 Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to CSIS. I'm Ernie Bauer. I'm the senior advisor and director of the Southeast Asia program. And for today's purposes, I am the convener and director of the U.S. ASEAN Strategy Commission, which has done its work over the course of the last year. The commission is co-chaired by Mr. Maurice Hank Greenberg and Secretary William Cohen. And we have several representatives of the commission here to my immediate right, George David, Carla Hills, and on the far right, Mr. Roderick Hills. So I'd like to thank all of them for their hard work and the other members of the commission. Over the course of the past year, the commission has met four times. It has taken two major trips to Southeast Asia, met with the heads of state, business leaders, senior officials, civil society, the media. In the United States, we've convened meetings with all those groups and others. We work very closely with the administration and Congress, as well as with the ASEAN ambassadors to try to pull together a set of recommendations that would provide the pillars of a foundation or the pillars that would make a foundation for a long-term American strategy for Southeast Asia. I think we're there. We have recommendations that are, we're rolling out today. And the chairman, the co-chairman will make a brief statement about our work. And then I will open the floor to questions and observations from the other chairs, from the other commissioners, and they'll answer your questions and take your comments. So Mr. Greenberg, if I can, I'll hand it over to you, please. Thank you, Ernie. Good afternoon. As Ernie Bowers said, the commission made several trips to the ASEAN region and met with the leaders and business community and others. The U.S. has been engaged in the ASEAN region for many, many years. We're no strangers to the region. American business has been in the region for many, for a long time, and has built significant businesses and trade relations in the ASEAN countries. What has disturbed us is that in recent years has been sort of a decline in American business activities in the region. And one of the purposes of this commission is to determine why that is so and what we can do to re-establish our presence in a bigger way, not that we have no presence now. We do and it's very significant. But what more can we do to enhance that? And there are many recommendations that I'll discuss that was in a moment. And Secretary Cohen will discuss the military aspects of that. The ASEAN's want us in the region, no question about that. Every country that we have visited is more engaged in the region, not less so. And we want to be more engaged in the region. There are a number of things that we should be doing. Certainly, we want to have more students, for example, from the region, visit and study in the United States. To do that, we have to get the visa issues under control so that it's easier to get a visa. We want to have a trade mission to the ASEAN region that would go a long ways if it's led by the President of the United States or a very senior official. It would make a big difference. It would show our commitment to the ASEAN that was serious about this. It would not be something that we just talk about but never follow up on and do. So that's critical that we do something like that. So there is a strong desire for us to grow more in the region. We have talked about for years a U.S.-ASEAN free trade agreement. Other countries have trade agreements with the ASEAN countries. We don't. We need an ASEAN free trade agreement. Now, we recognize starting to try to get one done today would be impossible. But that doesn't mean we shouldn't start on that long journey to get one done. We should. It would be a nice signal also to the ASEANs that were serious about increasing our trade relations with them. So these are some of the things that would be useful. It's no secret that other countries are doing more with the ASEANs currently than we are. China is a very big trading partner of the ASEANs. They have a free trade agreement. It's been in place now for about 12 years. So there is need for us to increase our presence, increase our business activities, increase the flow of students back and forth, and increase visa opportunities that would bring more people to this country and us to them. So those are some of the things that would be very useful. Now, I'm going to turn it over to Secretary Cohen who will talk some other aspects. Just a few words to add to Hank Greenberg who has been a real leader over the years, many years throughout the Asia-Pacific region. I would say it's almost a 3R proposal to reestablish leadership in the ASEAN area, countries, to reassure the ASEAN countries that we intend to remain in an Asian-Pacific power as such and that we intend to re-engage them in a major way across the spectrum from trade, education, culture, and sports, among others. They are looking now at our domestic situation, wondering whether we have either the wallet or the will, the coin President Bush 41, do we have the wallet or the will to remain engaged at a time when we know that China certainly is growing in both size and influence on the trade issue and eventually in the military issue as well. So what