 Hello, my name is Laki Vingas, I'm from Turkey. I would like to ask the Chinese delegation, just because they've been talking about their participation in the party meeting, what's going to be the contribution of the wealth, because China is becoming such a strong economy, to the social needs of the rest of the world, if it's been one of the major players in contributing to the social needs of the rest of the world? My name is Sim Sung-joon, former Korean ambassador. Well, this year, China and Korea marked 25th anniversary of their normalization. But as you know, because of the conflict over the introduction of the THAAD system, by the US military, not by my country, on the Korean soil, well, I mean, the celebration was contracted drastically, so we didn't have many events or celebrations we should have otherwise. This Tuesday, but Seoul and Beijing made a joint announcement to bring the THAAD conflict or dispute to an end and to move forward to normalize their strained relations. This 11th hour agreement made prior to the arrival of US president was welcomed by the seriously affected Korean business community, but made some ripples in the Korean political sector and also in Washington as well. Opposition party and the conservative media in Korea were critical of the deal, insisting that the Korean government made too much, I mean, unnecessary concessions or commitments of so-called three knows. No more THAAD introduction, no trilateral security alliance among US, Japan and South Korea. No Korea's participation in the US-led MD. As Korea and Chinese governments did not disclose the whole process of negotiations for working out this agreement, I was very surprised and the agreement came out out of blue at this time, at this particular time. Well, my question, what was the background? I'd like to put this question to the Chinese panelists. Well, what was the background which drove the Chinese authorities to make this agreement meant at this particular time? And maybe I'd like to hear from Doug Paul, my longtime friend. What did you hear from Washington about this agreement? Although I read National Security Advisor, McMaster welcomed this joint agreement. Thank you. So many questions regarding China. Some I can answer, some I couldn't answer. Regarding the some issue, economic issue, maybe I can answer now. If I miss something, other people can supplement. First of all, about free trade zone in Shanghai, I guess you mentioned. That's ideal initiate, I guess, three, four years ago after the new administration. I recall that time, Premier Li Kejian went to Shanghai. I discuss, they decide to set up a free trade zone in Shanghai first. One thing probably we have to keep in mind, the way of Chinese government to carry some policy, usually they want to do experiment first. That's the tradition. I'm not going to say right or wrong, but that's the tradition. Just like you look back almost 40 years ago, Deng Xiaoping pick up a sentence or another full city as a special zone. But the interesting why this time choose Shanghai as an experiment, rather than other place. That's something I guess interesting. Probably you don't know Deng Xiaoping once made such kind of remark. He said, we made a mistake. We didn't choose Shanghai as an experiment rather than a sentence. Why he say that? That time Chinese government have no idea the experiment will be success or not. If experiment in Shanghai failed, the total economy of China will be collapsed. Because at that time, I guess Shanghai contribute one sixth of physical revenue to central government. So that example also indicate now Chinese government have more confidence they chose Shanghai. They think they can be successful. That's one thing. Another thing is that it's difference between free trade zone in Shanghai and free trade zone in other country. Usually free trade zone just wanted to facilitate the trade. But in Shanghai free trade zone, they also put something in finance in Taiwan. So in past three, four years, they tried to do something like they call capital pool for a multinational company. You can transform money in, out freely. Also, they said something for example make investment for Chinese company or any company. Headquarter in free trade zone can make an overseas investment under 100 million U.S. dollars without approving advance. Such kind of things they have already done. So later on central government decided to promote that to now 11 place including Guangzhou, also even some inland city. Now in the National Congress Xi Jinping mentioned based on that they asked try to explore the possibility. As I say free trade pot. That mean more freely, more let goes in and out. Of course the detail have to be made later on. They just say we wanted to move to this direction. The detail we don't know. They some government have already including Shanghai or other city in Zhejiang. They have already some ideas they propose to present to central government. The detail we don't know. For SOE, yes, that's something you made a very good question. I mentioned in my presentation, I briefly mentioned SOE reform. Currently what we see is try to do we call mixed shareholder company. That mean some SOE sold a part of share to private company. Of course it cannot be say privatization because in some case they still government own shareholder. In some case not. For example, I sit in one listing company as an independent director. One company originally Shanghai government own large share. I guess couple years after the 18th National Congress the Shanghai government decide sell