 We're going to turn quickly now to our panel. We have Aqway Amosu of the Open Society Institute who leads their Africa programs here in Washington, DC. Former journalist, really such an insightful analyst of all things African. And Chris Fumuno, I think all of you know Chris from the National Democratic Institute, lead advisor on Africa, and West and Central Africa. Again, someone very thoughtful who was in Cote d'Ivoire during the elections and has followed that intensively. Chris and Aqway, why don't you come up? And we'll begin here. And I just want to thank the audience for the range of questions submitted. And I'm sorry that we couldn't get to all of them. I hope this session we're going to keep presentations fairly short so that we get a bit more interaction and discussion between the two. I think we'll start with Aqway, who's going to talk a bit about really the human side of this, of what's happening in Cote d'Ivoire. And I think, as I said at the outset, in all the issues of the test of democratic principles and conflict prevention and international governance, really at the core of this is the Ivorian people. And so Aqway, I think, will focus on that immediate situation and perhaps going forward. And then Chris will put this into a broader context of the bigger implications, both for Cote d'Ivoire, I think in the future of Cote d'Ivoire, but the broader region as well. So Aqway, why don't we turn to you first? Thank you very much, Dan, and for your kind introduction. Yes, how often have we ever seen echo us, the African Union, the US, the EU, the UN, global NGOs, African civil society all agreeing about a situation anywhere, but certainly not in Africa? It's extraordinarily rare to see this kind of unanimity. And Washington being a town of policy wonks, I'm sure, that the majority of people are gripped. And I think the size of the crowds is a testament to that. To understand how do we come out of this? Usually there's somebody who we can point to as the obstacle, the rock in the road. In this situation, I think it's a lot more complicated and it is genuinely fascinating, but I'm very happy to say that Chris, that's Chris's job to talk about that. What I want to do is to take a few minutes to focus, as Jen said, on the human consequences of this battle of wills, because it's about much, much more than politics. Since this crisis began at the end of November, there's been a steadily increasing incidence of violent abuse. According to Human Rights Watch, pro-bagbo security forces and unofficial militia have been conducting regular raids at night, snatching people perceived to be Wattara supporters from pro-Wattara areas like Abubu, taking them away to unknown locations, bodies are later found, or simply never turn up. And even as early as December the 23rd, the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights said that UN Human Rights Monitors had reported 173 killings, so that's just over a month after the, or just under a month after the election, that we were already seeing 173 individual killings, 90 cases of torture or abuse of treatment, 24 forced disappearances and hundreds and hundreds of arrests. And at least 20 of those people, by the way, were killed when security forces fired live ammunition at a demonstration on December the 16th. A week ago, the number of people killed had risen to 210. And today, there's been a statement again from the UN saying that the number is now up to 247 with 49 people unaccounted for. But as Al-Yuntin said to me, the president of the civil society group Radu in an email yesterday, the death toll is almost certainly a lot higher than that. And in his view has certainly exceeded 300. There are reports of three mass graves, one reportedly with 60 to 80 bodies in it, one with some 30 apparently, and a third nobody knows how many there are. The UN has been prevented from investigating any of these sites or where they've managed to get to anywhere that's been cited, things have been cleared away. And so there isn't any independent verification for these kinds of allegations. And one should be obviously careful to say that nobody knows precisely what the facts are. But I don't think anybody really is in any doubt now about the scale and the trajectory of this kind of violence. And perhaps important also to note that it's not just individuals who support President Wattara who are being targeted. We're now seeing a real pattern of attacks on the UN's mission there. So I believe they've said today six specific attacks taking place, but they're not just somebody lobbing stones. We're seeing vehicles being burned, a doctor and a driver of an ambulance were injured in one such attack recently, just a couple of days ago. A mob or a militia, depending on your definition, held up a vehicle carrying supplies to that hotel and to other, for other UN uses stood by and allowed people to loot the contents. You're seeing a level of impunity against an independent and neutral body, which I think we should all be extraordinarily concerned about as this situation continues. And this, listening to President Wattara's timetable just now, of saying, well, he's going to make some decisions next week and we're heading for a review at the end of the month. I think, again, I bring you back to the human factor. You've got to consider if this is the trajectory, then what will be the situation in two or three weeks and I'll jump ahead and quote from Valerie Amos, the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, who said, the violence has already caused a 10-fold increase in internal displacement in the space of a few days, showing how quickly a political crisis can have grave humanitarian consequences. And just to focus a little bit on the broader question of displacement, it's just obviously no surprise that people are beginning to run away. I think, unless there have been new figures today, the last figures that I saw suggested that 23,500 people have crossed the border into neighboring countries, the vast majority of those into Liberia in the past five weeks and lately at a rate of about 600 a day. An estimated 16,000 people are displaced, but still within Western Côte d'Ivoire. So nearly 40,000 people uprooted and I would suggest many more to come. And it's always hard to think in terms of these numbers, but I found this helpful, this grim statistic. UNHCR started to build a new camp near the Liberian town of Barn and to do it, the planners and the local community are clearing 80 hectares or 200 acres of land