is the United States, what role do we see for ourselves and are we going to turn inward, are we going to pull back, are we going to say let the Asia region take care of Asia. So this is something that's going on that we have to be very forthright to deal with to say no, no. We've got commitments that are made by Secretary Bob Gates before he left. He gave a very important speech in Singapore. We have the same message being carried by Secretary Panetta. We have the same message by Secretary of State Clinton and President Obama to be sure. So there is no difference in terms of what the policy objectives are. The question is how we're going to remain committed. This particular group, Task Force as such has put forth some recommendations which we think are critical. Some of them are already being implemented by the administration. So we're not pushing against, we're pushing against an open door at this particular point, but we want to go further. We want to be more aggressive about it. We want to do this in a way that is consistent with the interests of the ASEAN nations to know that we're doing this on a trade basis, economic basis, not to in any way jeopardize their relationship with China or to cause undue friction with China, but to say that this is important for the region, for their security, for their economic security and for prosperity. So we intend to remain engaged in that sharing of that prosperity by encouraging our own companies to invest, by encouraging our own government to open up its trade policies. And on the military side, we stress international military education programs, training programs, IMIT. We want to have more exercises with the ASEAN countries, military exercises on a bilateral and multilateral basis. We want to engage in more humanitarian type exercises because we know the value of what that means. When you can see our respective militaries cooperating to help bring relief to areas that have been damaged by natural causes, by tsunamis or typhoons or any other type of natural disaster, very important that the military being usually the only institutions in any country that has the training and the logistics and the capability of delivering humanitarian assistance at a time of need. So we need to do all of these things. And this particular set of recommendations is a good first step. We hope there'll be more that will follow. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me invite the other commissioners to comment if they like at this time. I would only underscore what our two variable co-chairs have said. One of the missions of this report is to heighten public awareness of how important the ASEAN region is. 15 years ago, Asia was not 50% of the global GDP. Today it is an ASEAN's very significant segment of Asia. ASEAN has trade agreements with the three, Japan, China, and Korea. We don't say for our recent adoption of the Korean pre-trade agreement. And so relatively speaking, yes, our investment in ASEAN is very, very substantial, larger than in our investment in China. But relatively speaking, we are losing our place in the world. That is, others are overtaking us. And with the significance of Asia and with our need to create jobs and more opportunity, we want those markets open to us. So we believe that a free trade agreement, if it has to be conducted with ASEAN in stages, because of the different levels of development of the components of ASEAN, the ASEAN 10, so be it. We could start with three, four, five or six, keep it open and keep going. But I think that the economic and military comments that have been made really summarize some of the things that ought to command the attention, both the American people and our elected representatives. Much of what we have done and what we hope you all will do is convince this world, our country, our people and our Congress that ASEAN is an important place, 600 million people. We were the number one trading partner of ASEAN for a very long time. Now we're number four. We're losing a political position and we're losing a business position critical to our country. And they know that. They want us there, but they're not sure we're coming. And so part of what we've done is to say, as Secretary Cohen said, reestablish the leadership that we had for so many years in that part of the world. Comments made previously by our co-chairs and other commissioners. Several of us had the privilege 15 years ago of being on a CEO trade mission to the ASEAN nations. The notable fact is that was 15 years ago and there hasn't been one since. That's a long period of absence in that intervening time period. The ASEAN GDP has traveled up to pushing $2 trillion right now. 15 years ago there was one FTA with one ASEAN nation, which was Singapore. And today there is one FTA with one ASEAN nation, which is still Singapore. We have all this talk about a US ASEAN FTA. And then we say we can't do that because we have different stages of development and we have the issues with Myanmar and things like that. And yet the fact is we only have one FTA with one ASEAN nation, which is Singapore. And there's nothing to stop us from doing two, three, four. And it need not even be for ASEAN or even a portion of ASEAN, it could simply be with an ASEAN country. I think