 Thank you. Thank you, First Navy Association, the invitation to come speak. As many of you know, prior to this job, I was the 3-5 and was part of the process of birthing the Cooperative Strategy 21. And we went after trying to understand the landscape and what our core functions were. And in the end, we decided we needed to talk about the anti-access area denial. And we ended up creating a new function called all-domain access. So I wanted to talk to you a little bit about that this morning and then where I think distributed lethality fits in. First slide. So there really is sort of a historical context to anti-access and aerial denial. And when we mean anti-access, what we're talking about is our ability just to get into the theater. And of course, area denial is once we're in there and if it's a contested environment, it's our ability to maneuver inside that theater. But this is not actually a new issue in terms of principles of war. And then for the Union Navy, this really came to the forefront in 1864 in the Battle of Mobile Bay. We had this grand strategic plan that we were going to create a blockade and prevent the Confederate Navy from being able to resupply, to basically resource their war by stopping cotton cells to the United Kingdom. And we slowly and surely created this great snake and were choking off the ports of the Confederate Navy. And then it came down to two ports were left open. One of them was Mobile Bay and Admiral Farragut needed to close and gain control of that bay because Mobile, Alabama, had a train hub that was a point of resupply both east and west to the Confederate. Well, the anti-access was the Confederate Navy had put forts on the two islands. They had a clear lane, 500 yards wide that blockade runners could go in and out and continue resupply. But then they also mined the bay torpedoes and those days what we call sea mines today. And so we had to get in there and get through this anti-access. And in those days the only way to do it was to run fast and that's what Farragut and his ships tried to do. They tried to go to the edge of that 500 yard lane avoiding the shells coming in from the forts and then Tacumza, USS Tacumza hit a mine and lost 93 men in two minutes as she sank. And that's when Farragut said, no, dam the torpedoes full speed ahead. And we got into the bay and then the area of denial started because the Confederates had their ships inside the bay but we ended up winning that battle. But it is a hint that our heritage is part of this thought piece of being able to maneuver despite being in a contested environment. Next slide. And mines still exist today. So these are still anti-access area denial issues that we deal with today and over decades the Strait of Hormuz, that great choke point from which 17 million barrels a day of oil flows through definitely a fueling the economies of many countries around the world. That traditionally almost historically gets threatened all the time. That has led since 2012 to the convening of an international mine exercise and this past November we had 44 navies cooperating. 38 ships, 6,500 people in a combined show of force and deterrence that we will keep the straits open if they're threatened to be closed. And so deterrence is one way to deal with anti-access area denial and working with our partners around the world also part of our strategy and the CNOs, one of the CNO's new lines of effort is one way to deal with anti-access area denial. And this is just the maritime domain. Next slide. But the cyber domain has been born in this century and there's issues there as well. Something as simple as a distributed denial of service where a single attacker will try and take down a website by increasing the traffic to the point that the website can't respond and then a talented attacker can take control of several other people's computers unwittingly and harness their ability to query a website and those unwitting computers, those zombies will go after that single website and the volume of traffic is so high the website crashes. That's referred to as a distributed denial of service attack. In military parlance, some of us might refer to it as volume of fires. It's just done electronically, taking down someone's resource. And if you don't think this is an issue in this contested environment, you got to think back to Estonia in 2007. And in April of 2007, they were the recipient, the government was a recipient of a distributed denial of service attack taking down their parliament. And in the second week, their financial systems went after. And so by the end of the second week, people's debit cards didn't work with the major bank that had 97% of the finances for the government. And by the end of the third week, Estonian's credit cards did not work outside of Estonia. That had a huge impact. And of course, the government websites are down so people have no way of communicating the way they normally communicate and really brought the government and the country to a standstill. And so we can have anti-access area denial in this domain as much as we can have it in the maritime domain. And it's something we need to think about as war fighters. Next slide. But there's a dimensionality to these domains that I wanted to talk to you with a little bit before I get to distributed lethality. So we go back to the time of Farragut and surface warfare was just literally in one domain. It was the domain right in front of us, a single plane. And then as the world evolved with the sinking of Lusitania in World War I, it became pretty clear there was a second dimension to war fighting that we as surface warfare officers had to be aware if there was something beneath our feet as well as something out in front of us. And in the same war, World War I, air power comes into being and there's three dimensions. So for our friends