the government share to private company. The private company own large share now. That's one case. Of course another communication company is very large. I guess third largest they sell some share to private company like Alibaba these kind of big things they try to get in. Maybe they expect some chemistry. They can maybe using some high technology or big data. We don't know the results. I have to admit they do have some contradiction. These kind of things when you mention more open door policy. But I don't know the detail. Maybe something can be resolved later on. Another thing regarding the contribution to the social needs of a word. I don't mean I don't understand what social needs the gentleman raised the question. I guess probably central committee party try to provide some alternative choice. Say hey here is China. We do something maybe different from advanced country. So far we are successful. I don't know whether at the end. What's the result for these kind of things. I'm not quite sure for that anything. Okay. Thank you. Maybe any further question. So I see none. So now it's high time for us to respond. To the question which I raised. And then the question you know raised among ourselves among panelists. Oh I'm sorry. Yeah. Okay. Sorry. I forgot it. No Chinese. And yes Chinese first. Then maybe. Professor. Yeah first. No please. Actually I myself don't know why this time. The timing. But I guess both sides. Have realized after repeated interactions. The other side cannot give up. And also the cost of confrontation is increasing to the extent that neither side think it's worthwhile to continue. So I think it's time to deal with this issue. Or to settle this issue. So both sides made some concessions in a way. The Chinese basically accept that the existing that systems can stay. Whereas the South South Korean government agrees that or promises that it would not increase. It will not let more system be installed on top of these systems. So some kind of agreement has been reached in order to overcome this and move the relationship forward. I think it's a sensible approach. And both sides have some kind of face saving arrangement. I understand that the conservatives think on both sides probably think that their government gives up too much. But I think it's good for both countries. Thank you. Thank you. I'm not the only person in this room who has for more than a year and a half criticized the Chinese government for pursuing what were manifestly counterproductive efforts to intimidate South Korea into giving up the THAAD system. You can only look at the popular polls in South Korea and realize that China had gone from enjoying tremendous public support through its implicit support for North Korea by criticism of THAAD defenses against North Korean capabilities. China was systematically alienating the people of South Korea first and secondly applying economic sanctions against Korean businesses that further alienated the people. Now this my understanding is this arises from a difference in China over how to deal with North Korea and South Korea and some Chinese have been saying China needs to rebalance its approach and others are saying no the blood is thick with North Korea and the threat from THAAD to the Chinese own missile testing and strategic weapons systems was so great that China needed to launch all-out opposition. The last point has been viciated by this agreement because THAAD will continue even after the agreement. So if China's main concern was THAAD radars reading the missile launches obviously that was not that was a false concern or it's concerned for some reason has gone away. I would tend to contextualize this plainly more sensible position by China and I'll reserve my position on the South Korean side of this judgment for a moment. The contextualization is that in 2013-2014 Xi Jinping launched very intense reconsiderations of Chinese relationships with its neighbors. They had a thing called the Peripheral Policy Conference in late 2013 and a Foreign Policy Work Conference in 2014. And if you had just gone from the words in the statements and speeches at the conferences you would conclude that China realized that the competition for its future security is on the periphery of China. If the United States and other countries are concerned about Chinese behavior, they have a natural coalition of 14 land neighbors of China and three maritime neighbors all of whom do not want to be part of the Chinese empire, do not want to be allies of China, but want to enjoy the trade and other benefits that come from being a neighbor of a growing economy like China does. And so they have very ambivalent views. These are useful to the West should China turn ugly in its behavior towards us or its neighbors because this would naturally form a coalition to resist Chinese assertiveness. On the other hand, if China can go in and persuade these countries that the balance of benefit is in good relations with China, building a coalition against China under some circumstances would be harder to do. So I think strategically it's wise for China to have sought to improve relations or normalize relations with all of its neighbors. But after the 2013 and 2014 conferences history went a different direction and China was in deep friction with Japan, Korea, Vietnam, India and maybe the exception was Russia in that period. It strikes me as eminently sensible to conclude that now that Xi Jinping has reduced his internal opposition and consolidated his power, he would want to return to a policy of trying to mollify and win over