 Let's turn now to my colleague Matthew Goodman to give some comments on the presentations and the themes we've heard. I will then ask one or two questions of the panel, and we'll open it up for your observations and questions after that. Thanks, Mike. And thank you all for coming today. It's delightful to see such a big crowd. So I'm going to start by telling a story from my own personal experience working on regional economic integration. In 2011, as you know, we hosted, the United States hosted the APEC forum in Hawaii. And we were very determined to make the leaders' discussion among the 21 APEC leaders as interesting as possible. So we actually dispensed with the notion of funny shirts and casual settings around soft sofas around large rooms. And we actually built a special hexagonal table, hexagonal because 21 can't neatly fit, so we thought that would be a little off beautiful Hawaiian wood table. And we made it a real business meeting, and we got a couple of outside speakers to come in and speak, including the energy secretary, Mr. Dr. Chu, and Christine Lagarde, the head of the IMF, and Fatih Barol from the International Energy Agency, Chief Economist. And they gave presentations. There was a challenge because they wanted to do PowerPoint presentations, a couple of them, Secretary Chu, among them. And we didn't want to put big screens in this room and sort of disrupt the feeling. So we actually obtained iPads for all the leaders. Now in 2011, this was still pretty cool, to be able to put iPads in front of leaders and to have them simultaneously move the slides so they were controlled centrally and the slides would move, and you didn't have to touch the thing, the presentation would move along. And there was one problem, which was that if you touch the iPad and tried to use it as an iPad to search the Internet or something, it screwed up the whole system. And so we had to tell President Obama to tell his fellow peers at the beginning of the meeting, there's one rule here, which is please do not touch the iPads because it will screw up the whole system. And we were about 20 minutes into the session, and one of the leaders, and I won't say which one, but it was none of the countries represented up here, picked up his iPad and found the access to the Internet and started playing with it, and it screwed up the system and we had to do a quick audible and fix it. So the lesson of that story for me is that I'm not confident that we're going to be able to establish rules in the Asia Pacific region that everyone is going to be willing and able to follow. But seriously, let me just comment on three things. One is TPP and RCEP and my own perspective and what I heard here and what it made me think about those two arrangements or two tracks of trade negotiations in the region. Secondly, talk about the free trade area of the Asia Pacific and how APEC plays an important role in that. And then thirdly, I'll talk a little about U.S.-Japan's role as all the speakers again touched on in one way or another. So first of all, I think that as most speakers indicated, I think TPP is really now the driving force for deep and comprehensive trade and investment liberalization and rulemaking in the Asia Pacific. I think most people now agree with that. And I think when you look at it as an American from an American perspective, but I actually think this applies to pretty much anyone in the region as they look at this, I think there are three big objectives or three big prizes to be had from TPP. One of them is obviously the economic benefits, the growth and jobs that are produced. And I want to just endorse something that Professor Errata said in his little footnote there, which should have been the first slide, not the footnote in one of his slides, about the impact and the benefit of these arrangements being opening one's own market. As we all learn in trade policy, the best trade policy is unilateral disarmament and opening your markets. That's where the real bang for the buck is, not opening other markets, although that's nice too. But so I think that's really the benefit for all of us is further market opening and the jobs and growth that that will produce. Secondly, it is rulemaking, and I think this is an important opportunity to both update and uphold the rules of the international trade and investment system that have served all of the members of the Asian Pacific region so well. And then thirdly, it's an important opportunity to bind the countries of this region or the economies of this region together in a way that really few other arrangements can do. I think a binding legal trade agreement could have a really dramatic effect in binding, particularly from a U.S. perspective, the United States into this region and really embedding us more deeply in the region, which I think is something that all countries want from an economic perspective. So there's a lot at stake here and a lot to play for, and I think TPP is absolutely critical for all those reasons, among others, from a U.S. perspective related to the rebalancing strategy, Freudian slip. I would say about our step quickly. I do think somebody called it Urata Sensei perhaps again in complementary, I do think it's complementary. I don't think it's inconsistent. It is not as broad or deep or doesn't seem to be headed that way, and I think it's not going to replace or substitute for TPP in the ways that I just suggested TPP was going to be important. I thought Dr. Lim's point about ASEAN being the facilitator but not really the driver of our step was quite interesting and I think it's interesting for the other Northeast Asian countries represented here. I'd be interested in your perspectives on what Japan, China, and Korea, as I saw Minister Kim