just to accommodate 18,000 people. So I think you get a sense of the kind of impacts we're talking about if this is not resolved fairly quickly. I think it's clear that it's a big challenge to work out what should happen now, but I wouldn't say that there are no useful things to do. I think the question of the effectiveness of economic sanctions, rather financial sanctions at this point and the possibility of developing economic sanctions and a program of targeted individual sanctions, there's still room in that space. And I think for many of us, it looks like the most promising path to take. And I think one of the questions that we've been discussing, I and my colleagues, is the extent to which we think that the political team in ECOWAS and the AU is supported by an adequate team of financial experts and people who are knowledgeable in the processes that need to be engaged. It might sound obvious, but sometimes these conversations take place without the right people in the room. And I think anybody who's in a position to identify what resources are needed and make sure that there is a kind of awareness among diplomats and bureaucrats about what they lack and what they need to add to this process, I think that would be extremely helpful. I'm sure that the AU plans to confirm that President Wattara is the legitimate president at the forthcoming summit in Addis Ababa and also to endorse ECOWAS decisions. These small acts of reinforcing the unanimity are not negligible, particularly as time goes by and it doesn't seem as though there are solutions in hand. I think on the military front, I'm not going to take a position over whether there should be a military intervention to unseat Bagbo, but I note that the Chiefs of Staff are meeting next week in Bamako to discuss strategies and it seems to me that there's, it perhaps was a mistake not to put too fine a point on it to firmly say that a military action was on the table if internally soundings hadn't been taken within ECOWAS to make sure that everybody was on board with that. Perhaps that would never have happened. Nonetheless, I think it's extraordinarily important that people shouldn't then be demobilized and say, well, we can't make a decision because some of us don't agree. There are several other critical factors. For example, if you're trying to prevent getting arms and mercenaries getting into the country, you've got to monitor that. To what extent is there an effective monitoring machine around the borders and internally? Is it possible to beef that up to strengthen that? Is it possible that West African militaries are doing enough in terms of engaging their counterparts in the Iborian military about what they're doing, about what the consequences might be? And if not, there is an area that can be strengthened. And then what about the countries like Angola that have been very supportive to Bagbo? You know, very rich, plenty of oil, no shortage of opportunity to supply material. So to what extent is that being monitored? To what extent is the Angolan government being engaged? It seems to me that all these things should be on the table for its sort of intensification and focus. I think it's not just about, going back to the point we made at the beginning, it's not just about putting the rightful government in place. As these days go by, and we are seeing the damage done to the standing of the UN's force in the country, it may well be the case that we're going to come to the point of view that there is a need and urgent need to ratchet up protection for civilians in Côte d'Ivoire, but that it is difficult for the UN to do that. ECOS has to engage with that problem too. And it seems to me that when they discuss next week, they need not to just think in terms of a kind of a mission to change the power, but to think about the broader questions of protection, not just also in Abidjan, but around the country and around the borders. And then finally, I wanted to just say something about accountability. The UN Security Council has stressed that those responsible for these kinds of crimes against both civilians and UN personnel must be held accountable. You've seen the ICC prosecutor, you've seen the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Madam Pillay, all make warnings. I'm still wanting to hear a stronger call from African leaders about accountability. I know and we all understand and know that there is ambivalence about the ICC, not to put too fine a point on it, but at the same time accountability is not only delivered by the ICC. There is a responsibility throughout the continent to the civilians of Côte d'Ivoire that's enshrined in the African Union statutes and especially in ECOS statutes. And so I think the message to those who are perpetrating these actions in Côte d'Ivoire that there is going to be a process for holding people accountable and that this information is being collected and documented is absolutely critical and needs to be said much more loudly and much more frequently in my view, just to make sure that if it can have a deterrent effect that it will do so in the coming days and weeks. Thanks very much. Chris, why don't we turn to you? So, you know, I was thinking to myself, you know, it's a challenge for the panel to come after the very eloquent and very thoughtful president-elect of Côte d'Ivoire, President Alasem Gautara. Little did I know that I would speak after, you know, a Côte d'Ivoire, which makes the task even much harder for me. However, I thought I should just put three points on the table so that we open this up for that discussion and have a more interactive session. I really like a quay's emphasis on the human dimension because some of that gets lost when we look at power politics and the power play that's currently on the way in Abizhan. And just the line that I take from that story is that when you have over 20,000 Ivorians crossing the border into a country like Liberia, it's very telling about the current conditions within Côte d'Ivoire. And I'm really hoping that we can all collectively do something about it to bring this to closure before it gets eclipsed by yet another African or global crisis. The three points I wanted to make are firstly that we have to find some ways to recognize the Ivorian voices through this entire process because we can't forget that over 5.7, close to 6 million Ivorians registered to participate in the elections, that between 4 to 5 million, depending on whose count you take, actually participated in those elections, went