003 in countries from indonesia to turkey a nato ally the united states may attack them support for the united states has plummeted polls taken in islamic countries after 9-11 suggested that many or most people thought the united states was doing the right thing in its fight against terrorism few people saw popular support for al-qaeda half of those surveyed said that ordinary people had a favorable view of the united states by 2003 polls showed that the bottom has fallen out of support for america in most of the muslim world negative views of the u.s. among muslims which had been largely limited to countries in the middle east have spread since last summer favorable ratings for the u.s. have fallen from 61% to 15% in indonesia and from 71% to 38% among muslims in nigeria many of these views are at best uninformed by the united states and at worst informed by cartoonish stereotypes the coarse expression of a fashionable occidentalism among intellectuals who caricature u.s. values and policies local newspapers and the few influential satellite broadcasters like al-jazeera often reinforce the jihadist theme that portrays the united states as anti-muslim the small percentage of muslims who are fully committed to Islam among bin Laden's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion it is among the large majority of arabs and muslims that we must encourage reform freedom, democracy, and opportunity even though our own promotion of these messages is limited in its effectiveness simply because we are its carriers muslims themselves will have to reflect upon such basic issues as the concept of jihad the position of women on muslim minorities the united states can promote moderation but cannot ensure its ascendancy only muslims can do this the setting is difficult the combined gross domestic product of the 22 countries in the arab league is less than the gross domestic product of spain 40% of adult arabs are illiterate 2 thirds of them women 1 third of the broader middle east lives on less than 2 dollars a day less than 2% of the population has access to the internet the majority of older arab youths have expressed the desire to immigrate to other countries particularly those in europe in short the united states has to help defeat an ideology not just a group of people and we must do so under difficult circumstances how can the united states and its friends help moderate muslims combat the extremist ideas recommendation the u.s. government must define what the message is what it stands for we should offer an example of moral leadership in the world committed to treat people humanely abide by the rule of law and be generous and caring to our neighbors america and muslim friends can agree on respect for human dignity and opportunity to muslim parents terrorists like bin laden have nothing but visions of violence and death america and its friends have a crucial advantage we can offer these parents a vision that might give their children a better future if we heed the views of thoughtful leaders in the arab and muslim world a moderate consensus can be found that vision of the future should stress life over death individual educational and economic opportunity this vision includes widespread political participation and contempt for indiscriminate violence it includes respect for the rule of law openness and discussing differences and tolerance for opposing points of view recommendation where muslim governments even those who are friends do not respect these principles the united states must stand for a better future one of the lessons of the long cold war was that short term gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments were too often outweighed by long term setbacks for america's stature and interests american foreign policy is part of the message america's policy choices have consequences right or wrong it is simply a fact that american policy regarding the israeli palestinian conflict and american actions in iraq are dominant staples of popular commentary across the arab and muslim world that does not mean u.s. choices have been wrong it means those choices must be integrated with america's message of opportunity to the arab and muslim world neither israel nor the new iraq will be safer if world wide islamist terrorism grows stronger the united states must do more to communicate its message reflecting on bin laden's success in reaching muslim audiences richard holbrook wondered how can a man in a cave outcommunicate the world's leading communication society deputies secretary of state richard armatage worried to us that americans have been exporting our fears and our anger not our vision of opportunity and hope recommendation just as we did in the cold war we need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously america does stand up for its values the united states defended and still defends muslims against tyrants and criminals in Somalia bosnia kosovo afghanistan and iraq if the united states does not act aggressively to define itself in the islamic world the extremists will gladly do the job for us recognizing that arab and muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting in the arab world, iran and afghanistan these efforts are beginning to reach large audiences the broadcasting board of governors has asked for much larger resources it should get them the united states should rebuild the scholarship exchange and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope where such assistance is provided it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the united states an agenda of opportunity the united states and its friends can stress educational and economic opportunity the united nations has rightly equated literacy as freedom the international community is moving towards setting a concrete goal to cut the middle east region's illiteracy rate in half by 2010 targeting women and girls and supporting programs for adult literacy unglamorous this help is needed to support the basics such as textbooks that translate more of the world's knowledge into local languages and libraries to house such materials education about the outside world or other cultures is weak more vocational education is needed too in trades and business skills the middle east can also benefit from some of the programs to bridge the digital divide and increase internet access that have already been developed in the regions of the world education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual and respect for different beliefs is a key element in any global strategy to eliminate Islamist terrorism recommendation the US government should offer to join with other nations and generously supporting a new