earlier from the Korean Embassy, what Korea's role might be as well in driving RCEP. So that's sort of a question. And then finally on TPP, the question of Chinese participation. Again, from the beginning, TPP was envisaged as something that would incorporate all of the members of the Asia Pacific economic of APEC, and that includes China. So I think very much it's been an implicit assumption of TPP that ultimately China would be a part of this, if not of TPP itself because I actually think it's going to be quite difficult for most countries, especially a large country like China, to actually accede to TPP just because of the nature, really for political reasons because it's very difficult I think for a country like China to join a mega regional deal that it was not an original founding member of, which is different from its approach to WTO. But I think there could be a leapfrogging from TPP to some other broader agreement, let's call it a free trade area of the Asia Pacific, which would be a sort of TPP plus arrangement. So I do think that's critical and it doesn't make sense. All of the benefits that we've talked about here don't make sense unless China is a part of this conversation and part of these ultimately binding system of rules in the region. So let me just say a word about APEC because I really think APEC is, or the road to an F-tap or free trade area of the Asia Pacific runs through APEC. It is the APEC vision for free trade and investment in the region as of 2006 or 2007 when it was endorsed by the leaders. And interestingly this year China, as I think Dr. Zhang mentioned, has revived the idea of an F-tap as something very concrete and actionable that we should be moving towards. And I think that that shows how APEC is a very important part of this story, often underappreciated, as I said in an event last week for those of you who are of a certain age and American. You'll know when I say that APEC is kind of the Rodney Dangerfield of American foreign policy. It doesn't get much respect, but it's very important because this non-binding consensual approach to, well, removing the kind of underbrush of impediments to trade and investment is, first of all, very important. And it serves, APEC serves as an incubator for some really good ideas in passing. I think it was Dr. Zhang or someone mentioned the environmental goods and services agreement in APEC. This was something that the WTO had been arguing over for a long time over, actually over the definition of what an environmental good is. And in APEC, in our year, we said let's forget what the definition of an environmental good is. Let's just agree that whatever an environmental good turns out to be, we will not impose tariffs higher than 5 percent by 2015. And we'll leave it to the next host, which was Russia, to figure out what an environmental good is. And to everyone's surprise, Russia did a great job of actually brokering an agreement on, I think, 54, 56 tariff lines that would be treated as subject to this non-binding commitment. So APEC has a useful role in advancing ideas like this. It also played an important role, as you all know, in the information technology agreement many years ago, several years, many years ago, I guess, now. And this year, I think China has a real opportunity. Again, Dr. Zhang mentioned this about promoting a conversation about global value chains. This is really important because, first of all, trade really isn't trade. It really is global value chains. You don't make things in one place, put them on a ship and send them like cloth made in a little factory down an English lane, and put it on a masted ship and send it to Portugal in exchange for wine anymore. You think of an idea in one place, you procure parts from a lot of different other places, you assemble them in yet another place, and transfer them and sell them all over the world. And in this world of global value chains, it doesn't make sense. It's insufficient to only talk about issues that occur at the border, like tariffs and customs procedures and other things. Those are necessary to talk about in trade negotiations, but they're not sufficient. You need to talk about the ray of things behind the border that affect efficient global value chains. So that means investment rules, intellectual property rules, the role of the state and the economy, regulation, a bunch of other things. So that's what really TPP is designed to get at. And I think there's an opportunity in APEC to have a conversation building on good work that APEC has already done on the more of the border issues, the supply chain issues at the border, to have a broader conversation about liberalizing global value chains. And if China can broker such a conversation this year and then it follows into the Philippines year next year, I think this could be a way of helping to try and bring these different tracks together. They may not fully converge. I'm a little skeptical that these things are going to actually converge, but I think some of the lower hanging or the lower elements of the disciplines that are being negotiated in TPP, for example, could be brought together through APEC and making these arrangements interoperable. So I think that's the real promise of APEC this year and into the Philippines year next year. And then finally, on US Japan, so we are obviously critical to this conversation, obviously because we're the number one and number three largest economies in the world, but also because we have a very similar approach to all the issues I just talked about. I remember, again, going back to that APEC year at some point in the middle of the year when I was at the White House and I asked somebody at USTR or the State Department to prepare a kind of matrix of where the other 