 Hello, and welcome to Carnegie. Thank you all for braving what are pretty oppressive weather conditions to help us in launching our brand new report entitled, Revitalizing Palestinian Nationalism Options Versus Realities. And I'm very excited with our, I'll be moderating the discussion. I'm Perry Kamak, a fellow in the Middle East program here. But I'm very delighted to welcome our two guests. Nathan Brown will introduce first, of course, as a professor at George Washington University, as well as a non-resident senior fellow here. And one of the contributors along with the editors, I should say, along with Marwan Washer and myself of the report. And of course, Ambassador Hussam Zumlat, who is the chief representative of the PLO delegation here in Washington, but also an academic and a thinker on these issues in his own right. Normally, the moderator kind of just sticks very carefully to kind of a neutral stand. But I think I'm going to break that rule and kind of I assume that most of you have not read yet what is a 80 page report that some of you are just seeing for the first time. So I thought before we kick off the discussion and we will be on the record that I would give you just a kind of very brief overview of the report just to help really frame the discussion. So this report really has two parts. Our goal with this was we felt that there really actually was a pretty big gap in the discussion here in Washington perhaps even more broadly internationally in the sense that there really is, as most of you know, a kind of cottage industry that's been looking at the peace process in all its permutations, Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But we felt that there actually was a gap in the sense that Palestinian politics itself is often considered a kind of black box within at least some of those analyses. So we thought it would be very interesting as part of the Arab World Horizons project which we have here to basically try to look at Palestinian politics not and Palestinian nationalism not as seen, oh dear. This is Palestinian politics. Well, whatever you think of our report, you'll remember. The false alarm. The false alarm, yeah. Yeah, perhaps. I guess we can get started. It's a little disconcerting to have these lights still going on, but let's reconvene. Thanks for your patience, folks. So again, we felt essentially that there really was a kind of missing element to at least some of the discussions happening both here in Washington and internationally. So the goal was really to kind of provide a look or a view of the Palestinian national movement not as seen from Washington, but really as seen by Palestinians themselves. So to that effect, there are really two parts to this report and we'll talk about it a little more in a bit, but the first part is really a survey of approximately 60 Palestinian thinkers, mostly in the West Bank, some in Gaza, some in Israel, some in the diaspora, some in Europe. And I would think of this not as a opinion poll of this group, but really as a kind of extended focus group where we really ask these folks to kind of grapple with these issues of the challenges facing Palestinian nationalism. And I think what we found, and I'll be very curious to hear the ambassador's reaction to this, is that Palestinian national movement, which is premised essentially on the promise of a two-state solution, but which has been stalled for 15 years or more, now seems to find itself at a crossroads. Certainly we found, as might be expected, that there was a lot of anger amongst the participants and a lot of blame at Israel, the Israeli government, settlements, occupation, et cetera. But I think what really stood out, at least to me, is that there was a sense of alienation and even anger, in many cases, at the Palestinian institutions themselves. And in particular, something that jumped out at me, we asked kind of what do you see you, open-ended question, what do you see as the biggest impediment to Palestinian national aspirations? A vast majority, of course, defined some version of occupation, settlement, et cetera. But even higher number actually talked about the polarization within Palestinian society. So geographic division, political division, ideological division. This, I should say, is not a policy report. So those of you hoping for a three, it's kind of our Carnegie three-point plan for solving the conflict, should have told you at the outset we're not gonna give it to you here. That's maybe a good idea for an event next year, or later in the fall. But hopefully, as you go through this, it will temper your understanding of the possibilities of obviously the events that are happening in real time with the Quartet meeting just today. Then the second part, after kind of building on this foundation of the survey, which is roughly the first half of the report, is a set of extended commentaries from nine Palestinian thinkers and writers, in which we really asked them to engage on specific aspects of Palestinian nationalism, so including kind of alienation amongst the youth, the prospects of political reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, economic prospects, and I'm very pleased to see that one of our contributors, Dr. Asama Khanan, is with us here today. The prospects for revitalization of the PLO and et cetera. So that hopefully gives you a kind of broad sense of what we were trying to do with this report. Like very much to kind of get you, the audience into this discussion. We'd like to keep this informal and interactive. But first, let me start with Ambassador Zumlat and maybe get your perspective on this. You've asked, obviously, where two hats, both as a diplomat as well, but a background in many of the issues that we're, as an academic, kind of grappling with in this report. So what were your impressions as you read this? First of all, let's go back to the story of the false alarm. You know, I was giving a talk in London and there were like 500 people in a huge road and the sound system sometimes does strange things in the sound system, like a bomb. So at one point in time, just when I started, there was almost a bomb and everybody dived under seats. And then when they started coming after a few seconds, they saw me the only one standing and looking at him. And they said, this is the virtue of being Palestinian. All these sounds and voices are not the relevant thing. And I think there are so many sounds and voices and distractions around us. And ever since I arrived to Washington, there is a great deal of distractions about the real issues. You know, I start by thanking you, Kerry and Nathan and of course, our good friend Marwan Demashev, thanking all the contributors for the report. It's crucial that you come up with this report for the following reasons. First, what you started by saying, Kerry, the Palestinian politics side of the story is not really understood in this part of the world. And it is about time that we understand it. Something that we are a black box and something we can just press about it and everything would be resolved. Yesterday, I was following the hearing in the Senate about the Taylor Force Act and I was really pulling whatever left of my head. Many people judge us as if we are already in a post-conflict situation. Much of the mindset, even about payment to prisoners and martyrs, to the families, the mindset is a mindset of a post-conflict situation rather than still in a very undefined period of national liberation and governance. So it's crucial that you bring to the fore the issue of Palestinian politics, the various discussions back there, the polarization, the mainstream thinking, some of the even not so much mainstream but on the edges and some new voices emerging. Thank you for that. Second, thank you also for bringing the discussion now about Palestine because with all that is happening worldwide, we need to make sure that this issue remains to be firmly on the table. And thirdly, I very much love the cover. We do too. Thank you, thank you very for this. Regardless of where do we agree and where do we disagree in this very important report, content is not the most important side of the story. Number one, I really do hope that your assessment based on the selective group of 50-something individuals is a false alarm, your assessment of the erosion, of the imminent erosion of the two-state solution. It came out in the report very strikingly and clearly that much of those who you interviewed think that the two-state solution is already dead. Seriously, I hope what happened with us a few minutes ago is exactly what is going to be the situation here because if it's not a false alarm, if this assessment is the reality, I think