 For more videos on people's struggles, please subscribe to our YouTube channel. Hello and welcome to People's Dispatch. Today, we're joined by a very special guest, Dr. Parthi Elfad, who is the Secretary of the Information Bureau of the Sudanese Communist Party. As we know, in Sudan, has been seeing a revolution over the past two years. The people rose up towards the end of 2018 against the dictator Omar al-Bashir. They managed to overthrow him. Even after overthrowing him, the military junta tried to retain power. The people have been continuously fighting against it. And the Sudanese Communist Party has been in the forefront of these struggles. So today, we are joined by Dr. Parthi, who himself, he was imprisoned during the protests as part of the Sudanese Revolution as well. Thank you so much for joining us. Dr. Parthi, the first question I wanted to ask you was regarding the Sudanese Revolution itself. It's been over two years now. How do you evaluate the progress of these popular movements? What have been the achievements and what are the challenges right now? The main problem as far as the present situation in the Sudan after nearly two years since the beginning of the mass uprising in the country on the 12th of December, 2018, is that since the mass demonstrations and protest actions took place without a central leadership in the sense that at that time, there was only the forces of consensus who made a bold step in calling for mass action against the regime. Other forces especially groups around Sudan appeared, Sudan cold, sorry, were very hesitant at the beginning. Especially the Umma Party, the largest party within the Sudan whole thought that the mass uprising was not as matured and would not lead to nowhere. And they were especially late Sadigal Mahdi was negotiating with the regime towards the end of 2018, beginning of even 2019. However, about the Umma Party supporting the election of President Terbashir in 2020. However, the mass uprising took them by surprise and they tried to join the mass action and they jumped at the last hugot of that mass action. And on the 19th of January, 2019, the Sudan cold people joined hands with the National Consensus Forces and they formed the Freedom and Change Organization and they signed a minimum program which is supposed to be the program for the transitional period. What was clear from the very beginning that differences between the different political forces existed in the sense that some, while they agreed on the minimum program, however, that there were two points which were not very clear at the beginning. Where is what is the direction of the mass movement? Whether it is a movement to remove the regime, to remove the regime, to overthrow the regime, to dismantle the regime and to liquidate the regime, which was mentioned very clearly in the document. Others had their own interpretation to that, especially the Umma Party, the Sudan Congress Party and some of the so-called rebel groups who thought that the main thing is the removal of the ultra-Islamic forces and not the whole regime. And they were ready from the very beginning to accommodate some of these forces within the opposition, which was refused by the SCP and its allies, especially the professional allies. Here comes the main question. From the very beginning, it was established that the forces for freedom and gain would stand on for a complete civil authority, a complete civil power and no sharing power with the military, which some of the other forces were very hesitant about. So the issue of differences, you might call it that way, or treason started from the very beginning, even before the overthrow of the head of the state, or the removal of the head of the state. In the second phase, on the 11th of April 2019, when the security committee of the regime removed over El Bashir, some of these forces thought that this is the end of it for them. While others, like the SCP, were demanding a complete go-forward and that the whole power should fall in the hands of the forces of freedom and gain, or those forces who are ready to take it. However, here was a problem, because even within the, let's say, the radical forces, there was no plan B which stipulates how they can raise power from the military or from the regime, previous regime. Here the main point of contention was how and where and what time the people's authority can be declared. On this matter, because of the absence of a clear-cut plan to range power, the hesitancy started to appear within the ranks of the opposition, and not a single force, including the SCP, was ready at that time to take the step towards forcing the hands of the military to surrender power. And the main thing was through the sit-in by, I think, around hundreds of thousands of people in front of the headquarters of the army, they thought that this is the main weapon through which they can range power from the military. And they were calling men's rule and they are calling for the army to take the side of the demonstrators. However, the main problem here, there was no single force, I mean, or a group of officers within the army who were ready at that time to side with the protesting masses. And the grip of the Security Committee of the previous regime was so strong on the army that the only way out for these forces within the opposition was to negotiate with them about the surrender of power. And here came the interventions from the international community, the United States, the Troika, and they used the African Union, especially the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, to