20 economies were on the various initiatives that we had proposed. And Japan, when you went down the list, was strongly support, strongly support, strongly support, strongly support. I mean, Japan was almost totally aligned with us on all of the things we were trying to do on the rulemaking side of the House through APEC and through these other arrangements. So I think it's very important for the US and Japan to be aligned in trying to work on these issues. Unfortunately, we have some old issues, not the new rules, which we still have to work out, but I'm confident that we will and we will eventually reach agreement. And that will, as somebody said, drive a broader, I guess it was the congressman who said that it will actually lead to a broader TPP agreement if we can get agreement between the US and Japan. Final point I'll make is just to echo something that Ishii Gesant said at the very end of his comments that it's important for everyone, not just in the US and Japan, but I think around the region to take a strategic perspective to these issues. And to me, as an economic policy person looking at the Asia Pacific, here I have my own Rodney Dangerfield complex because the word strategy is often thrown around, including at this institution, which has the word in its name, as a, in a traditional sense of high diplomacy and security issues. And that's of course what strategy does center on, but in economics there's strategy too. And I think that actually TPP and RSEP in its own way and certainly APEC are very much a part of the economic strategic engagement that the US and Japan certainly give to Asia Pacific regionally economic integration. And I think that's the perspective we should bring to these conversations and look in terms of how these arrangements promote growth and well-being for all of us instead of just looking sort of narrowly at parochial interests, which unfortunately we too often do. So that's my appeal or my reaffirmation of what Ishii Gesant said that strategic perspective is very important here. So I'll stop there. Thank you, Matthew. We've been meeting like this with Jethro for about a decade. And these are always interesting zeitgeist checks. Three years ago, I think it's three years ago Ishii Gesant, three years ago when we had this meeting, many of the Asian participants were criticizing APEC, saying it's irrelevant. It's, you know, the Rodney Dangerfield thing. It just doesn't deserve any respect. Arguing that RSEP was far more important than TPP. We even, and this was last year, took a vote of the audience and a majority of the audience said, the question was which will be completed first, RSEP or TPP? A majority of the audience said, RSEP, Matthew and I got an angry email from a senior person in the administration because there was an article saying CSIS experts predict RSEP will be finished before TPP. Last year, Professor Zhang made a very strong case that TPP is win-win for China and with RSEP. I think he was not only reporting on the views in China, I think he was in the process of changing the views in China. So it's a real pleasure having him here. And overall, in terms of the strategy, there's much more convergence. Every time we do this meeting, there's much more convergence. There are very, while there are in many ways rising geopolitical or military challenges, on the question of economic architecture, there's much more convergence of broad views. And you can see it clearly in the survey we did recently of a lead opinion in Asia. But what I wanted to ask the panelists was, even with that convergence, I still cannot visualize and maybe you can't either, but try. Let's assume we have a successful completion of TPP with 12 member states and a successful conclusion of RSEP. How do you marry those? I assume the answer is not everybody who signed on to TPP gets to then reduce their or increase their tariffs to get back to the RSEP level. On the other hand, as Hank Lim pointed out, maybe there needs to be some flexibility in how the non-TPP developing countries, including China, get into TPP. Maybe you create some new framework, APEC perhaps, that is used to arbitrate between the two. But could you speculate for a minute on how RSEP and TPP coexist, converge, merge, if we complete them both, some years down the road? Matt, you want to go first? Why don't you ask the... Okay, Professor Urrata and... Maybe my message wasn't clear. I thought I made my statement or my view toward these two frameworks. I proposed stages approach to regional economic integration in East Asia or Asia Pacific. First step, first stage is to join RSEP. I'm thinking about developing countries like CLM, maybe India too. So they join RSEP and then they assume they successfully grow economically and they can reach a level that they can accept some of the very high standard which TPP imposes. Then they join TPP. So they coexist and in my view, objectives of these two initiatives are quite different. Maybe... I like to know your view about this. RSEP, maybe the eventual goal is like to set up an East Asian community. We talked about this. Whereas TPP, eventual goal is FTAB and FTAB maybe go on to next generation WTO. So these are two different frameworks in my view and they coexist and the countries can join both or one first and then second and so they can be a member of two frameworks and that's how I look at these two. So to get this precisely right, so individual countries, when they're ready to sign on to TPP standards, do that. There's no special exceptions made to try to get everyone in from RSEP at once. You basically, when A country's ready it does what Japan or Australia or any current TPP member is doing and gets in. We have to consider one thing. TPP, it has an open accession closed