we've heard from ambassadors to the United States from the ASEAN nations. They enthusiastically want US participation. You heard the comment earlier and I'll repeat it that China has gone from non-existent in Asia and ASEAN rather 15 years ago to today and the largest trading partner by a margin. We are simply losing position and we lose position, I believe speaking as one commissioner, through inattention and neglect. And we need to raise the priority and understand and recognize that this is a critically important nation or group of nations. It's after all it's a little less than 10% of the world's population. A lesser percentage of the world's GDP, clearly growing, clearly prospering, clearly an important anchor in the Asian theater. And it needs our attention and the commission's report is it's bottom line and strongly held conclusion is we need to do a lot more and what's happened in the past is not at the standard that we need to expect in the future. Thank you very much, commissioners. Let me now open the floor to comments and questions that might have. I'll start with the gentleman here in the blue shirt. Could you please identify yourself? Sure, David Lynch with Bloomberg News. David Lynch with Bloomberg News. I'd be interested apart from the inattention and neglect comment Mr. David made, how the panelists explain the fact that we find ourselves in this position today, how did this come about? And second, with the administration talking about a pivot back to Asia, what are your expectations for the President's upcoming trip to APEC and the East Asia Summit? Well, you have to understand that the US business was the largest in South, in the ASEAN countries for many years. When China opened up, there was a divergence at that point. American companies began to invest in China because of the new opportunities. That's no excuse, obviously long term, for us to neglect the ASEAN region. And so I do think that paying more attention to it and bringing it to the fore will be somewhat helpful. We're still, if you add the investment we have in China and India together, it's still less than the American investment in the ASEAN countries. But the ASEAN countries are growing, I've been pointed out. And there's need for far more attention by US companies to the ASEAN region than has taken place in the last number of years. So that is critical. As far as the President's visit, well, we've urged it to be a trade mission that the President takes to the region. There's nothing more important to the ASEAN leaders to see how serious we are about trade by having CEOs of major companies on the mission. That would get attention. It happened before, I think, as pointed out about 15 years ago. There was a mission taken by the President with business leaders. And it had a profound effect. And so I do think that that's at least one thing we can do. But there is, there is attention now being paid to the region. And I think that will have positive effects. I can add just a couple of comments about that. Part of the neglect has come about that we have been focused on two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, for the past more than 10 years. And so with the focus on what we've been doing there, I think that accounts for some of the neglect in terms of from a policy point of view that the administrations have been consumed with those two countries. Secondly, there has been a great deal of activity in part of the business community to make sure that they got in the front door in dealing with China 15 years ago. And so the focus was on building opportunity in the Chinese economy, which has been largely achieved, at least to the satisfaction of the Chinese, which are now taking measures to at least reduce some of that attractiveness. But that's another reason why there's been a shift in focus, saying there are other big players in the Pacific and we haven't paid enough attention to them. And that combined, they are bigger than our investment and either our trade either with China or India combined. So there's both a need and a desire on the part of the administration and we should be on the part of the Congress and the American people to refocus and quote, rebalance. Thank you. I have Chris Nelson here in the front room. Thanks very much, Ernie. Great study. Thank you guys so much for doing a combination trade and Paul Mill. Bless you. Usually those things get separated and it's entirely different communities discussing them and you wonder, do we live in the same universe? So thank you for putting it in the same universe. It's how I've been living, thank God. It's sort of a two-parter if you'll indulge me. The first one is, how do you see the TPP situation fitting into this notion of an ASEAN FTA? Can you fold it in? Is it a subsidiary or is it going to make it not so necessary? First question, second part, and this is part of Secretary Cohen. You saw last week our good friend Clyde Prestwitz had an op-ed basically saying, hey, let the Asians defend themselves. We got business here at home. Let's bring everything back and focus on what we need to do here. I'm going to take a wild guess that you probably don't think that's a good idea. But how do you discuss in the report? What do you see as the continued role of a