 Αυτό είναι ένα πολύ ευκαιριμένο τρόπο για να δημιουργήσει οικογένειο οικογένειο οικογένειο που έχει been defended by Bas van Frassen in the early 1980s in his famous book, The Scientific Image, and it's called Constructive Empiricism. Now, Constructive Empiricism as characterised by Bas van Frassen is a mixture of two theses, an actual logical and a doxastic. The actual logical theses is that science aims at empirically adequate theories and the doxastic theses is that acceptance of scientific theories involves belief only in their empirical adequacy, though acceptance involves more than belief what van Frassen calls commitment to a theory. As such it is contrasted to an analogous doublet of realist theses. The realist according to van Frassen says that the aim of science is true theories and the acceptance of theories implies belief in their truth. The acceptance approach is empiricist but it's a non-standard empiricist approach. He takes it that both scientific realism and constructive empiricist are ways to view science that is ways to view a particular activity or game. This is most naturally understood in terms of its aim, what is the aim of science conceived of as an activity or game and of what it is to be counted as success in it, what is involved in meeting the aim of science. This way of putting things already seems to create a tension between a descriptive and a normative approach. What is at stake? If science is seen as an activity and if scientific realism and constructive empiricism are seen as rival accounts of this activity, what exactly is the issue between them? Seeing as rival accounts of an activity, scientific realism and constructive empiricism are compared vis-à-vis their ability to explain or accommodate the main actual features of this activity, success being if anything just one of them. The explanandum then we may say is the phenomenology of scientific practice which to be sure should not include the intentions and doxastic attitudes of individual scientists but instead the salient features of the activity they are engaged in. The question then is, are there salient features of science quite an activity or game that force upon us philosophers of science, structural scientific realism or is constructive empiricism a viable option. Now constructive empiricism is markedly different from old empiricist instrumentalist positions. Unlike traditional instrumentalism, constructive empiricism agrees with realism that theories and their commitment, theoretical commitment in science are ineliminable. It buys into the so-called semantic view of theories but that's a different ball game we shouldn't go into it at the moment. The key idea is that it puts empirical adequacy as the aim of science instead of truth. The empirical adequacy claim means to capture the old instrumentalist conception that theory should aim to save the phenomena. But whereas the traditional conception took it that the theory is empirically adequate, if and only if all of its observational consequences are true, Van Frassen casts this requirement in model theoretic terms for a theory to be empirically adequate it should be the case that the structure of appearances is embedded in one of the models of the theory. That is that the structure of appearances is isomorphic to an empirical substructure of the model of the theory. Now it's really important to realize that empiricism, the way Van Frassen understands the concept, is tied to a sharp distinction between observable and unobservable entities. Grover Maxwell, we've referred to him already, put a famous argument forward in 1962 that all entities are observable under screwed up circumstances. Maxwell's premise was that observability should be best understood as detectability through or by means of some instrument. Then there is in principle a continuous series beginning with looking through a vacuum and containing these as members, looking through a window pane, looking through glasses, looking through binoculars, looking through a low power microscope, looking through a high power microscope etc. So there is no sharp distinction between what is observable and what is unobservable in this sense. Now the rebuttal of Maxwell's argument that is a sharp distinction between observable entities and unobservable entities requires that naked eye observations form a special kind of detection which is set apart from any other way to detect the presence of an entity that is detecting an entity by a microscope. This can be taken as a brute fact, but even if this is accepted the key question is not whether the entity based distinction can be drawn at all, but whether it has any epistemic relevance whatsoever. Why should the observable and unobservable distinction capture the border between what is epistimally accessible and what is not?