whereas RSEP, you have to be a dialogue partner of RSEI I guess. So in other words, there's some condition which you have to satisfy to join these frameworks and for RSEP it's more closed than TPP and so for RSEP, if I understand it correctly, has to have a more open accession closed than individual countries can choose to join or not. So but again, individual countries choice. Professor Lim. I think I agree with Professor Urata except I want to add a few points from the Southeast Asian perspectives. At this stage, at this stage the ASEAN centrality is very important. Now the ASEAN centrality should be interpreted in very different way, but the way as it is constituted officially by the ASEAN secretary is that the ASEAN take initiatives for creating the ASEAN. Secondly, also supposed to be initiating the substance. Thirdly, the ASEAN countries as Professor Urata mentioned that they are dialogue partners, but the accession clause is already there and reaffirmed by the principles and the negotiations as agreed by the ASEAN economic ministers in 31st August in Simrib, Cambodia in 2013, at 2012. So these are very important issues that for ASEAN. Now but the next stage where it goes, you know, how it would evolve, well all ASEAN countries in the APEC I think play a role in it. You know, I don't vision any other road map where the FDA AP at this time where the all ASEAN member states and all the major Asia Pacific, they are ASEAN dialogue partners, U.S. dialogue partners, Russia also, not in a whole, but actually from sectoral move into a whole dialogue partners. So now another very important point that need to be emphasized is that the ASEAN centrality in the AEC moving into, it actually is moving elevated from after ASEAN free trade area into the AEC, into the ASAP, and on from there on. So the idea of regional integration. Now regional integration, there are two different things in the trade politics and trade negotiation. Trade negotiation is not so much of a life and death. Okay. That's why in the AEC, you don't, you don't, you know, in, in, in, in discussing about the various, the call it the ASEAN economic blueprint, which was agreed in Singapore in 2007, right from 2007, eight, nine, right up to 2015. It is not a trade negotiation. It's not the traditional way of it. It is a regional integration. So that's why the AEC, the ASEAN economic community, can be, can be best interpreted as a coordinated effort for domestic reform. So in a sense that trade facilitations and cooperation, and this is all, in my views, the characteristics of APEC. That's why I mentioned it, I think, last night that the, we have to watch, monitor, and the way we, we feel that China will say a lot in this year APEC summit in Beijing. So I, I, we feel from Southeast Asia that China is going to use these APEC instruments very much and how to integrate. At this point in time, nobody knows the, the, the next stage and the evolutions of moving, how to convert it and all these things, because it's, it's the principle of, of, you see it, the ASEAN, also high principles and a lot of the things are similar. But it's the politics, the trade politics and trade policies are two different things. One is trade negotiation, U.S. insisting on rules and regulation, of course. Transparency, predictability, reducing cost. But the international trade has changed so much, like Math mentioned. It's not only just exporting and importing, but it is divisions of labor and trade in, trade in, trade in function. It's not trade in goods and services, trade in function. So you have certain rules and I have certain rules. Everybody will gain. So I think that's the way it will evolve. But exactly how, where it will, I think it's difficult. But the way at this point in time is APEC seems to be the most likely platform or framework to go. So on the security side, ASEAN centrality makes sense to the major states, because it's a kind of neutral ground on which to begin to discuss security issues. But on the trade side, it's not as obvious to me. Can you clarify, at least for me, there are members of APEC who are not ASEAN dialogue partners. Is that correct? Canada, Mexico, Chile? Well, Mexico is not, I think it may be sectoral, but it's not a whole dialogue partners. The Canada is a dialogue partner to ASEAN. So what else APEC members? Chile is a dialogue partner, and Chile in the TPP as well as Singapore-Chile bilateral agreements. So I think it's not a big challenge, mostly overlaps with the APEC membership. So the structure of RCEP, the standards of TPP, these are things that will have to be sorted out. But probably definitely cannot be sorted out until TPP is real and complete. RCEP is real and complete. So we'll have to be flexible and see as we go forward. We've had several proposals. Matt, do you want to weigh on this again? I know you like the APEC framework for this, but... Yeah. No, I was just going to say, I mean, as I said in my remarks, I'm not sure that RCEP and TPP ever converge. Again, I see Jeff Shaw and other smart people who've thought about this, and I'd be interested when they ask a question if they could pronounce on this as well. But I think the standards and the rules are going to be sufficiently different. It's going to be very hard for them to actually just merge and converge. But I do think, so I think that ultimately if we're going to have a broader arrangement, whether it's F-TAP or, you know, it's going to have to be F-TAP plus because you've got to get the other three ASEANs who are not in APEC, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia into the conversation. You have to get India into the conversation. And so it's going to have to be something broader. But I think you're going to have to start over with the