international youth opportunity fund funds will be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools states that commit to sensibly investing their own money in public education economic openness is essential terrorism is not caused by poverty indeed many terrorists come from relatively well off families yet when people lose hope when societies break down when countries fragment the breeding grounds for terrorism are created backward economic policies and repressive political regimes often the societies that are without hope where ambition and passions have no constructive outlet the policies that support economic development and reform also have political implications economic and political liberties tend to be linked commerce especially international commerce requires ongoing cooperation and compromise the exchange of ideas across cultures and the peaceful resolution of differences through negotiation and renewal of law economic growth expands the middle class a constituency for further reform successful economies rely on vibrant private sectors which have an interest in curbing indiscriminate government power those who develop the practice of controlling their own economic destiny soon desire a voice in their communities and political societies the US government has announced the goal of working toward a trade area or MEFTA by 2013 the United States has been seeking comprehensive free trade agreements FTAs with the Middle Eastern nations most firmly on the path to reform the US Israeli FTA was enacted in 1985 and congress implemented an FTA with Jordan in 2001 both agreements have expanded trade and investment thereby supporting domestic economic reform in 2004 new FTAs were signed with Morocco and Bahrain and are awaiting congressional approval these models are drawing the interest of their neighbors Muslim countries can become full participants in the rules based global trading system as the United States considers lowering its trade barriers with the poorest Arab nations recommendation a comprehensive US strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development more open societies and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children's future turning a national strategy into a coalition strategy practically every aspect of US counter terrorism strategy relies on international cooperation since 9-11 these contacts concerning military law enforcement intelligence travel and customs and financial matters have expanded so dramatically and often in an ad hoc way that it is difficult to track these efforts much less integrate them recommendation the United States should engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism there are several multilateral institutions in which such issues should be addressed but the most important policies should be discussed and coordinated in a flexible contact group of leading coalition governments this is a good place for example to develop joint strategies for targeting terrorist travel or for hammering out a common strategy for the places where terrorists may be finding sanctuary presently the Muslim and Arab states meet with each other in organizations such as the Islamic conference and the Arab League the western states meet with each other in organizations such as NATO and the group of 8 summit of leading industrial nations a recent G8 summit initiative to begin a dialogue about reform may be a start toward finding a place where leading Muslim states can discuss and be seen to discuss critical policy issues with the leading western powers committed to the future of the Arab and Muslim world these new international efforts can create durable habits of visible cooperation allowing to step up to their responsibilities joined together in constructive efforts to direct assistance and coordinate action coalition warfare also requires coalition policies on what to do with enemy captives allegations that the united states abused prisoners in its custody make it harder to build the diplomatic political and military alliances the government will need the united states should work with friends to develop mutually agreed on principles for the detention and humane treatment of captured international terrorists who are not being held under a particular country's criminal laws countries such as Britain Australia and Muslim friends are committed to fighting terrorists America should be able to reconcile its views on how to balance humanity and security with our nation's commitment to these same goals the united states and some of its allies do not accept the application of full Geneva convention treatment of prisoners of war to captured terrorists those conventions establish a minimum set of standards for prisoners in internal conflicts since the international struggle against Islamic terrorism is not internal those provisions do not formally apply but they are commonly accepted as basic standards for humane treatment recommendation the united states should engage its friends to develop a common coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists new principles might draw upon article 3 of the Geneva conventions on the law of armed conflict that article was specifically designed for those cases in which the usual laws of war did not apply its minimum standard are generally accepted throughout the world as customary international law proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the united states will materialize if the world's most dangerous terrorists acquire the world's most dangerous weapons as we note in chapter 2 Al-Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years in chapter 4 we mentioned officials worriedly discussing in 1998 reports that bin Laden's associates thought their leader was intent on carrying out a Hiroshima these ambitions continue in the public portion of his February 2004 worldwide threat assessment to congress DCI tenant noted that bin Laden considered the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction to be a religious obligation he warned that Al-Qaeda continues to pursue a strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear capability tenant added that more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials a nuclear bomb can be built with a relatively small amount of nuclear material a trained nuclear engineer with an amount of highly enriched uranium or plutonium about the size of a grapefruit or an orange together with commercially available material could fashion a nuclear device that would fit in a van like the one Ramsay Youssef parked in the garage of the World Trade Center in 1993 such a bomb would level lower Manhattan the coalition strategies we have discussed to combat