we have so much to spare along. Because the issue here is neither about the national movement, your report is absolutely clear in terms of the Palestinian main identification is nationalism, I mean the people of Palestine. Still nationalism is the strongest stream among the Palestinian people. Therefore, the national movement with all the issues and shortcomings and misgivings actually tell the national movement remains to be, let's say, the closest representation of the Palestinian people in terms of their identification and in terms of their future. Still, there is no other alternative. And then comes the second level which is the institutional setting, the national institute, KLO and what have you. And with all the difficulties, and we have so many difficulties, we do have difficulties in reinvigorating these institutions as you rightly say in the report. But with all that, again, as you rightly indicate in the report, the majority of Palestinians remain to see the PLO to be their legitimate sole representative. And in the first, as in the movement, the national movement, I acknowledge there is so much that needs to be done by way of revitalizing the movement and re-link it to the newer generations, absolutely. And we need to learn, there are changes. Things are not as it used to be. We are no longer in the 50s and the 60s and the revolutionary era. We are not, we are in a different era altogether. We have to remodel ourselves, but the cracks of it, the heart of the national movement, the identity of the national movement, the type of the national movement, i.e. it's a secular national movement, is what the Palestinian people are about. And even if you want to recreate the scene, you will come up with the same sort of a composition. The institutions needs to renew the democratic process in it. There is a need, but that democratic process has been halted because of the internment division. We realize that nothing should come as a priority more than re-embracing the democratic process. And those who you interviewed, Perry and Nathan, are right. They don't mean that the national division is number one obstacle. No, they mean from a sequence point of view for us to get to our major task, which is ending the occupation, one major requirement is unity. And they are right there. They're absolutely right there. But then comes the third level of discussion, which is the goal in your report. And then there was a discussion about the one state versus the two states. And the report is very clear that many people you interviewed are increasingly seeing the... Some people. Some people increasingly seeing the binational state to be the alternative. And we see this at this point in time to be very dangerous. I think for those some, I'm not sure if it's out of possibility and potential and out of a vision and out of ability to attain that vision. It's mostly out of despair. Only out of the feel that actually our ability to get to the two state solution is severely constrained and it's almost becoming impossible. And despair in our situation is nothing we can embrace, actually. Number one. Number two, we have worked very hard on creating national, first national, very, very hard. Nathan knows this since 1974. There has been a real, what's the word? Clash, intra-PLO, inside the PLO to get to the point of 1988 embracing the two state solution. You know, many people in this part of the world think that the two state solution is our demand, i.e. we are demanding the two state solution. No, the two state solution was a condition or us. It was a condition, but on the Palestinian leadership. In the 60s, in the 70s, for America, the U.S. administration to engage in bilateral dialogue and for the peace process or something. But between 1974 and 1988, there were a great deal of deliberations among Palestinians about how do we do this? And then the decision was that we may want to ally ourselves with the international consensus. And I'll tell you, the national work was immense to get to the point of recognizing Israel and accepting the two states. For some of the historians here remember, the many Palestinians who lost their lives at the hand of their fellow Palestinians because of that dispute was not easy to come to a national equilibrium. To come to it in terms with foregoing 78% of what you consider to be your own. Your land was not. When it came about, there was a national equilibrium and still with us until this day, the majority and your report does bring this very clearly, the majority of Palestinians. See what you call it in the report, a variant of the two state solution to be the best way forward. Still with us. Second, there is a regional equilibrium that has been formed all over the years about the two state solution, about the 67 borders, about quitting the occupation of Arab land and about the Arab peace initiative. And that was not easy. It's an evolution until we got to the peak of it in 2002 and offered the Arab peace initiative. Some quarters are trying to blare now. Thirdly, we had a long journey in the international community to get to where we are today. Generation after generation after generation until we get only six months ago, the UN Security Council resolution condemning the occupation as a legal entity, the settlements as a legality and calling for reaffirming all previous international. And in today's world, in today's world to get an international consensus on anything, on anything, let alone an issue like Palestine is a huge asset. We want us to let go of all that and allow Netanyahu to blare the line and allow him to actually turn the de facto control and theft of the land into a de jure, theft of the land, if we call for some sort of a, that's another factor. We have to utilize our strength and then move forward. Fourthly or fifthly, I lost count. Are you sure? This is a starter in Israel. I'm not so sure if it's even a starter. If you can find five Israelis who would agree on a future over at this point in time. Or maybe you'll find five, but there are five heads of political parties I don't know. I don't think it's a starter. And in fact, those who think that there was- You're talking about binationalism. I was talking about the one binationalism. In fact, that was the PLO platform up until 1988. It was a one state democratic egalitarian for Jews, Christians, and more than that. People think the one state's offer, the one state formula is a new thing. No, it was the old thing that we had to abandon because of the Reagan pressure on us for the sake of peace. Fifthly or sixthly, I'm not so sure if the two societies are ready to merge at this point in time. There are various degrees of differences. And nonetheless, at this point in time, it would be jumping in the air because it might allow the extreme elements to actually take us into exactly where things are already going, which is a fault led department. It's a conflict by means of political, legal, or economic discrimination. So we better not to play with the goals. The problem is never with the goals. And here I know I want to just conclude the first round of the discussion. The issue with us Palestinians is about the means. About the means. In 1988, the strategic decision was that, okay, we will forego the armed resistance, though majority of our people at the time thought and considered armed resistance to be a legitimate mean of resisting military occupation. We will forego that. We will embrace the political process, negotiations, talks. And we will pay in advance the price for that talk, which is 78% of the land recognizing this. Yes, that pre-payment went to who? That pre-payment in the head of the PLO leaders was going to the White House. America was supposed to play the role of the equalizing, that asymmetry. That was the game. That was the whole issue. And America did pick the signal in 1988, immediately opened dialogue with the PLO in Tunis, as you remember Nathan. And short after we had Madrid, so America knew we were talking to America. America is the only, the American president, is the only person on the face of earth who can actually give in the whole signal. Now, do I need to tell you what happened in the last 25 years? I'll say it in one sentence. America have failed to play the role of the equalizing. And now, we are upon a new administration that is interested to play that role. We are engaged, fully engaged. The question is, if they succeed, we will be the first to celebrate. Their efforts to bring about a final agreement is something we support, we embrace, and we will lend our full attention. And we are, by the way, I'm in the White House regularly. The team of President Obama is now, as we speak, in Bama Allah and they've