base of these agreements and try to negotiate something at a higher standard. Now, from a U.S. perspective and probably from the perspective of anybody in TPP who's gone through the difficult domestic political process of getting this through, it's going to have to be TPP plus. So they're not going to be able or willing to negotiate down to lighter standards or less liberalization. So that's a challenge in practice. But, and then meanwhile along the way, as I said, I think if China can broker a conversation about how we start making interoperable these arrangements, at least at the levels of where we don't, for example, if you're in Malaysia and you're in TPP RSEP and you have third country trading partners, you don't want to have three different customs forms for those different participants. You want to, there's an incentive to try to come up to common approaches. That's a pretty simple example. But further up the chain, there may be things that we can do that are more interoperable and help bring these things together. But full convergence seems unlikely. I agree. I think this is a very complicated issue. Personally, I think, you know, that today actually both TPP and RSEP are facing these, you know, uncertainties and certainties. For example, for TPP, the certainty is that more than 80 percent contents already complicated, already complete. The problem is that the rest of 20 percent, most of them belonging to tough mission. And TPP is touching, today is touching so a lot of issues behind the border, such as, you know, IPR issues, environmental labor issues, this type of issues for some of developing countries, very difficult to get solutions. Even if in developed economies, also there are so a lot of problems. So I just wonder, even if some of developing economies, they can accept those high standard, those rules and regulations, the problem is that how to implement those rules and regulations for developing economies, I think that's a big issue. Especially look at China, actually in the past 35 years, we already have a series of reform and opening up. But we have to confess that today facing with those issues behind the border, we need to do a lot of, you know, homeworks. We need to reform further. So for some of small economic entities who are belonging to TPP, so actually there are a lot of, you know, thoughts on their ability to implement those high standard set by TPP. Regarding RCEP, I think that for some of developing economies in the region, actually especially for China and Indonesia, we feel that quite comfortable, you know, to join this type of negotiation compared with TPP because, you know, TPP is more comfortable for developed economies. The problem is that for RCEP, now I think that the most urgent thing is that there is no negotiation template. There is no, you know, negotiation framework. And the full rounds of negotiation, the progress quite slow. So I deeply thought that if by the end of 2015, RCEP can make, you know, a result or consensus, so that's the challenges. So my suggestion is that maybe for China, we actually indeed, we will respect other centrality. On the other hand, I think that China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Asia, we should work together and we should produce our template, negotiation templates as soon as possible. That's most urgent. In the future, how to make them merge, make them be merged, I think that maybe it will take time. Just like I mentioned, the possible, you know, scenarios in the future. Because TPP will have, you know, a series of rules and regulations, also RCEP will produce a lot. So this type of situation, one possibility is that maybe TPP and RCEP teams, they can work together to discuss in order to produce a new set of rules or regulations. Maybe that's the way. On the other hand, you know, just like Ulata mentioned, some of economic entities, they can draw in TPP. That's also possible. But another, you know, I mentioned three possible approaches, but I think that maybe fourth possible, maybe we can, you know, actually we can put a set, you know, TPP regulations as well as RCEP regulations. Just based on those bilateral and trilateral, you know, simple traditional free trade agreement. And then maybe if APEC platform could be transferred, you know, to Asia Pacific Aptap, that's also another possible, you know, approaches. I mean, very briefly, in the future, you know, the study on roadmap of Aptap is very important and very critical. I hope that all APEC economic entities can sit together and to explore the possible, you know, merge approaches. Thank you. It's complicated but exciting, but first we have to figure out the tariff on Japanese pork imports. So one thing at a time. Let me open it up for... Yeah, sure. And then we'll take questions. Yeah. Special and in response to Professor Chang's points need to be clarified. I was invited to the ASEAN Economic, Senior Economic Official Meeting in October last year when Brunei Darussalam was the chair of ASEAN Summit. Now, special differential treatment doesn't mean that you lower the quality, the high standards and all these things. It is just giving more time for them to implement it, agree and implement it, giving more time. So it's plucking out all the low-hanging trees first and the fruits and then later on in the higher fruits. So this must be clearly understood. So special differential treatment, you know, because Professor Chang is difficult to implement, for example, for Vietnam. Vietnam would agree that high standards in ASEAN and all this, but giving more allowance of time, okay, so that would reduce the distortions in trade integrations. The second point is that the ASEAN, because a lot of apprehensions that maybe the ASEAN, the ASEAN will not be able