forward American presence? How strong should that be? How important is that as part of what you're talking about reassuring the Asians that we're serious we are going to be here? Thanks very much. Thanks, Chris. Let me ask Carla to handle the first one if she would. And Secretary Cohen obviously should take the second. Well, the president talks about creating jobs. And our private sector is over leveraged. Our government is over leveraged. We have 5% of the world's population. And we create roughly 20% of its goods. Now we need markets. And I think your first question was, in effect, how do we do the TPP and move forward on ASEAN? Well, I say we can walk and chew gum at the same time. We finish the Uruguay round and negotiated the NAFTA. And both were very beneficial to US business, US workers, and US economy. And we have to have an outgoing philosophy today if we're going to raise our economic performance. When we say that we were number one in ASEAN a decade ago, and now we're number four, we're losing position, notwithstanding our investment in ASEAN is larger than our investment in China and India combined. That no longer holds. The totals don't matter. We've got to look at our relative position in the world and our very great need at home. And our need at home is to create economic activity for our people. And trade and opening markets is one way to do it. We can have the best businesses small and large in the world. But if their products sell for 10, 20, or 30% more than our competition, we don't sell as many products. And we see that we're losing market share because trade agreements are proliferating by others, but not by the United States. I was curious about the suggestion this time for the Asians to take care of Asia. That is a position that was taken by the Chinese about 12 years ago. In fact, I went over to lecture to the Chinese Academy of Sciences all their young military officers coming up when there were a lot of white papers being produced by the Chinese saying time for the United States to get out of the Asia Pacific region, time for the Asians to take care of Asia. And I pointed out to them at that time and I pointed out again today that would be the worst possible thing for the Chinese and for us. Because if we were to leave, so to speak, or ignore or remain indifferent to the Asia Pacific region, not only ASEAN, but Japan and China and also India, we would come back home and take care of America in that sense, then there's a vacuum. Nature abhors a vacuum. Who fills the vacuum? Chinese going to fill it? Are they going to fill it without some contest or concern by the Japanese? Are the Indians going to sit on the sideline? You would have substantial instability in that region. And with instability comes loss of prosperity because we like to say that capital is a coward. It takes flight whenever there's instability. So if you want to let Asians take care of Asia, you would see a great deal of instability in a region where you're going to see the most prosperity and you would see a general decline in that. Come back to the United States, the fundamental principle is you cannot have a strong, secure country without a strong and secure economy. Our economy's in trouble. So yes, there's pressure to say let's focus on the United States. Let's let everybody else take care of themselves. And we'll just rebuild. We'll have some nation building here at home. The problem is you can't have security out of a strong economy, but you can't have a strong economy without having a strong trade policy or engagement policy. And so the two are linked together inextricably. And we have to make that public policy very clear to the American people. We have to have a trade policy and engage actively in trading and selling our products and selling our services and selling our intellectual property to other countries. Otherwise, we'll continue to be on a very steep downward slide. Thank you very much. I think Tom Rekford, please. I'm Tom Rekford with the World Affairs Council and the Malaysia America Society. I'm so glad, Secretary Cohen, that you mentioned our military ties and the humanitarian aid, because we've done so much over the years that the publics in the ASEAN countries don't know about on the military side with joint training on the intelligence side, which of course has to be kept secret. But I wonder if you could expand on the humanitarian side, because I remember how grateful the Indonesians were when we came through with aid after the tsunami that no other country could do. And a lot of Indonesians thought, oh, once the Americans come to Aceh, they'll never leave. And when we left, they realized that we were really just there to help them. How can we leverage our abilities in the humanitarian area even more than we have up to now? Basically, just point out the successes. Think about it domestically. What happened during Katrina? What happened during Katrina is we saw some hesitancy during the first day or two when that struck us. It was not until the military became actively engaged and started to organize the effort, the humanitarian rescue effort, suddenly things started to happen. And I think that is true wherever we go or wherever we partner up with other countries. When we are able to train