to the polls and actually voted because they believed very strongly that elections matter. You needed to have seen the level of voter mobilization, the number of people who came out and how peaceful, relatively peaceful the campaign period was. In fact, for many of us who've worked on Côte d'Ivoire for many years and NDI has been in Côte d'Ivoire for more than half since the early 90s, I think 2010 was one of the most hopeful years in the lives of Ivorians, especially in that last week between November 25th, Thursday November 25th when the two candidates, the two candidates had a presidential debate and all pledged to respect the outcome of the elections and Thursday December 3rd when the wrangling began between the Constitutional Council and the Independent Election Commission of Côte d'Ivoire. A lot of good things did happen through this electoral process in 2010 that really underscored or captured the attachment of the people of Côte d'Ivoire to democratic principles and practices. It's not just the voter turnout, it's the work that was done by women's groups to call for peaceful elections, it's the work that was done by domestic election observers, Ivorians from civil society organizations who were fiscally present in over 40% of the polling sites which is a huge sample for any country because they were really committed to making a contribution to make sure that these elections could be properly conducted. I think these Ivorians want to believe that elections mean something and I think that a solution that is found that reasserts that feeling would go a long ways to reinforcing their commitment to democratic governance. However the outcome or whatever the outcome of this would be, the radar we take from this experience is that Côte d'Ivoire is going to require a lot of institutional reform because as we speak a number of institutions, state institutions have had their credibility put on the line, haven't performed as well as many Ivorians had believed they would perform and I think in the years ahead it's going to have to be a concerted effort to undertake institutional reform, national reconciliation and national reconstruction as well in order to restore citizen confidence in democratic governance in Côte d'Ivoire. My second point is that I think collectively everyone's credibility is on the line with regards to Côte d'Ivoire, it's not just the credibility of Ivorian political actors and their commitment to democracy and we've seen all too often in a number of African countries where people have been good democrats when they were in opposition, but once they get into power, begin to change the rules of the game, it's the credibility of these political actors that is on the line, it's also the credibility of institutions such as the respectability of the Independent Election Commission, the credibility of the Constitutional Council and when you go beyond the borders of Côte d'Ivoire you start looking at the regional bodies, ECOWAS and its protocols and to ECOWAS's credit they have at least stepped up to the task. You look at the African Union which in 2007 adopted a charter at the General Assembly meeting in Addis which is a very progressive document which talks to the need for credible elections and transparent governance, democratic governance but which charter has still not been ratified because not many countries have signed off to ratify the charter and that begs the question as to the level of commitment within the organization. Thankfully the African Union has also stepped up to the plate and has become very outspoken with regards to the present stalemate in Côte d'Ivoire but ultimately at some point the African Union is going to have to address the fact that this could be a watershed moment for the credibility of regional organizations and then you look at the entire UN system the fact that the UN had 10,000 close to 10,000 peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire that the UN had accompanied the Ivorians as they went through various peace processes trying to get peace accords that would create an environment for Côte d'Ivoire to become post-conflict to come out of conflict to the point where the certification process was introduced as a means of building confidence amongst Ivorians and especially the stakeholders that the outcome of the election would be one that would reflect the will of the Ivorian people and you look at the UN Security Council and the number of resolutions that have been passed and the fact that countries around the world are also watching to see whether Côte d'Ivoire takes these resolutions seriously because if that is not the case then the repercussions are going to be much larger than we could ever imagine and so I would say that collectively there's a lot riding on the line with regards to the Côte d'Ivoire crisis and the credibility of organizations and entities that have been involved with trying to get this resolved. The third and last point that I would say is that all of Africa is really watching what's going on in Côte d'Ivoire and some of you have written and many of you are aware of the fact that in 2011 we expect to have 17 or 18 national elections in Africa many of which would be very competitive some of which would be in contentious environments but elections that are being conducted by people who are waiting to read the final lesson from the Ivorian situation. In a couple of weeks, Benin for example will be having its presidential election an election which could be very competitive. The Central African Republic will be having elections in a few days time in a country that has not fully emerged from conflict when the central government is still not controlling the entire territory of the country. Nigeria is the big kid on the block. The ruling party had its primaries early this morning but Nigeria will be moving into and Nigeria will be moving into national elections by April of this year. Liberia, which is next door to Côte d'Ivoire which is already absorbing all of these refugees that we've talked about is preparing for national elections at the end of this year. So you can go down the list of African countries that are coming up with elections and the obvious lesson is going to be or the obvious conclusion is going to be that if Côte d'Ivoire gets it right if the issues in Côte d'Ivoire get resolved in a way that confirmed to African democrats that elections mean something then we're going to see an increase or the likelihood of better elections across the African