just concluded a meeting with our president. The engagement is ongoing. We agree with President Trump on the following. Number one, peace is possible. Number two, he can do it. We want somebody who believes that he can do it. They can do it. And thirdly, and most importantly, we agree with him that it has to be about the finance status, the real issue, not the big distraction that Netanyahu is coming up with, incitement. I arrived to Washington and all what I hear is about incitement, which I would give, it in school, which is putting Trump himself as fake. So, where I'm going here to conclude my thought, I'm going here, what if this fails? This is a question we Palestinians, and with you and the international community must ask and must answer. And the answer comes to this. There are here three levels that we need to think about Palestinians together with our friends. The first level is our national movement, and how do we reinvigorate its ideas and its connection to the future. The second level is the institutional setting. And here we have to think about how do we hold on on our one most important criteria, which is democratic process. You know, we are the last remaining secular movement in the entire region, by the way, that includes Israel. I do not think there is an Israeli secular government now with Mr. Netanyahu. We have to hold on these values and really find ways to reinvigorate it. But these are the two levels, must find that balance between, for instance, our government responsibilities and our liberation responsibilities. We have not been able to strike that balance. Because of what? Because of the peace industry. Because of the peace requirements for 26 years. Have you ever heard, have you ever heard of an occupier that demand protection by and from the victory? By and from the, or from and by the victory. And we have been doing the security. So you have the security first approach. You have the entraness, permanent entraness. We have to engage in a transitional period. You have the approach of, what else? Name some approaches of the peace processes. Outside end, right? So we have to bring peace from the region then, which means liquidate the Palestinian issue. We have the approach of culture of peace. I.e. we have to actually normalize the situation before addressing the real issues. And the list goes on and on and on. We Palestinians must find that, okay. Is it in our interest to do security coordination? It might be. And it, you know, we also need security. But we have to define it. And we must link it to our liberation system. This is the link that is upon us, we Palestinians. And we must also decouple our international work from peace processes. Said who, it's either or. Said who, it's either or. In fact, it's reinforcing. If you seek recognition of the state of Palestine, you are also seeking recognition of the state of Israel at the same time. It's the two state solution. And I know we have responsibilities to make, but there is one major responsibility on you. On you, I mean the elites and the policy world and the writers and the public opinion shapers help us because everything we attempt to do, and we are, it's not like we are still, we are not still. Only two days ago, we got a resolution from the UNESCO about Hebrew. We are not still. But help us define illegitimate, nonviolent legal means to leverage our situation and to put some sort of a cost associated with the illegality. When we go to the UN, now the Israeli government has a term for it. They call it diplomatic terrorism. Really, seriously? No, no, serious. Have you heard about it? Abou Mazen is a diplomatic terrorist, they call him. And I'm a sub-diplomatic, whatever. How can you merge diplomacy with terrorism? I have no idea. If some of us think that it's the Hague and the International Criminal Court, a place where we can build some sort of legal parity and bring an end to the illegality, it's called the nuclear option. When some international activists decide to use means to pressure the illegality and those implicated in the occupation, they use so many other terms like anti-Semitism and what that. There was an article in the New York Times the other day by Marwa Barghouti. I read some comments that this is journalistic terrorism. What is this? What are we supposed to do exactly? What means that are upon us and available for us to confront the reality? Is there anybody in this whole that doubts for a second that Netanyahu is not interested in a solution? You know, throughout the 25 years of making peace, attempting at making peace, we had two groups in Israel, the center left and the center right. The center left historically starting point was what is ours, is ours and what is yours is negotiable, the center left. And we have been head on trying to sort what is yours is negotiable. How do we do this? How do we do this? We've been trying to tell them in the 1988 offer is the maximum we could have offered and the minimum we could have accepted. Don't play with that genetic order of the Palestinian people. We have gotten to this level after a long journey. And then the center right are way more straightforward, way more straightforward, the right wing in Israel. What is mine is mine and what is yours is also mine. That's even easier to deal with. This is the reality we have been facing. And none of the success of Israeli governments have ever come to understand that short of the 67 builders, there is no sufficient political movement, national movement or institutional setting, the PLO can carry such an agreement. And now, now it's upon us and with you, with your help to really help define a mode of engaging the current situation and raising the cost of the occupation in a bloodless, peaceful, nonviolent way. All of us together. Otherwise, let's discuss until the morning, institutional settings and movements and goals. It is not the most crucial part of the story. The most crucial part of the story is how do we finally deliver an offer after being pregnant for 26 years? Ambassador, I know you're clearly very passionate. I have a few things to say on this. I would like very much to get Nathan into the discussion and maybe if I can bring it back to our report. In some ways I'm struck that the passion that the ambassador is bringing to the issues in some ways is the exact opposite conclusion that when we were conducting our field research and talking to the experts, one of the things that really struck out to me is that people were saying that many of the, and I think polling data suggests this as well, that many Palestinians and many of the people that we talked to felt that in fact, there's not a vision and one of the things we heard is a kind of lack of a coherent vision. Nathan, I wonder if you could kind of, A, comment on that and what made of these comments that we heard, but also maybe put it into a little bit of a historical perspective for us in light of the long struggle that the ambassador has talked about. Sure, I think, Harry, I think very much the ambassador. Yeah, we conducted sort of a series of discussions. We did sort of a survey of Palestinian opinion leaders. And I actually think that an awful lot of the people we talked to would have been nodding their heads at a lot of what the ambassador said in terms of diagnosis. Their prescription would be different. And I would bring that back actually to what you said sort of at the beginning, Harry, sort of the way the discussions have taken place in this town have been sort of around, sort of framed around the two-state solution or you'd often hear the phrase the solution is no and the question is how to get there. And so what we were trying to do was to say, okay, maybe the solution is no in here and maybe the question is how to get there. But what kinds of discussions are taking place among Palestinians? Let's start from just the reality as they perceive it. And I think what we heard was in the sense of questions being asked were different. The ways of answering them were different. And even their understanding of the current situation was a little bit different. Explain what I mean. The questions asked were a little bit different in the sense that a lot of what the ambassador said was sort of taken as given in terms of the existing situation. And so it wasn't necessarily what is the best goal, but sort of the assumption is the also process has failed. The two-state solution isn't going to happen at least as it was understood as being pursued, whether it's viable or not. And so the questions really had to do an awful lot more with kind of what do we do now? And the interesting thing that was I think most difficult for us to try and write about in the report was I