to finish it. So this is how we suggest ASEAN and it's being duly considered by the ASEAN Senior Economic Official, SHONG, S-E-O-M. Now Myanmar is the chair. They have also quite a number of SHONG meetings already in Myanmar as well as in Malaysia and Vietnam. There is a possibility that it, based on installment stages, in the sense that by 2015, the good sector all will be completed. But service sectors and investment sector will be the second phase. So it means, but you must agree to pay a deposit first. So the deposit is in the good sector. So service sector, it means installment. So every, but installment in the sense that you agree the principle, but the delivery and the actual agreement all will come later. The second point is that you must also agree on the schedules. It may not necessarily as one single undertaking that from beginning to the end, which ASEAN does not agree. And the asset is not a single undertaking, but in TPP is a single undertaking. So not necessarily a single undertaking, but it must have a schedule. If you pay installment, you go, you borrow money from the bank, how much you put the initial first and then second installment and all these things. So it's being seriously considered. So I personally, hopeful that asset by 2015 would agree. Quite a lot of things may not be the whole things, but good sector will be complete. Installments on service investment and free capital flow will come into it. So now the issue is that the, how to agree on the schedules. So when Myanmar now is chairing the ASEAN, so the show meeting, the senior economic official meetings, which is the technical working groups to put up proposal to the ASEAN economic ministers on asset on AEC. So it seems to be that the asset recommendations that being discussed when in the Bandai Shri Bergawans in October went, which I was invited to give some suggestions based from the area studies on the asset. So there is such a possibility that the asset would be concluded along this line. One, they would agree on goods, service sector, all based on installment. Thirdly, based on the schedules and the working groups on competition policy, intellectual property rights, SPS and TBD, the technical value to trade. Thanks very much, Sherm Katz, Center for Study of the Presidency. This is a friendly question, Dr. Lim, about ARSEP. You said, because I believe in it and I think many in this room do, you said at one point that the, that ASEAN is not providing the substantive initiative for the negotiations. And you also suggested that perhaps some of the non-ASEAN members could take that initiative. Let me suggest a third possibility which gets to some sort of political, cultural and economic things you may be able to enlighten us on. And that is that the ASEAN members themselves should be taking the initiative. For example, you have such a very basic thing as whether it is positive list or negative list. In Geneva at the WTO, for example, we would generally imagine that would not be the Secretary Director General who would be taking the initiative on that, but some of the members of the WTO themselves. So what I am trying to tease out is your evaluation of the readiness of the ASEAN members to really get going on the business of ARSEP. Well, a few things, a few things, thank you for your questions. Indonesia is moving toward more of inward looking. So Indonesia is by far the largest ASEAN member states. Indonesia is not so open and outward looking. So a month from today, on the 9th of July, there will be presidential election. There are two candidates, presidential candidates. One is the governor of Jakarta, the Joko Widodo, and the other one is general, former Army generals, the Prabowo Subianto. Both are nationalists. So Indonesia is moving toward inward looking. So it is a bit difficult. Singapore has ideas about the negative list instead of the positive list on moving toward the ASEP further in substantive. But as I understand it, this again is private views, that ASEAN is very difficult for Singapore to move the substantive discussion unless it used to be Thailand and pass it on to Thailand and Thailand carry the balls. But Thailand now is in turmoil. Government is not in action under military control. So it is difficult to find a partner where it is part. Malaysia is going to be the ASEAN chair next year, but you have to wait until next year. This year is Myanmar. So again, Myanmar is not that ready to undertake this role. So the way it is arranged in ASEAN is that you have to work closely with the ASEAN chair, who is going to organize the ASEAN summit, ASEAN minister meeting, and senior economic officials. In fact, actually, I think Professor Urata and myself and Professor Peter Drystels and Professor Chang Yun-ling from China all will meet in Singapore on the 20th June on the sidelines of the ASEP meeting in Singapore on Friday to discuss all these initiatives, how non-ASEAN members all can promote the substantive issues and push forward the ASEP. So there are quite a number of things being explored. And I think China, Japan, and Korea also seems to be giving some encouragement. And Australia is taking the lead in moving along your suggestion. Yes, right here in the middle. Thank you very much. I am Vikram Nehru. I am from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And thank you all for your excellent discussion. Michael, you raised on now on two occasions the whole issue of security. And it seems to me that there are these two parallel tracks going on. The first is increased economic integration. And the second is increased dissonance on security issues in the region. And this divergence between these two tracks potentially is really unsustainable. So the question that I have to the panel and to the