continent. Elections in which citizens will participate fully knowing that the will of the citizens will be respected by all of the political actors. On the other hand, if Côte d'Ivoire doesn't get resolved properly then I think that Democrats across the African continent can pick their marble and go home because there's going to be no incentive for a sitting president and incumbent with all of the attributes of incumbency on the continent to put in place a fair electoral process that would allow citizens to participate freely and for their voices to be heard let alone to hand over power if they still lose an election. These are some of the points that I wanted to highlight and I think as we move into an interactive session I'll be ready to take your questions as well. Great, thank you so much. Thanks so much to both of you. I wanted to, you know, the United States has responses being pretty remarkable. The personal engagement by President Obama who has twice tried to call President Bagbo really standing very firmly I think behind the leadership of ECOWAS and the African Union. Cote d'Ivoire has, you know, it's near and dear to many of our hearts but it's never figured particularly high on US policy agenda. I think the intense effort right now is kind of a reflection of the things that Chris was saying. How important this is for so many other things in the region and going forward. So in the midst of the historic referendum in Sudan which has major public constituencies here in the United States and has been a process of intensive US diplomacy, the attention that Cote d'Ivoire is getting I think is really laudable and really quite remarkable. We have someone here from the State Department and I was gonna just quickly ask Jason Small to say a few words about where the US is in its thinking. Just a brief intervention and then we'll open up for questions and answers from the audience. Jason, do you wanna come up or do you wanna stand from the audience and use, Mike will come to you. And thanks so much for agreeing just to say a few words. Great, sure. Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here. A very good presentation so far we've had here. Let me just say that if you had told me a year ago that we would have elections in Cote d'Ivoire and that we'd have the political crisis, I wouldn't have believed you. Here we've been losing sleep over Guinea and we should have been losing sleep over Cote d'Ivoire Certainly I think this has been a very important issue for this administration for a whole number of reasons and some of which have already been mentioned. I mean, the fact that we're having 17 national or presidential elections throughout Africa in 2011, what happens here in Cote d'Ivoire is gonna resonate across the continent and of course, one of the countries I follow very closely is Nigeria and that's a big election and it's very important and so what happens here matters a lot to what will happen in Nigeria as well. And so there has been very, very high level of tension in fact I've been told that President Obama asked about Cote d'Ivoire almost on a daily basis so it continues to resonate at that level. In terms of U.S. policy, U.S. policy starts from the premise that President Uttara is the president-elect of Cote d'Ivoire. That's where it starts and everything where we go and everything that we've been doing flows from that premise and certainly it's been remarkable the amount of unity that we've seen across the international community both within Africa through ECOWAS and the African Union but also internationally, the number of countries that have come together and through the UN bodies in terms of support for this premise. Just a couple of things that the U.S. has been focused on in particular. Some of them have been mentioned certainly the financial pressure option here which has been focused both on targeted sanctions whether they be travel bans on former President Bobbo and his inner circle as well as asset freezes which we did just about a week ago on five of himself and four other individuals around him. Those are mirrored in the European Union as well and so it makes it very difficult for those individuals to transact any financial transactions at all or for U.S. companies or U.S. persons to be involved with any of those individuals so it's a particularly important piece of pressure that we've continued to apply. Also, we've all granted yesterday Agrement to President Wattara's ambassador designate to the United States and again it flows from the premise that President Wattara is in fact the president of Côte d'Ivoire. Other areas we continue to work to build and sustain the coalition and the strong unity and support there has been for President Wattara assuming all the powers of the presidency and begin to carry out his term as he so rightfully wants to do. But at the same time we've had outreach to President Bobbo as was mentioned, President Obama tried to reach him on two occasions and have also offered him as well as some of the other countries what we like to call the soft landing an honorable exit for him to take up a role as a former African president. I thought we thought it was quite good that President Obasanjo himself a former African president who has found a very successful career following his presidency of Nigeria to convey a message that life does exist after you leave office. And so all of these efforts are continuing. We continue to work very closely with ECOWAS and with the African Union and our hope is that in the near term we'll be able to find a peaceful transition that will allow President Wattara to fully assume the duties and powers of his office. Thanks very much. Thanks very much, Jason. Let's turn to our audience that's been very patient throughout this process and let's take a couple of questions perhaps together. So we have Ni there. We have the gentleman in the front row and then we'll go to the very back row there. Thank you very much. I have a two-part question. The first actually will go to the State Department representative. And if you could keep the mic close to you. Yes. I was going to talk about the financial sanctions on people around Mr. Bagu. Because I thought the American list is smaller than the European Union list. So why the discrepancy? But also, I mean, are you talking to an African country like Angola who I know that have been trying to have close relations with the US but they are one of the few African countries that you can tell is supporting the wrong side. So what