think a different perception almost in terms of which are goals and which are means. Talk about putting it in historical perspective. The Palestinian national movement from the beginning in the early 20th century was always about statehood in some way, shape, or form. There should be a state called Palestine if the process was going to culminate in success. And I'm not sure that's true so much anymore for everybody. It's not that there's any opposition necessarily to statehood, but statehood for some people who've now seen a little bit more as a means, the means might be ending the occupation, or the goal might be ending the occupation, securing Palestinian rights. People sort of talked about it in those terms, but the idea that there was in a sense in that way of thinking the state becomes a means to an end of securing Palestinian national vision and maybe it's not the appropriate one to discuss right now. So there's a conflation or confusion kind of which are means and which are ends that I think made it a little bit difficult for us sometimes to understand and even write up some of the discussions that we heard. Which is a means of which is an end. But to me what is most striking again is the degree to which the discussions didn't always center around statehood, or which discussions about one state versus two state didn't necessarily dominate the discussions. They have them, but it wasn't necessarily the most pressing issues. The ways of answering the questions I think are a little bit different. The way that these discussions were carried out by Palestinians in the sixies and the seventies sort of tended to focus around ideology. Arab nationalism, pan-Arabism, Palestinian nationalism. What was the relationship between these two? Hamas comes on the scene in 1980s and introduces sort of an Islamic, an attempt to come up with an Islamic version of this. It's not about ideology anymore. The discussions of the 80s and 90s were about diplomacy. At this point I think what we heard an awful lot more was about discussions about the Palestinian future tended to get into issues of demography and geography and sociology. In other words, this is a long-term generational struggle. It's no longer about what to do about the next Quartet meeting, what to do about a Security Council resolution, what to do about the latest American initiative or anything like that. These are sort of tuned out. And so the way of answering questions really tended among a lot of the participants, I think, to focus on much more sort of long-term, sometimes even tectonic developments. And conditions differ. I mean, and this gets into the issue of opening the black box of Palestinian politics. I think a couple of things were clear from most of the participants that we talked to. One was that Palestinian institutions have basically lost their vitality, lost their rezondetta, lost an awful lot of their legitimacy, whatever. They're just a real weakness of institutions. And that has to do with the PLO, that has to do with the Palestinian National Authority. That even has to do with the factions of the Palestinian political party. These things have not, by any means, disappeared. They're still there very much on the scene and they're still in this very much active. But that they were not seen as a channel for Palestinian national aspirations in any effective way. And sometimes this was expressed in real anger and sometimes personalized anger. Our leaders have failed us. But even in calmer moments, and even when it wasn't personalized, there was sort of a sense that these things aren't working. They're not doing what they should be doing. And the other thing in terms of opening the black box, Perry is this idea that there is no national strategy. And if there was any kind of consensus in the room, it was that's what we really need. That's where we really have to start. We need to have some kind of viable national institution and people would talk about the PLO almost in the schizophrenic way. The PLO is no longer relevant. It's dead. And on the other hand, the PLO is all we have as a means of talking to each other and hammering out this national strategy. So it was this kind of schizophrenia about the PLO and this assumption that the existing leadership has failed, the existing institutions have failed. We have to revive them and we have to be able to come up and articulate some kind of national strategy. And let me just say one other thing about what we heard and what a phrase in the report that I want to call to people's attention. The people that we talked to tended to be more active kind of opinion leaders. They weren't necessarily, they were from multiple different generations, multiple different ideologies, affiliations and so on. But this was not a public opinion survey. This was, I'm preparing you to use a sort of more focused group of Palestinian sort of politically engaged and opinion leaders of that sort. But what they expressed in terms of their society was sort of a strong sense of alienation. Alienation certainly, for the reasons the ambassador talked about from things like the peace process, from the idea of international community leading to some kind of two-state solution. Alienation from all kind of the diplomatic and institutional struggle. But alienation in terms of Palestinian politics as well in terms of the institution. The phrase that I wanted to pull out from the report is in the contribution by Nora Arifa where she talks about the alienation of the Palestinian youth. But she says, alienation should not be confused with happening. And I remember when I first heard the phrase, I thought that sounds very, very idealistic. In other words, people think the current institutions have failed, but we can do better. We're not giving up. And perhaps there is an idealistic spin to that, but there's also a very worrying spin. If people are completely disengaged from existing processes and institutions but still determined to act, that can lead in some dangerous directions. And I think that's what we're beginning to see on the Palestinian scene. Or that is, I think, some of the feelings that we heard in the room, a generational disconnect, not simply that there's a generation of struggle, but a generational disconnect, that the generation that is becoming politically active is one that we heard some of our participants say, they've never even heard of this national history. The kind of national struggle that is kind of the formative experience for the existing generation of Palestinian leaders doesn't really, they don't really connect with it that much. And the idea of, I think, energy that is not harness to any kind of program strategy or set of institutions, is one that can lead in some potentially very worrying directions. Great, I want to do one more lightning round or at least relative lightning round and ask you kind of pick up where you left off, Nathan, two minutes for each of you. And I agree that there was this sense of apathy, which you could see apathy, but kind of energized apathy if that's an expression for it. On the other hand, I would say if there, this is not light reading, a spoiler alert, it's not a particularly uplifting report, but I would say if there is a kind of glimmer of light, it was the kind of idea that there is a kind of new generation, younger generation, kind of subnational civil society student leaders that are there, that we're approaching probably a moment of kind of generational transfer and that there is this capacity that could step up. And so I guess I would ask both of you in two minutes what is the potential for these institutions that we've been talking about, that I think we all agree that regardless of the circumstances have been kind of atrophying institutional capacity, what is the capacity of these institutions to rejuvenate themselves and kind of incorporate this new nascent generation of leaders? And that's here in the Nathan, and then we'll go straight to bring the audience into the discussion. You know, I'm considered to be the young generation still until this year, at least. And I did run the elections for the Tateh Congress, the seven Congress, oh, by the way, we just had a seven Congress for Tateh for the movement. So some of the democratic process is a year to, at least. And so I did win a seat in the Tateh Council and I came sixth at the first national meeting and everybody was discussing the generational issue. Until you one thing, out of that experience, and it was a very interesting and rich experience for me, I don't think the divide is old and young. As accused of being young, I can speak on behalf of my generation and I tell you that the previous generations and our fathers have