ashore, land had been a single domain and then with air power there's a two dimensionality to it. And then in the 50s after air comes space and now we're in a 360 world of war fighting. So for us in the maritime domain we tend to worry about three dimensions air surface and subsurface. But what did cyber do? And it's my argument that cyber put us into the fourth dimension of war fighting. So let me walk you on that journey. Any of you ever read the book, A Wrinkle in Time when you were a kid? Probably a couple of EDOs in the back. Now if those of you who raised your hand do any of you remember what it was about? Come on down. The price is right. What was A Wrinkle in Time about? Essentially it was a group of kids who were able to they hooked up with some aliens but they did it through what's called a tesseract which is the ability to, as they describe it if you have a piece of cloth you can take the tooth of the cloth and bring the two pieces together the distance is much shorter. I think what Adam was pointing out is that cyber has done that for us. That is fantastic. Would you like to give the rest of the presentation? What's his name? Steven is his name and he's an information warfare officer just by the way, not an EDO. You knew. No, I did not plant him. That would be in violation of that attribute of integrity the scene I was talking about. Thank you very much. So when did I fall into this thought process? Okay, so the World Wide Web was born in 1994 and I'm in Leavenworth and I'm getting my first computer and I order it and it comes in a box with cow markings I don't know what that was about and I put the thing together and I set it up and it doesn't work. But there's lucky for me a 1-800 number and it's a guy in India which tells you how long ago it was and all he had no issues about telling me he was in India. So we're trying to get my computer to work and he says finally, well, let me take control of your computer. So as Steven said, I'm in Leavenworth. He's in India and all of a sudden two points across continents meet. At the speed of light this tech is fixing my computer and I fell into the fourth dimension and it was eye-opening for me that there could be effects from two continents away in Kansas. And that's true today. The internet's only matured and we can have effects at the speed of light. And so what's going to happen in these domains is we're not only going to fight in the physical domain surface up surface in air at our normal human being speed but we'll have to fight in the cyber domain at the speed of light simultaneously. And that is our challenge. But we are up to it as surface warfare officers. Next slide. So the question is, where have we been operating and have these domains actually been contested? And this is a great discussion. Have we really been green and had freedom of maneuver in all of these domains and dimensionalities over the past 15 years? Or has it just been our land friends who've been dealing with a contested environment? Well, when you think about it you can have effects from one domain into another. And so we are going to have to keep that in mind as the world matures. Next slide. And so what is contested and what will be contested in the future? Next slide. And what will it mean for us if we're contested in one domain and not contested in another? Do we reach out with our dimensionality and try and get to all domain access? Sufficient freedom of maneuver working from one domain to another. And that is probably how we're going to win the next fight. We're going to have to be cognizant as war fighters of all the domains in the dimensionality. Next slide. And someday our path to success might be through just one domain working and achieving volume of fires in another domain. That's the war fighting world we've moved into. Next slide. And so Admiral Rodin's been taking us on this path of distributed lethality where every, every ship is a shooter. And it's not about massing platforms. It's about massing the fires. Next slide. And so when you think about the dimensionality of all of this that's how we win the next fight. That we think about when and where the domain is contested and we can access one domain from another by synchronizing, integrating those fires. And so what we're talking about with distributed lethality it's not that just every ship is a shooter but everyone, every platform and every domain has an ability to have offensive capability. And then it will be the war fighting leadership who's going to have battle space awareness, command and control ability and figure out how to bring those fires together to an effective decisive win. And it's a big thought. It's an important thought. And it means that how we look at all of our platforms is going to have to change. That everyone is going to have to have offensive capability. And then it's the synchronization of those forces that's going to be different in the future. It's exciting. But it is a, it is a wonderful path to victory as far as I'm concerned. Next slide. So Farragut, after the battle of Mobile Bay writes this great letter to Secretary Wells, Secretary of the Navy, and he says, you know, we have this natural fear of devastation and torpedoes are among the top and it is really the discipline that we provide our sailors that gives them the endurance to overcome something like that great natural fear. He's right. We as a community have that discipline and there's a lot that could create natural fears for us in the future. This thought of fourth dimensional war fighting, this belief that we're going to have to, we're going to have to deal with contested environments as compared to what we've been living with today. But it is our discipline and our leadership that will get us through to creating a new way of fighting and really understanding how we're fighting and lead us to victory.