loan discussant is to what extent will the security questions impact the economic integration issues, both ASEP and TPP? Will the impact be different for these two tracks? And to what extent is increased economic integration a good security strategy? And to what extent could it potentially actually have an impact? Can increased integration actually make countries more vulnerable to security trends in the region? Thank you very much. I think one impact is the trade negotiation that no one's really, I think no one has mentioned, which is the China-Japan-Korea trilateral, which is in abeyance in large part because of these political and security challenges. But let me open the floor and see other examples. Yes, China-Japan-Korea, so-called CJKFTA negotiations. As I understand it, they are moving forward regardless of political problems with China, political problems with Korea. So as far as negotiations are concerned, they don't be so far, they haven't been affected by political problems. And the relationship between security issues and economic issues, of course, if you... I'd like to see more economic integration or interaction between two countries, say Japan and China, will lead to a better security relationship. But I don't know, that's what I hope. And as I understand it, the closer they get together, it makes more damaging if they get into trouble. So I hope that that kind of way of looking at the relationship is correct. And at the same time, political tensions lead to or discourages economic relationship. And here, what is interesting is that the number of Japanese tourists to Korea and China has been declining, as far as I understand it. Whereas tourists coming from China and Korea to Japan, whatever reason, are increasing. So Japanese, I guess, tourists are much more affected by political relations than Chinese or Koreans. And that's just a fact that I understand correctly. But again, what I'm trying to say is that more problems in political or security relations can lead to declining the relationship in economic matters. And that's why we don't want to see any political security conflicts between, say, Japan and other countries. Actually, from an economic aspect, you can find that the trend is convergence due to global economic globalization and the regional economic integration. But if you look at political aspects, definitely security issues will be another direction. That is divergence. So I think that I'd like to remind you that every, even if bilateral FTA, or multilateral FTA, that's not a pure economic issues, but also will be an impact by political issues, diplomatic issues. So personally, I hope that CGK FTA could be in progress. That FTA cannot be disturbed by political reasons. But in fact, I think that maybe the progress also will be an impact to some extent. But how to evaluate, I think, is not easy. But generally speaking, I think that in this region, from a medium and a long run, CGK FTA is a very critical bilateral FTA for its Asia economic integration, as well as for Asia Pacific economic integration. Thank you. Just to start. So I think the CGK example is clearly one where the security issues are having an impact on the policy initiative in that agreement. I think on the two main tracks, there isn't much evidence that the security issues are slowing down the economic policy impetus to integration. Nor is there much evidence that it's speeding it up, which is another possible outcome in the sense that if it were so true, I mean, to be a little oversimplified, but that the TPP members wanted to get this done, somehow, to establish more solidarity in the face of some of the challenges that some of the members are facing from China, then, you know, it's not clear to me why we haven't reached agreement yet. I mean, we're obviously still negotiating over some really hard economic issues, and that's what I think is slowing it down, not the political security issues, and nor is it speeding it up in particular. I do think on the ground, though, that clearly Japanese investment in China has the marginal flow of investment has slowed pretty dramatically. And so I think it is having an impact on integration at that level. But as a policy matter, I don't see much evidence either direction other than CGK, which is sort of a special situation. We're also, I think, asking about the macro sort of long-term impact of these two trends, and putting on the historians hat for a moment, there are historians who argue that, for example, it was convergence with the gold standard in 1931, and then the collapse of the British pound that caused displacement and militarism in Japan. So it wasn't because it was convergence, but convergence created an expectation and winners and losers in the economy, and then it was exacerbated when the global economy hit a crisis. Or even before World War I, there are historians who argue that, in fact, it was economic interdependence that weakened the British power that made deterrence and maintenance of a balance of power harder, that somehow it was economic interdeterrence that sowed the seeds. Possibly, but I would still bet on these economic integration efforts, reinforcing peace and stability, in part because legitimacy for every regime and country other than North Korea, including now Myanmar, depends heavily on economic performance, also because the democratization examples in Asia are all about growing middle classes. And so I think we're right to bet on economic interdependence and these economic frameworks having a positive impact, but nothing is guaranteed. Nothing is guaranteed in life. In 1928, Thomas Lamont, the head of J.P. Morgan, gave a speech at the time of a very famous speech saying, war with Japan is absolutely impossible because of the