as much of the neighborhood as he can and do this by very quickly after the 19th party congress, not just having an agreement on THAAD with the ROK government, but having indications of an early summit in Japan next year and working out an agreement with the Vietnamese just two days ago to manage their South China Sea disputes. So I see maybe the fire was lighted under this process by Trump's impending visit, but I see bigger forces at work beyond that and they may reinforce each other. Now whether the ROK made a great deal, my years are open, I'd like to hear. One of the problems that I've, I was in Tokyo until a couple days ago and talking to senior people in the Japanese government and none of them had been briefed on what was going on. Americans had not been briefed on what's going on and the US has not been briefing them on what the US plans are for regional security. There's been an insufficient dialogue among allies and friends to give us a sense of the value of these developments, but I think they're really eye-catching developments and bear close watching. I added some personal observation on the issue. I'm not expert on this area, but as average Chinese people, I paid attention on the relation with South Korea. Probably President Pan knows that we privately talked a couple of times on previous situation between South Korea and China. I don't feel happy with that previous situation. Also, in some way, what the Chinese government or part of that, what they are doing not perfect in many ways, why they pick some South Korea company operating in China. I don't think any reason to do that. But if I look forward, the results of negotiation, I guess, is positive. At least not both sides, even including US or Japan, can concentrate to deal with North Korea nuclear issue. Otherwise, it's very hard. Each side has a suspicion of what's the motivation for the proposal or whatever on the other side. So I look at the positive. Another thing that I will add, people here always say is a learning curve. I guess in some way, Chinese leaders also are under learning curve. At the beginning, Xi took over, deal with Diao Yudong, the Asia. Maybe he is very strong. Now it's kind of a learn more experience. I guess maybe we should have a kind of open position to consider that. As for the presentation of Japanese panelists, you have a very good summarized two-track strategy of Japanese to deal with China. Also, as an average Chinese people, I read the news. I don't understand. I do feel fundamental contradiction, these two tracks. On the one hand, you openly, publicly say, we want to set Asia security diamond, openly want US, India, Australia get together, contain China. On the other hand, you say, hey, we want to update the level of relation with China. Unless Chinese leaders are really stupid, otherwise how they can do that? You probably do that on the table, fine. You openly, publicly. On the one hand, on the other hand, hey, we want a good relation with you. I don't understand. How you can work that way? No, we can work that way. That's, I'm not professional international relation, I just, but I read, I'm very interesting on these issues. So that's my comment. I'd like to invite Minister Kope for your some additional comment on the future of the Silk Road project. There are many, not many, but some counter-argument on the feasibility of the one belt, one note present, because it entails huge financial resource and there's some security issues involved in, then how we could secure sustainable income business model. So maybe you might have some, your comment. Well, first of all, we need a strategic vision. We have it. There is a framework and we, all of us know exactly what can be our own road map in order to align the interests of everybody. So now the second step, as you were saying, is to see if it's financially sustainable. There are many interrogations, of course, and it wouldn't be serious to say today that we have all the answers. But by having a little experience about the past, we know that growth generates growth, activity generates activity. And so if we are able to develop partnerships to set the question of protectionism and reciprocity and trade, I think we have some opportunities to develop activity. On the question of the way we can financially sustain this project, we know that we need private funds. It's not possible to imagine only public funds when we know, all of us, the high level of public debt and the fact that it's not possible. But we have to use public funds as leverage. It's the only way we can implement some incentives for the private project. When you see, for instance, the success of the Juncker plan for the European investment, you can imagine that we can develop this kind of opportunities in the whole layout of the Silk Road. But of course we have lots to do and I think this will be the next step. But my opinion is that Europeans today can bring their own contribution to it. Can I invite Professor Hosea for any comment? Yes. Thank you very much. I'd like to combine a question by Ambassador Park and also a question by Professor Xiao about Japanese intention to create some sort of regional cooperation. One thing is that, well, this is not, I think, a Japanese invention. I think that in the beginning, President Xi Jinping said that, reportedly said that in his summit meeting with President Obama that the Pacific Ocean is large enough to be divided by two great powers, the United States and China. And basically I think that the BLI, the One Belt Road initiative, is trying to avoid confrontation