really done their duty. Starting point for them was a humanitarian issue in terms of taking care of by one organization called Honor War. That was the starting point. Scattered, absolutely shattered after the Nakba of 1948, disfigurement of the society and the dispersement of the nation all around the region and the world. Starting the revolution they did, establishing the national movement they did, putting up together national institutions they did, affirming Palestinian national identity by political means, cultural means. It's not just Yasa Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas and the founders, but it was also Mahmoud Darwish and Edward Saeed and all that era gaining our, going through that transformation of us being a humanitarian issue at the margin of things to a political issue, forcing it on the regional and international arena, gaining international recognition worldwide is something we have to stand given the giving. The problem is in my generation. The real problem is in my generation and the younger generation. We have to find our way. We must find our way. And there are two ways. Either you get your hands dirty if I may use that, either you get in and try to part of that re-invigoration and revitalization or you actually find yourself some sort of a force that would be in the opposite direction. Much of our youth have not found their place in neither. In neither. They are neither pro nor against. And much of my generation have not found that model of engagement. So I think, and by the way, this old guard and new guard as if the new guard are way more open and less corrupted and all that you said to. In fact, in our experience, the younger generation are very dangerous. And I don't need to mention names. You know some names. They are too ambitious and vicious. And their appetite for public steel or theft is very high. Listen, I don't like this new generation or old generation. What do you? Give you two minutes, you've taken four. So I want to get the audience in. We need one lesson. One lesson. What we need to do, Palestinians, is to make sure that there is some sort of a common arena for all of us to have a smooth transition of generations and to keep some of the old but to renew some of the newer guards. Nathan, I don't know if you want to comment on this. Sure. And I think the idea of- There's a theme that came up again and again and again, at least in our discussions, for sure. Some kind of common arena, as the ambassador said, I think would be very welcome. I was actually a little bit more optimistic about this a couple of years ago. And I was optimistic about five years ago. After, in the wake of the 2011 uprising, there was this sense of energy from some Palestinian youth. And one of the issues that they focused on was ending the division. Basically trying to force the leadership into some kind of, the Hamas and Patah leadership, into some kind of national reconciliation. And they managed, actually, even to force the two into the negotiating room. But what the two sides essentially did at that point was close the doors and said, don't worry, we can now settle it. And of course they didn't. And since that point, I mean, the idea of a younger generation kind of operating outside of the structure of the factions, I think, is dissipated. So that's one reason why I'm a little less optimistic now about operating outside of the factions. The second thing that I think is actually kind of worrying is there's increasing international involvement, right? I mean, the Palestinian national movement for a long time was about the independence of Palestinian decision-making. And right now, there's always been some regional and international effort to say, we're backing this person, not that person. This person is acceptable, this person isn't. It's now ratcheting up. And you're seeing right this right now, an awful lot of this going on in Gaza right now with the idea of some kind of role from Muhammad Ahlan and, you know, even though he didn't get it. So right at being, in essence, thrust on the Palestinians by some regional actors. You see these kinds of worrying trends, which means that Palestinians are not able even to talk to each other without a very extensive outside involvement. So I see those as very worrying. Let me close at least on one kind of optimistic note. I think the institutions are extremely weak. I think they've lost all legitimacy, but they are still there. Both Fatah and Hamas have had internal elections recently. They're deeply problematic elections, but at least they still have them. The PLO, which I mentioned earlier before, is still has some kind of cachet as a name. Nobody's willing quite to give it up. So you're not dealing with a situation like Syria or Yemen or Libya where you've completely collapsed at the national level. Palestine doesn't have a state yet, but at least in comparative regional terms, it still has some kind of institutions. I don't see any process on the horizon that would be like that into them, but they're not quite dead yet. Great, you promised us an optimistic note, Nathan. Let's turn to questions. I imagine there'll be quite a few. I think what I'd like to do is take them maybe two or three at a time. We have 40 minutes for Q&A. I'm determined to get us out at five. False alarm, notwithstanding. And just reminder, we're on the record. Please identify yourself and phrase your comment in the form of a question. The first hand I saw there was the gentleman in the red and maroon shirt. My name's Dan Lieberman. I'm a writer. Yeah, we talk about two state solution and one state solution, but it seems that Israel is providing its own solution, which is a no-state. Israel has no borders. It has really a capital that is not recognized now by any nation before it was a few. It really has no written constitution and it suddenly doesn't obey UN regulations. So it seems to me that Israel is quite well satisfied with a no-state solution, that they can do what they want. So before we start resolving two state and one state, then we have to resolve the situation that propels Israel to at least make themselves into some type of recognized state. Okay, how about there in the back? We'll kind of work our way forward. Ra'id Jarar with the American Friends Service Committee. I am a Palestinian American and my organization has offices in Gaza and Jerusalem. It seems like the situation in Gaza has been deteriorating. Unprecedented way in the last few weeks, mostly because of the Palestinian division, because the PA has refused to pay the bills for a few of them. So now it's down to a couple of hours a day of electricity. So my question is about this Palestinian division. I was hoping to hear more about it in this report. I was hoping to hear more from the ambassador on ways to overcome the division. But what I heard today was more of an emphasis on a secular movement. And although I am personally a secular person, I do read that as code for no Hamas in a movement. So can you clarify that? Because it is a little alarming to me as a Palestinian American to hear this rhetoric coming from the ambassador in a vision for moving forward that does not include religious movements in Palestine. And I think that is a part of why the division is there. Okay, thank you. Let's do one more here in the front. And then we'll go to the side. Hi, I'm Donna Wells. Is there a specific city that serves as the capital of Palestine? Can you give me the name of a specific city that is considered the capital of Palestine? Thank you. Okay, so should we start there? So we heard about the kind of no-state solution, I think, capital of Palestine. And then this question of Gaza. And I will say that just to reiterate, this issue of the kind of internal Palestinian divisions was one that we heard again and again and again. And I would say it probably resonated at least as much in the conversations we had as the occupation itself. So I don't know, maybe the ambassador will start with you quickly, please. Both, and then so we can get as many as we can. I very much agree with you, sir, that the mainstream Israeli sort of, let's call them, officials, those who call the shots at the border are into the arena of no-state solution. I agree, this is the essence. And they are in that arena because unfortunately the calculation they have made or they are making is that the course of making peace is way more than the course of associated with the status quo, with the current reality. And the course associated with the current reality is very minimal, if any. And this is exactly why I started by talking about the means. Because if you go to Tel Aviv, there is a normal sense of, no sense of urgency. There is