is the US saying to them? Now for Chris and Aque, I was wondering if you can contrast the attitude of the government of the two neighbors, Ghana versus Liberia. It seems to me Liberia is more vulnerable but they've been stronger versus Ghana which seems to be backpedaling. So what's your read of especially what's happening in Ghana? Why Ghana is taking such a... What I consider to be an unusual position given it's Mr. Obama going there and them getting credit for being strong on democracy. And here they seem to be taking the wrong side. Thank you. Excellent question that Chris or Aque can tackle if they want or not going to... Yes, the gentleman here in the front row and please identify yourself. I'm Erosman. I'm with Saif Darfur, slash Genocide Intervention Network. Two quick questions. The first to Aque, we have field reports about the movement of militias from Liberia and Sierra Leone into Cote d'Ivoire, how serious is this? And what could be done to stop it because mail I think is disturbing to see militias movement within African countries. And the second question is about the international community's response and in particular the current US administration about being firm and speaking publicly about what should be done. We have seen elections during the past years in Africa and unfortunately we didn't see the Obama administration being critical on the results of these elections. For example, Sudan and Ethiopia and we are seeing as Chris said another 18 elections, most of which I think they would be irregularities during the conduct of the elections in particular Egypt and Uganda should we expect the Obama administration to be similarly firm on how this should be conducted. Thanks. Good question as well. And the gentleman in the far back corner. Thank you, Elliot Pence for the Whitaker group. Thanks to the panelists and Jennifer for a wonderful panel. My question is brief. The political actors that have been brought into compel Bagbo out have broadly failed. What's the next approach? Who has sufficient capital to compel Bagbo? Have we reached into the civil society communities, the religious communities? Is the State Department thinking on those lines or? Thanks. But let's start with that round and then we'll come back for another. Akwe, do you want to take on the first shot at the Ghana versus Liberia approaches and the outflow of refugees? You know, I wouldn't claim to have really informed insight. I can only say that I think if you've been through very serious conflict and Liberia has very recently, it knows what the price of failure here is. I think Ghana for very, very good reasons, or rather I should say President Atta Mills is uneasy about the consequences of seeing a major war or major conflict in which his troops are involved right there on the border. He doesn't know how he's going to set a limit on that, never having had to come out of such a situation. He, his strongest instinct may well be to just hold it back. But I think from the Liberian side, they are veterans in this and recognize that in fact stopping this process early nipping, well probably nipping in the bud is certainly not a good expression, but trying to prevent this situation getting worse by recognizing the possibility that some kind of military intervention might be needed if it's planned well and effective. I don't find it that surprising, perhaps is all I'm saying, that contrast should be there. But I think neighboring countries have the best reasons in Liberia too for not wanting there to be a war. And if, you know, Ellen Johnson-Serleaf is, you know, looking at this situation and saying, you know, in the twinkling of an eye, I will be back where this country was, you know, 10 years ago, she will be absolutely desperate to prevent that happening with the enormous losses that they would be taking. So I don't know. Chris, do you want to comment on that one? Yeah, of course, let me first on the Angola question. By the way, I, you know, it was very awkward that the swearing in of Laurent Barbault that was staged by the Constitutional Council the very next day after the announcement, there were only two ambassadors present. That was the ambassador of Angola and the ambassador of Lebanon. It was very telling. In terms of Ghana, I wouldn't be surprised if there are internal dynamics within the ruling party in Ghana that may be making President Atamios a little uncomfortable about being so upfront about a military option in Côte d'Ivoire. We should remember that the NDC in Ghana is part of the Socialist International family to which the FBI in Côte d'Ivoire belongs and that the West African, or the African chapter of the Socialist International, which is headed by Tano Dieng of Senegal, has not distanced itself publicly from Laurent Barbault the way that the French Socialist Party has done. And that also within the NDC, there are some rumblings of people to the left of Atamios that may be preparing to challenge him in the next primaries when Ghana prepares for his presidential elections. I don't know if all of that is playing into his decision-making with regards to Côte d'Ivoire. Also, let's know, let's acknowledge that Ghana has been very heavily involved in peacekeeping missions around the world. And when he says, the president of Ghana says, they're overstretched, that could be a matter of fact. They could really be overstretched. And thirdly, I would just say that as President-elect Alassane-Watera said, Ghana has been burned in Côte d'Ivoire before. Some of us may remember some of the riots when Ivarians took on Ghanians and said, Ghana must go. And Ghanians lost a lot in Côte d'Ivoire. And that generation is still alive and active. And I'm sure a lot of Ghanians wouldn't want to get caught up in the internal politics of Côte d'Ivoire. So I'm just guessing here, but all of these elements could be at play. With regards to, I could probably just skip to the third question. What about future elections? Why this election has galvanized this remarkable unity, perhaps? And I think from the United States, I think you could ask the same questions of the African Union. Why is it this election versus the election in Ethiopia, for example, or are there very flawed elections? Oh, I'm sorry. Why is it this election that has focused, US did not react in a similar way for the Ethiopian elections, for example, but neither did the African Union? And what is it about this election in particular? Is it the destabilizing consequences? So, and then I think the next question