with the United States by marching westwards, not eastwards. If China is marching westwards, of course there are Japan and South Korea and the United States. Yes, eastwards. But if China is marching westwards, we can see a sort of a power vacuum because the United States is retreating from Afghanistan and Central Asia. That's why if we see the power vacuum after the dissolve of the dissolution of the dissolve of the Soviet Union, of course Russian influence has been declined. That's why it's much safer, I think, for China to expand in that direction rather than to the direction where Japan and South Korea are there and American security commitments are there. So in a sense I think that it is a quite wise strategy for China to try to expand in the direction and try to coexist in the Pacific Ocean together with the United States. And also one more thing is that that initiative, Prime Minister Abe's regional vision was originally criticized by Chinese officials. That's why Prime Minister Abe after that stopped talking about the vision. But recently in the last one year or so, both Indian officials and experts and Australian officials and experts are much more interested in promoting this idea because they fear more assertive Chinese foreign policy and that they fear the future of American commitment in this region to try to involve the United States in this region. I think that the two countries, Australia, to allies, security allies of the United States, Australia, India, trying to ask Japanese government to promote once again this idea. So I think that this does not contradict to the recent Chinese policy, which means that China is expanding westward. But at the same time in the longer term, I think that having seen the recent speech by President Xi Jinping, China is in the long term trying to become the number one country, number one great power in the world. It means that there will be some vacuum in East Asia as well. Then there will be power vacuum after United States retreat in some way from the region in some way under President Trump. I think that China is more interested in expanding in that direction. In that way, I think that original one by one old initiative can expand in a longer term in the direction in East Asia as well. Then I think China would be trying to replace in some way American leadership role in this region. Have anything to add? Please. I think that contradictions are in the eye of the beholder. And I actually didn't see any contradiction in the presentation of Japanese policy except I don't like metaphors. And the idea of a diamond puts me off. But the idea of security cooperation among four countries that are natural. Now of the four modernizations of Deng Chaoping, number four was modernization of the PLA. China is by its own declaration an interpretation of history a peaceful nation. And why was the China modernizing the PLA? Well, the rationale was initially defensive. Although the most recent action which prompted that was an invasion of Vietnam in 1979. And that's a story of its own. But then China went beyond purely defensive weapons in the PLA and adopted weapons that can only be described as offensive. Now that is, but by global standards, PLA was way behind the times. So is that a contradiction? Well, in one respect, yes. And in the other respect, no. So these contradictions as I say are in the eyes of the beholder. And the question is how countries handle their various often sometimes conflict conflicting or partially conflicting objectives. So anyway, I didn't see the contradiction. But I and similarly, I had no problem with modernizing the PLA at least up to a certain point. It seems to have gone beyond that point in my judgment, given Chinese declaratory policy. We have three to five minutes. So I'd like to give some common question to Doug and Professor Jiajiguo. That is your comment on possibility and the feasibility of Henry Kissinger's grand bargaining ideas. Here and there, we could have some similar implication from China and the United States. So I think there will be no official position, but I'd like to ask your personal comment on these two issues. I have to say again what the issue is. Comment on the feasibility of Henry Kissinger's suggestion on the name of the grand bargaining. So the content is as follows. If North Korean nuclear issue has been resolved, then the U.S. could consider the withdrawal of the U.S. ground forces from Korea. That is big deal, you know, the contents. So maybe. So this is concerning the Korean peninsula. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But grand bargaining because it is, you know, there should be some great negotiation between South Korea, China and United States, not North Korea. I think a lot of what Kissinger stirred up in his discussion of the grand bargain. Well, first people think he's very close to Trump and therefore it might be consequential. But as he will tell you in private, I have no influence on that man. He can't pay attention to anything for 20 seconds, let alone make a policy. So I think that fear is misplaced. Secondly, I think Kissinger could have spent more time and he's always been bad at this, at considering what allies and friends would think about hearing ideas like this without first being consulted on that. The idea of passing Japan or passing Korea and China first has been a source of irritation among our friends and allies in the region for a long time because he tends to go leap over them and go right to China where power resides. Having said that, now that Xi Jinping is