no sense of crisis. Good for them, the per capita GDP in Israel now is almost $40,000 per year per person. West Bank and Gaza, it's less than 2,600. By the way, Gaza is only 1,400 per year per person. If I can quote you some statistics, you would, is about the discrepancy. And therefore there is a profiting of the status quo of the occupation and the colonization and the use of the land and the water. The daily consumption of an Israeli citizen of water, most of it come from our coffers in the West Bank, is 300 meters per person per day. The cubic meters, or square meters square meters. Letters, sorry, meters, yes. 300, the international standard for poverty is 50 liters per person per day. The West Bank and Gaza average is 60 liters per person per day. Guess how much is the settlers' consumption in the West Bank? 360 liters per person per day. So the situation is simply comfortable. There is no, the majority of Israelis want a two-state solution. That is confirmed in every poll. But when you ask them, you want it now, why now there is no such a thing as a pressure point to have it now, we can delay it. This is the equation we need to look at. And that's exactly why I was saying, even if you bring a new national movement, 18 years old, not even, and you bring new national institutions to represent the Palestinians. And you choose a new goal, maybe the bilateral, the binational, sorry, the binational is a beautiful goal. You still have to think and come up with the right means to attain your goal. And what I was saying is that the current formula, especially the two-state solution, provide us more tools, including in the international arena and what have you to attain that goal. The second question about Gaza, I agree with you, the situation in Gaza is miserable and you are speaking to one. I am a Gaza myself and I have my family there, my relatives there. It's unbearable. It's subhuman and it is unacceptable. It is unacceptable. And let's remember first and foremost that Gaza has been under blockade since 1993. Those who think that Gaza has been under blockade only the last two years are mistaken. I can attest to this. Ever since Oslo was signed, Gaza has been carved out of the equation. I was a student at Birzai University, which is in Ramallah, in the West Bank in 1993. I was a third year in my undergraduate, when there was an Israeli decision, a military decision, that anybody who holds the Gaza ID like myself is not supposed to be in the West Bank. So I had to finish the other two years in hiding actually. So in effect, there was a system, an overall system to keep Gaza out. You know why? It's a demographic issue. Because of the gentleman's question, because for the no state solution to happen, Gaza must be carved out. For the scenario of a one state reality, whereby they can control the resources and the people in the West Bank, the two million must be carved out. Now here comes our role. We have walked straight into that trap in 2007, straight into that trap. And the division has contributed to this whole situation of a one state reality, or a no state reality. So... Mr. Master, can I ask you about the second part, though, of Riot's question? And I think the implication of which is that the Fatah leadership itself, now through the pressure of putting on Gaza, is actually contributing both to these divisions and even to the understanding situation. This is not about Fatah or Hamas. This is about the division. And I believe some of the measures that have been taken are measures tailored to shorten the life of the division. I don't think any of these measures are tailored to make the life of the people in Gaza difficult. And I understand that there is a situation that needs to be attended to. But those who are taking decision back home about this issue are no longer interested in funding the division, are no longer interested in funding the Stata School. Those who have taken a decision, think whether rightly or wrongly, this is not the discussion, they are waging a war against the division. They know that there will be pain associated with this. But the idea, like a good doctor, is that maybe if you sustain short pain for a short period of time, but severe, it's better than sustaining a milder form of pain for a long period of time. Nonetheless, the policy needs to be discussed. The well-being of the people of the Palestinians in Gaza needs to be prioritized. I agree with you, the situation. I was just reading yesterday, you and the report, that Gaza must be evacuated on mass now. It's unlivable. It's not suitable for human being. And I'm not saying this polimically. The situation in Gaza cannot sustain. And going back to what Nathan just said, things are boiling underneath all of us. But we cannot afford this trap we have been in. We cannot afford the division. We cannot engage any regional or international actors without finishing this business of division. And I'll tell you what, the status quo of division has become almost the raison d'etat, if I may use that term, the modus operandi, the modus vivendi. We can't. So at least there is an intention to resolve this, to put some pressure, whether in the political sense or even in the financial sense, to unite again. That's the basis of it. But the suffering of people you are right, people must be attended to, their hospitals, their schools, their well-being, their electricity. I agree with you. Nobody should touch that. It's a bad fight. The last question, and you know what? What do we have to provide ourself with? You asked me about secularism, as if we exclude Hamas. Let me tell you something. We believe, and I do not represent Fatih here. I represent the Palestinian people. We believe that Hamas is an integral part of the Palestinian people. They are an integral part of our national fabric. And this is not an important movement. And this is exactly why the best way to do so is to include this movement within the Palestinian national arena all together. And that's why the discussion, as we speak, is in what terms? And it's Hamas that has to come closer to its nation, not its nation go closer to Hamas. And the majority of your nation is like you. Secular, not in the religious sense, my friends. Since secular in the political sense. Yes, we want total separation between the state and the religion. Absolutely. And Hamas must accept this. This is something we pride ourselves with. We will not allow for any mixing between religion and the state. And yes, I say it out loudly here, that we pride ourselves as a nation of being diverse and tolerant. For years, for decades, for millennia, we have left together as Jews, Christians, and Muslims. The Church of Nativity has been sitting there in Bethlehem worshiped and embraced by Muslims as much as by Christians for hundreds of years. Have you ever heard one incident? The keys of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre is with a Muslim family in Jerusalem, right? You know that, because you are from Jerusalem, Mr. Khanat. You know that it's the Nusebi family. They open the Church of the Holy Sepulchre every morning and they close it every. This is the society. This is the nation. And Hamas must come to this nation, to this national camp, to this show. We will not retail ourself to the tunes of Hamas. And we will engage them and continue to engage them so they come to the national camp with the commitments we have. We are an entity that have committed to the region and to the international community. And we are committed to international law. And we are committed to international legitimacy. No way we can accept a different arrangement. The last point about the capital of Palestine is unfortunately under occupation, military occupation. That is East Jerusalem. And according to international law, including the US policy, by the way, East Jerusalem is not recognized to be under the Israeli sovereignty. So East Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine, but we do not exercise sovereignty or control of our occupied capital. Nathan, do you want to jump in? Yeah. Quickly, so we can get. Sure, sure. Let me just respond briefly to three questions. The first one is about Israel. I would think that most of what you said would be axiomatic, except as axiomatic, you put a question mark at the end. They would be period of the end of most Palestinian political discussion. This is just how Israel is. I'm not necessarily, this is not my view necessarily, but this is the way that Palestine, this is a starting point for Palestinian discussion. We talk about the lack of taking Palestinian leadership. I don't think that there was anybody that we talked to who was saying, oh, you know, there's these Israeli