with the Indian Navy or the Malaysian Navy or the Singaporean Navy or name the country whenever we can train together and prepare for these kinds of contingencies, then people will see the benefit of having a strong mill to mill relationship. It doesn't have to translate into planes on the ground or tanks on the ground, but rather saying, here are the superior trained officers and enlisted people who are dedicated to protecting one's security. Well, when we protect our security, we're protected against adverse forces, enemy forces. Mother nature can turn into an enemy. And we see that. What's a weapon of mass destruction? We've seen weapons of mass destruction, but mother nature has weapons of mass destruction. So by training for these, they are one in the same. You need the same kind of consequence management for Katrina that you need for a military operation. How do you get water? How do you get recovery into an area? How do you get medicines? How do you get transportation? How do you set up relief for people? That's all part of military training. It all goes into humanitarian rescue mission. So I think the more the people can see this, there'll be more inclined to support it. In the second poll, I'm Larry Nicks from CSIS. Let me address this question to Secretary Cullen, because I know- You're speaking to a trustee now, so be careful. Because I know as Secretary of Defense, I believe you dealt with either the issue directly or a similar issue in the late 1990s. South China Sea has been a source of increased tensions in the last two years, and has drawn more U.S. attention to statements and speeches by Secretary Clinton, for example. Recently, Senator Webb has called on the State Department to study and to issue a clarification of the relationship between the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty and the disputed area in the Spratly Chain, disputed between China and the Philippines. Now, when I read, and actually I first read it in Chris Nelson's report, that Secretary Webb had done this. The first thing I thought about was Dean Atchison's controversial speech in January 1950 defining the U.S. defense perimeter in the Western Pacific, leaving out South Korea from that defense perimeter. Do you think there is a need now or in the near future for this kind of clarification of the relationship between the defense treaty and these disputed islands or are arguments for ambivalence? No, ambiguity. Perhaps better at least at this time. Well, you're right. I did have to confront this issue back in the late 90s, and I came down on the side of keeping it deliberately ambiguous that once drawing a line, you then have to stand behind that line. Interesting question, because I watched a debate that took place in July up in Toronto between Dr. Kissinger, who was linked up with Fareed Zakaria, and they were on one side debating against Neil Ferguson and David Lee from Tsinghua University on the other. I raised a question from the audience, and I asked Fareed Zakaria, because in his book he said, we have to draw some lines with China, but you can't draw them everywhere. So I said, is this one of the lines in the South China Sea that should be drawn? This obviously provoked something of an energetic response from Dr. Kissinger in terms of drawing lines, but essentially the Chinese position was, as articulated by David Lee, I said, before you start drawing any lines, you better get your financial house in order, which in essence raised another issue in terms of what the Chinese feel about the United States now and how that all plays into the geopolitical stratagems that they're following. And that, namely, there is some sentiment that perhaps the United States is not as strong as it once was, or will be in the future, and China will be stronger, and therefore we're not in a position to be drawing lines or indicating what we will do in response to any kind of provocation. I think what we have to do is to maintain a very substantial presence as such, it doesn't mean on the ground presence, but in terms of having a presence throughout the Asia-Pacific region, having relationships with all of the ASEAN countries, having it with Australia, with Japan, with India, and with China, by the way, to make sure that we send the right kind of signal that we understand that China is going to continue to grow in military power, they're gonna continue to challenge the United States and others in terms of that military power, in terms of what their jurisdictional claims are, but they must do so in a way that's consistent with international norms. And by reinforcing these relationships, be it the Philippines with Vietnam, with Malaysia, with Indonesia, with Singapore, et cetera, we are in essence saying there's a way to resolve these issues without resorting to force or without the United States declaring this is a red line, you cross it, and then what? We have war or conflict. Now there's a better way to handle this diplomatically by also showing that we are engaged with there, that we intend to remain powerful militarily, but we intend to pursue diplomatic resolutions of these kinds of disputes rather than drawing red lines. Thank you. My question is to the Secretary Cohen. We know personal Obama's visit to- Who are