was, who will be next, kind of what's next in terms of mediation? And then we'll get you to answer on the lists in the Angola question. So that wasn't a very organized moderation here, but why this election and for the US and others? Selection, I mean, you know, well, one thing that I think is important and people often underestimate is that, there are many reasons why standing up on a particular election can be difficult. If you don't feel that the data is solid, for example, and you're going to come in and say very definitely that that was an unfair result, or if you think that the results are extremely close and that they're so close that it's difficult to be clear and know that one side one. I think this election, it was a very categorical result. I don't think any, there was no challenge that was laid at these results could have changed them. Nothing that the Bagmose side put there. So I think that made it very safe for everybody. He was an incumbent that also made it very, very clear. Usually what happens is that, you know, the incumbent wins, but only just. And that's a much heavier lift for outside governments than to say an incumbent definitively lost he should leave power, that's much easier. And so I think that's one of the reasons. I think the calculus also has not escaped other people's notice either, that we're at the beginning of a year of many elections and that many of those look vulnerable and that it feels like time to draw a line in the sand or else spend a year of having no sleep and probably with less chance in each case of prevailing. So sticking here and trying to make this one work makes very good sense in terms of international politics. So that would be my answer to that question. Did you want me to answer Amir's question as well? I mean, the short answer is I don't have detail if your question about how serious it is, how many people are involved and what's the scale of the remobilization of these fighting men in the region. I don't know. What I am very sure about is that once people spend their lives making their living from one byproduct of conflict or another, it's really hard to reintegrate into civilian life. And even now, after all the time that has passed in Liberia, there are people who are to some extent outside of society. It's hard to reintegrate. And the prospect of being able to return to the old firm as it were, to take on a kind of form of economic activity that they know very well and know how to leverage effectively is going to be very attractive. And that's why I made the point earlier about the critical importance of monitoring. It's no use having an embargo in place or having a formal position against mercenaries, but not having the people on the ground to monitor, not having the data to be able to demonstrate to the governments around in the region that their people are involved. And so it seems to me absolutely critical. In that sense, I think it's very serious. I think it's absolutely critical that that should get special attention and if necessary, international support so that we do actually know what is the position on the ground at the moment. So far as I'm aware, it's all anecdotal. Yeah, I think we have to remember that these selections were supposed to have been held in 2005. And that between 2005 and 2010, a lot of actors were very patient and understood that you needed to go through various peace accords to get the parties to the table. There was a lot of African countries, including the OECOWAS countries have invested a lot in this process by putting troops into Côte d'Ivoire to help the peacemaking or peacekeeping between the rebels in the North and Bagbo's government. So I think there was a sense that these investments could not be allowed to go for now. And that having waited for five long years and finally created an environment which had everything going for it. And this election came very close to being a perfect electoral process. It was almost humiliating to everybody collectively that at the last minute, one of the actors who pulled the rug from under everybody's feet. I think that explains some of the frustration and the reason why people said it was so blatant, it was right in your face, we have to draw the line somewhere. Now the data also, as Aqway said, that was one factor that kind of emboldened or gave a lot of backbone to some of the actors. That explains why the issue of a government of national unity, Allah Zimbabwe or Kenya model was rejected very early on by the evidence because they said in those two previous cases, people couldn't really say what the outcome was. There was some doubt, but in Cote d'Ivoire, everybody had their statistics on the outcome of the elections. The political parties to their credit had poor watches in the polling sites and they were doing their own independent tabulation of the outcome. So the outcome of this election was really not endowed. And I think that even when the constitutional council throws out 600,000 votes to bring from one of the candidates constituencies to bring that candidate to 49%, it's very telling. It's obvious, it's not rocket science, you just say it. Now in terms of the future, what does this mean for the elections in Uganda, in Egypt, in the DRC and in other countries? As I said, African Democrats are watching this very closely. It was very interesting last night for some of you who may have stayed up late to watch the president of Tunisia, Ben Ali, on TV saying, I promise you, I'm going to give you all the liberty you want and I'm going to give you all the democracy and I will not be president in 2014 and there's no life presidency in Tunisia. People are watching this very closely and I tell you that if this gets resolved in a way that reassures Africans that their voices should be heard and must be heard through electoral processes, that's going to enhance the prospects for better elections going forward. Can I do that something? Yeah, I did not intend in my answer to let Western governments off the hook quite so easily. I mean, I think if I look back at Ethiopia, as was mentioned, or I look ahead to the upcoming election in Uganda in a few weeks' time, I'm pretty unhappy actually about the level of critique from the US side and I don't think anything particularly excuses that. I think it's people, governments have interests and when it's very important not to offend somebody or not to destabilize some other project, then they back off and it's nothing that happens means that we don't need to keep holding people's