leaders who would be different, or if the next Israeli election results in this kind of labor party doing better or this sort of thing. That's just not how the discussion takes place. The other two questions I'm going to actually, about the division and about the capital, I'm actually going to try to combine a little bit. Yeah, the division is just very, very big for a Palestinian population that clings very much to this idea of national identity. The fact of the division just leads very, very heavily in discussions in terms of what is the capital of Palestine. Yes, there are three answers to that question. The capital in terms of the consensus of the national movement is Jerusalem. The capital in the administrative sense for the West Bank is Ramallah. That is to say, Palestinian national authority institutions are headquartered in Ramallah. In Gaza, you've got a completely different set that don't acknowledge Ramallah. So you've got, in a sense, three capitals, one which doesn't serve as a capital, the other two of which are administrative capitals that don't really talk to each other. The division, I want to say, also goes a little bit deeper than that. But it's not just a division between Fatah and Hamas al-Masr. That's the one that gets most of the discussion. But Jerusalem itself is one which, until really the Second Intifada, there were Palestinian national institutions, Orient House, cultural institutions that were headquartered in Jerusalem. They disappeared. And Jerusalem is, in a sense, cut off not as severely as Gaza, but it is cut off. What about Palestinian citizens of Israel? This was actually a big part of our discussions. To what extent are they part of the national community? To what extent is a new political movement for Palestinian citizens of Israel? To what extent is it part of the Palestinian national movement? What is the relationship with the Palestinian national movement? The PLO is the slogan, it's a soul of the Palestinian people. That includes the diaspora. The Oslo process concentrated leadership in the West Bank in Gaza. What is the relationship? What is the division between Palestinians in the West Bank in Gaza and those in the diaspora? These are questions that don't necessarily focus attention so much on day-to-day political struggle between Wembley and Gaza and so on. But I think they weigh very much in the background of discussions about the way in which institutions don't unite Palestinian society and politics and in ways in which many of these divisions are getting worse. I could add one kind of observation from our discussions that we had as part of this. As Nathan said, we brought together kind of different components of the broader Palestinian nation. And one of the most interesting things in my mind were the discussions between Palestinians in Israel or Israeli Arabs and folks from Gaza and West Bank. And since actually that the Palestinians in Israel, actually their politics have become quite fertile and kind of what is the longer term implication of that for broader Palestinian politics in terms of this national rejuvenation that we're talking about. And I don't know that we heard any answers, but it certainly I think is a factor to watch going forward. Okay, let's do this side of the room. Lots of hands are up. Let's start with maybe I saw Mitchell earlier there. And maybe we'll take maybe four or five questions. We've got 20 minutes or so left and see how far we can get. Mitchell Plotnik, the moment independent journalist. So, Sam, you mentioned the work that the Palestinian Authority right now is trying to do with the Trump administration. So my question sort of focuses on where the Trump administration itself is actually going in regards to Palestine. You have an administration now that they're essentially waging war in the UN. You have an ambassador to the US ambassador to the UN who openly states that she will oppose with everything she has, any nominee for anything at the United Nations who is Palestinian, just by virtue of that person being Palestinian. You have the US's hysterical reaction last week to UNESCO. And when Israel responds to the UNESCO resolution by saying, well, we're going to build even more settlements here, now the Trump administration is silent. That doesn't seem to bode very well for either for working with the Trump administration, but also it seems like it's going to be even harder for Palestine to work through international institutions now. So I'm kind of wondering what the PA's thinking is there and on the global scale, is there any strategy, national strategy that includes what's happening with the BDS movement? Okay, let's start with the lady in the back and we'll move forward. Thank you. I'm Diane Perlman, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason. Well, anyway, speaking of the nuclear option, I just got back from three weeks at the UN for a nuclear ban treaty which passed on Friday, which was a great celebration, and the Palestinian delegate, if I'm correct, I think it was the first treaty that Palestinian Palestine delegate voted on, and he was very, very proud of that and he was also very, they were very impressive. So I guess two questions. Was that well reported in the newspapers and was it a source of pride? It was not here, and also it was boycotted by all the nuclear weapons states in Israel, of course. And also I have the impression, like when Abbas first went to the UN for recognition and Netanyahu and many Israelis were very negative about it. It seemed to me that it's in Israel's interest to have the Palestinians have a sense of pride and joy and for Abbas to be a stronger leader in their eyes and a stronger leader to negotiate with, first they're not thinking on that level, but something I thought about, I just would like your opinion on that. Okay, this is too sophisticated for them. My name is Marcus Montgomery, I'm with the Arab Center. Mr. Brown, you mentioned that there's kind of a combination of alienation and political energy in the youth in Palestine and that it could lead, if unharnessed it could lead to worse outcomes. I was just wondering if you could unpack that a little bit. Does that just mean more fracturing or does that inherently mean violence? Let's do up here in the, Miriam, here. Erin McAd. I have a question based on Tuesday State Department press briefing. They were discussing how Ambassador Friedman had met with Palestinian officials and that was a break of a taboo for multiple different administrations. U.S. Ambassador to Israel doesn't be with Palestinian officials. And the State Department spokeswoman had there, I think she was a former Fox News anchor. She said that Palestinians appreciated this and they welcomed this. That was an odd remark because she was speaking on behalf of Palestinian. So I wanted to give you the opportunity to say as a Palestinian representative, you appreciate meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Israel Friedman in general and him specifically. This part of the book is part of the report that revitalizing Palestine. Page 27, you'll find it. Okay, maybe we'll start with Nathan first. That's a relief. Okay. The question addressed to you. In a sense, you know, alienation, where does this take us? I think this is the question. I'm not sure. Armageddon. Armageddon. Armageddon, maybe step by step. Yeah, at least conceivably a step in that direction. I don't think, I mean, I think that some of the people who talk that way talk with some measure of kind of excitement. They want to see some kind of political energy. They don't trust the old institution. So this is, in that sense, kind of a positive development. And you'll hear people who are associated, say, with something like the BDS movement, talk about how they've managed to keep it out of factional control and so on. There isn't necessarily any embrace of violence. I don't think we heard very many people who said we're anxious to go back to the Second Department, to an uprising, or we have to revive the armed struggle. I don't think that there was much of an appetite for violence, not necessarily because people were squeamish and passionate, but because they just saw that as ineffective and armed struggle was, in a sense, the slogan of the National Leadership Act, when it founded the National Movement, or these national institutions, and it's kind of failed. Militarization of the Second Department didn't work very well, so it just doesn't work. So it's not necessarily an embrace of violence. That said, I think what happens is that a national movement that is expressing itself in sort of a very strong consensus, the status quo is unacceptable, but offers no channels, it has no organizational