Islamist terrorism should therefore be combined with a parallel, vital effort to prevent and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction WMD we recommend several initiatives in this area strengthen counter-proliferation efforts while efforts to shut down Libby as a legal nuclear program have been generally successful Pakistan's illicit trade and the nuclear smuggling networks of Pakistani scientist AQ Khan have revealed that the spread of nuclear weapons is a problem of global dimensions attempts to deal with Iran's nuclear program are still underway therefore the United States should work with the international community to develop laws and an international legal regime with universal jurisdiction to enable the capture, interdiction and prosecution of such smugglers by any state in the world where they do not disclose their activities expand the proliferation security initiative in May 2003 the Bush administration announced the proliferation security initiative PSI nations in a willing partnership combining their national capabilities to use military, economic and diplomatic tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile related technology the PSI can be more effective if it uses intelligence and planning resources of the NATO alliance moreover, PSI membership should be open to non-NATO countries Russia and China should be encouraged to participate support the cooperative threat reduction program outside experts are deeply worried about the US government's commitment and approach to securing the weapons and highly dangerous materials still scattered in Russia and other countries of the Soviet Union the government's main instrument in this area the cooperative threat reduction program usually referred to as Nun Lugar after the senators who have sponsored the legislation in 1991 is now in need of expansion improvement and resources the US government has recently redoubled its international commitments to support this program and we recommend that the United States do all it can if Russia and other countries will do their part the government should weigh the value of this investment against the catastrophic cost America would face should such weapons find their way to the terrorists who are so anxious to acquire them recommendation our report shows that Al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least 10 years there is no doubt the United States would be a prime target preventing the proliferation of these weapons in the maximum effort by strengthening counter-proliferation efforts expanding the proliferation security initiative and supporting the cooperative threat reduction program targeting terrorist money the general public sees attacks on terrorist finance as a way to starve the terrorists of money so initially did the US government after 9-11 the United States took aggressive actions to designate terrorist financiers and freeze their money in the United States and through resolutions of the United Nations these actions appeared to have little effect and when confronted by legal challenges the United States and United Nations were often forced to unfreeze assets the difficulty understood later was that even if the intelligence community might link someone to a terrorist group through acquaintances or communications the task of tracing the money from that individual to the terrorist group or otherwise showing complicity was far more difficult it was harder still to do so without disclosing secrets these early missteps made other countries unwilling to freeze assets or otherwise act merely on the basis of the US action multilateral freezing mechanisms now require waiting periods before being put into effect eliminating the element of surprise and thus virtually ensuring that little money is actually frozen worldwide asset freezes have not been adequately enforced and have been easily circumvented often within weeks by simple methods but trying to star of the terrorists of money is like trying to catch one kind of fish by draining the ocean a better strategy has evolved since those early months as the government learned more about how Arcata raises, moves and spends money recommendation vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in US counter-terrorism efforts the government has recognized that information about terrorist money helps us to understand their networks search them out and disrupt their operations intelligence and law enforcement have targeted the relatively small number of financial facilitators individuals Arcata relied on for their ability to raise and deliver money at the core of Arcata's revenue stream these efforts have worked the death or capture of several important facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to Arcata and has increased its costs and difficulty in raising and moving that money captures have additionally provided a windfall of intelligence that can be used to continue the cycle of disruption the US financial community and some international financial institutions have generally provided law enforcement and intelligence agencies with extraordinary cooperation particularly in supplying information to support quickly developing investigations obvious vulnerabilities in the US financial system have been corrected the United States has been less successful in persuading other countries to adopt financial regulations that would permit the tracing of financial transactions public designation of terrorist financiers and organizations is still part of the fight but it is not the primary weapon designations are instead a form of diplomacy as governments join together to identify named individuals and groups as terrorists they also prevent open fundraising some charities that have been identified as likely avenues for terrorist financing have seen their donations diminish and their activities come under more scrutiny and others have been put out of business although controlling overseas branches of Gulf area charities remains a challenge the Saudi crackdown after the May 2003 terrorist attacks and Riyadh has apparently reduced the funds available to Al Qaeda perhaps drastically but it is too soon to know if this reduction will last though progress apparently has been made terrorists have shown considerable creativity in their methods of moving money if Al Qaeda is replaced by smaller decentralized terrorist groups the premise behind the government's efforts that terrorists need a financial support network may become outdated moreover some terrorist operations do not rely on outside sources of money and may now be self funding either through legitimate employment or low level criminal activity end of chapter 12.3 recording by Leanne Howlett