feet to the fire and it's certainly not only the US government and I think I'm sure that I'm not the only one who's enormously appreciative of some of the strength of opinion that's come out of the US government and indeed that key speech that Obama made in Accra which has been taken as a template for so many subsequent engagements and arguments even where they haven't been won. I think everybody's very appreciative of the things that were said then, but at the same time, I don't think that it's gonna be democracy and on everybody's behalf is breaking out all over and then we will never have any more doubts about convictions on African elections. I think we will be, there will be business as usual again in another setting and there will be arguments but on this one for a variety of reasons there has been a kind of alignment, a strange alignment of the stars that has allowed for coordination. Yeah, I think on the US obviously we have probably less complex relationships with Cote d'Ivoire than we do in Rwanda and Ethiopia and that and so for obvious reasons I think probably we could do much more in those instances but the key in this one too was the potential leverage that we had once ECOWAS and the African Union stepped up. In Rwanda you gotta think in a lot of those countries, the US doesn't have that kind of leverage even in this instance where you have the whole international community behind you and the UN Security Council including the Chinese and Russians behind you, ECOWAS, the African Union we're seeing really the limits of leverage in a situation like this much less so when the international community is divided, when African leadership is ambivalent in a place like Zimbabwe for example and you didn't hear African leadership speaking up against very flawed elections across in a lot of other instances and I think this is an opportunity for the US to seize it as having greater leverage in this because of this unanimity. Let's take another round of questions but we won't forget Elliot's questions about kind of what's the next way forward. Who's putting, oh I'm sorry that I'm looking at you. Is it just you here? Okay, oh and Jason, okay. Jason, we'll get your response in the next round. I'm really not doing a very good job here. Let's go with the gentleman here, the gentleman in the far back and we'll, sorry, we'll go to the lady back here. Good morning. Oma Arunagudwa Center National. Going back to Chris's point in relation to recognizing the voice of the Ivorian with regard to what is going on and with regard to the election. My question is based on Babbo's propaganda rhetoric obviously he has supports, supporters and based on the result from the right, I would say based on the right results he's at least 40% of the vote and following also his rhetoric he probably was able to raise a few other people. Won't we be going back to the pre-election situation where we had two armies face to face and Babbo is governing and now in a reverse mode if Watara is able to really effectively assume his position. If it's just a case, how can we prevent situation that will also get us back into a situation where we'll be talking about a election in five years in the same situation. Okay, thank you. I'd like to, yeah, we had the question back here if you could keep the question quite brief because we're a bit short on time. So a microphone to the back, yeah, okay. Hello, thanks Jennifer. This is Nyaka Lagoke from the Ivory Coast. I had a few questions but- Just if you could limit it to one. Can I make a comment instead? Can I? A very brief one. No problem. Okay, my comment is going to be on the military intervention in the Ivory Coast. I said that already on different shows. I believe that Mr. Watara is not right when he's talking about the military intervention and then Ivory Coast, like I said, is the microcosm of a united Africa. So when you go and you allow a military force to go in Ivory Coast to try and remove somebody from power, I presume that it is not the right way to approach this crisis because many people have said it, nobody knows the effects of that military intervention. So next time, my suggestion to you when you organize those kind of fora, I suggest that you listen to different voices because since the beginning of the runoff, we've been, I've been attending those conferences and we've been hearing the same voices and I think that in the name of democracy, it is good to invite other people so that we can have a better discussion. Thank you. Thank you for that comment. And then the lady here. This question is for Jay. Hello. Can you hear me? Last month, the World Bank froze funding to Cote d'Ivoire this week. We saw the global fund cut off most aid. Cut off most aid and there are some rumblings that France is considering some sort of cocoa sanctions. How seriously is the U.S. taking this option going beyond targeted sanctions and imposing economic sanctions at large? Is it even being discussed? Okay, let's turn to Jason. You have the Angola question, the compatibility of the lists, and this last question. Okay. First on financial sanctions, well, sanctions are at large, the U.S. list, first of all, on travel sanctions is actually quite extensive, and in fact, the decision is flexible so names can be added fairly easily to that list. So on travel sanctions, we can make it very clear that those who are supporting Mogbo are not welcome in the United States. On the asset freeze question, that's a little more complicated. I'm not from the U.S. Treasury Department, but they are the ones who have to follow U.S. law when it comes to economic sanctions, particularly related to individual asset freezes. We've done five, that does not mean that's the end of the list. There may be other names out there that we're considering, and certainly there are means by which we can go ahead and add to that list. So certainly there are continued talks about how we strengthen our sanctions regime. On broader economic sanctions, I mean, you heard what President Wattara said about broader economic sanctions. He's very concerned about the effect on the Ivorian people as are we and as are our European partners. And so we continue to consult on those issues, but as we said, no option is off the table, certainly in this situation. And then finally, I think Angola, yes, we're talking to Angola on a regular basis. We know that they have influence with Mogbo and others. And that is a big major country that we continue to talk to. In fact, at the AU summit, which is