you? Oh, I'm Ching-Yi Chen with Phoenix TV, Hong Kong. We know a person, Obama's trip to Asia, when he might announce the more military presence in Australia when he visits Australia. I'm sorry, I can't quite hear you. He might announce there will be more US military presence in Australia, and also he might touch the issue of South China Sea when he meets with the ASEAN leaders. So do you think this might cause more friction with Chinese military? It might, but that's something that we should expect, anticipate to say, look, what's important to us is that the South China Sea not be declared the exclusive zone of any one country, that it be free and open, there be no denial of access for any country in those waters, and that for China to declare that it's all theirs, and that they, and for the United States to stay out of any consideration diplomatic or otherwise I think it's really unrealistic on China's part. So I think we have to, I think Secretary Clinton has laid it out very clearly. I'm sure that that was cleared with President Obama, who that's his policy that she's articulating, that we intend to have stronger relations with the Australians. They've been with us at every major conflict that we've had, they will continue to be with us, and so we're gonna reinforce that relationship. But I'd like to see Australia have a stronger relationship with China. I think that's in our interest. I think it's in the interest of ASEAN to continue to have more trade with China, and the message for me, or India having better relations with China, and Japan having, I was just in Japan urging more closer relations with China. I think that's the message you wanna send, that no one's trying to contain China, it cannot be contained. But what we can do is promote a peaceful relationship all the way around. And so that's the goal, and for us to have a strong relationship with Australia, that's good. I want more facilities there. The same with the ASEAN countries, not to have facilities, but to have training. I would invite the Chinese to participate in multilateral training operations, rescue missions, humanitarian. I have advocated that when I was Secretary of Defense. I said, let's have some tabletop exercises. Let's talk about how we could have humanitarian types of missions. It hasn't been a lot of receptivity to that. But I think that's important for the future. Thank you. My name's Jim, I'm a reporter from Straits Times. I was wondering if the panel could talk a little about what you hope the ASEAN countries would be able to do more of in this relationship. I mean, is it just more than just giving the US good welcome economically or in a security realm? What more can they do? Thank you. ASEAN can do a lot. First, we'd like more of their students to come here. We'd like them to invite our people there. They can do a lot to break down the trade barriers among themselves so that when we sell to one of the countries we can, or invest in one of the countries we can sell to the other countries. So they have a lot to get their act together. And I think as we encourage them to do so, they will. I think that some of the regulations are different for different industries in the various ASEAN countries. Some regulations are quite restrictive on how much of equity a company can have in a particular ASEAN country. Those things are very negative in trying to build more trade and investment with ASEAN. Some of these changes, some of these issues go back many years and I think it'd be very useful if some of those are revisited, which would be very encouraging to many different industries in the United States. Let me add just a couple of words here. What I would hope that would come out of the ASEAN countries are willingness on their part to measure up to their responsibilities in this type of relationship. So if they, frankly, want to continue to do more trade with China, and that's understandable, they also don't want to be totally dominated by China, which is also understandable. So the United States has a key role to play in this relationship. But I would expect that they have to be willing to do more as well. And not say we'd like to see more of you, but not in our backyard, so to speak. We'd like to see more exercises take place but do it with some other country. So I think it's time for the ASEAN countries to measure up to their responsibilities by saying we need to have more training, we need to have more engagement, both in a military, non-military level, on humanitarian missions, et cetera, and students and lots of activities, and don't back away from it, thinking that it somehow is going to upset their trade relationship. They have to be willing to be upfront enough with the Chinese to say we want good relations with you, but we also want to do these things which are important to us. That's what I would expect. Quite a bit of reciprocity. I'm Service Officer at the U.S.TR for a short time in the Southeast Asia Affairs Office. You know, Washington, many a good idea dies on untimely death. What do you think the main impediments are to realizing some of these recommendations in the report? A one-word answer? Ignorance. I think very few Americans know much about geography beyond our shores, but are particularly uninformed with