through a point of transition with a great deal more authority and therefore the ability to put aside pesky, minor arguments and look at the big picture, I think the US should be proposing big ideas which first must be carefully vetted with our allies on how we can respect each other's concerns. It's entirely theoretically possible, whether materially possible it means to be tested, that the US could offer different kinds of radars to support effective THAAD defenses against North Korea. Or at another level of development, if North Korea no longer has a threatening capability, then the United States and South Korea might agree that the US footprint in South Korea can be very different or our patterns of exercises could be considerably changed. Downsized, narrowed, reducing tensions generally in the region. That's what I think of as that kind of grand bargain. But implicit in the conversation with China or North Korea or both would be an understanding that in the absence of progress on those threats to South Korea and the United States that we have every right and intention to do the things I outlined in my opening remarks, which is more missiles, more nuclear weapons and other kinds of capabilities to defend ourselves legitimately against the North Korean threat. I think it's conceivable that North Korea gives up nuclear weapons then the US government may think about withdrawing American troops from South Korea. But not completely. Probably it would withdraw most of the American forces from South Korea. Actually at the end of the Cold War, the idea was seriously entertained. The reason that it would leave a few Americans in South Korea after the threat is gone is the need to maintain, you know, stationing troops in Japan. If the US completely withdraws forces from South Korea, then the Japanese may demand the US to leave too. American soldiers to leave too. That would become a big problem, you know. So I think there is a kind of political interaction there. So I think probably the US can make the deal but then with some kind of a variation to make sure that it's the probably China probably would not demand to the extent. I mean complete withdrawal either considering the utility of US troops stationed in Japan as far as China is concerned. So I don't know. I think there are nuanced discussions to be held to sort out this kind of issue. I'm like Xiao. I'm an economist and I just am on the fringes of these areas but I try to pay attention. I found the Chinese argument against THAAD with focus on the radars simply baffling. We have satellites these days and we heard at this meeting about the new European Galileo and how many satellites are going to be up and the resolution that they provide, which is a square meter, which is just amazing actually but that's been the evolution of technology from satellites and I don't understand what this must get into highly sensitive issues which I not qualified to understand but I don't understand what the radar could produce that satellites these days, not 20 years ago but these days can produce. So my interpretation of the Chinese action given that view which may be incorrect was that this was a deliberate provocation by the Chinese government to South Korea and then the question is why would they do that and I've seen them do that with respect to Japan from time to time but that has an entirely different history but again to me this heavy emphasis both to the U.S. and especially to South Korea on the compromising of Chinese security by the radar, I just found baffling with today's technology, leave aside the technology the next 10 years, just found it baffling and so maybe there's something I don't know but there may be something that the PLA also doesn't know that they should know. Okay actually some Chinese experts argue that you know the THAT radar system can do much more than the satellites in terms of identifying the location of Chinese intercontinental missiles, the so-called strategic assets. So that's their argument and then later on you know there are different arguments to to bolster the position on that that is the THAT system could be used as a way to integrate the South Korea into this theater missile defense on the part of the U.S. so the THAT system may be the way to I mean deploying the THAT system may be a way to integrate the South Korea to get South Korea into this theater missile defense arrangement on the part of the U.S. and so this is the so-called theater missile defense is not against, you know the Chinese have always believed that it's not just against North Korea, it's against China, the primary purpose is against China. So later on the Chinese were saying that the THAT you know when the Americans and South Koreans wanted to come to Beijing to explain to the Chinese why the THAT system radar does not pose a serious threat to China's limited strategic capabilities to destabilize the relationship, the Chinese rejected saying that this is a this is no longer a technical issue, it's a strategic issue. So it was against this contest but of course it's the probably the reality is even more complicated. I'm not going to say that. We may need a whole night for to complete this discussion so it's high time for me to end this discussion on China. Maybe if I just one was one sentence you know the closing remarks will be as follows. Maybe we hope I mean international community expect China will play more responsible and more constructive leading role you know in shaping new world in to achieve peace and prosperity. So that is our conclusion. Thanks so much.