economic ties between the countries. So you can't bet 100 percent on it, but I think it's a good trend line overall. Yes, over here. Now we're in trouble, a real economist. Jeff Schott with the Peterson Institute. I think the combined comments of the panelists have given us some good insights on the question of convergence. And unfortunately, Mr. Lim, I think your arguments have shown why RCEP is going to be on a very slow track. In fact, everything you've said has indicated that, but it also has indicated a reluctance to move quickly on policy reform in many areas of economic interchange. You mentioned the focus on goods and pushing off decisions on services in other areas. If you want to look where convergence is taking place already, look at the countries that are looking at economic integration arrangements as a means of complementing domestic reform. China is in the forefront of that. Korea has done that for the past decade because through chorus and through its FTAs with Europe and is now engaged in a very important negotiation with China. Japan is doing that, albeit grudgingly, in the context of the TPP negotiations. Those are the countries that are setting really the standard for economic integration in the region and are providing really the impetus for other countries to consider accelerating domestic reform. And I think that's why you're seeing so many countries looking into or studying very closely the possibility of engaging with TPP. Already seven of the 16 RCEP countries are in TPP, and four others are studying it at various stages given the political cycles in their country. So I think I'm more in line with what Matt and what Professor Orata have said. RCEP is really a complementary initiative that is almost a preparatory school for deeper integration, and that it's unlikely that there'll be a convergence of the RCEP and the TPP, and yet there will be a need to use the cooperation of countries, and this is one of the things China is considering this year in APEC, to help advance and accelerate the economic development so that there is inclusive growth throughout the region. But it seems to me that TPP will be the standard, and the challenge for TPP countries is how do you ensure a smooth transition so that you can bring in more and more countries in the coming years, and you can then deal with the non-TPP members in a way that encourages their readiness in the future. I think that's the challenge that APEC countries have this year. Before I respond to that, first on the securities and things while ASEAN. In addition to the ASEAN economic community, actually we have another two pillars. One is the ASEAN social cultural communities, and the other one is ASEAN political security communities, so the three must go together. Second point is also even though the ASEAN economic community sometimes is misleading, means no money, because you compare to a European community. But ASEAN, that's why conflicts in Southeast Asia tend to be under control, in a sense that they would like to have a sense of community, even though with small C, not the big C like in the European case. So security is very much in the minds of many ASEAN policy makers. The second point is on the South China Sea, the spready islands. As you know, 2022 Indonesia initiated this DOC, Decorations of Contending Parties in the South China Sea, but it is voluntary non-binding. China also agree, but it's not good enough. You must have some commitment. So because security issues, the ASEAN China FTA, which came into full operation into 2010, but it's not good enough. Although ASEAN's Asian peoples are more pragmatic, more materialistic than Europeans or others. Economic benefits, tangibles all are very important. Although the impulse of war, impulse of resolving conflict through armed struggles and all these things is still there, but you must understand also the sociocultural characteristics that material, tangible benefits are very, very important. So as a result of it now, we're moving into the COC, Code of Conducts. And China was very reluctant at first, but through ASEAN centrality and all these things. So China has agreed in Myanmar in May, the first ASEAN summit. China has agreed to proceed from DOC to COC. So in a sense, there is, you need a framework in addition of economic interaction, economic cooperation, economic integration. You need a framework whereby security, peace and possible conflict can be not to avoid but can be minimized and can be managed. But it is not happening in Northeast Asia. Partly is because they are big powers and secondly is also ASEAN reached beyond to Northeast Asia. But at least in Southeast Asia, that's possibility. Framework has been put in place and being considered and initiated by ASEAN country. And that is the issue of the economic cooperation and integration with the security framework. There are quite a lot of contending disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia on Simbadan, on Sigitan and all these, they resolve it. Just last week, Indonesia and Philippine also agreed on the disputed islands, Singapore and Malaysia on the Raffles Lighthouse. It's very close to Malaysia, but for over 120 years under the Singapore Lighthouse Raffles and all these things. And the International Court of Justice has agreed to, they say it belongs to Singapore and Malaysia, agree, accept it. So in Southeast Asia, it seems to be the ease of framework, although it is still fragile and tentative, but it is much better than in Northeast Asia. So at least that's the issue more manageable. We're going to break now for lunch. Lunch is back over there. If you could grab your lunch, bring back. We'll hear from Wendy Culler from USTR. And let's thank the panel for a very excellent discussion.