discipline, can very often result in violence. There seemed to be some movement in that direction a year ago, and there was talk in Palestinian society about an upsurge in, I mean, what is really called lone wolf attacks, the Palestinians called the Habba, but some kind of inchoate, but still disorganized wave of violence from sometimes very, very young Palestinians completely outside of the factions. That way seems to have dissipated for now. So that's a very, very long way of saying, I don't know, but there are some, in a sense, organized and peaceful ways organized in violent ways, disorganized in violent ways, all of those seem to be possible. And if I could just add to that, we did have very, very few, I think it was only two of our kind of thinkers, quote, unquote, directly advocated violence, but they were both student leaders. And so, which I think basically tracks, if you look at Khalil Shikaki's kind of polling, I mean, it kind of consistently finds that the kind of segment, perhaps not surprisingly, both because of the age, but also because of their experiences, most prone to support violence is the young, which does, I think, as we've heard here today, creates some worrisome signs, potentially, if the situation stays it is. Ambassador, maybe I'll let you have the last word here before we adjourn. The questions were basically, in a sense, a lot of it kind of is what's happening here internationally. The Trump administration, both their approach, as well as more specific variation of that is Ambassador Friedman, who's a parent overture to Palestinians, but then also Palestinian participation in the Test Ban Treaty debate. The ban, sorry, thank you, yeah, thank you. I'm clearly not part of the non-proliferation program here at Carnegie Hall. Yeah, the first question was about Niki Haley. Never Niki Haley thinks or does, that's up to her, but there is something called international law, there's something, something also called US long-held policy. Now, I think she is way on her own about all that she does and all that she says. On her own. A one-woman crusade on the Palestinians. She sent a letter, officially, you can code that, by the way. We're on the record, so either way. Yeah, yeah, she sent a letter to the UNESCO just when we were seeking a resolution that lists Abrahamic Mosque and what they call it, the Patriarchs, through Patriarchs as a Palestinian heritage that should be protected by the international community. And her letter was very aggressive and very strong. The resolution passed. Working with the international system, the international law, with our logic, seeking international and applying international law is something that is within our right and we do. They at fault, by the way, not paid us when I use that term. And I hope that instead of the rest of the world, the six billion people around the world, go the Niki Haley way. I hope Niki Haley, going to be sooner or later, coming to the six billion people, where the six billion have formed their international system and international. That's what her motivation is, which does not seem to be professional or related to her post. It's, hey, she's thinking way beyond her post, most likely. How is that? You like that, don't you? Okay. Question about, of course, we would join a ban treaty for the nuclear. We are the ones who suffer the most from militarization to start with, let alone a lethal mass destruction weapon. So we're proud and we're happy and we're delighted that we'll continue pushing for a ban on such weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons worldwide. That's our position. And in fact, that's why we always seek, not even, we don't even seek a military when we establish our own. We think, you know, the best defense for one's own is neighborly relations. And I tell how much, how much weapons you have. This is not going to be by your defendant. Israel has so, you know, has 260 warheads of nuclear heads. Israel has the fourth strongest air force army in the world, actually. And, you know, this does not bring security. Walls do not bring security. What brings security is normalizing your existence and hating to yourself, to your neighbors and to the region you live in. Zeroing any crisis and any issue, conflicts. Addressing political issues rather than just, we are wholeheartedly with that agreement and with the universal agreement on banning such silly weapons. The last question about Mr. Friedman. But it also ties in, I think, with the question of kind of faith in the Trump administration's approach. The first question was really, you know, yes, about Ambassador Haley, but also in terms of a broader sense of confidence in the process of being in the meeting. No, no, I understand. But I think that part of the question included a kind of, you know, what's your assessment of the broader approach? The U.N. has one voice. And the U.N. has 194 voices. No, no, but putting aside the U.N. and Ambassador Haley, what about, you know, the envoy is in, as you said, meeting with your president today. What's your sense of, is there real prospect for success? I mean, many experts, I think, some of us on the stage included look at the situation and say, look, given the statements of both the leaders on both sides, the divisions we're talking about, it's hard to see a kind of pathway to six meaningful negotiations, let alone progress on the ground. President Trump has stated publicly and privately his interest, poker, a fine and peace deal. Fighted our president to the White House and it was a very positive, constructive meeting. Good chemistry between the two leaders. First, sort of a patient-based relationship. And, you know, the president of the United States of America declaring early on in office that he wants to intervene and bring about a final status issue is something that we support. As simple as straightforward as that, we do want to discuss the final issue. We do want to discuss borders and Jerusalem and settlements and refugees and our natural resources that are being stored on a daily basis. We don't want to discuss distractions of the budget. So we are with him in that. Yet, that declaration of intent is yet to be supported by a plan we still engage in. Today, just this afternoon, there was a meeting with our president in Ramallah. The engagement is happening. As of today, we haven't heard yet. My expectation personally is that the American side, the Trump administration is interested in a final deal what President Trump describes as the ultimate deal. He thinks he can do it. He thinks it's possible. He thinks, oh, he has sufficient will to do it. I think we're gonna run into issues if they haven't run into that issue already. Netanyahu's huge retaining wall rejection of any discussion of the final issues. If they encounter that rejection, maybe they have already, then the question comes what they are going to do about. That's what we are at right now. But we support this effort. It's the right effort. It's the right approach to focus on the final issues as opposed to all these peace processes and in-out and security and all that. It's good to focus on the, and in a short period of time, and we have a strong American president who wants to be the arbitrator. All that is good. Friedman comes in this because it was the choice of President Trump. Not our choice. We don't decide who's the American team to negotiate with us. The only thing we made sure of is that of the ambassadorship between the two. The one who represents America and Palestine is the consul general and Jerusalem. So the one who attends meeting with our president is the consul general, and that's what happened. But the meeting you are referring to happened in West Jerusalem. It did not happen even anywhere inside the 67 borders. We will make sure for the sake of the US and for the sake of the protocol and the long held arrangements that that line is not mixed. Had Mr. Friedman been an advisor to President Trump, we would welcome him in Ramallah. But he happened to be the ambassador to Israel, and this is the issue. The issue is we have an ambassador of America to Palestine, regardless of what they call him, consul general. The issue is that of protocol, purely. So we hope that he's gonna be what President Trump expects, a good addition to the negotiation team, and we'll push the peace efforts forward. Well, we obviously got a little bit of field from our report. But in some sense, I think that's the point. That really is the point of this, is obviously these discussions are happening daily. But hopefully we've shed some light in terms of this black box of Palestinian nationalism. So please, thank you for coming. Why don't you join me in welcoming our guests.