act as mediators between the civilians and the military. Here, the position of the SCP was very clear. Negotiation with the military was only on handing power to the civilians, nothing more, nothing less. And here, there was, at that moment, groups within the freedom and gain forces started to facilitate and to go back on their work and on their commitment about this main demand of full and complete civilian authority or complete civilian power. And I think this is the point where betrayal of the revolution started. Unfortunately, during that time, the pressure on the whole organization of the opposition was so great to the extent that and it was a bit fragmented. So the pressure from outside about a negotiated settlement or a partnership between the civilian and the military had gained certain ground. But what we want to say very clearly, that this pressure would not have resulted in the partnership or this project would not have been accepted unless within the opposition there were forces who were ready to accept such a compromise or such a betrayal. It depends how you look at it. And from that point, we came to discover the SCP, sorry, came to discover that the alliance itself is based on idea of blocks, block. So the, for example, the forces of natural process are represented in the freedom and change coordinating committee as a block. And this block where it has five, it has five representatives, but they act as a block, not as independent political parties within the coordinating committee. And I think and we think, sorry, this is this was one of the mistakes which we accepted at that time, which has led to diminishing the independent role of the Sudanese communist party within the alliance. And so we were forced to accept the beginning, the consensus of the other with the other four who were representing the consensus forces. So this is the second shortcoming at that time. And because of that, what we, the program of the transitional period was never ever even started to be implemented. So, for example, the civilian government was formed, yes, through by certain proposals coming from the forces for change and freedom and change. But the final where was not with the forces of freedom and change. But between at that time, the Prime Minister Hamdok and the sovereignty council or at that time, the transitional military council. So the betrayal, the compromise which appeared at that time, it started to really abort the main demands of the revolution, freedom, peace and justice. And from that time, we find that the forces which were educating the soft landing, which in another way mean that the soft landing that to keep the basis of the previous regime, which adding new social forces to enlarge its basis so that it can continue to defend the interests of the parasitic bourgeois as well as foreign capital. And this is how the revolution was betrayed. However, due to the, let us say, the success achieved by these forces and new situation developed. Instead of going straight to implement the program, the hesitation created the situation of what we call a revolution, I mean a fluid situation whereby there was internal struggle between two forces, one going for the continuation of the revolution, one going for at least if not aborting the whole thing, keeping it at the standstill. And this situation was covered by the long period for negotiation to Paris, draft the two main documents, the political document and the constitutional document, then the establishment of the civilian government, the compromise that led to the military having the two ministers of defense and interior, then that the numbers within the sovereignty council to be 5-5 but with the practice that started since the 11th of April, the military started because they were the main organized force. They mean they since then they started to display their control over the state, the decisions and Al-Burhan head of the military council acted as a real head of state. And from that time I think the deterioration and attempts to stop the revolution achieved certain success. This is how we see it. So the ends of the revolution were practically through the palace coup on the 11th of April, through the intervention of the international community and the regional forces, especially the EU and the prime minister of Ethiopia, who played a real role in convincing the hesitant forces within the opposition, they managed to create a force to succumbing to the implementation of the soft landing. And this is what we are living right now. Right, absolutely. In continuation with what you were just saying right now, over time the Sudanese Communist Party has also withdrawn from the declaration of freedom of change forces as well. It has withdrawn from this coalition. It has also what do you call had very strong differences with some of its other coalition partners in the national consensus forces also. So could you explain the reason why the party decided to withdraw from the freedom and change coalition? Okay, as I have stated earlier that the idea of losing our independence within the so-called organization of block really curtailed the independence position of the party within the alliance, which goes against our main principle that while we are part of an religion or a broad front, we should maintain all the time our independence within the alliance as well as outside the alliance. Because our main slogan is at least to reflect what is going inside the negotiating room to the masses. And this is where a second mistake was committed. So we were pressed by the alliance and it seems