respect to Asia, writ large, and ASEAN in particular. So the educational effort of why we care about ASEAN and the exchange with the ASEAN-10 is very important. And so, you know, we urge our trading partners to be transparent. Well, we need to have a lot more transparency on the information with respect to this very important economic block that is growing very, very rapidly. And let me say an answer to, I want to underscore something that both Rod and Hank said on what can the ASEANs do. The trade barriers among the ASEAN members are extraordinarily high. And if you are going to invest in Malaysia and think you can export with facility to Indonesia, wrong. So if they carry the responsibility of increasing the harmonization among the ASEAN-10 as we move forward to reach out and have an effort to lower trade barriers between the United States and the members of ASEAN, we could have really a magical kind of an economic effect globally, regionally, and bilaterally. This is executive for national security. My sense is that many of these countries, India, the ASEAN countries, they don't trust us. And in the case of India, they're concerned that at any moment we won't supply them with spare parts and things because of it. In terms of military to military, they just took one senator from Vermont to kill the IMET program with Indonesia for a decade. And eventually we came to our senses and realized that because there were some bad apples in the Indonesian army, they really are some in our own. But we continue to pass defense bills. And in the case of Myanmar, which most many people continue to speak call the colonial name Burma, we have had my view absolutely insane love affair with Aung San Suu Kyi and these sanctions are kind of productive and so forth. So I mean, when I'm over there and I spend about three months of each year there, they would love to send all of their kids over to different schools. They can't, at least in some of these places, they can't. And having military-military relations, many places that we won't do it. So what do we do? Well, the whole idea of this commission and with the US government is to bring about change. This is not an exercise in just doing nothing. There is a major movement by our government and our administration and the business community and even the military to change that image that you just portrayed. Secretary Panetta was just in Asia and made a very important speech. Secretary Hillary Clinton has made several speeches on the importance of ASEAN and the United States. There was a great movement to change the status quo or the backward-looking that we had before. And the American business community certainly is interested. All that needs a little encouragement from the administration. If there would be a trade mission, it would go a long ways. And those kinds of things will bring about change. The ASEANs want it and we want it so there's nothing to stop it from happening except execution. And I would hope that the administration will follow through because they've been very public about it. And I believe that will happen. I'm confident in it. Can I add a word about India? Because India, after all, the United States has made quite an effort during the past 10 years starting with President Clinton having made the first visit to India in the year 2000, followed up substantially by President Bush 43 to extend and expand that relationship. And it was the United States who did all of the heavy lifting, carried all the heavy water so to speak on the civil nuclear agreement. And to get that passed over strong objection coming not only within the United States but outside the United States and within India. And yet the first thing that happened, the regulations were written in a way that no US company could participate in the nuclear industry in India. When we came time to, they needed a new multi-role combat aircraft. The United States offered to sell its two premier combat aircraft, F-18, F-16. Both were declared to be insufficient or not meeting their requirements. The two most capable aircraft in the world, combat aircraft, were rejected because it didn't comply, didn't meet their standards. Something was wrong with that picture. So it's not always the United States who's not a reliable supplier. We not necessarily have a reliable consumer under certain circumstances. So it's a reciprocity becomes a key element here. I think that the relationship's getting better. There's more trust being developed, hopefully. But that comes on both sides of the equation. And so I would hope that they would see the benefit of having a better relationship with the United States when you see a report that comes out on the paper that military officials in India are worried about the expansion of Chinese power. Well, okay, there are some ways in which you can contend and deal with that. But you can't have it both ways, blame the United States for not being a reliable supplier and then come up with rationales why you US can't participate in these major activities. Okay, we're at time. Let me ask the commission if they have any, if anyone would like a final word before we close. If not, I hope you'll join me in thanking the commission for its work. And I thank you for joining us today. Thank you.