coming up the end of this month, Cotibar is expected to be a major piece of the discussion that will happen bilaterally among all of the representatives that are there. And then finally, I think the other constituencies that are out there that may have influence, or as we like to say personal persuasion, perhaps, on President, for President Mogbo. Yes, there are certain individuals who we've been in contact with who some have asked that they not be publicly named, but have tried to contact Mogbo and to urge him to do the right thing in this situation. So yes, all tools at our disposal are we're trying to pull together and nothing is off the table. Thank you. No, let's wrap up with comments from our two. And I think it goes to this question and to the gentleman with a comment on the military intervention and really the division of opinion in Cotibar. And there's not one Iwarian view. And it is, I think, that's something that the next Iwarian government is going to have to deal with as well. So maybe we conclude this with some thoughts on kind of the future in Cotibar and that bigger reconciliation process that's going to have to unfold however this immediate crisis plays out. Aqway, do you want to start on that? Sure. I mean, I think it's a short-term, long-term problem. People understandably don't want to take action economically that's going to leave people suffering. I think anybody who's watched the process of wars in the Mano River area knows that there's a great deal more to be lost than some economic ground. And I think I was quite surprised to hear him back off a little bit from the economic sanctions because it seems to me that if you're looking at the prospect and I think we all recognize that this is a real prospect of a revived civil war, then you're really going to want to take on, take into consideration options which on a normal day you wouldn't be open to and it doesn't seem to me right at this point to be backing away from that. It seems to me that you ought to be saying, what is the list of things that would really make a difference here? And I think some of those things are already in place and aren't yet effective. The financial sanctions piece, for example, I'm not at all surprised to hear informally that some of the small states are thinking about their problems with applying financial sanctions against Côte d'Ivoire and about the backlash or rather the blowback from Côte d'Ivoire's economic problems if they go ahead with this affecting them. And I think some sort of rigorous conversation within the community of states about whether it's better to take that pain in the short term and avoid a much worse longer term situation just seems to be due at this point. It's easy for an amateur on the sidelines like me to say that, but I do, as a journalist over the years, I've always been surprised when I finally get close to the heart of what's taken place behind the closed doors. I'm always surprised at the lack of vision and the short term and pragmatic calculation that had it not prevailed and kind of allowed much worse situations to be avoided. So that would be my reaction is that absolutely there should be a much tougher mindset around financial sanctions and economic sanctions and isolation and monitoring of those various pieces to make sure that if it has a chance to work, then that's by far, in my view, the best option for Ivorian civilians. Yeah, let me conclude by probably taking on Eloyte's response to Eloyte's question and say it's the one person out there who may still be helpful. I would say Dos Santos could be that person because he's one person that Babu listens to. I imagine he's being talked to as well. The only unfortunate thing though is that Dos Santos has been 19 years since he had his own presidential elections. So they may not be a personal incentive there to tell his friend to do the right thing, but I think if there was enough leverage, especially if he is looking for opportunities to be viewed as a statesman, maybe he could weigh in and this issue would be resolved without further bloodshed, without further violations, gross violations of human rights. I think nobody's out there saying bomb Abijan, nobody is saying the military should go in at full force and shoot at everybody. People are hoping that even though the military option is on the table, that we really don't get to that. And one way to resolve it is to have people like Dos Santos to help President Babu to do the right thing. I would just conclude with Omar's question, which is really where I started, by saying that in terms of further polarization of Ivarian society, I have confidence that the Ivarians can get this, they can get their act together if this issue is resolved. And there are examples to draw upon in Ivarian society. For those of you who followed the whole debate about Ivaritay in the last decade, who would have believed that in the 2010 elections, Alassan Watera would have as his strongest ally, Henri Conant Bédier. And it's because those two stuck together in the alliance of the R.H.D.P. that it became very difficult for the FBI to win a presidential election in Cote d'Ivoire. And that reconciliation is taking place between the people who were arch rivals to the point where Ivaritay nearly tore up the entire country. It happened. Also, at the time when Babu was in opposition, at one point he and Alassan Watera were allies in the front Republican. The FBI and the R.D.I. were allies in the front Republican at the time against the PDCI. So that's something to work with. And I think if the crisis is resolved in a way that reinforces fairness, justice, the credibility of elections, elections matter, democratic governance, I think there will be some room, especially as President-elect Alassan Watera has talked about national reconciliation, that if he continues to reach out, there will be room to kind of get all of this together so Cote d'Ivoire can move forward in a way that would give Ivarians a sense that their investment in democratic governance is paying off and also help in strengthening other nascent democracies in the sub-region that seem to depend on Cote d'Ivoire because of his economic and political might. Chris, thank you very much. Thank you to you all for joining us today, really. And thank you to N.D.I., and to OSI, and to US Institute of Peace for co-sponsoring this. I think we'll hope to come perhaps together again in the coming months. But please join me in thanking Aqway and Chris. And thank you. Thank you. Thank you.