at that time the leadership was so keen in maintaining the alliance against, let us say the military, that we succumbed to this pressure in keeping within the alliance and losing the independence of the party. We made a lot of effort on this, our partners, especially within the national consensus forces, about our position, about the importance of really seeking to the idea of civil power and curtailing the influence of the military as well as the interests coming from the regional forces, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who started playing havoc with the alliance, inviting delegations, bringing delegations in and outside. So we tried as much as we could to maintain the alliance, to keep the alliance intact. But when we discovered that the alliance itself is being manipulated by forces from outside and inside, this is the point we started to act alone. And there was no chance for us to, for example, that we can withdraw from the freedom and change organization without withdrawing from the bloc, to which we are represented. And this is what had happened. And this is why it happened. It happened because we discovered that being inside this alliance, our role is kept second. That this, I mean, there is a certain crystallization of forces which was taking place till October or November last year, that a lot of forces, especially the, we were speaking, for example, of enlarging the forces for freedom and change on a horizontal basis, allowing, for example, the resistance committee, committees to join the alliance. Speaking about the new committees, which were created as the steering committees to establish the trade union organization, to allow workers' organizations inside. Other forces blocked this idea of enlarging the alliance on a horizontal level. On its side, the Ummah party, the Sudan Congress, and even the Arab nationalists agreed together to establish a kind of a vertical leadership which would tie the hands of the parties inside the alliance, rather than give this party more independence and more space to speak and seek for these others. All these issues combined together has led to the party from the two organizations. Absolutely. Right. And in this context, a couple of major developments are going to happen this month. One is the two important pillars of the new system, that is the sovereignty council and the cabinet are going to be reshuffled. And this is after the talks with the various rebel groups that had been taking place over the past few months. So could you maybe talk about what is the kind of shape that this new governing, both the cabinet and the sovereignty council will take. And there have been reports that some of these armed groups are collaborating with the establishment in a much more detailed level. So how do you see this taking shape? Anyway, what is happening now is that, I mean, something which is missing even in the question, because the development has led to the establishment now of what they call the partners council for the transitional period. This council is actually a super power organization. It is above the sovereignty council, above the cabinet and above even if the legislative body is established. This is, in reality, this is the organ of power today, whereby there is the military council that the so-called representatives of the rebel groups and two or three from what remains from the freedom and change organization. So what they are speaking now about forming a government within the force of February or even establishing the legislative body by the 25th of February. I don't think this, first of all, this is a clear violation of the constitutional document which was adopted in the period after the overthrow of the ship. And they are going with, I mean, this new alliance between the military in the sovereignty council, the representative of the so-called revolutionary front of the rebel groups plus three political parties. This is the, the buses, the buses mainly, the Sudan Congress and the National Union. These three parties are the real parties and having this new alliance today which is proposing these new steps to establish a cabinet and so on and so forth. So our position that this is now, they are trying to use the quota principle to distribute offices of the cabinet ministers among themselves to add some people to the sovereignty council, maybe to appoint new governance for the different provinces and so on and so forth away from the main trend within the street because there is a real contradiction existing now in the Sudan between the forces who are seeking a radical change in the country and are mainly represented within the committees, the resistance committees and the trade union, the professional alliance. I mean, these are the forces which are today fighting against these proposals of post of February and so on. So I don't envision because they have their own plan which means they are changing everything which was adopted earlier within the constitutional document and the political document to suit the new alliance and in a sense that means a real betrayal of the revolution. That's why today, for example, we are calling for a change in power that we are fighting to establish a broad front to change the balance of forces first and second, really to establish a government which represents the aspiration of the people. We don't expect the formation of any government or sovereignty council which they will add two or three from the rebel group and they will change some of the civilians and so on. We really expect the policies being implemented in the country.